Yemeni forces backed by the United Arab Emirates have driven Al-Qaeda militants from a southern district that is the birthplace of President Abedrabbo Mansour Hadi, security sources said according to dailymail.co.uk.

Wadea is located in Abyan province, which for months was a no-go zone for pro-government troops and where Al-Qaeda fighters fled after a similar offensive in the neighbouring province of Shabwa last month.

Seven suspected Al-Qaeda members were arrested during the Wadea operation which began on Wednesday, including an alleged explosives expert known as Abu Abdallah, according to the sources.

Other sources said the jihadists had not put up a fierce resistance, but withdrew — a now familiar pattern for Al-Qaeda in Yemen.

“Most of the organisation’s leaders fled … and headed towards the nearby Muhafid district,” the sources said, referring to an Al-Qaeda stronghold on the edge of Abyan province.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, seen by the United States as the network’s most dangerous branch, has exploited years of conflict between the government and Huthi Shiite rebels to expand its presence in Yemen, particularly in southern provinces.

The UAE is a key component of the Saudi-led coalition which intervened in Yemen in 2015, when Hadi fled into exile as the rebels threatened to overrun his last stronghold.

Around 100 UAE troops have been killed in the conflict.

Iran has topped the world league table for money laundering and terror financing for the third consecutive year, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

It was followed by Afghanistan, Guinea-Bissau, Tajikistan and Laos in the annual rankings compiled by the Basel Institute on Governance, an independent anti-corruption group based in Switzerland. The three lowest ranked countries were Finland, Lithuania and Estonia.

In the list of 146 countries, Saudi Arabia ranked 93rd, which gives the Kingdom’s banking system a superior rating to that of Turkey in 43rd, Pakistan in 46th, China in 51st, Russia in 64th and India in 88th, and only marginally behind Japan in 98th.

“The Kingdom has a clean record as far as money laundering is concerned,” said Syed Ahmed Ziauddin, chief of the financial institutions and public sector at Bank Aljazira. “All financial institutions, including banks, have a high compliance rating within the framework of international regulations and guidelines issued by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority. The banks in the Kingdom have world-class technical platforms on a par with advanced countries.”

Marwan Jafri, another local banker, said: “Saudi banks are fully committed to fighting money laundering and combating terrorism financing by adopting and maintaining appropriate policies, systems and controls. But there are ample proofs in the public domain about the involvement of Iran in money laundering and terror financing.”

This is the sixth year in which the institute has compiled its rankings. Its report says the greatest improvements in the past year have been made by Sudan, Taiwan, and Bangladesh.

In South Asia, Afghanistan is the highest-risk country followed by Nepal, Sri Lanka and Pakistan.

In the latest sign that Tehran is seeking to expand its economic sphere of influence in Syria, the Iranian government on Tuesday signed several agreements with Damascus to restore Syria’s power grid and infrastructure. Although the Syrian war is far from over, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (I.R.G.C.) is already looking for financial rewards for its support to the embattled regime of Bashar al-Assad in the past six years. Since the seizure of the northern Syrian city of Aleppo in December, the Syrian government has granted I.R.G.C. companies lucrative contracts on a no-bidding basis. As in Lebanon, the I.R.G.C. is complementing its hard power mission with economic projects and other soft power strategies to consolidate its long-term presence and influence in Syria, like reported by mei.edu.

Repairing Syria’s power infrastructure 

According to Iranian and Syrian media, the contracts, “worth several hundreds of euros,” were signed during a meeting between Iran’s Acting Minister of Energy Sattar Mahmoudi with his Syrian counterpart Zahir Kharboutli in Tehran. “Most of these contracts are related to the reconstruction of electricity equipment, power plants and transmission lines so that we can provide better services to the Syrian clients,” Mahmoudi said after the meeting with the visiting Syrian delegation. The agreements include exporting five gas-fired power plants to Syria’s northwestern city of Aleppo. The Mapna Group, an Iranian enterprise with suspected ties to the I.R.G.C., will implement the 130-million-euro project.

