A female suicide bomber was killed early on Wednesday as she was trapped by Iraqi troops inside a Baghdad school before blowing herself up, the Baghdad Operations Command said according to iraqinews.com.

In a statement, a copy of which was obtained by Basnews website, the command said, “Security forces foiled a terrorist attack by a female wearing an explosive belt inside a school in al-Tarmia area, north of Baghdad.”

“The troops opened fire at the terrorist after she refused to give herself up, causing the explosive belt to explode immediately,” the statement read.

It added that the woman had spent the night at the school with an intention to go out in the wee hours of Wednesday to blow herself up at any crowded place in Baghdad but security forces foiled her plot.

The Iraqi capital has seen almost daily bombings and armed attacks against security members, paramilitary troops and civilians since the Iraqi government launched a wide-scale campaign to retake Islamic State-occupied areas in 2016. Though most of the daily bombings go without a claim of responsibility, Islamic State has declared it had been behind many.

A total of 115 Iraqi civilians, excluding policemen, were killed and another 250 injured in acts of terrorism, violence and armed conflict in Iraq in January 2018, according to casualty figures recorded by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

Security forces arrested on Tuesday a former Islamic State media official after raiding a house of one of his relatives in Mosul, a security source was quoted as saying according to iraqinews.com.

Speaking to Baghdad Today news website, the source said that security forces “arrested Mazhar Hamad al-Ghesh at al-Houd village in southern Mosul district of Qayyarah.”

“Al-Ghesh was arrested while hiding inside a house of one of his relatives,” the source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said, stressing that the arrest was made upon accurate intelligence reports.

The source added that al-Ghesh, as a media official, was entitled to deliver press releases of the terrorist Islamic State group.

On July 10, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced liberation of the second largest Iraqi city of Mosul from IS militants, who had captured it in 2014. More than 25000 militants were killed throughout the campaign, which started in October 2016.

A government campaign, backed by paramilitary troops and a U.S.-led international coalition, has been fighting the Islamic State group, which declared a self-styled “caliphate” from Mosul in June 2014.

Iraq declared the collapse of Islamic State’s territorial influence in Iraq earlier this month with the recapture of Rawa, a city on Anbar’s western borders with Syria, which was the group’s last bastion in Iraq.

The Iranian-backed Kata’ib Hezbollah militia warned it might engage in armed confrontation with US forces in Iraq at any moment, like reported by kurdistan24.net.

It is the second, if not the third warning issued by the Iranian-backed Shia militia against American troops in the country since the Iraqi government declared final victory over the Islamic State (IS) in late 2017.

There are over 5,000 US troops in Iraq. The US-led Coalition against IS on Monday stated its focus in Iraq would shift from combat operations to sustaining military gains against the extremist group.

The coalition statement revealed its troops would remain in Iraq as IS extremists “continue to pose a threat” to the country’s security and risk transition back into an insurgency.

“The Coalition will tailor its forces in consultation with the Iraqi partners to ensure the lasting defeat of [IS],” Brig. Gen. Jonathan Braga, the coalition’s director of operations, said.

The statement came the same day as an Iraqi official claimed the US would be reducing its presence in the country since the “battle against Daesh (IS) has ended.”

Jaafar Al-Husseini, spokesman for the Kata’ib Hezbollah, also known as the Hezbollah Brigades, “There is no stable Iraq with the presence of the Americans.”

Iraqi government officials have asserted on more than one occasion that the presence of US troops in the country came at the request of a US-led coalition against terrorism.

“The Americans did not come to Iraq at the request of the government,” Husseini said.

Baghdad says the US’ presence is mainly focused on training and advising Iraqis.

Husseini said clashes with the Americans “may start at any moment … This time the Americans will not be able to talk themselves out of it.”

The Hezbollah Brigades are one of the most prominent factions of the Hashd al-Shaabi, also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), formed three years ago following the emergence of IS in Iraq in 2014.

The Shia militia has close ties with Tehran, similar to Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba group, the closest armed faction to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Commander, Qassem Soleimani.

Militia groups have already threatened to target US forces, days after US air strikes targeted local police and tribal fighters in a friendly fire accident in Anbar last month.

