Nineteen years after the al Qaida attacks of September 11, 2001, American troops are still deployed in Afghanistan, although there is a new enemy that has emerged to destabilize the country—the Islamic State Khorasan Province, or ISKP. The Afghan Taliban—the same group that provided sanctuary to al Qaida as it planned the 9/11 attacks—is on the verge of entering into a power-sharing agreement with the Afghan government in a peace deal facilitated by the United States.

President Donald Trump seems determined to draw down the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan to 4,000 soldiers before the presidential election in November. This would be the lowest number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan at any point since just after 9/11. The United States seems to be holding out hope that a potential peace deal will stabilize Afghanistan. Giving the Taliban partial responsibility in governing the country, so the logic goes, could make the group a vested stakeholder in ensuring a de-escalation of violence.

But ISKP remains a growing concern, even as U.S. CENTCOM Commander Gen. Frank McKenzie is optimistic that the Taliban will actually help the United States fight against ISKP militants, as he said back in mid-March. But even as the Taliban and ISKP might remain adversaries, for the United States to rely on the Taliban—a group it has fought against for the past two decades—as a cornerstone of its counterterrorism strategy, seems a risky proposition.

ISKP in Afghanistan is strongest in the strategically important provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar. However, it still retains the capability to conduct spectacular attacks with near impunity in the Afghan capital, as demonstrated by the deadly attack on a Kabul maternity ward in May. To be sure, ISKP has experienced its share of struggles, including the recent killing of its top judge, Abdullah Orakzai.

Yet despite having its leadership targeted and losing territory, ISKP has proven remarkably resilient. Even without large swaths of territory under its control, ISKP retains a robust cadre of committed fighters dispersed throughout Afghanistan. As demonstrated by the Kabul maternity ward attack and an attack that same day on the funeral of a local police commander in Nangarhar, cells of ISKP fighters have the operational space and resources necessary to launch devastating terrorist attacks. Last month, ISKP militants attacked a prison in Jalalabad in an effort to free imprisoned fighters, in one of the group’s deadliest attacks to date, in addition to being sophisticated from a tactical and planning perspective.

Following the arrest of Aslam Farooqi, also known as Mawlawi Abdullah Orakzai, ISKP appointed Shahab al-Muhajir as its new regional chief, and many suspect he arranged the prison break to signal an increased operational tempo for the group moving forward. Indeed, in a 20-minute-long audio tape, ISKP spokesman Sultan Aziz Azzam claimed the attack on behalf of the group, provided details of the operation, and stated that al-Muhajir planned and supervised the attack. “The attack is also part of an effort by the newly-appointed ISKP leader to prove his credentials, boost the morale of his followers and possibly attract new recruits,” according to Dawood Azami of the BBC.

However, to revive ISKP fully, its new leader will have to overcome a litany of challenges. In neighboring Pakistan, the revival of the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban, adds another potential enemy to what is already a growing list that includes the Afghan Taliban, al Qaida, and the Haqqani Network.

A recent report (PDF) of the United Nations Security Council suggested that more TTP members could join ISKP as a result of shifting political dynamics in Afghanistan, although TTP leadership quickly refuted this claim. Through a press release, the TTP used strong language against ISKP, accusing the jihadists of being a proxy of regional intelligence agencies. Initially a splinter group of the TTP, there are longstanding relationship between members of ISKP and the Pakistani Taliban. Since the split, the TTP supported the narratives of al Qaida and the Afghan Taliban, issuing a detailed religious verdict nullifying the legitimacy of ISIS’s claims of a caliphate. Since its re-emergence under the leadership of Muhajir, ISKP has not yet claimed any attacks against the Afghan Taliban, though many suspect these attacks are forthcoming, given the historical animosities between the groups.

For its part, al Qaida in Afghanistan has sought to mostly avoid direct confrontations with ISKP. Still, the recent issues of al Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent’s (AQIS) magazine Nawai Ghazwa Hind reveal that their members have played significant roles under the command of the Afghan Taliban in removing ISKP fighters from their strongholds in Nangarhar. These revelations are telling in a number of ways, particularly since peace negotiations between the United States and the Taliban have progressed, al Qaida and AQIS have tried hard to conceal their presence in Afghanistan.

