Islamic State vigilantes in the western side of Mosul are obscuring any signs identifying them, fearing that they might make them obvious targets for security forces, according to iraqinews.com .

A local source in Nineveh told Alsumaria News on Tuesday that members of the extremist group’s Hisbah (vigilantism) bodies began to remove the service’s logos from their vehicles, fearing that they could make them easy targets for security forces-guided drones that have killed many members recently.

Hisbah committees are Islamic State’s religious law enforcement arm, which arrests violators of the group’s rules and carries out sentences issued against them.

IS militants have occupied Mosul since they emerged in 2014 to proclaim an “Islamic Caliphate” in Iraq. A three-month-old military campaign by Iraqi joint government forces, backed by troops and advisers from a U.S.-led coalition, has managed to recapture the eastern section of the city, and is preparing to cross the Tigris River, which bisects the city, to recapture the western region, where militants still maintain a majority of districts inhabited by nearly 750.000 civilians.

The extremist group has lost many of its senior leaders and personnel over the past three months, and reports of infighting and division within its ranks have been recurrent.

The recent death of Iran’s former president Hashemi Rafsanjani has triggered fears that Iran’s reformist camp has also been fatally wounded. Many are concerned that without Rafsanjani’s imposing presence, current President Hassan Rouhani will be overpowered by the conservative religious establishment and a controlling IRGC. However, Rouhani may in fact emerge stronger from Rafsanjani’s death, like reported by washingtonpost.com.

Rafsanjani — along with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei — was one of the last remaining founders of the Islamic Republic in 1979. His last position as head of the expediency discernment council did not give him much executive power. But his presence in key roles over 38 years of the Islamic Republic  made him one of the few symbols of stability in the Iranian political context.

In his last years, Rafsanjani retained strong ties to dignified Shiite clerical figures and the Shiite Seminary. That strong bond protected him from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the conservative former president, and from other radical forces who wanted him out. Rafsanjani initially was a principal supporter of Ayatollah Khamenei — and helped ensure his selection as Iran’s supreme leader — but their relationship gradually soured.

Following Rafsanjani’s defeat in the 2005 elections, he was sidelined: He was no longer Tehran’s Friday imam, and two of his children were convicted in closed-court proceedings and imprisoned for fraud and political charges. The supreme leader never cut off Rafsanjani completely, however. And among the people who had access to Khamenei, Rafsanjani was the only moderate figure who expressed supported free trade and ties with the West.

Rafsanjani protected Hassan Rouhani and paved the way for Rouhani to succeed him as president. Rouhani was Rafsanjani’s deputy from the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, continuing to 2013, when  Rouhani won the presidential elections. Rouhani replaced Rafsanjani in the election after Rafsanjani was disqualified by the Guardian Council. In the years that followed Rouhani’s election, Rafsanjani openly supported his government through several controversies, including the nuclear dealand the 2016 parliamentary elections. Many felt Rafsanjani articulated what Rouhani could not publicly say.

Given the sensitivity of the supreme leader to the government’s involvement in partisan politics, the house arrest of Green Movement leaders, and the stringent limitations imposed on the reformist former president Mohammad Khatami, it fell to Rafsanjani to take on the role of leading the reformist movement. Under his guidance, reformist candidates won a majority in parliament in the March 2016 election.

Now that Rafsanjani has died, Rouhani has no choice but to undertake the leadership of the reformist movement himself. Most post mortems have suggested that everything is now harder for Rouhani — just five months from the presidential election in June. Having lost his mentor, he now faces the hard-liners on his own.

Should Rouhani be defeated in the next elections and a radical government formed, it could negatively affect the long-term future of Iran. Under such conditions, Rafsanjani’s death would be bad news for the conservative clergy, as well as for moderates and reformists in general. Notwithstanding its unwanted consequences, however, this important event could also present reformists with opportunities.

