The White House released a statement Sunday morning on the Pulse Nightclub attack, yet unlike all the major news outlets it refrained from recognizing the actions of 29-year-old Omar Mateen as radical Islamic terrorism.

govexec.com

According to the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, the jihadist group is “actively trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction [WMDs]”:

[ISIS] has already carried out numerous chemical weapons attacks in Syria; we know it wants to go further by carrying out a nuclear attack in the heart of Europe. This, combined with poor levels of security at a host of nuclear research centers in the former Soviet Union mean the threat of a possible ‘dirty-bomb’ attack on a Western capital is high.

The Independent reports that Dr. Viatcheslav Moshe Kantor, the think tank’s president, declared:

[ISIS] has already carried out numerous chemical weapons attacks in Syria; we know it wants to go further by carrying out a nuclear attack in the heart of Europe. This, combined with poor levels of security at a host of nuclear research centers in the former Soviet Union mean the threat of a possible “dirty-bomb” attack on a Western capital is high.

The warning from the organization is consistent with a June 2015 assessment by Australia’s Foreign Minister Julie Bishop. Citing Australia’s departments of Defense and Foreign Affairs, as well as NATO, she told The Australian that ISIS had gained access to radioactive material from hospital and research centers in territory it captured in Iraq and Syria, raising the likelihood that the jihadist group could develop a large “dirty” bomb.

Moreover, ISIS, in the ninth edition of its propaganda magazine Dabiq, published last year, indicated that it could purchase a nuclear weapon in Pakistan, take it to Nigeria, and then smuggle it into the United States through Mexico by using existing trafficking networks in Latin America.

ISIS has established a growing presence in the region of Pakistan, the only Muslim nation with a nuclear arsenal.

The most recent warning, issued by the international think-tank, comes amid concerns that ISIS will attempt to carry out attacks during the upcoming Euro 2016 soccer championship in France, reports The Independent.

Although the forum did not explicitly suggest that a terrorist nuclear attack is likely to occur during the tournament, Dr. Kantor noted that the jihadist cell linked to the Brussels attacks earlier this year were believed to be monitoring employees and the security apparatus at a Belgian nuclear facility.

“Their previous documented attempts to gain access to a nuclear power station in Belgium are evidence of their intent,” he told an international conference in Amsterdam. “The terrorists don’t necessarily have to use a ‘dirty bomb.’ We are not just talking about stolen nuclear material; using conventional explosives in a nuclear plant, such as smuggling in a bomb, would have catastrophic consequences.”

“It shouldn’t be a surprise that if terrorists get hold of nuclear material they will try to use it. We also know that they are seeking such material; there were reports, for example, of Isis getting hold of uranium when they captured Mosul,” added former U.K. Defense Secretary Des Browne, a member of the forum and vice-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), noting that the threat of nuclear terrorism required attention from the international community.

In 2015, the Australian foreign minister said that the nuclear threat linked to ISIS is severe enough to have gained the attention of the Australia Group, an alliance of about 40 nations, plus the European Community, established 30 years ago to prevent the export of materials that can be used to develop chemical, biological, and radiological weapons.

“It isn’t that hard to build a ‘dirty bomb.’ They may not kill that many people with such a bomb, but the effect on the environment, the infrastructure and the psychological impact on people would be devastating,” explained Browne. “They can also use cyber warfare to target a nuclear facility.”

“We know that terrorist organizations have the desire to get access to these raw materials and to have a nuclear device,” added Ben Rhodes, U.S. President Barack Obama’s deputy national security adviser.

breitbart.com

In the largest case of its kind in the United States, three young Somali-Americans were found guilty on June 3 of federal charges that included conspiring to support a foreign terrorist organization and conspiracy to commit murder abroad.

The three men—Mohamed Farah, Abdirahman Daud, and Guled Omar—all in their early twenties, face the possibility of life in prison. The case represents one of the few examples of the development of an Islamic State (http://soufangroup.com/the-islamic-state/)  recruitment cluster within the United States involving more than just a few people; six additional co-conspirators have already pleaded guilty. Sitting at the top of the recruitment cluster was Abdi Nur (http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-terror-recruitment-in-the-united-states/) , a Somali-American from Minnesota in his early twenties who successfully traveled to Syria in June 2014. He was subsequently involved in communicating with the remainder of the group on social media—most of
whom were already his friends or acquaintances—in efforts to persuade them to join him.

