The Islamic Republic of Iran has reportedly resorted to Iraqi Shi’ite militias to suppress ongoing Iranians’ protests, deploying the militia groups to encounter angry demonstrators, like reported by basnews.com.

Citing local sources form Iran’s Ahwaz province, al-Arabiya said the Iraqi militias “have been deployed alongside Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and security forces in the streets of Abadan and Khorramshahr and in Al-Thawra neighborhood in Ahvaz.”

Iranian opposition media Amad News has also claimed that the Tehran government has brought in Afghan militias from the Liwa Fatemiyoun who are fighting in Syria, deployed them to Isfahan province to disperse the growing protests.

Incidents involving Iran have been among the most sophisticated, costly, and consequential attacks in the history of the internet, like reported by carnegieendowment.org

Incidents involving Iran have been among the most sophisticated, costly, and consequential attacks in the history of the internet. The four-decade-long U.S.-Iran cold war has increasingly moved into cyberspace, and Tehran has been among the leading targets of uniquely invasive and destructive cyber operations by the United States and its allies. At the same time, Tehran has become increasingly adept at conducting cyber espionage and disruptive attacks against opponents at home and abroad, ranging from Iranian civil society organizations to governmental and commercial institutions in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.

Iran’s Cyber Threat Environment

• Offensive cyber operations have become a core tool of Iranian statecraft, providing Tehran less risky opportunities to gather information and retaliate against perceived enemies at home and abroad.
• Just as Iran uses proxies to project its regional power, Tehran often masks its cyber operations using proxies to maintain plausible deniability. Yet there are clear indications that such operations are conducted by Iranians and frequently can be linked to the country’s security apparatus, namely the Ministry of Intelligence and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
• Iran’s cyber capabilities appear to be indigenously developed, arising from local universities and hacking communities. This ecosystem is unique, involving diverse state-aligned operators with differing capabilities and affiliations. Over the decade that Iranians have been engaged in cyber operations, threat actors seemingly arise from nowhere and operate in a dedicated manner until their campaigns dissipate, often due to their discovery by researchers.
• Though Iran is generally perceived as a third-tier cyber power—lacking the capabilities of China, Russia, and the United States—it has effectively exploited the lack of preparedness of targets inside and outside Iran. Just as Russia’s compromise of Democratic Party institutions during the 2016 U.S. presidential election demonstrated that information warfare can be conducted through basic tactics, Iran’s simple means have exacted sometimes enormous political and financial costs on unsuspecting adversaries.
• The same Iranian actors responsible for espionage against the private sector also conduct surveillance of human rights defenders. These attacks on Iranian civil society often foreshadow the tactics and tools that will be employed against other targets and better describe the risks posed by Iranian cyberwarfare.
• Through technical forensics of cyber attacks, researchers documenting these campaigns can provide a unique window into the worldview and capabilities of Iran’s security services and how it responds to a rapidly changing technological and geopolitical environment.

U.S. Responses Going Forward

• While Iran does not have a public strategic policy with respect to cyberspace, its history demonstrates a rationale for when and why it will engage in attacks. Iran uses its capabilities in response to domestic and international events. As conflict between Tehran and Washington subsided after the 2015 nuclear deal, so too did the cycle of disruptive attacks. However, Iran’s decisionmaking process is obscured and its cyber capabilities are not controlled by the presidency, as evident in cases of intragovernmental hacking.
• The United States is reliant on an inadequately guarded cyberspace and should anticipate that future conflicts, online or offline, could trigger cyber attacks on U.S. infrastructure. The first priority should be to extend efforts to protect infrastructure and the public, including increased collaboration with regional partners and nongovernmental organizations targeted by Iran.
• Narrowly targeted sanctions could be used to deter foreign countries or other actors from providing assistance to Iranian offensive cyber operations. Such restrictions should still prioritize allowing Iranian society wide access to the internet and information technologies, to mitigate the regime’s ability to control information and communications.
• The United States has pursued a name and shame strategy against Iranian threat actors, and should continue to do so. The Justice Department has issued indictments against Iranians implicated in disruptive campaigns and has successfully obtained the extradition from a third country of a hacker involved in the theft of military secrets. Because of the small operational footprint of the groups, targeted sanctions or legal proceedings are more symbolic than disruptive. These indictments may at least chill participation by talented individuals who wish to travel or emigrate.
• Iran continues to pursue its interests through cyber operations, engaging in attacks against its regional opponents and espionage against other foreign governments. A better understanding of the history and strategic rationale of Iran’s cyber activities is critical to assessing Washington’s broader cyberwarfare posture against adversaries, and prudent U.S. responses to future cyber threats from Iran and elsewhere.