In addition, the Syrian minister reportedly signed preliminary agreements with Mahmoudi on the restoration of Damascus’ main electricity station as well as power plants in the Syrian provinces of Homs and Deir Ezzor. The project to reconstruct the 90-megawatt plant in Deir Ezzor comes as the Syrian Army and Iranian-led forces are making steady advances to recapture the region from the Islamic State. Based on another memorandum of understanding, Syria will also import 540-megawatts of electricity from Iran to its Latakia Province. Speaking to reporters after the meeting, Mahmoudi stressed that Iran will play a significant role in Syria’s reconstruction and claimed that the Syrian government and people welcome Iran’s participation in the country’s recovery process.

I.R.G.C.’s financial rewards  

The Syrian government is heavily indebted to Tehran for its support as the I.R.G.C. and its regional proxies have played a significant role in Assad’s survival. It is therefore no surprise that the I.R.G.C. is now seeking financial dividends in return and Damascus obliges. During Prime Minister Imad Khamis’ visit to Tehran in January, the Iranian government signed several agreements with the Syrian delegation. One major contract to build a mobile phone network in Syria was awarded to the I.R.G.C.-affiliated Mobile Telecommunication Company of Iran – delivering Iran’s elite military force an additional source of revenue. The I.R.G.C. already controls much of Iran’s telecommunications sector, and building Syria’s mobile network will also provide the I.R.G.C. and its elite Quds Force with a valuable intelligence and surveillance tool.

It is worth noting that an Iranian conglomerate bidding for the same project in 2010 did not make it the final shortlist as it could not compete with France’s Orange S.A. and United Arab Emirate’s Etisalat Telecommunications Company.

Bilateral trade  

With the Syrian regime now in control of most of Syria’s population centers, Iranian exports to Syria are increasing. In 2010, prior to the start of Syrian conflict, the volume of annual trade between Iran and Syria had reached its peak of $545 million – with Syria’s exports to Iran accounting for about 30 percent. Bilateral trade began shrink significantly after the war broke out.

In April this year, however, Iran’s trade attaché at the embassy in Damascus, Ali Kazmeni, said annual trade between the two countries had surpassed one billion dollars – nearly double the amount of the pre-war period. He revealed that Tehran and Damascus plan to build two shipping lines to boost trade and expressed the hope that Iranian exports to Syria will increase further in the near future. “The Syrian markets are awash with merchandise from Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other Arab countries, whereas the Syrian people and government are keen to use Iranian goods and products,” he claimed.

Last month, when Syria opened the country’s first international trade fair in six years, Iran was the largest participant, with over 30 Iranian companies attending the event. On the sidelines of the event, the Iranian delegation told Syria’s Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade Mohammad Samer al-Khalil to assign a special envoy to arrange for the implementation of a free trade agreement between the two countries.

In the past one year, the Iranian government has also been encouraging the country’s businessmen and builders to purchase property in Shiite-majority neighborhoods of Damascus. The two countries have also taken steps to strengthen banking relations.

Soft Power Influence

While Iran’s hard power strategies and military role in Syria often make headlines, its soft power influence in Syria and the broader region is largely overlooked. After Sattar signed the latest agreements with his Syrian counterpart on Tuesday, he told reporters in Tehran that the Iranian presence in Syria is more than just about bilateral economic cooperation. “It signals an ideological, visionary, humanitarian and political message to the world,” he stressed.

The I.R.G.C. systematically uses its soft-power assets to complement its military strategy in the region. Through extensive soft-power efforts – including myriad construction projects, charity work, cultural and media activities, and religious (often sectarian) programs – the I.R.G.C. promotes its ideological, political and military agenda at the expense of the interests of the United States and regional Arab countries.

