Recent gains by the Assad regime in its ongoing northern offensive — in particular, the recapture of the Shiite towns of Nubl and Zahra — pose a significant geostrategic threat to Turkey and the opposition groups based in and around Azaz. The regime and its allies are now in a favorable position to cut the lines of communication between the Turkish border areas and the rebel-held city of Aleppo. Such an outcome now seems inevitable given major Russian and Iranian support for regime forces. As a matter of fact, the regime, backed by the Russian air-ground campaign, has been successfully advancing towards the Turkish frontier areas at the time of writing. In this regard, it should be noted that the Russian air force detachment in Syria enjoys high sortie rates as a result of Hmeymim Airbase’s proximity and an effective sortie-to-strike ratio stemming from good intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). An expansion of Russian military advisors on the ground has enabled efficient coordination between close air support platforms and advancing Syrian Arab Army units, while the elite Iranian Quds Forces and Lebanese Hezbollah drive forward fueled by sectarianism and experience in hybrid conflicts.

More alarmingly, Ankara may soon face a menacing combination of hostile forces along its southern borders: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-affiliated YPG forces, the self-proclaimed Islamic State, and the Syrian Arab Army. The only Ankara-friendly groups near the Turkish border would be the rebel fighters in Idlib province, who would be surrounded by Latakia in the south and Aleppo in the northeast.

Under these tense circumstances, Russia accused Turkey of preparing for a military incursion into Syria. In response — having already drawn attention to Russian “crimes” in Syria — Ankara firmly stated that it had the right to take necessary measures for its national security. This rhetorical exchange raised eyebrows about prospects of a possible Turkish incursion into Syria. Yet while a limited Turkish intervention in Syria might seem likely, Russian presence in Syria remains a highly complicating and dissuasive factor.

Turkey’s Longest Week: Getting Caught Between Tough Choices

Ankara closely monitors the battle around Aleppo, as developments in that theater could lead to irrevocable setbacks for Turkey’s position in Syria. At the time of writing, sources on the ground reported that the Syrian Arab Army had advanced to within 10 kilometers of Tal Rifaat, the last defensive line for pro-Turkey armed opposition before the border city of Azaz. Furthermore, experience suggests that the fall of Aleppo could trigger a massive influx of refugees into Turkey, which is already hosting close to 2 million Syrians. Notably, even the regime’s march towards the northern frontier areas has led to a new surge of refugees at the Turkish border. The heightened usage of unguided munitions in Russian and Syrian airstrikes ensures high civilian casualties and contributes to greater refugee flows.

In strictly operational terms, Turkey possesses the ability to launch a limited incursion and create a small safe haven on its border. Deployed along the southeastern border areas, the Turkish 2nd Army has long been at the epicenter of Turkish defense modernization. The 2nd Army’s 5th Armored Brigade in Gaziantep and the 20th Armored Brigade in Sanliurfa have been reinforced since the outset of the Syrian civil war and currently enjoy high combat readiness — both could serve ably as principal maneuver units in any limited incursion. Battalion-level detachments from the army’s fully professional commando brigades have been deployed in support of these armored brigades. The Turkish armed forces have also deployed robust artillery forces along the border, predominantly equipped with 155mm Firtina howitzers with a 30 to 40 kilometer range. Finally, the Turkish air force operates airbases in close proximity to the Syrian border, allowing it to generate long on-station times and high sortie rates.

Primary Drawback: The Russian Factor

The Russian military deployment presents the most significant challenge to a Turkish incursion into Syria. Any Turkish ground incursion would require close air support from Turkish army aviation attack helicopters and air interdiction operations flown by the Turkish air force. Though air superiority would not be a prerequisite for operating Turkish rotary and fixed wing assets in Syrian territory, the Turkish air force would have to deny air superiority to the Russian air force, at the very least.

The operational necessity of denying Russian air superiority could lead to direct Turkish–Russian air-to-air clashes. Problematically, the Russian air force detachment in Syria is now much stronger than it was in November 2015, when a Russian Su-24 was downed by the Turkish air force for violating Turkish airspace. The Kremlin responded to that Turkish move with further escalation: Russia deployed S-400 long-range air and missile defense systems, additional Su-34 strike fighters, and extremely capable Su-35S air superiority fighters. Currently, over 20 air superiority “Flankers”(SU-27SM3, Su-30SM, and Su-35S) and air-to-air capable Su-34 Fullbacks pose a deterrent threat to any Turkish operations within Syrian airspace. Furthermore, the Russian air wing in Syria now operates under a robust, layered air defense umbrella provided by deployed S-400s, SA-17s, and SA-22s coupled with advanced electronic warfare capabilities, such as the recently spotted Krasukha-4 that could blind Turkish command and control systems and aircraft.