Adopting a role to lead reformists outside the government is admittedly not a role Rouhani would likely choose under his own volition, given that his previous positions — second-in-command during the Iran-Iraq War and secretary of the Supreme National Security Council — reflect his inclination toward managing security and defense affairs and away from engaging in partisan reformist actions. But the death of Rafsanjani brings Rouhani’s interests and those of civil society into a closer alignment.

While before, Rouhani’s role was as a proxy for Rafsanjani, now the possibility of him simultaneously leading both the administration and the reformist masses is buoyed. These new circumstances require that Rouhani take more explicit positions, articulate his supporters’ demands for political and cultural freedom and reduce the interference of militants in political affairs.

Rouhani’s actions now will determine how his evolving political role will shift. Rouhani’s direct cooperation with reformist grass-roots factions  effectively makes him a proxy for reformers, as the only one to echo demands for reform to the circles of power. Undoubtedly, this will attract criticism, including from the supreme leader and those in unelected positions of power. Nevertheless, this role could also transform Rouhani into a political leader acceptable to a wide range of supporters of modernization and development, both within Iranian society and among foreign observers.

To protect himself against powers opposed to him, Rouhani will also especially need support from the West, which made economic demands in relation to the nuclear deal. Rouhani may be building his ambitions as he considers running for a second term in 2017, yet his complex political situation may also ultimately make him a threat to the implementation of any succession plan.

The continuous suppression since 2009 — of both political leaders, parties and the reformist movement’s supporters — present Rouhani with a well-timed bid at a reelection campaign. Considering Rouhani’s membership in the assembly of experts in 1989 — when then-President Ayatollah Khamenei was chosen as the next supreme leader (the only incidence of leader substitution in the history of the Islamic Republic) — Rouhani has great potential to be proposed as a candidate for the leadership position himself if his public support is sustained.

The sudden death of Rafsanjani eliminated a moderate pillar of the Islamic Republic, but it did not put an end to the possibility of replacing it. Everything depends on how Rouhani plays his cards in the near future — and on the support he gets from the grass roots during his encounters with radicals.

The United States was on the sidelines as peace talks aimed at ending the war in Syria got under way in Kazakhstan’s capital of Astana. U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan George Krol represented the Trump administration as an observer, while Russia, Turkey, Iran, Syria and Syrian rebels tried to work out a long-term peace agreement. But the absence of a strong U.S. voice in the talks is raising questions about the future of American influence in the Middle East, like reported by voanews.com.

The Astana talks were brokered by Russia, Turkey and Iran with no direct U.S. input. The invitation for Washington to participate as an observer came from the government of Kazakhstan, according to the State Department.

“Our position remains the same with regard to any effort to bring about a durable cease-fire in Syria. At the same time, we want to see access — full access — for humanitarian assistance. And then, ultimately, we want to see that political negotiations are back up and running in Geneva between the parties. Because, ultimately, that is the way to solve this,” State Department acting spokesperson Mark Toner told VOA on Monday.

Toner added that the long-term solution to the Syrian crisis is a political, not a military, one.

“We’ve got to get these political talks up and running again because that’s the way out of this,” he said. “And what those political talks need to result in is a political process, a transition, that respects the Syrian people’s desires and aspirations for a more democratic system. This is not for us to decide; this is for the Syrians themselves to work out. ”

‘Rejection’ of U.S.

While the U.S. has not been a direct party of organizing the Astana talks, Washington does not oppose the initiative and has been in close contact with both Moscow and Ankara.

But experts said the Astana meetings were conducted “in some way as a rejection of the United States.”

“I think this is all part of sort of a wide political scheme in order to present the United States with certain facts and get it on board largely with what is a Russian position,” Michael Kofman, from the Center for Naval Analyses, told VOA.

Kofman added, “I have no doubt that Russia, Iran and other countries understand it’s very difficult for them to actually have serious talks and lock in gains without U.S. involvement.”