It is worth noting that Iran’s soft power tools are not benign, but are linked with Tehran’s broader expansionist agenda in the region. For example, the I.R.G.C. established the Iranian Committee for the Reconstruction of Lebanon (I.C.R.L.) after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war to rebuild Hezbollah-dominated regions in southern Lebanon; two years later, the United States Department of Treasury designated the I.C.R.L. as a terrorist entity because it “financed and facilitated” the activities of Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization. Hassan Shateri, a Quds Force commander, headed the I.C.R.L. under the pseudonym Hessam Khoshnevis from its inception until he was killed in Syria in February 2013. According to Hassan Hijazi, a Hezbollah operative who worked with Shateri, the Quds Force commander had implemented over 5,000 construction and reconstruction projects in Lebanon. It was also the I.C.R.L. that built Hezbollah’s secret fiber optics network that sparked a dangerous political and military crisis in Lebanon in 2008.

Iran’s growing economic activity in Syria also affects the power relations between the two countries. The Islamic Republic has historically used its economic clout to seek political concessions from its smaller trading partners such as Afghanistan. While the volume of trade between Iran and Syria is the rise, it disproportionately favors Tehran: Iranian exports account for about 95 percent of the one-billion-dollar trade volume between the two countries. The Syrian government has also reportedly borrowed billions of dollars from Iran in recent years. The disparity in economic ties makes Syria dependent on Tehran for the long haul at a time when the West and many regional powers are unlikely to reestablish ties with Damascus any time soon.

The Kurdistan Region will pay a “price” if it persists in holding the referendum on independence, Turkey’s foreign ministry warned in a statement like reported by rudaw.net.

“There will most certainly be a price to pay” if Kurdistan insists on going ahead with the September 25 vote, read the statement, without elaborating.

The ministry welcomed the Iraqi parliament decision on Tuesday to reject the referendum as unconstitutional and supports the clear statement for Iraqi political unity and territorial integrity.

Turkey is alarmed by the “increasingly emotional statements” from the Kurdish leadership and insistence on holding the vote, despite international objections, the statement read.

The ministry asked the Kurdistan government to act wisely and give up its wrong approach and offered its support to strengthen relations between Erbil and Baghdad.

Turkey is a key trade partner for the Kurdistan Region, importantly providing an outlet for the Region’s oil via a pipeline to its Ceyhan port. Ankara has strongly opposed the independence referendum and urged Iraqi unity.

Four years ago, Tom Nichols and John Schindler warned that U.S. fecklessness in the Middle East was creating conditions where Russia would be able to emerge as the key player in regional security. In responding to critics of their original article, they penned a follow-up days later that laid out the Russian strategy: to present Moscow as a “viable alternative partner” for the states of the region, like reported by nationalinterest.org. At the time, they were roundly criticized for their apparent pessimistic assessment that a collapsing “regional power” would be able to diminish the influence of the world’s sole remaining superpower in the Middle East or even that Moscow would have anything it could offer to compete with Washington’s largesse.

Yet events since then have validated their assessments. The Russian hand is visible everywhere in the Middle East. Moscow is presiding over the effort to tap down the Syrian civil war and establish the deconfliction zones between the various factions and their outside patrons. Russia has inserted itself into the volatile Kurdish issue—both with regards to any Kurdish zone in Syria vis-a-vis Turkey and the efforts to clarify a final status between Iraqi Kurdistan and the government in Baghdad. Russia has played a major role in sustaining the Iran-Iraq-Syria “Shi’a Crescent” but also is involved in direct talks with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates on how to maintain a fragile balance of power in the region. Egypt and Israel both now have their own lines of communication with the Kremlin and see Vladimir Putin as a more reliable statesman who does what he says and follows through on his commitments. This assessment is also apparently shared by Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who seems prepared to forge a new strategic axis with Russia on energy, Eurasian security and the future alignment of the Middle East. Moscow has hosted meetings of the various Libyan factions, Palestinian political parties, Kurdish representatives and members of the Syrian opposition, and Middle Eastern leaders regularly make the journey to Moscow to confer with the Kremlin.