In the absence of air superiority, Turkish maneuver units would face significant challenges in an extremely hostile environment that could result in high casualties. If Turkey opts to reduce risk for its ground forces by denying Russian air superiority, the situation could escalate dangerously. The Turkish air force’s 151st Squadron in Merzifon is assigned to the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) duties with its AGM-88 high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM) that could be effective against some Russian air defenses and ground-based electronic warfare assets. Yet the Russian anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) bubble in Syria and the eastern Mediterranean penetrates several hundred kilometers into Turkish territory, holding all Turkish combat air patrols (CAPs) at risk. Further, open-source intelligence suggests a significant shift in the payload configurations of Russian aircraft in Syria. Russian strike packages are now flying with more escort aircraft and an increased number of air-to-air missiles. In a confrontation, beyond visual range (BVR) combat with AIM-120C and AA-10 or AA-12 missiles would be the determining factor, though Russian air superiority fighters could certainly seek to exploit their kinematic advantages by seeking within visual range (WVR) combat.

Even more importantly, the risk of a Turkish–Russian escalation inevitably brings NATO into the picture. If Ankara acts unilaterally by opening an out-of-area front in Syria, this likely would not be subject to the Article V umbrella, unless Russia then attacked Turkish territory. As such, the Turkish–Russian military balance in a prolonged conflict would become a matter of true concern. Ankara likely cannot rely upon any tangible support from its NATO allies that it could interpret as encouragement for even a limited incursion into Syria. Although the Turkish elite could still opt for cooperating with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, some of which openly voiced interest in a ground deployment to Syria, such a ”coalition of the willing” would offer no tangible and deterrent protection to Turkey as NATO would.

The Problematic Home-front

Beyond the challenges posed by the Russian contingent in Syria and a lack of political-military support from NATO allies, Turkey’s internal terrorism problem continues to devolve. The PKK terrorist network has altered its tactics, techniques, and procedures in recent years. The PKK now pursues an urban warfare-driven operational approach to the decades-long low-intensity conflict through intensive use of improvised explosive devices, barricades, and snipers to create dangerous kill zones. The PKK is even employing some “mercenary” foreign snipers, based on recent captures by the Turkish security forces. At the time of writing, Turkish security forces still run counter-terrorism missions under urban warfare conditions, particularly in the southeastern districts of Sur in Diyarbakir and Cizre in Sirnak. Under the problematic internal security situation, launching a land incursion into Syria, especially into Syrian Kurd-dominated areas, would be highly risky.

Conclusion

In sum, Turkey seems to be caught between geostrategic necessities of launching a limited incursion and the twin risks of an uncontrollable escalation with Russia and the domestic terrorist threat. In the absence of robust support by its NATO allies, Ankara’s decision will depend on the volatile political-military calculus in Syria and the trajectory of the ongoing northern offensive.

Without a doubt, any land incursion would significantly differ from the Turkish cross-border military operations into northern Iraq in the 1990s. In Syria, the Turkish air force would have to operate in contested airspace and the Turkish army would have to confront hybrid threats. The campaign would require planning to overcome the Russian A2/AD systems and hold ground defensively instead of repelling hostile groups for a limited time.

Finally, predicting Russia’s possible moves will remain a great concern in Ankara. The Kremlin’s intentions for further escalation or even primitive revenge should be taken into consideration. Yet an over-cautious approach could end with the complete exclusion of Turkey from the Syrian chessboard. Ankara is stuck at the crossroads as it considers how to make its most critical political-military calculation in Syria yet.

warontherocks.com

On February 4, 2016, the chief spokesman for the Saudi military announced that Saudi Arabia would be willing to contribute ground forces to the campaign against the so-called Islamic State in Syria, if asked to do so by the leadership of the 65-country anti-Islamic State coalition led by the United States. Claiming equivalence with the Saudi-led campaign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen, the spokesman explained that Saudi Arabia was very aware that the Islamic State could not be defeated from the air alone. On February 7, the UAE, while stressing that its number would be small and its role limited, also offered to send troops as part of a U.S.-led ground force against the Islamic State, repeating an offer it had already made last year. 