The so-called Islamic State (ISIS) carried out a big ambush against a large number of Hezbollah personnel in the Badiya region of eastern Syria, a Syrian military source told to almasdarnews.com.

According to the military source, the Islamic State forces attacked the large contingent of Syrian Hezbollah personnel while they were traveling through the Humaymah area in the western countryside of the Deir Ezzor Governorate.

As a result of this Islamic State attack, several Hezbollah personnel were killed, including a large number of fighters from the predominately Shi’i towns Al-Zahra’a and Nubl in northern Aleppo.

In response to this ISIS attack, Hezbollah and their allies from the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stepped up the intensity of their assault in the Badiya region, inflicting heavy damage on the terrorist group’s defenses in the Humaymah area.

Arab Coalition forces in support of legitimacy in Yemen announced that Iran-backed Houthi militias lost control of more than 444 sites, arms and ammunition between December 25, 2017 and January 3, like reported by aawsat.com.

Furthermore, the coalition announced that 86 ballistic missiles have been fired by Houthis at Saudi Arabia.

The official spokesman for the coalition forces Colonel Turki al-Maliki said that the permits granted to aid agencies and ships since the beginning of the military operations amounted to 17,293 permits, including 2,749 through sea ports and 7,590 for humanitarian and relief assistance coming to Yemen through the airports.

At a press conference at King Salman Air Base in Riyadh, Maliki stated that 37 permits had been granted for humanitarian aid and evacuation operations between December 26, 2017 and January 3, 2018, adding that 3,045 passengers left the Yemeni territories.

Maliki reiterated his rejection of statements made by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Yemen, Jamie McGoldric, urging him to validate the facts concerning the Houthi recruitment of children.

The spokesman presented many video clips that showed a number of military air operations by the coalition forces against sites taken by Houthis to carry out attacks on the Yemeni army and the popular resistance, inside Yemen and on the Yemeni-Saudi border.

He also showed through the videos that the coalition continues to accurately target the Houthis and their arsenal of weapons while avoiding civilians.

Maliki said the Iranian regime seeks to replicate a new model of “Hezbollah” militias in Yemen. He pointed out that the Houthi decision to kill former President Ali Abdullah Saleh came from Iran.

Al-Shabwa province is now liberated, and the coalition is fighting to oust the Houthis from al-Jouf, Maliki indicated.

The spokesman didn’t give any information about the whereabouts of Saleh’s nephew, who has reportedly been killed or has reached a safe location following his injury.

Maliki concluded by confirming that the coalition forces still have the superiority on the battlefield inside Yemen and on its border with Saudi Arabia.

At least seven Russian planes were destroyed by anti-regime rebels who shelled the Khmeimim air base in Syria before the New Year, according to Russian media and like reported by kurdistan24.net.

Russian daily Kommersant on Wednesday revealed that it was Russia’s “biggest loss” of military hardware since the Kremlin began its air campaign supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in 2015.

The report claimed more than ten servicemen were wounded in the attack launched by “radical Islamists.”

“At least four Su-24 bombers, two Su-35S fighters, and an An-72 transport plane, as well as an ammunition depot, were destroyed by the shelling,” military and diplomatic sources allegedly revealed to Kommersant.

The Russian defense ministry has yet to comment on the report.

On Wednesday, however, the ministry acknowledged a Mi-24 helicopter had crash-landed in Syria due to a technical issue. The two pilots were killed in the crash.

Russia keeps a large number of troops and advisers present as they continue to help Assad recapture territory lost to anti-government rebels and the Islamic State (IS).

Russia’s Khmeimim air base is located in Syria’s Latakia province, which the Kremlin turned into a strategic center for its military operations in the embattled country, establishing a permanent presence despite claiming IS had been defeated.

Six days into the wave of protests that is shaking Iran, Israeli and Western intelligence services are still hesitant to provide an answer to the main question that is keeping their political masters busy: Do these new circumstances present a window of opportunity for the first time since the failed Green Revolution in 2009 to bring down the Iranian regime?

The information, like reported by haaretz.com, coming out of Iran is still too fragmented to provide a clear picture. The government is disrupting access to the messaging app Telegram, which protestors used at the beginning to coordinate their moves. At the same time, internet traffic in Iran has been lagging, even though those opposed to the Islamic regime have managed to find ways to bypass this problem to a certain extent.

But as time goes by, a few aspects of the protests are becoming clearer according to Israeli and Western intelligence services’ analyses.