Iraqi forces, backed by the US-led coalition, last year restored all territory which had fallen into the hands of IS in 2014 and 2015, including Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq and self-proclaimed capital of the jihadist group.

A Syrian government forces commander made the announcement on Monday, noting that “they cover the air space of the Syrian north,” press tv reported.

The Northwestern province of Idlib, which borders Turkey and is largely under the control of Al-Nusra Front (Tahrir al-Sham Hay’at or the Levant Liberation Board), is one of the last main strongholds of jihadi militants opposed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who have been driven from most of their bastions across Syria in recent years.

The commander further said that the defense systems were deployed on the frontlines in rural regions of the provinces, adding that they had been deployed as “a message to everyone.”

The deployment comes at a time that Turkey has been launching airstrikes against the Northwestern Syrian Kurdish region of Afrin, which is part of the Aleppo province.

Turkey launched the so-called Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s Afrin on January 20 in a bid to eliminate the YPG, which Ankara views as a terror organization and the Syrian branch of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

Before Turkey launched operation Olive Branch, the government in Damascus had warned that it would shoot down any Turkish warplane that enters Syrian airspace.

An international volunteer OSINT community says Russia continues supplies of weapons to the Kurdish YPG (People’s Self Defense Forces) in northwestern Syria, like reported by unian.info.

On February 4, a video footage was released of the interception by the Turkish army along with the SSA fighters of a gasoline tanker truck transporting a concealed batch of weapons and ammunition to the YPG.

The truck was stopped en route to Afrin, the city controlled by YPG since 2012, according to InformNapalm.

The footage shows a large number of RPG-7 rocket launchers and anti-tank guided missile launchers Fagot, Metis-M and the Competition.

Although these weapons were designed in Soviet times, their main operator today is the Russian Federation, InformNapalm write.

“Russia could intensify the supply of weapons to Kurdish forces in connection with the beginning of the Olive Branch operation of the Turkish armed forces and the pro-Turkish armed formations of the Syrian opposition,” the experts noted.

It is reported that the operation began on January 20, 2017, while on February 3, 2018, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the successful advancement of forces taking part in the Olive Branch toward Afrin.

“Anti-tank missile systems, probably supplied by Russia for YPG, are designed to destroy Turkish tanks and armored vehicles in the battles for Afrin,” the volunteers say.

They recalled that during a press conference at the UN General Assembly in 2015, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov admitted that Russia was supplying weapons to the Kurds via the Iraqi government.

These arms shipments to Syrian Kurds were announced in the context of the alleged fight against the Islamic State. But after Turkey downed a Russian Su-24 warplane, Russia said it would provide direct military support to the Syrian Kurds.

“Apparently, Russia is still interested in the Kurdish forces continuing to burn Turkish tanks on the approaches to Afrin with the help of Russian weapons,” Informnapalm concludes.

As UNIAN reported earlier, the YPJ Kurds in Syria destroyed a Turkish Leopard 2A4 main battle tank with a shot from the Fagot ATGM.

President Trump’s Mid-East Envoy Jason Greenblatt attacks Iranian financial assistance to Gaza, which he says Hamas uses for tunnels and weapons instead of improving worsening humanitarian situation; ‘The corrupt regime in Tehran squanders the resources of the Iranian people on military adventures throughout the region,’ he tweeted; providing security overview for ministers, IDF Chief of Staff Eisenkot cautions that hostilities may break out if humanitarian situation worsens.

“Imagine what the people of Gaza could do with the $100 million Iran gives Hamas annually that Hamas uses for weapons and tunnels to attack Israel!” he tweeted, like reported by ynetnews.com.

“Iran spends almost a billion dollars a year sponsoring terrorism in Lebanon, Israel and West Bank/Gaza. This blood money only increases violence and does nothing to help the Palestinian people,” President Trump’s envoy added.

“The corrupt regime in Tehran squanders the resources of the Iranian people on military adventures throughout the region instead of investing at home and promoting peace abroad,” he accused.

IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot said at the weekly Cabinet meeting Sunday that no actors sought war or another round of hostilities in Gaza, but there was growing concern over a conflagration happening nonetheless due to the circumstances in the strip—the precarious humanitarian situation and the crisis in Hamas-Fatah relations.