Of the approximately 250 Americans (http://soufangroup.com/foreign-fighters/)  who have traveled or attempted to travel to join the so-called Islamic State and other groups in Syria and Iraq, the vast majority of cases involve a single individual or small groups of two or three drawn to the Islamic State exclusively through social media (http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-battling-the-islamic-states-message/) .

Though peer-to-peer communication has played a pivotal role in known cases of Islamic State radicalization and recruitment within the United States, that communication takes place almost entirely online. The recent case in Minneapolis is exceptional, as it represents one of the few known larger clusters of Islamic State recruitment within the United States, in which the members—known to each other through existing social networks formed in high school and college—communicated and engaged in one-to-one, in-person contact to help persuade and reinforce sentiments to
join the Islamic State.

Cases of this type of community-based Islamic State recruitment (http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-offline-allure-of-the-islamic-state/)  have been far more prevalent in Europe. In neighborhoods like Molenbeek in Brussels, charismatic Islamic State recruiters (http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-jihadi-john-and-terrors-celebrity-factor/)  have been able to masterfully manipulate pockets of susceptible youth, leveraging preexisting social networks of known acquaintances, friends, and family members, and helping them evolve into entrenched Islamic State operational networks.

The most notorious example of this is the network responsible for the November 2015 Paris attacks (http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-paris-and-the-pain-of-hindsight/) , of which Abdelhamid Abaaoud sat at the head; remnants of the same network were also tied to the March 2016 Brussels attacks. On May 25, Belgian authorities arrested four members of an unrelated Islamic State network
(http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-islamic-states-strategy-to-level-the-playing-field/)  in Antwerp, which was reported to include as many as nine members who had been in direct contact with Hicham Chaib—a Belgian now high in the ranks of the Islamic State in Syria, who has long been active in recruiting Belgian youth to join the Islamic State.

These two distinct networks serve as evidence of the multiple clusters of Islamic State recruitment that have emerged in various parts of Europe. Such clusters pose a significantly larger threat than individual recruitment efforts over social media, as they provide tight-knit networks with greater resources and levels of commitment than individuals acting alone.

Despite the existence of the Minneapolis community-based network to which Farah, Daud, and Omar belonged, the presence of such a cluster inside the United States is an outlier rather than an indication of emerging trend. In May 2016, FBI Director James Comey stated there had been a steep decline in the number of cases of Islamic State recruitment within the United States (http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-islamic-states-american-sympathizers/)  over the past year. In 2014 and early 2015, anywhere between six and ten U.S. citizens were attempting to travel to Syria per month; since August 2015, that number had dropped to about one per month, according to Comey. This sharp decrease is likely the product of a variety of factors, and serves as an indication that efforts to stem the group’s social media footprint have taken a toll.

The relative prevalence of community-based Islamic State recruitment clusters in Europe (http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-unraveling-europes-terror-networks/)  compared to the U.S. is one of the primary reasons why the threat facing Europe is far higher than that facing the United States. Nonetheless, despite the focus on the unprecedented terror threat in Europe, the threat of Islamic State-inspired attacks in the U.S. persists. The Islamic State has repeated its call (http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-a-message-from-the-islamic-state/)  for the group’s sympathizers to carry out attacks (http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-islamic-states-eternal-call-to-terror/)  by any means possible, and despite efforts to limit the group’s reach on social media, it still maintains a very active and influential presence online. As such, though the U.S. is less at risk for coordinated, simultaneous, and multi-location attacks like those seen in Paris and Brussels, the threat
of lone-actor or San Berdardino-style attacks is still very present.

soufangroup.com/

The Islamic State claims to have executed 489 “martyrdom operations” in Iraq, Syria and Libya during the first five months of 2016. The figure comes from monthly data published by Amaq News Agency, a propaganda arm of the so-called caliphate that releases infographics summarizing the group’s suicide attacks.

Amaq’s most recent infographic (seen on the right) indicates that the jihadists executed 119 “martyrdom operations” in the month of May alone. If Amaq’s figures are accurate, then the Islamic State is launching suicide attacks at a historically high rate.

Earlier this month, for example, the State Department reported that there were 726 “suicide attacks” executed by all perpetrators around the globe in 2015. Therefore, all terrorist groups, including the Islamic State, carried out an average of 61 suicide bombings per month in 2015. The Islamic State nearly doubled that rate in May and has exceeded it by more than 20 attacks each month this year, according to Amaq’s infographics.

The data referenced by Foggy Bottom is compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), which maintains an “unclassified event database compiled from information in open-source reports of terrorist attacks.”

According to START’s data, 2015 witnessed a record number of suicide bombings. But 2016 is currently on pace to eclipse that high-water mark.