These remarks from the Gulf states may have come in response to criticism last month from U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter that most coalition partners were doing nothing at all to help the military campaign. Both the White House and the Pentagon have welcomed Saudi Arabia’s offer and Secretary Carter will be in Brussels this week to discuss with all members of the coalition how to step up the fight. 

The third country to openly discuss sending troops into Syria, and one that has already sent a limited training contingent into Iraq, is Turkey. President Erdogan is reported to have said last week, as he returned from a swing through Latin America, that he had made a mistake in 2003 by not contributing more actively to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and that Turkey should play a more dominant role if a similar situation arose in Syria. Erdogan is certainly more concerned about assuring Turkey’s role in regional politics than defeating the Islamic State, but with the sharp disagreement between Turkey and the U.S. over the role that the Kurds might play in the fighting, it is hard to see how the two countries could join forces.

The differing objectives among the countries that are most likely to contribute to a coalition ground force continue to bedevil the alliance. If for Turkey the conflict is mainly about Assad and the Kurds, then for Saudi Arabia it is mainly about Iran, and for the UAE it is mainly about its relationship with Saudi Arabia and the United States. These competing or overlapping interests will test the coalition as it contemplates next steps, especially now that the rebel forces backed by its member states have suffered serious setbacks around Aleppo and in the south. The United States’ objectives are focused first on the Islamic State and secondly on re-establishing a measure of regional stability. It already has Special Forces fighting in Iraq, as does the United Kingdom, whose main interest is in showing its allies and enemies alike a measure of competent engagement. Both countries’ forces have taken casualties, including at least one death on the U.S. side. 

But even though the whole world is opposed to the Islamic State, the two other countries that have troops in Iraq and Syria, Iran and Russia, see things differently than the coalition. Although Iranian forces have helped push the Islamic State out of territory in Iraq, they have only fought other rebel groups in Syria. For Tehran, fighting the Islamic State is less important than strengthening the pro-Iranian governments in Baghdad and Damascus. Russia is in a similar position; its air power has finally proved its worth in support of Assad’s campaign against rebel groups, and Russian forces have been engaged on the ground alongside the Syrian army. Still, however, the Islamic State remains of secondary concern.

Another problem facing the coalition is the legal basis on which it might attack the Islamic State on the ground. Although Iraq has welcomed U.S. and UK contingents, it will not welcome Saudi troops or additional Turkish forces. Syria likewise will not accept any coalition troops unless they attack targets selected by the Syrian government. This rules out any ground intervention unless mandated by the United Nations Security Council, which will not reach such an agreement any time in the foreseeable future. 

Furthermore, if coalition forces enter Syria, they will likely meet Iran-backed militias, or even Iranian troops, and will be vulnerable to Russian attacks—increasing the risk of regional conflict. The Syrian government—believing that the objective would be to force regime change, not just drive out the Islamic State—has already maintained that if any troops from the Gulf intervene in the country, they will return home in coffins. The Iranians have also scoffed at the idea of a Saudi intervention, without considering that the offer to fight the Islamic State might provide a possible area for cooperation. 

In the meantime, thousands more refugees have fled towards Turkey and Jordan. Turkey is setting up camps on the Syrian side of the border, trying again to establish the safe zone that it called for earlier in the war. But these efforts could come to nothing quite quickly if the Syrian army is able to continue its advance to the north, pushing a desperate population ahead of it. Sooner or later, something must break in Syria beyond the spirit of its people, but it is not yet clear what.

soufangroup.com

Forces loyal to Hadi backed by coalition Apache helicopters lay siege to Aden’s central Mansura district, clash with Al-Qaeda militants.

Yemeni forces clashed Tuesday with Al-Qaeda militants in Aden as the Saudi-led coalition provided air cover, in a bid to drive the jihadists out of the city, security officials said.

Al-Qaeda controls part of the southern port city which has become the temporary headquarters of the government of President Abedrabbo Mansour Hadi as it battles to retake large parts of Yemen from Shiite Huthi rebels.

Forces loyal to Hadi laid siege early Tuesday to Aden’s central Mansura district and clashed with militants, while coalition Apache helicopters provided air cover, security officials in the city said.