Eisenkot’s statements came during a security overview he had provided the ministers as part of what has been called “deepening their knowledge base.”

The chief of staff added that efforts should be made to prevent a total humanitarian collapse in Gaza, but that humanitarian assistance—which the IDF supported—needed to be kept separate from a complete rehabilitation of Gaza, which should be conditioned on returning the bodies of IDF soldiers Oron Shaul and Hadar Goldin as well as the Israeli civilians held captive by Hamas.

The army chief further noted that the humanitarian crisis there has worsened with added intensity since Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has begun implementing a policy of disengagement from Gaza.

The crisis was especially grave, Eisenkot said, as it pertained to problems with water and power supplies. On the same topic, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu commented that Israel would be “glad if international organizations and bodies assisted Gaza.”

In a ceremony for the promotion of Lior Carmeli, head of the IDF’s Computer Service Directorate, to the rank of major-general, Eisenkot added, “The IDF’s superiority over its enemies is plain to see, but we remain aware of the very real risk of combustibility that exists on several fronts, which requires us to act with sound judgment, creativity, cunning, initiative and daring.

“I’m counting on you—especially during these complex times—to serve as an example for professional, responsible work. If we are required to operate the IDF’s forces, we will do so and conquer any foe.”

After visiting the Gaza perimeter and touring the tunnel, Greenblatt tweeted, “Hamas wastes resources on tunnels & rockets to attack Israel, instead of helping the people of Gaza by getting the lights on, the water flowing & the economy growing.”

“Hamas spews hateful rhetoric & foments a vicious cycle of violence. Gaza deserves better!” Greenblatt added.

A worsening humanitarian crisis: Gaza on the brink

The chorus of voices within Israel’s defense establishment cautioning that the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza may lead to military confrontation—or to Israel having to assume civilian responsibilities over infrastructures in the strip to prevent utter collapse—has grown exponentially in the past year.

The situation in Gaza, taken together with the buck of solving it being passed around, leaves Israel as the only capable player on the field. The Hamas-Fatah reconciliation process is mired deeply in crisis that is slowly transforming into a freeze, and both sides appear to be digging in their heels.

The current reconciliation agreement, then, seems to be about to take its place among countless previous reconciliation processes whose sole existence was on documents produced by the two parties.

Likewise, President Abbas has continued levying sanctions on Gaza, despite his decision to resume payments to Israel to restore the strip’s power levels to what they were before the sanctions were imposed.

Egypt, the broker of this latest reconciliation attempt, continues keeping the Rafah Border Crossing locked up tight, despite Hamas handing over responsibilityfor crossings to the Palestinian Authority.

Very few people pass through the Erez Border Crossing, meanwhile, as the Kerem Shalom crossing for goods is seeing less and less traffic due to dwindling orders from Gaza in light of dire financial fortunes.

International aid groups, for their part, are carrying out a dwindling number of projects in Gaza. The United Nations’ agency for Palestinian refugees, which is feeding close to a million mouths in Gaza, faces a severe cut of its budget following a decision by President Trump and it remains unclear how it will prioritize its various project in the region, and to which degree the strip’s residents will be harmed by the cut.

A group of foreign volunteer fighters have arrived at the frontline in Afrin to fight alongside the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) against Turkish army, like reported by basnews.com.

“The members of the International Brigade of YPG fighters have arrived at the front lines in Afrin,” the YPG said on Sunday.

“The attack by the Turkish state against Afrin is contrary to all international human rights instruments and laws.”

The foreign fighters are mostly veterans from the US or UK.

The Iranian Leader’s Aide on International Affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati, stressed on Wednesday that “Either US will leave Eastern Euphrates in Syria or we will force them to leave,” said during a conference for Palestine according to Iranian daily Mehr news. The statements were made amidst the Turkish attacks on Afrin, like reported by theregion.org.

Ali Akbar Velayat, “How could we have remained silent when the flag of Israel was raised during the referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan region?,” he said about the independence referendum that was held on 25 September by the Iraqi Kurds.

Velayati claimed there was a US plan for creating the Greater Middle East, and the developments in Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen as a result of it.

“Washington seeks to partition regional countries to topple them, and the recent developments in Syria are a result of this plot,” Velayati said about the presence of US troops in northern Syria and recent tensions between the US and Turkey over American support for the Kurds against ISIS.