While Amaq’s claims are difficult to independently verify, the statistics are reasonable given the scale of the Islamic State’s fighting. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s men routinely claim credit for simultaneous suicide bombings. The organization is taking on multiple adversaries in every country where it operates, making the use of suicide bombings (one of the jihadists’ most effective tactics) an especially important tool. For instance, the State Department noted that “[o]n average, suicide attacks in 2015 were 4.6 times as lethal as non-suicide attacks.”

A recent video from Al Hayat, another one of the Islamic State’s mouthpieces, trumpeted this “caliphate vs. the world” mentality. In “The Religion of Kufr Is One,” Al Hayat made it clear that Baghdadi’s enterprise is at war with virtually everyone else. The subtitle of the video, “The Islamic State and its methodology dealing with all apostate parties and nations of disbelief,” underscored the degree to which this is the group’s deliberate strategy.

The Islamic State’s prolific use of “martyrs” probably highlights both its strength and weakness. On the one hand, there are likely more people, predominately young men, willing to die for the jihadists’ cause today than ever. (It should also be noted that adolescents and even children have been used in suicide attacks.) On the other hand, most of the organization’s suicide attackers are being dispatched in areas where the “caliphate” is being challenged, including locations that were once under its control.

The Long War Journal assesses that Islamic State is being forced to deploy many of its “martyrs” because its territorial claims are being rolled back in Iraq, Syria and even Libya.

The Long War Journal has tallied the figures provided on Amaq’s infographics from January through May of 2016. The English-language versions of these infographics can be seen below.

The following observations have been culled from Amaq’s statistics.

Most of the Islamic State’s “martyrdom operations,” 303 of the 489 claimed (62 percent), have been carried out inside Iraq. Approximately half of these (152 of 303) have been launched in Anbar province, where the jihadists are engaged in fierce battles with Iraqi government forces and Iranian-backed Shiite militias for months. Salahuddin (52 suicide attacks), Nineveh (40), Baghdad (32), and Kirkuk (17) are the next most frequently targeted areas.

The Islamic State launched 175 suicide attacks in Syria (36 percent of the total) during the first five months of the year. Aleppo province (59) was hit most frequently, followed by Hasakah (33), Deir Ezzor (25), Homs (20) and Raqqa (14) provinces. Raqqa is, of course, the de facto capital of the Islamic State. Amaq’s data indicate that 12 of the 14 suicide attacks there this year were carried out in February.

The remaining 11 “martyrdom operations” took place in Libya. Interestingly, Amaq claimed only one suicide attack in Libya from January through April. But the infographic for May shows 10 such bombings. Nine of the 10 have been executed in and around Sirte, the group’s central base of operations in Libya. The Islamic State’s presence in Sirte has been under assault from multiple directions for weeks, with the jihadists losing their grip on some of the neighboring towns and key facilities. Thus, the group is likely attempting to stymie its rivals’ advances with the deployment of its suicide bombers.

Iraqi forces are the most frequent target of the Islamic State’s “martyrdom operations,” as they were hit 279 times from January through May. Bashar al Assad’s regime is the second most frequent target, with the Islamic State’s suicide bombers striking the Syrian government’s forces on 89 occasions. The remaining bombings struck “Kurdish units” (54), the “Syrian opposition” (31 times), the Peshmerga (25), Fajr Libya (10) and General Khalifa Haftar’s fighters in Libya (1).

Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) are used more often than individual bombers strapped with explosives, according to Amaq. The infographics count 301 VBIEDs used in suicide attacks (62 percent of the total) as compared to 184 bombings using explosive belts, jackets and vests. The remaining four are listed as “dual operations.”

Assuming Amaq’s data are accurate, then the Islamic State’s “martyrdom” machine is setting a record pace for suicide operations.

For illustrative purposes, The Long War Journal has compared Amaq’s claims to data reported in the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism from 2005 through 2015. The data for 2005 through 2011 come from the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), while the data from 2012 through 2015 were accumulated by START. The methodology for tracking terrorist attacks has evolved over time and this brief summary does not account for those changes.

As seen in the chart above, the data compiled by NCTC and START indicate that all terrorist organizations around the globe — including the Islamic State, al Qaeda and its regional branches, the Taliban, the Islamic State in West Africa (formerly known as Boko Haram), as well as other jihadi and non-jihadi terrorists — carried out an average of approximately 61 suicide attacks per month in 2015. In no prior year did this figure ever exceed 50. From 2009 through 2012, there were less than 30 suicide attacks per month globally.