Tens of thousands of people have participated in the demonstrations. The numbers are still nowhere near the hundreds of thousands who took part in the Green Revolution protests, but those demonstrations were concentrated in Tehran and led by students and the middle class. This time, the protests began mostly with the lower classes and have spread throughout almost all of Iran to many distant towns that the regime now finds difficult to control. It seems that for a significant group of people, the barrier of fear has been breached – something that did not happen in the past and prevented similar action since the brutal repression of the protests nearly nine years ago.

The high cost of living may have been the original motivation for people to take to the streets, but it is far from the only one. The anger against rising prices has added to the accumulating despair of young people who are educated yet unemployed. In the background is a long-time bitterness for a large part of the Iranian public over the Islamic regime’s strict enforcement of religious laws. The most remarkable visual emblem of the protests so far – and their escalation will certainly bear other symbols – is the video clip in which a young woman removes her head covering in the middle of a demonstration and waves it in the air.

The Iranian government’s efforts to set in motion and finance the export of the Islamic revolution to other countries has created great anger among the public. In a few cases, protestors were filmed burning pictures of General Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Al-Quds force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards who has been lauded as a national hero after the defeat of the Islamic State and the successes of the Assad regime in the civil war in Syria. Raising the prices of eggs and gas at a time when Iran is providing billions of dollars in aid to Syrian President Bashar Assad, Hezbollah, Shi’ite militias in Iraq and the Houthi rebels in Yemen has been the focus of the protesters’ anger.

As of Tuesday evening, the Iranian regime still has not used its full force to put down the protests. It appears that like the foreign intelligence agencies, the Iranian authorities had not predicted the timing of the breakout of public fury. Even though the regime responded violently in a number of cities, and about 20 people have been reported killed so far, it is far from the aggressive means used to quell the 2009 protests. It looks as if the regime is still in the containment stage and has yet to loosen the reins on its offensive forces.

This is also due to Iranian foreign policy: The supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his circle are still very worried about U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats to cancel the nuclear deal. To repulse Trump, the Iranians need the Europeans. The European Union may have remained silent so far in response to the killing of protesters – which is morally grating – but using more force could well lead to new complaints about human rights violations and complicate Iran’s situation vis-a-vis the Europeans.

The sanctions are still important. The ones imposed by the United States at the beginning of this decade hurt the Iranian economy and forced the leadership in Tehran to agree to the nuclear deal, which delayed the Iranian nuclear program. The accumulated damage from the sanctions can still be felt, and it is impeding the rebound capabilities of the Iranian economy.

For now, Trump has expressed his support for the protestors in an almost incidental manner in his tweets, between his fights with the media and his efforts to take credit – for instance, for commercial aviation safety since he took office. But a reconsideration of the sanctions because of Iran’s support for terrorism, its ballistic missile program and human rights violations could provide a real tailwind for the protesters.

There is even a bonus as far as Trump is concerned: This is exactly what the Obama administration did not do in 2009, when it watched somewhat apathetically from a distance as the Green Revolution collapsed. And for now, Israel is still not in the picture.

In early December, senior Trump administration officials suggested that approximately 80 percent of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s defense against insurgents in the country’s ongoing civil war is being provided by forces imported from outside of the country. The lion’s share of these fighters is being trained and equipped by Iran, the Assad regime’s most ardent supporter, like reported by nationalinterest.org.

Interestingly, however, these foreign fighters, almost of all which are Shia Muslims, are not merely comprised of Lebanese and Iraqis, but include significant numbers of militants from South Asia—mainly Afghanistan and Pakistan—which adds an entirely new dimension to Syria’s ongoing civil war, now entering its seventh year.

As the civil war in Syria drags on, the Assad regime has been plagued by casualties and desertions. Many of its fighters have been killed or injured on the battlefield and to make up for these manpower shortages, the regime has looked to Iran to help recruit new fighters. Iran has been able to leverage the sectarian nature of the conflict in Syria to help rally Afghans living in Iran as refugees, of which there are approximately three million.

The Afghan fighters belong to a division known as Liwa Fatemiyoun, which is under the command and control of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and according to official Iranian sources, numbers between 10,000 to 12,000 fighters. Many of these militants have experienced major combat action in Syria in Aleppo, Deraa, Damascus, Latakia and the Qalamoun region.Some reports indicate that hundreds have already died fighting in Syria.