“The US will not succeed in partitioning Syria,” he said. “Either they will leave Eastern Euphrates in Syria or we will kick them out of there. Our presence in Syria and Iraq are upon the request of the governments of these two countries,” he said.

Damascus, Ankara and Moscow were alarmed by reports that the US would create a 30,000-border force in northern Syria.

However, later the US denied it had plans to create a border force.

Iraq’s neighbours Turkey and Iran backed Baghdad against the Kurds in Iraq, fearing their own Kurdish minorities demanding more rights.

Now both Iran and Turkey seem to be also demanding an exit for US troops in northern Syria.

In January 2018, the Islamic Republic of Iran experienced a week of intense antigovernment protests in approximately eighty cities throughout the country. Before they were eventually suppressed—with over 4,000 people arrested and twenty-five killed in the process—tens of thousands of Iranian citizens frustrated by economic malaise and political and social repression took to the streets. They chanted slogans such as “Let Syria be, think about our plight,” and “Neither Gaza, nor Lebanon, let my life be sacrificed for Iran.” These and similar slogans referred to the Islamic Republic’s multibillion dollar economic and military assistance to its regional allies. Despite the growing resentment this assistance has spurred at home, Tehran is unlikely to reassess its long-term regional strategies, like reported by carnegieendowment.org.

As one of the largest and most populous countries in the Middle East, Iran has naturally sought to fill the numerous power vacuums that emerged in the region as a result of the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, coupled with ongoing Arab upheavals. The cultivation of Shia foreign legions has been a critical element of this strategy, helping Tehran expand its influence in the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories), Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen. It has often expanded its footprint under the pretext of fighting (Sunni) radicalism.

While antigovernment protests may have humbled Iran domestically, Tehran seemingly remains confident about its regional prowess. In a November 2017 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Major General Qassem Suleimani—Iran’s most powerful military commander who oversees the extraterritorial operations of the Quds Force unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)—reportedly wrote, “As I am completing the operation liberating Abu Kamal [a Syrian town bordering Iraq], the last bastion of ISIS [the self-proclaimed Islamic State extremist group], I am declaring the end of this evil and cursed organization.” Suleimani’s letter goes on to express gratitude to “Iranian, Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese, Afghan, and Pakistani guardians of the shrine”—Islamic Republic lingo for Shia foreign fighters in Syria—who sacrifice their lives defending the “life and honor of Muslims.” Responding to Suleimani’s letter, Khamenei too offered thanks to “holy warrior brethren from Iraq, Syria, and others,” and congratulated them on their victory.

People from these countries have a history of helping to fight in the Islamic Republic’s wars. Of the approximately 250,000 Iranians killed during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), 4,565 were foreign nationals killed wearing Iranian uniforms. Most of them were Shia Afghan immigrants to Iran, Shia Iraqi refugees in Iran, or Shia Iraqi prisoners of war who had joined the Badr Corps of the IRGC, which Tehran had created after the 1979 revolution. A much smaller number were Pakistani, Indian, Bahraini, and Kuwaiti Shia who volunteered to support the war effort.

Since January 2012, almost the same nationalities have provided the bulk of Shia foreign fighters under Suleimani’s command in Syria and Iraq. Based on a meticulous reading of press reports of funeral services held in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon for Shia foreign fighters killed in Syria and Iraq, 535 Iranian nationals were killed in combat in Syria between January 2012 and January 2018. In comparison, at least 841 Afghan, 112 Iraqi, 1,213 Lebanese, and 153 Pakistani Shia foreign fighters were killed fighting in Syria during the same period.

In Iraq, this author only registered 3 Shia Pakistani nationals and 42 Iranian nationals killed in combat between March 2013 and January 2018. During the same period, a minimum 2,433 Shia Iraqi nationals were killed in that country.

These numbers must of course be treated as the absolute minimum that can be documented using open-source information, and the real numbers may be somewhat higher. The real Iraqi numbers are doubtlessly significantly higher, and are gradually released to the public as Iraqi authorities get a better grasp on the magnitude of their losses.

Regardless of the exact scale of the losses, closer scrutiny of Iran’s Shia foreign legions offers a fuller picture of who they are, how Tehran uses them to further its strategic interests, and what the limits to their usefulness are.

LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH

Chief and oldest among the Islamic Republic’s Shia foreign legions is Hezbollah, which has become the most powerful political actor in Lebanon and the most formidable military force in the Levant. Hezbollah is also the Iranian ally with the highest total number of combat fatalities in Syria. At a minimum, 1,213 Hezbollah fighters, including 75 officers, have been killed in combat in Syria since the first was killed on September 30, 2012.

Hezbollah’s leadership initially dismissed reports that it had a military presence in Syria. Given that its raison d’être has always been resistance against Israel, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah naturally had difficulties explaining why it was fighting fellow Arabs in Syria on Iran’s behalf. But as funeral services in Lebanon for Hezbollah fighters received greater press coverage, the militia and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad came to embrace Hezbollah’s military presence in Syria.

Tehran initially preferred to deploy Hezbollah forces—rather than Iranian forces—in Syria. A comparison of the dates when Iranian and Lebanese nationals were killed in combat in Syria further suggests that Hezbollah fighters were not fighting under Iranian command, and instead operated independently of the Quds Force.

Hezbollah’s high mortality rate in Syria forced Tehran to deploy the IRGC and quickly assemble additional Shia militias, allowing Hezbollah to maintain a sizable domestic presence in Lebanon. A significant weakening of Hezbollah forces could tempt rival Lebanese militias to challenge their dominance. Hezbollah also faces formidable challenges on its southern flank: the Israeli Air Force has on several occasions bombed arms transports from Syria to Lebanon, and it cannot disregard the risk that the Israel Defense Forces will take advantage of Hezbollah’s engagement in the Syrian civil war to attack the militia’s positions in Lebanon. This risk only increases as Hezbollah expands its arsenal and Israel feels further threatened.

The preservation of the Assad regime demonstrates Hezbollah’s capacity as a formidable Iranian proxy. But the tenuous balance of power in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s inherent vulnerabilities to Israel, and the need for larger-scale deployments of IRGC and allied Shia militias in Syria reflect the limits of Hezbollah’s capabilities.

THE AFGHAN FATEMIYOUN DIVISION

With 841 combat fatalities since the first on August 23, 2013, the Afghan Fatemiyoun Division has suffered the second-largest number of losses in Syria among Tehran’s Shia foreign legions. According to the official Islamic Republic historiography, reflected in the Kayhan newspaper,the Fatemiyoun Division was established by Ali-Reza Tavassoli and twenty-five of his friends. They volunteered to fight in Syria to protect the Sayyida Zaynab Mosque—a prominent Shia pilgrimage site in the suburbs of Damascus. Kayhan further claims that Tavassoli managed to mobilize about 5,000 Shia Afghan nationals who were already residents of Damascus.

Kayhan’saccount is false. Tavassoli moved to Iran in 1984 to join the Abouzar Brigade, which was the Afghan branch of the IRGC’s Office of Liberation Movements (Daftar-e Nehzatha-ye Rahaei-Bakhsh)—a precursor of the Quds Force. After the end of the war with Iraq, Tavassoli spent some time in Afghanistan fighting against the Taliban in the 1990s and was in Lebanon during the 2006 war. There is, however, no evidence that Tavassoli resided permanently in Afghanistan, let alone mobilized Afghan nationals for the war effort in Syria.

Apart from this, all slain Shia Afghan fighters are buried in Iran. This suggests the IRGC recruited them in exchange for permanent residence permits and Iranian citizenship for their families

Kayhan’s claim that the Fatemiyoun Division operates independently from Iranian forces is also false. The Fatemiyoun Division is an integral part of the IRGC Quds Force. This is demonstrated by the fact that there are Quds Force officers, including midlevel commanders, among the Fatemiyoun losses.

The Islamic Republic’s ability to mobilize a significant Shia Afghan force to fight in Syria may allow Tehran to one day employ these same forces to further its interests in Afghanistan. But the Fatemiyoun Division’s disproportionately high casualties and reliance on Iranian midlevel commanders reflect its limited usefulness for Tehran.