The Islamic State claims that its fighters have executed nearly 98 “martyrdom operations” per month thus far in 2016. That is 37 more suicide attacks per month than all terrorist organizations combined in 2015.

It is worth mentioning again that there were more suicide bombings in 2015, 726 in all, than any previous year, according to NCTC’s and START’s statistics. Before that, 2014 witnessed an all-time high of 575 suicide bombings. Therefore, the trend line has been increasing in recent years. At its current pace (it is far from certain that the Islamic State can maintain it), the Islamic State would execute more than 1,100 suicide attacks this year just in Iraq, Syria and Libya. Amaq’s figures do not include suicide attacks carried out elsewhere.

To add more perspective to the Islamic State’s current “martyrdom operations,” consider data published by the Washington Post in 2008. According to the Post, there were just 54 suicide attacks in all of 2001, when al Qaeda’s “martyrs” launched the most devastating terrorist hijackings in history. Although the overwhelming majority of the Islamic State’s suicide assaults are launched primarily in war zones in the Middle East, with comparatively few in the West (Paris and Brussels), Baghdadi’s “martyrs” exceed this figure every month.

Whereas suicide bombings were relatively rare in 2001, they are now a common occurrence, especially in war zones such as Iraq and Syria.

longwarjournal.org

Hackers are forcing Islamic State supporters on Twitter to delete or make their profiles private as they are being spammed by thousands of accounts linked to graphic pornography.

The accounts, known as pornbots, feature sexually-explicit images and are automatically generated, but almost never tweet, The Mirror reports. The hackers are targeting Twitter users who use ISIS hashtags, and they can follow them with several hundred of the fake accounts in just a few minutes.

One purported ISIS account run by a French fighter who often tweets about the deaths of journalists in Syria and Iraq flew under the radar until Monday, when its follower count jumped from around 50 to more than 800 pornbots.

Last week, the account of ISIS’ media arm, Amaq, was hit by a wave of pornbots until it was disabled by Twitter.

The flood of images containing naked bodies has made ISIS supporters switch their accounts to a private setting, or just delete them altogether, The Mirror reports.

Following the deaths of several African American men at the hands of police last year, the Twitter hashtag #blacklivesmatter enabled people from around the world to discuss race relations in the US. What is less well-known is that this hashtag – among others – was also used by supporters of Islamic State, who aimed to appeal to African Americans with the message that in IS, there “is no difference between black and white”.

Thanks to advancements in technology, it is now easier than ever to get involved in politics and civil society. Social media, in particular, helped to mobilise thousands of people during the uprisings on Tahir Square in Egypt and the Indignados protests in Spain.

But the internet is not democratic, per se. Radical groups also rely on websites, apps, social network and content-sharing sites such as Facebook, the Internet Archive, or YouTube to recruit supporters. In 2015 alone, IS published 1,000 videos, 15,000 photos, and 20 magazines online.

IS is especially active on Twitter. An analysis by the Brookings Institute highlighted that “from September through December 2014 … at least 46,000 Twitter accounts were used by IS supporters”. Researchers from the George Washington University further showed that – of 300 American IS supporters on Twitter – only a few tweeted new, official information. More common were accounts that retweeted and endorsed messages to reach as many people as possible. The amplifiers were complemented by shout-out accounts, which post new Twitter handles that replace blocked accounts.

The halo effect

It is not surprising that radical groups use popular social media to recruit supporters. These services are free, and censorship is still quite difficult. Most importantly, young people tend to trust the information they read or hear on social network or micro-blogging sites. The perceived trustworthiness of the platforms can affect a person’s evaluations of posts or messages from radical groups, making them seem more valid and convincing.

This is due to a well-established phenomenon known as the “halo effect”: when you make an overall positive judgement of a person or product, based on one specific positive characteristic. For instance, research has shown that if we think that a teacher is enthusiastic, we also believe that she or he is knowledgeable – even if this is not the case.

Propaganda is most effective when it is emotionally involving. That is why radical groups include well-curated multimedia in their online newsletters, magazines, and social media posts. Many groups even develop multi-player games, and make them available for free via online gaming platforms. The games often endorse violence and, crucially, allow users to perform an idealised version of themselves; users feel pride and a sense of community while fighting with others against enemies.

Over time, online experiences can influence users’ expectations about how they wish to live. If they feel that these expectations are not being met in their everyday life, users may reach out to radical groups (or respond to their outreach) to become part of what they see as a great cause, and an opportunity to do something worthwhile.