Since the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr Baghdadi in October 2019, AQIS leadership has attempted to poach disillusioned ISKP footsoldiers no longer confident about the group’s future. Cognizant of the retention challenge, ISKP recently issued a special package of general amnesty for their militants who surrendered to the Afghan government after setbacks in Nangarhar and Kunar, guiding them on how to renew their oaths. Aware of its limitations, ISKP has focused less on holding physical territory and more on spectacular attacks designed to destabilize Afghanistan and draw attention to the group, in an effort to improve morale and keep its name in the headlines. An attack earlier this week against Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh killed ten but failed to take out Saleh. So far, the attack has gone unclaimed, but the Taliban have denied involvement, which leaves ISKP as the only other culprit capable of conducting such a high profile attack. The attempt on Saleh’s life comes at a time when the Afghan government is attempting to rejuvenate negotiations with the Taliban.

The withdrawal of U.S. troops will likely impact conditions on the ground in Afghanistan. And the presence of terrorist groups is not a reason in and of itself for the United States to maintain a permanent presence, which is neither feasible nor desirable. But depending in any significant way on the Afghan Taliban to fight ISKP seems foolhardy—American and Taliban interests might temporarily overlap in countering the Islamic State, but the Taliban is not a trustworthy partner. Unless a coherent counterterrorism strategy is laid out, ISKP will continue to recruit, mobilize, and plot new attacks. The Islamic State in Afghanistan may be down, but it’s not out.

Following leadership losses, defections, and operational setbacks, the Islamic State’s Afghanistan-based affiliate, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), appears to be struggling in Afghanistan. But the remnants of ISKP are trying to reconstitute the group. Recently, ISKP appointed Shahab al-Muhajir as its new regional chief. According to multiple sources, the newly appointed head of ISKP is an Arab from the Middle East who was previously with al-Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Muhajir’s promotion marks the first time that an individual from outside South Asia has been appointed as the top leader of the Islamic State’s franchise in the region, which could have significant implications for the group, like reported by lawfareblog.com.

Muhajir’s appointment has been shrouded in mystery, and ISKP has done little to demystify it. In May, the U.N. Security Council’s Sanction Monitoring Team reported that Syrian national Abu Muhammad Saeed Khurasani was most likely to become the new leader of ISKP. Then, in June, Afghan journalist Bilal Sarwary reported that Muhajir had been named the new leader of ISKP. Khurasani and Muhajir might well be the same person; as Asfandyar Ali Mir, an expert on jihadism in South Asia at Stanford University, has noted, it is common for foreign jihadists to have multiple pseudonyms for security reasons. The Islamic State’s department of far-away provinces and ISKP’s media outlet, al-Milat Media, confirmed that Muhajir was the new chief of ISKP in July but didn’t provide a photograph or any other biographical details. Al-Milat released a recorded audio message written by Muhajir and read in Pashto by ISKP’s spokesman, Sultan Aziz Azzam, addressing ISKP members in Afghanistan.

Muhajir’s message added to the mystery about his identity but also might contain some clues. One possible explanation for having Azzam read his message is that Muhajir might not be fluent in the local languages of Afghanistan, such as Pashto and Dari, and requires a translator to communicate to the group’s base. If so, that lends credence to the claims in the U.N. Security Council report and from Bilal Sarwary that the new head of ISKP is an Arab, possibly from Syria or Iraq. The other possibility is that ISKP is hiding all details about its new leader in a bid to protect him, as he is likely to be targeted not only by the U.S. and Afghan governments but also by the Afghan Taliban.

The most significant question among analysts about Muhajir’s appointment has been about how his non-Afghan background will affect the organization and his ability to lead. Analysts with whom I have discussed the leadership transition believe the decision to appoint a non-Afghan as the chief of ISKP will further undermine the group. Amira Jadoon, a professor at West Point, argues that the appointment will not be accepted by the Afghan rank-and-file of the organization. Similarly, Borhan Osman, a senior consultant for International Crisis Group, believes that an Arab with little or no familiarity with the territory, culture and language of Afghanistan will struggle to lead the group.

Jadoon’s and Osman’s arguments align with the historical record of leadership dynamics of jihadist groups in Afghanistan, going as far back as the anti-Soviet jihad. Since then, non-Afghans have generally not been made leaders of armed groups comprising Afghans. The most prominent example is the Palestinian jihadist leader Shaikh Abdullah Azzam. Despite enjoying immense status among major Afghan jihadist groups, he struggled to establish himself as the leader of Afghan jihadists during the 1980s.

At the same time, given the peculiar internal politics of ISKP, there are at least three reasons why a non-Afghan with ties to the Middle East is better positioned to revive ISKP than someone with stronger local credentials. First, a non-Afghan is better positioned to deal with the internecine feuding among local factions, which has wrecked ISKP. Since its formation, ISKP has suffered from internal clashes regarding the ethnicities and nationalities of its leaders. These differences surfaced initially in the dispute between ISKP’s first chief, Hafiz Saeed Khan, and prominent Salafi leader Sheikh Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost. Dost refused to accept Saeed Khan’s leadership, apparently on the basis of policy issues, but his statements condemning Saeed Khan’s leadership demonstrated a clear dislike for his Pakistani background.