Russia, by all appearances, is “back.” The mistake, however, is to view these developments in light of the Cold War experience. While it would seem to go without saying, contemporary Russia is not the Soviet Union. The Kremlin is no longer interested in spreading a particular ideology nor does it seek to impose any sort of binary choice on countries in the region to “choose” between Moscow and Washington. This is because Russia is not interested in footing immense bills for security and economic assistance. Instead, the twenty-first century Russian approach is not to displace the United States, which continues to bankroll much of the costs of regional security, but instead to act as the “hedge bet” for the regimes of the region to balance against America’s preferences and to have options to escape America’s conditionality. The Kremlin offers itself as a more reliable mediator than Washington and proffers equipment and capabilities that Washington is reluctant to provide. In turn, this makes former Cold War adversaries in the region—especially Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel—more open to developing a new relationship with the Kremlin.

Russia has been able to reestablish its presence because every country in the region, after two decades of U.S. transformational efforts, is now more interested in stability. It is clear that Washington lacks the ability to follow-through on its grandiose promises, and in particular no U.S. presidential administration is now in a position to commit large amounts of U.S. personnel or resources. This has been evident in the manic search by the United States for nonexistent proxies—committed secular democrats who nonetheless are prepared to fight with the same fervor and sense of sacrifice as militant jihadis—to sustain U.S. efforts in the region. The only group that has come closest to fitting the bill have been the Kurds, but whose commitment wanes outside traditionally ethnically Kurdish regions, while creating new complications in the U.S. relationships with governments in Ankara and Baghdad.

The Russian approach has been to recognize that, at present, long-term solutions are not possible, so Moscow’s efforts are instead focused on jury-rigging a series of compromises: the deconfliction zones in Syria; attempting to square the circle of de facto Kurdish self-government in Syria with a Turkish security zone; maintaining a balance between Sunni and Shia interests in Syria and elsewhere in the region; guaranteeing Iran’s ability to reach its Hezbollah proxies in Lebanon with allowing Israel to enforce its red lines. In essence, Russia offers a nineteenth century vision of spheres of influence and balances of power—with Moscow as the essential outside negotiating partner—in place of an easily distracted Washington who preaches a twenty-first century vision that is not linked to any actual commitment of resources.

Putin enjoys the limelight of being seen as a global statesman and the position of near-peer equality with the United States. However, it would be a mistake to assume that Russian efforts are being driven solely by the prestige demands of being seen as a great power. Moscow also expects to reap tangible benefits from its policies. Beyond validating Russia as a global power, the Russian calculation is that a return to playing a more active role in Middle Eastern affairs can create demand for Russian goods and services, starting with arms and nuclear power plants, and particularly technologies that the United States does not want to provide. The Middle East is critical to Russia’s geo-economic strategy: Turkey is set to become Russia’s replacement for Ukraine as a transit country for energy shipments to Europe, while Russian investments in Iraq and Libya are designed to further Russia’s ability to supply Europe with oil. Meanwhile, Russia wants to create a new north-south route that will connect the Russian heartland with the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.

Most significantly, Russia has used its new-found influence in the region to thwart the U.S. effort to use Saudi Arabia as a pressure point against the Russian economy. Now, instead of competing against Moscow, Riyadh is actively coordinating with the Russians in an effort to set a stable price “floor” for energy, to help guarantee revenues for both their treasuries. In addition, given the continued uncertainties that Western sanctions create for European and U.S. financial institutions to consider lending to Russia or facilitating investment, Moscow hopes to continue the trend of securing funds from Middle Eastern sources into its economy.

Russia has been learning valuable diplomatic lessons from its activities in the Middle East over the past four years—and is now taking the first steps to apply them to East Asia, playing on the same fears among both American partners and competitors in that region of U.S. unreliability and unpredictability. We see the first steps with Chinese, Japanese and Korean meetings with Vladimir Putin over the North Korea crisis—with Russia hoping that its diplomatic efforts in this arena will generate some of the same economic benefits it hopes to reap from the Middle East.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union attempted to compete frontally against the United States—and found itself outclassed. Today, Russia is engaged in a more subtle strategy. So far, it appears to be paying dividends.