At least two gunmen were killed in the fighting, the officials said.

Residents said warplanes also hovered overhead and that they feared for their lives.

“We live in terror… We got rid of the Huthis and now Al-Qaeda militants have come to turn our lives into hell,” said one resident.

Loyalists backed by a Saudi-led coalition have since July recaptured Aden and four other southern provinces from the Shiite rebels, who continue to control Sanaa and other northern regions.

Al-Qaeda and the rival jihadist Islamic State group have taken advantage of the weakness of the central government to gain ground in southern cities such as Aden.

Both have a presence in Yemen’s second city, where jihadists occupy government buildings and are seen patrolling several districts and intimidating civilians.

They have claimed a string of attacks and assassinations in recent months.

middle-east-online.com

Saudi Press Agency (SPA) reported that ISIS militant group claimed responsibility for an explosion that damaged a car in the Saudi capital Riyadh on Monday. The incident took place because of a bomb that had been affixed to the vehicle by an ISIS member.

The Saudi citizen said that his car had been damaged by a blast on Monday while parked in front of his house in the city’s Al-Azizia district, SPA reported citing a police spokesman. The blast caused no casualties; however, some nearby vehicles were damaged.

ISIS, which controls territory in Iraq and Syria, has staged a series of attacks in the kingdom. In 2014, Saudi Arabia declared the group a terrorist organization and apprehended hundreds of its supporters. Furthermore, it has been participating in the fight against extremist organizations in several countries.

In a statement released on the Telegram social messaging platform, ISIS’s Amaq news agency said the blast was triggered by a “sticky bomb” attached to the vehicle of a member of the Saudi armed forces, the SITE monitoring service reported.

A Saudi interior ministry spokesman was not immediately available for comment.

Among the attacks by ISIS was the incident of January 29th, when a Shi’ite Muslim mosque in the al-Ahsa district in Eastern Province was attacked killing four people and injuring 18. It was among a string of attacks claimed by the ISIS- affiliated jihadists that killed around 50 Saudis in the past year.

aawsat.com

The Iraqi army is deploying thousands of soldiers to a northern base in preparation for operations to retake the Islamic State group’s hub of Mosul, officials said on Monday.

IS seized Mosul in June 2014 and except for air strikes has held Iraq’s second city largely unopposed for over 18 months as the country’s security forces battled the jihadists in other areas.

“Units from the Iraqi army have begun arriving to a military base near the Makhmur district to start launching initial military operations toward Mosul,” a staff brigadier general told AFP on condition of anonymity.

“There are three brigades located in that base now,” and their number will eventually reach 4,500 soldiers, the officer said, adding that troops from the 15th and 16th division will take part in operations to retake Mosul.

Makhmur lies around 70 kilometres (45 miles) southeast of Mosul.

Iraq’s Defense Minister Khaled al-Obaidi who visited Makhmour on Saturday did reportedly discuss the deployment of troops with Kurdish military officials.

Shakhawan Abdullah, a Kurdish lawmaker and head of the Iraqi parliamentary security committee told Rudaw that “the deployment comes with Kurdistan’s consent and coordination, and it is also temporary.”

He added that the military base and the control of the front will be given back to Peshmerga forces after the Mosul operation.

Peshmerga commander of the Makhmour front Gen. Najat Ali said that the Iraqi troops may arrive at the front on Wednesday this week, adding meanwhile that he does not expect Mosul to be retaken this year.

The initial aim is to completely sever IS supply lines between Mosul and areas farther south including Hawijah in Kirkuk province and areas near Baiji in Salahuddin, the officer said.

A Kurdish official said that most of the soldiers deployed to the area, which is located within territory controlled by Iraqi Kurdistan, are ethnic Kurds from the Iraqi army.

“These forces came with the approval of the presidency and government of the Kurdistan region of Iraq,” said Halgurd Hekmat, a spokesman from the ministry responsible for the autonomous Kurdistan region’s forces.

The base will be for both soldiers and aircraft, Hekmat said.

Multiple Iraqi divisions collapsed during the early days of IS’s 2014 offensive, which overran large areas north and west of Baghdad.

With the help of US-led air strikes and training, Iraqi forces have since regained significant areas from IS, but Mosul will be the most difficult battle of the war against the jihadists.

ekurd.net

themoscowtimes.com

Fierce clashes have broken out between militants of Daesh and the al-Nusra Front terrorist group near the Syrian-Lebanese border. Both sides are sustaining casualties, a source close to Hezbollah told RIA Novosti on Monday.