In comparison, Muhajir’s Arab ethnicity grants him unique advantages in the Afghan context. It carries a special premium in the jihadist communities of Afghanistan and Pakistan for historical reasons rooted in the anti-Soviet jihad. In addition to the prestige, it will also separate Muhajir from the ethnic and national conflicts that have affected Afghan and Pakistani officials in the organization. As a result, an Arab as the head of ISKP could enjoy unique authority in managing the group.

Second, Muhajir can leverage his networks in Iraq and Syria to energize ISKP. He can attract foreign fighters to Khorasan in a way that an Afghan or Pakistani leader could not. There are some reports that this process is already under way. According to the July 2020 U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee report, two senior members of the Islamic State from the Middle East have arrived in Afghanistan recently.

Third, Muhajir can leverage his ties with al-Qaeda cadres to recruit from al-Qaeda’s organization in Afghanistan. This is likely to be on the minds of ISKP’s leadership, especially now, when some al-Qaeda leaders and personnel are concerned about the Taliban’s peace deal with the United States, which calls on the Taliban to repudiate the group. In the past, ISKP has had some success in poaching fighters away from al-Qaeda. From 2014 to 2017, many members of al-Qaeda, even some senior leaders, defected to ISKP. The peace deal may also prompt hard-line cadres in the Afghan Taliban to defect to other organizations, and a group headed by an Arab and former veteran of al-Qaeda is likely to be an attractive choice over rivals whose leaders’ ethnic and national status is a source of internal conflict.

ISKP continues to engage in violence in Afghanistan. Despite losses of territory, it has conducted major attacks in Kabul and Nangarhar. In August, ISKP conducted its largest attack yet, a coordinated assault targeting the central prison in Nangarhar province. ISKP spokesman Sultan Aziz Azzam claimed the attack was directed by Muhajir. The ISKP’s statements about the attack seem designed to burnish Muhajir’s credentials as an effective leader and to signal to other jihadist groups that he means business. Despite the group’s constraints, it is premature to write off ISKP. The group and its new leader pose an enduring threat to peace and stability of Afghanistan.

Three security force members were killed and 11 wounded when insurgents detonated a car bomb at the gate of a public protection forces compound in Gardez city, in Paktia province early Tuesday, like reported by ariananews.af.

Local officials said insurgents first detonated the car bomb and then stormed the compound.

A brief gun battle ensued before two attackers were killed by security forces.

Among those wounded and hospitalized is a woman, officials said.

The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack in a Twitter post.

At least 11 Taliban were killed in an Afghan forces airstrike in northern Faryab province, 209 Shaheen Army Corps said in a statement on Monday, according to tolonews.com.

The airstrike took place in Qarma Qul district on Sunday, it said, adding that the Taliban camp was destroyed.

The statement did not provide further details.

The Taliban has not yet commented.

An explosion in the Kandahar province in southern Afghanistan, close to the border with Pakistan, killed 13 civilians on Friday, a security source said.

“This morning, a bomb exploded on Tunas vehicle in the Loy Karez area of Spin Buldak district, killed 13 civilians, including women and children,” the source said.

Earlier this week, a car bomb exploded near the Balkh district of northern Balkh province of the country killing at least one soldier and injuring six others.

No group has claimed responsibility for the blast

Last week, the Independent Human Rights Commission in Kandahar condemned recent explosions, which caused civilian casualties, and called on all parties to the intra-Afghan conflict to protect civilian lives.

Taliban fighters killed four civilians on Thursday during clashes with Afghan forces in the central province of Parwan, amid rescue work after flash floods claimed more than 150 lives, officials said to reuters.com.

It was the latest violence amid peace talks between the warring sides that have been delayed over the issue of prisoner releases, as part of efforts to end the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, which has spanned nearly two decades.

“Taliban fighters opened fire on civilians fleeing areas worst hit by the flash floods,” said Abdul Shukoor Qudoosi, a district official in Bagram, home to the country’s biggest U.S. military base and the site of the clashes.

“Taliban were clashing with Afghan forces and they killed civilians who were in an autorickshaw near an army checkpoint,” Qudoosi said, adding that it appeared as if the Islamist militants mistook the passengers for Afghan soldiers.

One Afghan soldier was killed and two were injured.

A Taliban spokesmen was not immediately available to comment.