Kurdish Peshmerga commanders announced they killed 17 ISIS militants as Iraqi forces continue to find and flush bands of ISIS militants out of villages like Qasab al-Rai in northern Iraq, like reported by rudaw.net.

A Peshmerga commander near Ayazya told Rudaw after 13 days of siege, the Iraqi army attacked the village of Qasab al-Rai on Monday from three directions and that ISIS militants are still defending in some places.

The militants fell into a planned Kurdish Peshmerga trap before they were killed, another commander detailed.

“After the attack was launched by the Iraqi army, 17 ISIS militants ran away and later fell into an ambush set up by the Peshmerga and were all killed,” said Col. Jamal Saadun, a Peshmerga commander in Duhok which has a base near the village of Qasab al-Rai.

The village of Qasab al-Rai had been under siege from the Iraqi army for 13 days. Rudaw was told by Peshmerga officials that nearly 200 ISIS militants and 30 ISIS families, mostly foreigners, had been hiding out in the village.

Tal Afar is a district in Nineveh province. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi officially declared the province “liberated” on August 31 after an 11-day offensive involving Iraqi security forces paired with Hashd al-Shaabi paramilitaries.

Kurdish Peshmerga, as part of the West Tigris front, are maintaining northern defensive lines to prevent ISIS from fleeing into Syria or the Kurdistan Region.

The US-led international anti-ISIS coalition warned at that time that hard work still lay ahead to clear Tal Afar of explosives and “eliminate any remaining ISIS holdouts so they do not threaten the security of Tal Afar in the future.”

According to the coalition ISIS has lost more than 90 percent of the territory it once held in Iraq. The group still controls enclaves that include Hawija, a city in Kirkuk province, as well as the Hamrin Mountains in Diyala. They also have a presence in Anbar province along the Euphrates River Valley in Anah, Rawa and the border crossing to Syria at al-Qaim.

Islamic State’s so-designated “finance minister” has fled the group’s havens in Anbar province, carrying large amounts of money allocated for fighters’ salaries, a paramilitary source was quoted saying, according to iraqinews.com.

Qatari al-Obaidi, a senior leader at the Tribal Mobilization, told Alsumaria News that Islamic State’s finance official, Sabbar Batoushi, fled the town of Annah, 210 kilometers west of the city of Ramadi, carrying large amounts of the group’s funds.

Obaidi said the militants declared a curfew in the town in search for the fugitive leader.

Since Iraqi government forces launched a wide-scale campaign to retake Islamic State-held regions in October 2016, the militant group has reportedly suffered financial constraints and many of it senior leaders have either died in combat or fled battlefields.

Islamic State has held the towns of Annah, Rawa and Qaim since 2014, when it proclaimed an Islamic “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria. Recent news reports have said military reinforcements were sent to areas near those towns preparing for an invasion against IS. The Iraqi Joint Operations Command has, meanwhile, declared that its coming battle would be in IS-held Hawija, southwest of Kirkuk. So far, U.S.-backed government forces recaptured Mosul, Islamic State’s former capital, and the town of Tal Afar, a major haven west of Mosul.

SDF Commander Rojda Felat stated that 70 percent of Raqqa has been cleared of ISIS since the launch of the campaign for the liberation of the city, like reported by anfenglish.com

No effort is being made to cloak the warming of relations between Hamas and Iran in a veil of secrecy. A key figure in this budding rapprochement is senior Hamas official Salah al-Arouri, who was expelled from Turkey two years ago after Jerusalem and Ankara reached a reconciliation agreement. Photos from Aug. 2 show Arouri meeting in Beirut with Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, special assistant for international affairs to Iran’s Shura Council. Also in attendance were Osama Hamdan, Hamas’ point man for international relations, and Ali Barakeh, the movement’s representative in Lebanon, like reported by al-monitor.com.

After the meeting, Arouri flew straight to Tehran, where he joined a high-level Hamas delegation attending the inauguration of President Hassan Rouhani for a second term. Arouri, Hamdan and Izzat al-Rishq held a series of meetings with top Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, senior adviser to the supreme leader on international affairs Ali Akbar Velayati and Strategic Committee for Foreign Policy Chairman Kamal Kharazi.