“Clashes resumed between Daesh and al-Nusra Front militants at the ad-Deb Valley in the mountainous region of Arsal,” the source said.

In late-January, Daesh terrorists seized an al-Nusra military camp and captured six militants.

According to the source, meanwhile in Damascus suburbs the Syrian Army alongside the National Defense Forces (NDF) are engaged in fighting against militant groups in the districts of Marj and Fadaya.

The Syrian army advanced towards the Turkish border on Monday in a major offensive backed by Russia and Iran that rebels say now threatens the future of their nearly five-year-old insurrection against President Bashar al-Assad.

Iranian backed-militias played a key role on the ground as Russian jets intensified what rebels call a scorched earth policy that has allowed the military back into the strategic northern area for the first time in more than two years.

“Our whole existence is now threatened, not just losing more ground,” said Abdul Rahim al-Najdawi from Liwa al-Tawheed, an insurgent group.

“They are advancing and we are pulling back because in the face of such heavy aerial bombing we must minimise our losses.”

The Syrian military and its allies were almost five km from the rebel-held town of Tal Rafaat, which has brought them to around 25 km from the Turkish border, the rebels, a residents and a conflict monitor said.

The assault around the city of Aleppo in northern Syria has prompted tens of thousands to flee towards Turkey, which is already sheltering more than 2.5 million Syrians, the world’s largest refugee population.

In the last two days escalating Russian bombardment of towns north-west of Aleppo, Anadan and Haritan, brought several thousand more, according to a resident in the town of Azaz.

Rebel-held areas in and around Aleppo are still home to 350,000 people, and aid workers have said they could soon fall to the government. Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan was quoted at the weekend as saying Turkey was under threat.

Damascus says it wants to take back full control of Aleppo, Syria’s largest city before the civil war erupted five years ago. It would be a huge strategic prize for Assad’s government in a conflict that has killed at least 250,000 people across the country and driven 11 million from their homes.

After around a week of heavy Russian air strikes, Syrian government troops and their allies broke through rebel defences to reach two Shi’ite towns in northern Aleppo province on Wednesday, choking opposition supply lines from Turkey.

SUPPLY LINE

The Syrian army’s success in opening a route to the Shi’ite towns of Nubul and Zahraa enabled it to cut a main highway that linked rebel held areas in the northern countryside of Aleppo with the eastern part of Aleppo held by insurgents since 2012.

The latest gains by the Syrian government brings it to the closest point to the Turkish border area since August 2013, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said.

The capture of the towns of Mayer and then Kafin, just north of Nubul and Zahraa, in the past 24 hrs have opened the road towards Tal Rifaat, the next focus of the army assault. The capture of that would leave only the town of Azaz before the Turkish border itself.

The prospect of the loss of Azaz, just a few miles from the Bab al Salama border crossing, would virtually wipe out the insurgents from their main stronghold in northwest Syria.

Russian bombing has for weeks targeted rebel routes to the main border crossing that was once a major gateway from Europe and Turkey to the Gulf and Iraq.

Since it fell to insurgents, the crossing has been both a major commercial lifeline and arms supply route for rebel-held areas in Idlib and Aleppo provinces.

The army’s advance has also been indirectly helped by Kurdish-led YPG militias who control the city of Afrin, south west of Azaz. They have seized a string of villages including Ziyara and Khreiybeh in the last few days, rebels said.

The Observatory also said they had secured the villages of Deir Jamal and Maranaz from Islamist insurgents.

Four months of Russian air strikes have tipped the momentum of the war Assad’s way. With Moscow’s help and allies including Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iranian fighters, the Syrian army is regaining areas on key fronts in the west.

cyprus-mail.com

Islamic State militants crucified a teenage boy and left the body on display in Raqqa in one of the terror organization’s latest public executions.

The 17-year-old was accused of accepting money for filming Islamic State training sites and a placard in Arabic was hung around his neck telling people of his alleged crime.

Images of the bloody and battered teen’s body tied to a cross in the central square of the Islamic State’s declared capital went viral after leaders accused him of receiving 500 Turkish lira per photograph of the Islamic State’s military base in Raqqa.