The death toll from the floods rose to 150, with at least 250 people injured, as survivors and rescue workers sifted the debris of more than 1,500 homes destroyed to the north of the capital, Kabul.

Authorities moved more than 900 families out of parts of the mountainous province that had been devastated by the floods, which were triggered by exceptionally heavy rain this week.

“The search is still on, as many people, we fear, are still buried under the rocks and rubble,” said Tamim Azimi, a spokesman for the ministry of disaster management.

“The situation is very grim, the scale of loss is intense.”

Security forces, officials and survivors have trudged through deep mud in the search for survivors while the effort to clear the disaster area has stretched more than 28 hours, hampered by blocked and damaged roads.

The dead included many children, survivors said. The death toll was expected to rise as families prepared for mass burials, while mounds of rubble remain to be cleared.

Afghanistan regularly suffers from drought but can be lashed by very heavy rain during the south Asian monsoon season.

A wave of attacks across Afghanistan on Tuesday left at least 17 people dead and scores more wounded, officials said, including a Taliban truck bombing in the country’s north that targeted a commando base for Afghan forces, like reported by thenews.com.pk.

The violence comes as expectations had been rising that negotiations could soon get underway between the Afghan government and the insurgents as part of a February agreement between the US and the Taliban.

The truck suicide bomber struck in northern Balkh province, killing three people, including two Afghan commandos and a civilian, according to Munir Ahmad Farhad, the spokesman for the provincial governor.

According to Hanif Rezaie, the spokesman for the Afghan army corps in the north, initial military report said at least six commandos and around 35 civilians were wounded in that explosion, which also destroyed or damaged dozens of nearby civilians houses.

“Most of the wounded civilians are women and children,” said Rezaie.

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid claimed responsibility for the Balkh attack in a tweet, claiming that “tens” of military personnel were killed. The Taliban often exaggerate their battlefield claims.

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said on Twitter that the attack was revenge for a video circulating online that appeared to show Afghan troops desecrating the bodies of Taliban soldiers in the south. Ministry of Defence has launched an investigation into the video, which surfaced earlier this month.

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani strongly condemned the attack in Balkh and said the Taliban have increased their attacks on major Afghan cities despite the February agreement. “The Taliban’s insistence on continuing war and violence is challenging peace opportunities,” he said in a statement.

Arrests of two persons associated with the Islamic State, within a week, has brought back attention on the undiminished threat of the global jihadist organisation to India’s national security, like reported by rediff.com.

While 28-year-old Abdul Rahman, working as an ophthalmologist at a Bengaluru medical college, was arrested on August 18, Mohammed Mushtaqeem Khan, aged 36, was arrested in New Delhi with IEDs and explosives following a brief exchange of fire with the Delhi police on August 22.

Rahman had reportedly visited an IS camp in Syria to treat injured fighters.

Khan had never left Indian shores and had reportedly taken up the role of being a lone wolf fighter on the advice of an IS recruiter.

Since its founding in 2014, the IS in Iraq and Syria has posed a rather subdued threat to India.

Its repeated calls and outreach to Indian Muslims have largely been ignored.

Close to 200 people have either left the country or have attempted to do so to join the group.

This has been interpreted as a failure of the global jihadist force, whose appeal to the Muslims of Europe, Africa and even South East Asia have been far more successful than those in South Asia.

Even in Kashmir, a theatre of jihadi groups, the IS as well as the al-Qaeda phenomenon has not been able to find significant support.

The cyber wings of intelligence agencies as well as those of state police establishments have done well to arrest self-radicalised individuals and bust modules.

Individual state police wings have been able to infiltrate into chat rooms, social media groups to track online communication, activities and exchanges of IS recruiters.

While the government does not stress much on either unleashing a counter-messaging to the IS propaganda or engaging in a de-radicalisation initiative, adequate promotion seems to have been given to tracking and neutralising the online recruitment efforts.

And till now, this approach has been successful.

What, the IS, however, has succeeded, through its regular online propaganda and recruitment efforts, is to create a rather dispersed band of followers in several states of the country.

While a few of them are linked to a common recruiter and have operated with a vague sense of unity, most others like Rahman and Khan have been lone wolves, using their motivation, skills and energy to further the cause they believe in.

Amid the sporadic and intermittent nature of their operations a degree of sophistication is clearly visible.

Compared to other cadres arrested previously who were still in their planning stage or had access only to basic weapons, Khan reportedly had learnt to assemble pressure cooker IEDs online and had even carried out a test in his village.

Rahman, the ophthalmologist from Bengaluru, was developing a weapons-related mobile app to benefit IS fighters.