On Aug. 6, Barakeh released a statement announcing that Hamas’ political bureau head, Ismail Haniyeh, would soon be visiting Iran and that Hamas and Iran were allies again. “Iran sees continuation of resistance in Palestine as a vital issue and Hamas, too, knows that relations with Iran would strengthen the Palestinian resistance,” said Barakeh. What this means is that Hamas has chosen military and economic aid to rearm itself at the expense of Gaza residents, who believed that improved relations with Egypt offered the best hope of easing the siege in any significant way. When Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’ leader in Gaza and an advocate of rapprochement with Tehran, met with Gaza journalists Aug. 28, he informed them that ties with Iran had been renewed.

Also on Aug. 28, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres met with Israel’s coordinator of activities in the occupied territories, Maj.-Gen. Yoav Mordechai, to discuss the possible easing of the closure against Gaza to prevent a humanitarian crisis. The answer he received was that Israel is doing everything it can to provide for the needs of the civilian population and ease restrictions on them, while Hamas is blocking all attempts to improve the lives of Gaza’s people. “The Hamas terrorist organization takes advantage of the people of Gaza again and again in an effort to exploit Israeli aid, despite the difficulties in Gaza,” Mordechai told Guterres.

From there, the secretary-general paid a visit to Gaza. It left him in shock. At a meeting with journalists at a school supported by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, he said, “I am deeply moved to be in Gaza today, unfortunately, to witness one of the most dramatic humanitarian crises that I have seen in many years working as a humanitarian in the United Nations.” Guterres called on Egypt and Israel to open the border crossings, but Hamas, by choosing to throw its lot in with Iran, has effectively ensured that the secretary-general’s emotional plea will go unheeded. If there was any chance for a humanitarian solution in Gaza as a result of the warming of relations between Hamas and Egypt, the recent decision by the movement’s leadership sealed the already miserable fate of Gaza’s people and ensures permanent control of the territory by the movement’s military wing.

Not all of Hamas’ leaders find the renewed alliance with Tehran acceptable. There was a bitter argument within the movement regarding whether Sinwar and Arouri are gambling with the movement’s character and future, and even more important, with any chance it might have to lift the siege on Gaza. Supporters of a pragmatic approach include Mousa Abu Marzouk, Ghazi Hamad (once responsible for border crossings and now head of Gaza’s Energy Administration), Ahmed Yousef and others. In Gaza, they are known almost disparagingly as the “Egyptian faction,” or in other words, the group identified with the Egyptian approach. The members of this moderate group were pleased when relations with Egypt warmed up, considering it to be nothing less than a light at the end of the tunnel. They now worry that all their efforts to reconcile Hamas and Egypt have been in vain.

It is not yet clear how the group advocating for closer relations with Iran see this evolving at the practical level. Given Egypt’s war in the Sinai against radical Islamic groups and its close monitoring of the border area, it is much harder to smuggle weapons and armaments into Gaza through the border tunnels. Can this bet on Iran as an ally be as effective as it was during the second intifada (2000-2005)? At the time, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak ignored the massive development of the network of tunnels in Gaza. Will today’s Egypt even allow Haniyeh to leave Gaza through the Rafah crossing when President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi knows that he is going to meet his sworn enemies in Tehran?

It is hard to believe that these senior Hamas officials are oblivious to the risks lying in wait for them by gambling on a distant ally, knowing that it could cause problems with their next-door neighbor, Egypt. After all, Cairo has the power to decide whether they survive or fall.

As a Fatah member in Gaza told Al-Monitor on the condition of anonymity, “It is quite possible that this warming of relations with Tehran and the astonishing publicity that it is receiving were actually orchestrated to convince Sisi to offer Hamas a better deal, if only to ensure that Hamas doesn’t fall into the arms of his rival. Otherwise, it is very hard to understand [Hamas leaders’] motivations and plans.”