Fighting back

It is impractical and, in fact, nearly impossible to disconnect radical groups from the internet. Increasing censorship on platforms that we use every day jeopardises our right to privacy, the free flow of information, and freedom of speech. Instead, counter-radicalisation programs are also using internet-based campaigns to challenge the ideologies and claims of radical groups.

Opinions become more extreme if we only interact with others who endorse our point of view. But this process – known as group or attitude polarisation – can be prevented. The internet is a marketplace where different ideas compete. Sharing diverse perspectives on topics such as identity, religion, and violence with people who are immersed in the one-sided messages of radical groups, can prevent opinions from shifting to more extreme positions.

When presenting these so-called counter narratives, it is important to acknowledge grievances of different groups in society, while suggesting non-violent strategies to address the struggles. And those who communicate the alternative messages must be valued by potential or existing supporters of radical groups; indeed, former militants may be the most convincing.

The Canadian organisation Extreme Dialogue, for example, produces video documentaries of former members of radical groups, their families, friends, and victims. Showing how people’s lives were dramatically affected by violent radicalisation, the project aims to stimulate critical thinking and discussions.

Meanwhile, in the UK, the Quilliam Foundation relies on social media to promote a democratic, non-radical Islam. Founder Maajid Nawaz uses Twitter and Instagram to share pluralistic ideas without degrading Islam. The work of these organisations shows that the tactics which lead individuals to join radical groups, can also be applied to counter radicalisation online.

theconversation.com

The Islamic State group has used social media platforms and apps as vehicles to spread information to its followers as well as aid in recruitment. The apps, while being viewed as a trustworthy source of intelligence, can also be exploited, according to a report from Motherboard. Recent alerts sent out through official channels of the terrorist organization, also known as ISIS or ISIL, warn of fake news apps filled with malware.

ISIS’ app portfolio includes Amaq Agency for news and al-Bayan for streaming radio. There’s also an instructional children’s app where letters of the alphabet are associated with various pictures of weapons. An English version of Amaq Agency has been released, while other news apps in French and Turkish have been developed by the group.

Warnings of fake apps first spread in the beginning of June. The alerts provided directions on how to ensure what was downloaded was an official ISIS app. “Dubious sources published a fake version of the Amaq Agency Android app, aimed at breaching security and spying,” reads the alert. Users have been asked to download only from official channels and to verify the app’s checksum, a block of data that can be used to see if the numbers of bits sent matches what was received. The checksum acts as a “digital fingerprint.”

Unlike “Candy Crush” or “Clash of Clans,” ISIS apps won’t be found in the Google Play or Apple iOS stores. Apple has an approval process for any app that appears in its store, while Google has measures in place to remove apps after they have been uploaded to its store.

All ISIS apps are developed for Android devices because there are alternate ways to download the program for use on smartphones or tablets. A method called sideloading lets users install ISIS apps onto their device, but that same ability to create, upload and share software has led to the spread of fake ISIS apps. These apps can be loaded with malware that infect the user’s device. Despite the threat of detection among its users, Rita Katz, co-founder of the SITE Intelligence Group, believes ISIS will continue to develop apps to spread propaganda.

ibtimes.com

There was a marked fall in the number of terror attacks around the world in 2015, the US State Department has said.

It attributed the 13% drop from 2014 to fewer attacks in Iraq, Pakistan and Nigeria, three of the five countries worst affected by terrorism.

The other two are India and Afghanistan and together more than half the 11,000 attacks occurred within their borders.

Separately, the UN warned that so-called Islamic State (IS) was focusing on international civilian targets.

Over the past six months IS had carried out attacks in 11 countries, not including its activity in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan and Libya, the UN said.

More than 28,300 people died – a 14% decline – and about 35,300 others were wounded in 11,774 terrorist attacks worldwide last year, data compiled by the University of Maryland showed.

However, attacks and deaths increased in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, the Philippines, Syria and Turkey, State Department Acting Co-ordinator for Counterterrorism Justin Siberell said.

The State Department said figures showed the terror threat “continued to evolve rapidly in 2015, becoming increasingly decentralised and diffuse”.

Extremists were exploiting frustration in countries “where avenues for free and peaceful expression of opinion were blocked”, it said.

IS was the biggest single threat, the State Department said. The group has attracted affiliates and supporters in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

Although IS was losing territory in Iraq and Syria, it had gained in strength in Libya and Egypt, the report said.

The report said Iran was the biggest state sponsor of terrorism, saying it supported conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and was also implicated in violent Shia opposition raids in Bahrain.

Bahrain has accused Iran of supplying weapons to Shia militants behind bomb attacks on security forces. Iran denies this.

bbc.com