THE PAKISTANI ZEINABIYOUN BRIGADE

Little is known about the Shia Pakistani Zeinabiyoun Brigade, which has reportedly suffered 153 combat fatalities in Syria and three in Iraq. Hiding from the prying eyes of Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence, this militia avoids the limelight. According to a Fars News Agency background article from July 24, 2016, this militia was formed not so much because of the civil war in Syria, but in the wake of systematic persecution of the Shia minority in Pakistan.

The July 23, 2016, issue of Panjereh weekly, which is no longer available to the public but was posted online by Martyr Rahimi International Institute on March 3, 2017, expanded on the Fars News report. In an interview, a man called Abbas, reportedly the chief Zeinabiyoun commander Seyed Abbas Mousavi, claimed that Pakistani Shia have been in touch with the IRGC Quds Force “for almost fifteen years.” That puts the beginning of the relationship around the time of the 2001 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and the collapse of Taliban rule. Abbas further claimed that the Pakistani Shia wrote a letter to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei asking for his opinion concerning their participation in the war in Syria, to which Khamenei orally responded: “Whoever is capable of performing duty, should do it to the best of his ability.”

However, al-Mustafa University in Qom, Iran, seems to be the real recruiting ground for Pakistani Shia fighters. This author has identified several Shia Pakistani graduates from this particular university among the Zeinabiyoun fatalities in Syria.

That said, the relatively low number of Zeinabiyoun combat fatalities in Syria is an indicator of the small size of the militia in comparison with other Shia militias and its limited usefulness in Iran’s regional power projection.

SHIA IRAQI MILITIAS

The Islamic Republic’s support for Iraqi Shia militias dates back to the 1979 revolution and Tehran’s creation of the Badr Corps of the IRGC, composed of Iraqi refugees and prisoners of war. Ever since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Tehran has ostensibly sought to encourage Iraqi Shia unity, but Iran simultaneously encourages and contributes to the formation of numerous Shia militia groups in Iraq.

While most of these armed groups are now formally organized under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi), they have remained independent entities outside the control of the civilian government in Baghdad. The rivalry between Iraqi Shia may not necessarily be detrimental to Tehran’s agenda. Lack of unity between Iraqi Shia has provided the Islamic Republic with ample opportunities to shape Iraqi politics. This also makes Iran’s Qassem Suleimani a central player in Iraqi politics, and the authority to whom Iraqi Shia militiamen defer.

Apart from their significant casualties in Iraq—the real magnitude of which remains unclear—the Iraqi Shia seem to have suffered very few losses in Syria. The relatively low number suggests their combat participation in the Syrian civil war primarily serves political propaganda rather than military purposes. It not only communicates the message of transnational Shia solidarity under Tehran’s guidance, but also sends a message that the IRGC and its proxies can simultaneously engage in combat operations in two different theaters of war—Iraq and Syria—and have been doing so since 2015.

IRAN’S SHIA FOREIGN LEGIONS SHAPE THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Almost four decades after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the regime in Tehran is facing the mixed results of its revolutionary activities.

On the one hand, the Shia militias that the regime patiently cultivated over the years have helped Iran’s allies project power by force, via the ballot box, or both, in fractured societies with dysfunctional governments. This is not just a burden-sharing arrangement reducing the number of Iranian combat fatalities in regional wars. It also brings Tehran’s allies into government offices and secures for the Islamic Republic an overland corridor connecting western Afghanistan in Central Asia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria to Lebanon on the shores of the Mediterranean.

Iran’s regional adversaries have only a limited ability to turn to radical Sunni militias to counter the Islamic Republic’s expansionism, given that many Sunni militants are intent on overthrowing Sunni Arab regimes, including Saudi Arabia. However, the combined forces of the Islamic Republic’s Shia foreign legions and the Russian Air Force seem to have prevailed, at least for the time being.

Yet, on the other hand, the repercussions of Iran’s regional adventures are a source of growing domestic resentment, provoking antiregime protests that target the Islamic Republic’s financial and military support to those same Shia militias. For the time being, the Islamic Republic seems to have suppressed the antigovernment protests, and there is no indication of the regime backing down from its regional ambitions or reducing the support it provides to its Shia foreign legions. This in turn is likely to ignite the next round of antiregime protests, and the very source of the Islamic Republic’s regional power may become a threat to its survival at home.