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/08/israel-hamas-gaza-iran-rapprochement-egypt-military-wing.html#ixzz4rPpwf2NX

Iran and its allies are sending reinforcements near a de-confliction zone in southeastern Syria to pressure the U.S. military to withdraw from a strategic garrison near al-Tanf border crossing. Both Tehran and Damascus see the presence of U.S. troops training rebel forces in al-Tanf, as well as in northeastern Syria, as a serious threat. Iran also views the expulsion of the U.S. military from the strategic border crossing between Syria, Iraq and Jordan as a prerequisite to securing a sustainable supply line to Syria and Lebanon, as well as to establishing a new battlefront against Israel in southern Syria. The new escalation risks another direct, and potentially much more dangerous, ground confrontation between the U.S. and Iranian-backed forces in Syria in the near future, like reported by mei.edu.

Reinforcements near al-Tanf

On August 30, Iranian media outlets published photos of heavily-armed Harakat al-Nujaba militants deploying to southeastern Syria. “Since it was revealed that America is supporting Daesh [Islamic State] logistically and materially at the Iraq-Syria-Jordan border triangle, the Islamic movement of Harakat al-Nujaba has stepped up the deployment of its combatants to eliminate members of this Takfiri terrorist group,” wrote Tasnim News Agency, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (I.R.G.C.). The photos show the Iranian-led Iraqi militia forces in the Syrian Desert advancing toward al-Tanf and carrying with them tanks, pick-up trucks, R.P.G.s and other heavy weapons.

According to the reports, the militiamen are additional reinforcements as scores of Iranian-linked militia forces are already stationed near the de-confliction zone, where the U.S. and its allies are training Free Syrian Army rebels. On August 27, Iranian media publishedphotos from a funeral procession of Nujaba militants killed near al-Tanf region that were transferred to Iraq for burial. Hundreds of Iraqis, including senior commanders from the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (P.M.F.), participated in the ceremony and chanted slogans against the Islamic State and United States.

Confrontation with U.S

The commentary in the Iranian media, particularly those affiliated with the I.R.G.C., indicates that Tehran believes that it can force the U.S. to leave al-Tanf by sending more forces to the region. As in the past, the I.R.G.C. may test U.S. resolve and staying power in the southeast by crossing U.S. red lines in the de-confliction zone. In the past, U.S. warplanes have struck pro-Syrian regime forces advancing toward al-Tanf de-confliction zone on several occasions, and Pentagon has made it clear that it will do so in future to protect its forces and allies.

An article in conservative daily Fararu entitled “Potential for Confrontation between Iran and America in al-Tanf?” wrote that the Syrian Army and Iranian-supported militia forces are determined to evict the U.S. from al-Tanf region. “Significant progress has been made to achieve that,” it claimed. According to the article, Iran and its allies are increasingly focusing on al-Tanf, particularly after the decapitation of Mohsen Hojjaji, an I.R.G.C. officer captured by Islamic State fighters near al-Tanf earlier this month. Senior Iranian military officials, including Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, have vowed revenge. The article also cited a claim by Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, another Iranian-supported Iraqi militia group, that the U.S. and its allies were responsible for the killing of 36 pro-Assad forces near al-Tanf this month. U.S. and Iraqi officials have debunked the claim.

The article adds that the al-Tanf region is strategically important for Iran as it connects Baghdad to Damascus and Beirut. It said the U.S. has succeeded to deny Iran access to the region, but emphasized that pro-regime forces backed by Iran “are trying to bring this passageway under their control.” The article further noted that the pro-regime forces already reached the Iraqi border north of al-Tanf on June 9, cutting off U.S.-backed rebels from moving north and linking up with pro-U.S. Kurdish fighters in Deir Ezzor. It also pointed out that “the Americans are not happy with this” because the route allows the supply of weapons to the Syrian regime through Iraq.