While the Islamic State has repeatedly used crucifixion as punishment for those who have worked against them or violated Sharia law.

At the same time, people under Islamic State rule have tried to document the group’s violent methods in Raqqa.

The group crucified nine men in Aleppo last June, and routinely kill even fellow jihadists, if the group’s leaders think certain people are not devoted enough.

upi.com

Building on the momentum from the successful pursuit of the nuclear deal with Iran, the P5+1 should now combine pressure and diplomacy to deal with Iran’s missile program.

Missiles became an essential component of Iran’s military posture during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, in which Iran received intensive Iraqi missile and air bombardments. Tehran started to build a missile arsenal because it could not get technical support for its largely U.S.-made modern aircraft. Over the years, Iran acquired Soviet-made or copied missiles from North Korea, Libya and Syria.

Although Iran today has the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East, both Saudi Arabia and Israel have substantial missile programs and had deployed longer-range missiles before Iran. Moreover, Israel is believed to arm its longer-range missiles with nuclear warheads.

The low accuracy of Iran’s missiles has limited their military utility. More recently Iran appears to be placing a priority on accuracy over range—most logical if Iran’s paths to nuclear warheads is blocked by its agreement to last July’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and if it has no intention to engage in long-distance nuclear terrorism.

The scope of Iran’s missile program is worrisome. The most capable weapon under development is the Sejjil-2 medium-range solid fuel ballistic missile which has a somewhat greater range (2,000-2,500 km) and a significantly improved survivability over Iran’s operational liquid fuel ballistic missiles. The intelligence community has provided no evidence that Iran is actively developing an intermediate range or intercontinental ballistic missile.

How to explain this Iranian pursuit of missiles? First, with Iran’s outdated air force, deterrence and defense in the face of the potential threats Tehran sees from Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United States depend heavily on its missile forces. Second, Iran’s military and hardliners have an institutional commitment to a missile program already costing over $1 billion. Hardliners might become even more determined to expand that arsenal as Iran’s multi-billion dollar nuclear program shrinks. Third, Iran has a strong nationalist-inspired commitment to become a modern, technologically and scientifically advanced nation.

How can Iran’s missile program be checked? The United States has just announced sanctions against eleven institutions and individuals linked to Iran’s missile program. More measures can be expected to tighten controls over imports of missile components that are hard to produce indigenously. But that path could press Iran to devote even more resources to its missile program as U.S. sanctions build, thereby creating a dynamic similar to what the United States experienced with Iran’s nuclear program. In the nuclear case, Iran responded to new sanctions by installing more centrifuges and raising the level of enrichment. As well, a strenuous punitive program against missiles could place at risk Iran’s full compliance with the far more important JCPOA that blocks nuclear warheads for its missiles.

The door is now open to explore with Iran constraints on its missile program in return for lifting UN Security Council missile-related sanctions. Iran’s decision to limit dramatically its nuclear program was based in part on a cost-benefit analysis. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, seemed to conclude that it was better to strengthen Iran’s economy than to continue an unrestricted and very costly nuclear program with high risks and limited benefits. If President Rouhani can continue in this new direction, he and the supreme leader could find it similarly smart to contain the high-cost strategic missile systems that have only limited value without nuclear warheads and to negotiate benefits for Iran.

Persuading Iran to negotiate limits on missiles—a core element of its defense system—would require a significant return for Tehran. Also, U.S. negotiations to constrain Iran’s missile program would create opposition from Israel and the Gulf States just as diplomatic efforts to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon did over the past years. But an Iran without nuclear weapons and without a strategic offensive missile delivery system would be a major step forward for regional security.

The objective should be to freeze the current range of Iran’s missiles (around 2,000 km) to complement the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the JCPOA. To encourage such restraint, the United States and its allies might offer to increase civil and scientific collaboration in many areas, including on Iran’s space program, increasing the chances that Iran’s technological progress is not directed towards military development. Such negotiations could eventually become part of new regional security discussions including parallel regional missile constraints.

A few years ago reaching a nuclear deal with Iran seemed a pipe dream to most national security experts. The negotiations with Iran began with an apparent unbridgeable gap and irreconcilable needs of each side. But creative and persistent diplomacy backed by strength and sanctions demonstrated that even very difficult problems can be solved peacefully. The United States should now lead a follow-on diplomatic effort to cap missile development in Iran—and the region.

nationalinterest.org