Some fighters are purely mercenaries motivated by money, and some are enticed by promises of legal residency status and residency permits for their families back in Iran. Others are induced by the honorific “defenders of the shrine,” believing it is a religious duty to protect holy Shia shrines in Syria, including the shrine of Sayyida Zainab, revered by Shia Muslims as it supposedly contains the grave of the Prophet Muhammad’s granddaughter. In many cases, recruitment standards appear to be quite low. Criminals and other undesirables are oftentimes among the regime forces, considered the equivalent of cannon fodder by Assad, where they are dispatched to the frontlines in Syria.

In addition to Afghans, Pakistani Shia foreign fighters are also now fighting in their own distinct unit in Syria, known as the Liwa Zaynabiyoun. This represents a major evolution from earlier stages in the conflict when Pakistani Shia where routinely integrated with other units, since they often lacked the numbers and training to be effective on the battlefield. Starting in 2013, substantial numbers of Pakistani Shia from the Turi tribe of the Kurram tribal region and ethnic Hazaras from Quetta began to arrive in Syria. Around this same time, Urdu-language websites and social media pages proliferated urging Pakistani Shia to join the growing network of foreign fighters in Syria to defend the Assad regime against fighters from the Islamic State and other terrorist and insurgent groups active throughout the country.

Most analysis from Western think tanks and universities on foreign fighters tends to focus on the threat posed by Sunni jihadists linked to the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. But the growth of the Iranian Shia foreign fighter network also presents a major challenge to the international community, and perhaps an even more dire long-term obstacle to the stability of the Middle East. The IRGC and its proxy force, the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah, are trainingAfghan and Pakistani Shia in weaponry, tactical movement and even tank warfare.

Iran is facing its worst civil unrest in almost a decade, with at least 22 people killed in street demonstrations that began in a reaction to tough economic times, like reported by theweek.co.uk.

Iranians were promised in 2015 that the easing of sanctions would make their lives easier, with oil revenue restored after years of embargo. But there has been no recovery. In fact, according to the BBC’s Persian service, the average Iranian is now 15% worse off than they were ten years ago.

So, where is the oil money going?

Some protesters want Tehran to stop spending what they say is “vast amounts of money” on supporting the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad, the Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas movement, Deutsche Welle reports.

In an interview with The Times of Israel, Israeli government minister Yuval Steinitz says that Iran spends $1bn (£740m) each year just on Hezbollah.

Left-wing Israeli newspaper Haaretz quotes unnamed “Western intelligence sources” who claim that hardliners want to “capitalise” on money spent during Syria’s civil war to “entrench [Iran’s] presence by building a permanent air base and docking facilities on the Mediterranean coast”.

This would cost “at least hundreds of millions, if not billions”, the newspaper says, money that factions close to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani want to reserve for “improving infrastructure and providing jobs at home”.

According to Haaretz, Iran’s state-owned banks set up credit lines totalling $4.6bn (£3.4bn) for the Syrian regime in 2013 and 2015. It has paid a monthly wage to around 50,000 militia fighters, and has supplied arms “daily”, and military “advisers”.

Estimates of Iran’s total funding for Hezbollah in Lebanon vary from $60m (£44m) to $1bn a year, the newspaper adds, while Israeli intelligence estimates Iranian backing to Islamic groups in Gaza adds up to some $100m (£74m) annually.

Messaging app Telegram and Facebook-owned Instagram have reportedly been restricted in Iran, following a wave of anti-government protests in the country.

Associated Press news agency, citing Iranian state TV, reported that authorities had temporarily blocked both services in order to maintain peace.

Iranian ministers have claimed that social media is contributing to the protests, and was used to organise mass gatherings.

ICT minister Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi also tweeted Telegram’s founder Pavel Durov directly, claiming that a “Telegram channel is encouraging hateful conduct”, as well as armed uprising and social unrest.

“Now is the time to stop such encouragements via Telegram,” he added.

The channel is called @amadnews.

Durov has since confirmed that the authorities have blocked the app, and it was not yet apparent if the move was permanent or temporary.

He also said Telegram had suspended the channel Jahromi was objecting too because it had broken Telegram’s terms of service.

Durov initially responded to Jahromi’s tweet stating: “Calls for violence are prohibited by Telegram’s rules. If confirmed, we’ll have to block such a channel, regardless of its size and political affiliation.”

Given the high level of media censorship in Iran, digital apps like Telegram have a large user base in the country.

Durov revealed last year the app has 40 million monthly active users, and 25 million daily active users.

Telegram has also faced recent controversy in Indonesia, where the government threatened to ban the encrypted messaging app unless unlawful content, such as radical and terrorist propaganda, was blocked.

In that particular case, Durov promised to shut down “terror related” public channels.