Many Iranian analysts echo similar views. Hassan Hani-Zadeh, an Iranian expert of Middle Eastern affairs, told Tasnim News Agency that the U.S. is seeking to “reestablish terrorists” in al-Tanf to reverse the latest gains by Damascus and Tehran. “Given the defeat of terrorist groups in Mosul and many Syrian regions such as Palmyra, Homs, Deir Ezzor and Homs, the Americans have realized that the six-year joint project by America, Britain, France, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to alter the political and military chessboard in Syria has failed… Therefore, American gunmen are stationed at the triangle of Syria-Jordan-Iraq shared border to take advantage of the situation and regroup other terrorist groups,” he claimed.

Doubts about Russia

Despite close cooperation between Russia and Iran over Syria, many in Iran remain suspicious of Moscow and caution that a potential secret bargain between the White House and the Kremlin may undercut Iranian interests in Syria and the broader region. “So far, Russia has acted as a mediator to avoid a confrontation between the U.S. and Iranian-backed forces in Syria. However, as indicated in the latest incidents and sporadic clashes, it is said that Russia has fallen short of carrying out this role and has even taken the side of America in some ways,” cautioned the article in Fararu. “This view was further reinforced after an agreement between Putin and Trump at the Hamburg summit,” it added.

Al-Tanf’s significance

From Tehran’s view, the expulsion of American troops from al-Tanf not only removes a long-term threat to the regime of Bashar al-Assad, but it also helps consolidate Iran’s strategic plans in Syria and the Levant region. “Liberating al-Tanf and clearing remaining areas from Daesh gives Iran access to the Mediterranean shores and northern borders of the occupied territories,” wrote Alwaght News. “There is evidence that Washington, in addition to consolidating its control over al-Tanf, is seeking to capture Abu Kamal region as well. It aims to control two strategic border crossings between Syria and Iraq after the defeat of the Islamic State. It appears that who first enters the battle with Daesh over Abu Kamal is important,” it added.

If the U.S. maintains control over these two strategic border crossings, according to the article, it will be able to prevent the ground lines of communications for Iranian-backed forces between Iraq and Syria. “A land route to Damascus not only strengthens security of the resistance axis, but it can also increase the resistance axis’s maneuverability power on the ground and its political bargaining power vis-à-vis the opposition.”

Some Iranian outlets suggest that the U.S. is blocking Iranian access to al-Tanf region in order to ensure Israel’s security. “Washington is seeking to create a vacuum along the Iraqi-Syrian border in order to prevent the geographical connection of these two countries and the resistance axis so that it can ensure the security of Israel,” wrote Javan Online, another I.R.G.C. mouthpiece. “The Americans’ goal was to simultaneously advance from al-Tanf to the north and from Raqqa to the south so as to seize Deir Ezzor and divide Iraq and Syria. But this U.S. goal was defeated by the wisdom and courage of the resistance,” the article added.

Threat to Israel

The growing presence of the Nujaba group in southern Syria will also further alarm Israel. The group has declared that, after the defeat of the Islamic State, its next fight will be alongside the Lebanese Hezbollah against Israel from Syria. In March, the Nujaba movement announced that it had established a new brigade to seize the Golan Heights – claiming that “latest victories” against the Islamic State and Sunni rebels in Iraq and Syria have allowed the group and its allies to focus on Israel. Leaders of the group claimed that members of the new brigade are highly-trained, well-equipped and capable of fighting the Jewish state. “Israel is weaker than a spider web. Islamic resistance is capable of confronting the axis of evil and annihilating the occupying Zionist regime,” Akram al-Kaabi, the leader of the group told Lebanon-based Arabic-language al-Mayadeen news network.

Harakat al-Nujaba – also known as Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba – is a prominent Iraqi sectarian group that operates under the leadership of I.R.G.C. Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. It has been fighting in Syria since 2013. Kaabi has pledged allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The I.R.G.C. uses the Nujaba group not just to fight the Islamic State, but also as a pressure tool against the Baghdad government, regional countries, and the United States. Kaabi had said that he would deploy more forces to Syria after the ouster of the Islamic State from Mosul.