A source in Moscow’s Foreign Ministry was quoted by the news service on April 11 as saying: “We express sincere regrets over the escalation of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran because we believe these two large Muslim countries are very influential in the region, on the global arena and on the oil market”.
According to the diplomat, Moscow has friendly ties both with Tehran and Riyadh, and “is willing to play, if necessary, a role as a mediator in the settlement of existing and emerging discords between these two countries”.
One month later, Russia offered to arm the Libyan army when the restrictions on arms sales to Libya are eased. President Putin had a long telephone conversation with Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi during which the two leaders discussed in some detail the situation in Libya.
It is true that the Arab Spring marked a turning point in Russia’s Middle East strategy. An increasing Russian pushback against what it perceives as a systematic move by the West to topple its regional allies has culminated in Russia’s bold military intervention in Syria in 2015 to protect one of its last regional friends.
The importance of the Moscow Foreign Ministry’s offer of mediation between the GCC and Iran is not in its potential effect. It is clear that the offer does not have wings to help it take off. Rather, it is in the message Moscow wanted to send with this offer. And the message is clear: We wish to remain relevant. But can he remain relevant?
The structural problems in President Putin’s Middle East strategy were obvious from the beginning when Moscow tried to play a more assertive role in the region. First, it does not have the muscles for the heavy lifting required. Second, it is mobilizing against a background of long absence of ties with major players. Third, the nature of the regional crisis is such as to leave little room for playing both sides of the regional rift.
There was a better chance for Moscow to build some forward bridges last year. A year ago, the Saudi King Salman was invited to visit Moscow. The visit was expected to happen in August, as Sergei Lavrov said. “The conversation regarding the situation in the Middle East, began in Saint Petersburg [at the SPIEF-2015 economic forum] with the Crown Prince and continued in Doha and opened the possibility for more detailed discussions,” Lavrov said during the Saudi Foreign Minister’s August 11 visit to Moscow. A source in the Russian Defense Ministry told Russian media outlets that the King will come to Moscow. According to the source, the Saudi and Jordanian kings will visit the MAKS-2015 air show and defense expo on its opening day, August 25, together with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
During preparations for the visit, which did not happen, it became obvious that President Putin’s policy on Syria was non-negotiable. It was clear then that the Saudis were offering certain “incentives” to Putin in areas like arms deals and oil policy, but the Russian President declined the offer in return for a reasonable understanding on Syria. The same Russian reluctance was reported in previous visits to Moscow of high-level Saudi officials, including Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman.
Moscow was then, as it is now, faced with a stark choice: Either reach a reasonable understanding with the Saudis and anger Tehran, or decline the Saudi offers. There is no magic way to remain on friendly terms with both sides when they are at war. It is indeed a challenge to keep one foot on opposing sides of the rift when the two sides are drifting away from each other.
Russia’s naïve initiative of forming a regional coalition to fight ISIS was a manifestation of the poverty of Russian tactics for reducing the gap. The recent offer of mediation is yet another naïve attempt to remedy the failure of the previous naïve proposition.
In a reflection of Moscow’s calculus last year, many Russian experts were predicting an imminent crisis in Saudi-American ties. “For the Saudis, the Russian connection is part of a general diversification of their foreign policy away from overreliance on the United States,” wrote Carnegie’s Dmitry Trenin, citing stable oil prices as a shared interest of Russia and Saudi Arabia.
In addition to this expected drive towards diversification, Moscow seems to have overestimated the potential strategic gains of its alliance with Assad and Tehran. Obviously, President Putin was planning on having his cake and eating it too, and waiting for the favorable moment to make his move.
President Putin’s main mistake is that he expected from Iran and Syria much more than they are ready to offer. He now looks like an investor who has lost out and had to double down to reduce his losses. His air force reluctantly participated in bombing civilians around Aleppo last month in spite of his commitment to the “cessation of hostilities” deal. To his contacts in Washington, he seems to be having a real difficulty in keeping his commitments and satisfying his allies, who insist on doing what they want, regardless of Moscow’s limits and agenda.
At this moment, the Russian President would appear to be outmaneuvered by the Iranians. Yet, he cannot pull out or else he will lose all. The Russian military effort to enable Assad and Iran’s militias in Syria to control the north of the country could not even get them to control Aleppo, let alone Idlib. It was expected that by that time, the Iranians would be putting up pictures of Khomeini and Khamenei in all of Aleppo province, east and west, and potentially in Idlib city as well. Instead, the IRGC had to evacuate a record number of dead soldiers in boxes from Khan Toman. The political process to find a solution, on which Putin counted to regain his status in the world as both a warrior and a peacemaker, is going nowhere. While Putin is not focused on keeping Assad in power, Tehran considers removing him a red line. Assad is the one person Iran trusts to keep its bridge to the Eastern Mediterranean opened.
Putin may end up empty-handed in Syria. His original bet was to bolster Assad, preserve his interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, render Tehran a service, and turn into a broker during the diplomatic effort to reach a political solution there. Assad’s combat positions in the civil war improved only marginally, Iran is licking its wounds and replacing an increasing number of its IRGC fighters with militias from everywhere else, and there is no serious political process to give the Russian President the broker role he wished to play to gain relevance.
In both accounts, military action and diplomacy, the Russian move in Syria did not bring its perceived fruits to the Kremlin. Neither Iran nor Assad are doing what Moscow wants. Furthermore, last year’s window of opportunity to improve relations with the Gulf countries is long closed.
The end of the road for President Putin’s gambit in the Middle East is near. He still has an opportunity, however, to play a role in mediation between the Iranians and the GCC.
This mediation role should be based on the understanding that Iran should limit its external intervention and focus on building its economy. The GCC is ready to sign whatever commitment required from its members not to interfere in Iranian affairs. It simply does not. And it never said it would. Moreover, the GCC countries are ready to engage in investment in Iran the moment Tehran announces its verifiable withdrawal from regional countries. Arabs can take care of their own peacefully and constructively. Iran is not Arab.
Iran will never end its intervention without substantial pressure from whichever countries are willing to help. Moscow can play a constructive role in building an anti-terrorism coalition in the region, guaranteeing the security of the Gulf, and engaging all parties on normal trade and economic ties if it gets its allies in Tehran to behave exactly like any Arab Gulf country: No intervention in others’ affairs through proxies or directly.
This is how President Putin can be relevant in the Middle East. And this is how he can help lower the tension in the region.
mebriefing.com