Heather Conley, former deputy assistant secretary of state, said the brokering of the Astana talks by Russia, Iran and Turkey “was done in some ways as a rejection of the United States.”

She said to keep an eye on Turkey.

“The Turkish-Russian rapprochement is something that we have to follow closely to understand what the principles of that relationship will be,” Conley said at a recent event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Officials said the Astana talks do not include direct negotiations between the Syrian government and rebel groups. Syrian rebels that attended the talks said they would focus on the enforcement of an ongoing cease-fire and humanitarian issues.

Cease-fire, Islamic State

Meanwhile, Syrian activists said the success of the Astana talks rests with “effective monitoring and enforcement” of a nationwide Syria cease-fire.

When asked about Syria during his confirmation hearing earlier this month, President Donald Trump’s Secretary of State nominee Rex Tillerson acknowledged that “Russia, Syria, Turkey and Iran are dictating the terms of how things are going to play out in Syria today.”

He told lawmakers the U.S. should re-engage with traditional allies, including Turkey, a critical and longstanding NATO ally.

Tillerson’s remarks on priorities to solve the Syria crisis were seen as a break from the Obama administration.

“We’ve had two competing priorities in Syria under this [the Obama] administration. [Syrian president] Bashar al-Assad must go and the defeat of ISIS. And the truth of the matter is, carrying both of those out simultaneously is extremely difficult because at times they conflict with one another,” said Tillerson during his confirmation hearing at the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 11. He referred to the Islamic State terrorist group as ISIS.

“The clear priority is to defeat ISIS. We defeat ISIS, we at least create some level of stability in Syria, which then lets us deal with the next priority of what is going to be the exit of Bashar [al-]Assad,” he added.

But Atlantic Council’s Middle East expert Frederic Hof said, “Assad and Islamist extremism are two sides of the same murderous and terrorist coin,” and a clear understanding of the “truth” would be a good place for the Trump administration to start sorting out the difficult Syrian crisis.

The first drone strikes launched under the Trump administration over the weekend killed three alleged al Qaeda militants in Yemen, according to local security and tribal officials, like reported by freebeacon.com .

The two Saturday strikes killed al Qaeda area field commander Abu Anis al-Abi along with two others, the Associated Press reported.

U.S. drone strikes targeting al Qaeda militants in the Middle East became routine following the devastating Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The program accelerated substantially under former President Barack Obama.

U.S. intelligence officials estimated as many as 117 civilians were killed by drone strikes in the region under the Obama administration. Trump has pledged to continue the program.

Six Russian Tu-22M3 long-range bombers have launched airstrikes on Daesh targets in Syria’s city of Deir ez-Zor, the Russian Defense Ministry said to sputniknews.com

Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Major General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri called on the Army Ground Force to boost preparedness constantly and keep pace with new technologies in the military field, like reported by tasnimnews.com

Forces loyal to President Abedrabbo Mansour Hadi launched a vast offensive on January 7 to retake the Dhubab district overlooking the Bab al-Mandab, a key maritime route connecting the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Coalition warplanes and Apache attack helicopters have been pounding rebels in support of pro-Hadi forces advancing towards the Red Sea city of Mokha, military sources said.

By Sunday, loyalist forces were within 10 kilometres (six miles) of Mokha, they said, but the offensive has been slowed by mines laid by rebels.

The rebels took their dead to a military hospital in Hodeida, a major western port city they control, a medical source told AFP.

But despite its massively superior firepower, the rebels and their allies still control the capital Sanaa and much of the central and northern highlands, as well as the 450-kilometre (280-mile) Red Sea coast.

United Nations peace envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed arrived in Sanaa on Sunday for talks and to push a peace plan that would restore a ceasefire and lead to a political transition in the country.

The plan would lead to a political transition under which Hadi’s powers would be significantly reduced.

The World Health Organization says that more than 7,400 people have been killed since the coalition intervention began.

A UN spokesman has said the civilian death toll alone could top 10,000.