In contrast, Mehdi Masroor Biswas, the IS sympathiser who was arrested in December 2014, used his twitter handle @ShamiWitness mostly for propaganda purposes.

For long, security as well as academic interest has been centred on the ‘South Indian’-ness of the Islamic State, buttressed by the fact that overwhelming majority of the IS operatives who have travelled out of the country or have been arrested are from the four southern Indian states.

However, this trend could possibly be undergoing a tectonic shift.

Number of arrests of IS cadres in the recent past have either been from Uttar Pradesh or have links with that state.

Khan belonged to a small village in Balrampur, UP.

Members of a 10-member IS module, named Harkat-ul-Harb-e-Islam (HUHI), arrested in April 2019, belonged to Amroha and Meerut.

HUHI’s efforts to carry out a massive attack in the national capital arguably remains the most sophisticated attempt by IS operatives in recent times.

Close to 25 kilograms of explosives had been recovered from them.

In 2016, four members of another IS-inspired module, Junud-ul-Khalifa-e-Hind (JUKH, Soldiers of the Caliph in India), had been arrested from Haridwar.

Similar to the HUHI, the JUKH too was attempting to indulge in terror strikes in major cities across India.

Other cities where IS cadres have either been arrested or killed include Lucknow, Saharanpur, Kushinagar and Azamgarh.

The impact of the online propaganda and recruitment efforts seem to have found a degree of resonance in the erstwhile SIMI/Indian Mujahideen cadres, who are reviving their old linkages, at a time of their own choosing.

This UP phenomenon, if true, could have larger security implications on the National Capital Region compared to other mega cities.

The ephemeral palaver in the media centering around individual arrests of IS cadres notwithstanding, threat of global jihadist outfits to India’s national security has been under played in the policy making circles.

The arithmetic division of the number of known IS sympathisers by the total Muslim population in the country has remained a much (mis)used method to down play the threat.

While such a public posturing does have its utility in limiting the IS narrative in media space, the policy making apparatus need to take cognisance of two critical points.

First, unlike 2017, the narrative on Islamic State is no longer that of a vanquished force, but one that has orchestrated a dramatic revival in several new theatres around the world, aided by the West’s early declaration of victory.

This could be providing a fillip, reigniting some short of a jihadist reboot, for those who wish to identify themselves with it.

Second, the group continues to harp on the importance of lone individuals in executing terror.

Its online publications earlier this year delved on of how the coronavirus pandemic has created unique opportunities for inclined individuals to plan and execute attacks.

This has a potential to shape thought processes of the DIY brand of terrorists, who sense an opportunity for themselves.

The undiminished threat, therefore, has the potency of sustaining itself in multiple ways in the near and medium term.

State agencies need to utilise innovative methods in countering radicalisation and violent extremism to address this growing threat.

A bombing in a town on a restive southern Philippines island killed nine people and wounded dozens on Monday, among them soldiers and civilians, the military said, with radical extremists suspected of being behind the attack, like reported by thenational.ae.

Two explosions believed to be homemade bombs were triggered within one hour of each other in the main urban centre on the island of Jolo, a stronghold of the Abu Sayyaf, a militant group that has pledged allegiance to ISIS.

It was the biggest attack in the town since January last year, when twin suicide bombings before Sunday service at a Jolo church killed more than 20 people and wounded at least 100.

A faction of Abu Sayyaf was blamed for that attack, which Philippine authorities said involved Indonesian bombers.

The first blast on Monday happened about noon in front of a food centre, outside of which two military trucks were parked, the army said. A second blast followed, but there were no immediate reports of casualties from that incident.

That first bomb killed five soldiers and four civilians and 16 military personnel were among dozens wounded, said Lt Gen Corleto Vinluan, head of the Western Mindanao command.

Lt Col Ronaldo Mateo, a military spokesman, said the bomb was attached to a parked motorcycle.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility and police said an investigation was under way.

Abu Sayyaf was founded in the 1990s with its roots in a separatist cause that it has since abandoned. It is active in the Sulu archipelago of Mindanao, where hundreds of military have been deployed to try to destroy the group, which has been linked to ISIS and Al Qaeda.

The group’s various factions have grabbed headlines, most recently for suicide bombings, banditry, piracy and kidnap for ransom. It also has become notorious for beheading captives, among them westerners.

Taliban attacked Khwaja Bahauddin district in the Northern Takhar province of Afghanistan last night, killing at last 13 members of public uprising forces and 1 border police, a local source said like reported by khaama.com.

According to the reports, Taliban attacked public uprising forces in Khwaja Bahauddin district of Takhar last night that led to long hours clashes.

Both the government officals and the Taliban have not yet commented on the incident.