Islamist militants have been holed up for three weeks around the city’s commercial port

About 400 people have been killed in few weeks of heavy fighting between Libyan pro-government forces and Islamist groups in Libya’s second-largest city Benghazi, medical staff said on Saturday.

The Islamic State group is employing multiple tactics to subdue the Sunni Muslim tribes in Syria and Iraq under its rule, wooing some with gifts – everything from cars to feed for their animals – while brutally suppressing those that resist with mass killings.

The result is that the extremists face little immediate threat of an uprising by the tribes, which are traditionally the most powerful social institution in the large areas of eastern Syria and northern and western Iraq controlled by the group. Any US drive to try to turn tribesmen against the militants, as the Americans did with Sunnis during the Iraq war, faces an uphill battle.

Some tribes in Syria and Iraq already oppose the Islamic State group. For example, the Shammar tribe, which spans the countries’ border, has fought alongside Kurdish forces against the extremists in Iraq.

Offering sweeteners In eastern Syria’s Deir el-Zour province, for example, the Ogeidat is one of the largest tribes. One of its major clans, the Bu Jamel, has been a staunch opponent of the extremists. Another, the Bakir, long ago allied itself to the group. IS operatives use threats or offers of money or fuel to win public pledges of loyalty from senior tribal sheikhs.

Source: Kuwaittimes

Libyan general Khalifa Haftar vows to retake the eastern city of Benghazi and the capital city of Tripoli in two weeks and three months respectively

An anti-Islamist Libyan general, Khalifa Haftar, said he has given himself two weeks to take Benghazi and three months to recapture the capital Tripoli.

The strongman who this week was has been reinstated into the National Army, is allied to the Libyan parliament and has been battling Islamist militias who took control of the war-torn country’s biggest cities this summer after their defeat in elections.

Forces loyal to Haftar and Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani are fighting for control of Benghazi in the east and have launched an offensive against Islamist positions west of the capital.

“For Tripoli we are only at the beginning,” Haftar told the Italian daily Corriere della Sera. “We need more men and more supplies and weaponry.”

“I have given myself three months, but maybe we will need less. The Islamists of Fajr Libya (Libya Dawn) are not difficult to fight, no more so than the Islamic State at Derna,” the town in the east of the war-torn country which has become a base for militants affiliated to the extremist group who control swathes of Syria and Iraq.

“But the priority is Benghazi,” Haftar said. “The Ansar Asharia (Islamist militia) is battle-hardened, that takes more work, even though we control 80 percent of the city and we are pushing forward,” he added.

The general wants parliament and al-Thani’s internationally-recognised government, now based in Tobruk, close to the Egyptian border, to come back at least to Benghazi. “I have given myself a deadline of December 15,” he said.

More than three years after dictator Moamer Kadhafi was toppled and killed in a NATO-backed revolt, Libya is awash with weapons and powerful militias, and has rival governments and parliaments.

“The Tobruk parliament is the one elected by the people. The one in Tripoli is an illegal assembly where the Islamists want to turn back history,” Haftar insisted.

“But the real danger comes from the fundamentalists who want to impose their will everywhere. If Ansar Asharia takes power here, the threat will come to you in Europe, in your houses,” he said in the interview, given close to Benghazi.

“Egypt, Algeria, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia have sent us arms and ammunitions, but only their older technology. We are not asking you (Europeans) to send us ground troops or bomber aircraft. If we have adequate military equipment we will manage,” he added.

Source: Maltatoday

The Syrian troops on Thursday advanced in a contested town in the southern province of Daraa and killed a local commander of the al-Qaida-linked Nusra Front in that town, according to the state news agency SANA, Xinhua writes.

The Syrian troops killed Abu Hammam al-Jasrawi, a Saudi fighter who was leading the fighters of the Nusra Front in the town of Sheikh Miskin, where intense battles have been raging between the al-Qaida-affiliate group and the Syrian army for days, according to SANA.

The Syrian forces also killed a rebel commander called Hamzah Jamus, the leader of the Abn Qayem Jawziya battalion in the town.

Citing military sources, SANA said units of the Syrian army killed “terrorists” who had attempted to attack military outposts in Sheikh Miskin, which is 22 klm north of Daraa and constitutes an important knot that links many areas in southern Syria.

The state news agency said the Syrian troops continued to undertake “precise and qualitative” operations against the Nusra fighters and likeminded groups in Sheikh Miskin, adding that town has become fully exposed to the Syrian army’s fire.

SANA said the army forces dealt “heavy blows” to the rebels in several areas in Daraa as well.

Meanwhile, the oppositional Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said Thursday that battles are still ongoing in Sheikh Miskin between the Syrian troops backed by the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah militia and the extremist groups.

The UK-based group, which relies on a network of activists on ground, said a commander of Hezbollah was killed a day earlier during the incessant battles there.

Separately, the Observatory said the Syrian troops backed by the National Defense Forces (NDF), a pro-government militia, and Hezbollah clashed with the Nusra Front and other hardline groups at the northeastern entrance of the northwestern province of Aleppo. A Syrian officer was killed during the clashes, said the Observatory, spelling no further details.

In the central province of Homs, the Syrian government troops fired multiple mortar shells against the rebel-held city of Talbiseh in the countryside of Homs, without information on losses yet, said the Observatory.

It added that clashes continued between the Syrian forces and the Islamic State (IS) militants in the vicinity of the al-Shaer natural gas field in Homs countryside.

Source:  Trend.az

Si parla di nuove trattative, di una ‘Ghadames 2’, per tentare di sbrogliare la matassa libica, stavolta allargando l’incontro ai “leader tribali”.

D’altronde, viene spiegato, sia il governo di Tobruk (guidato da Abdullah al-Thinni) che quello autoproclamato di Tripoli (il cui premier è Omar al-Hassi) dipendono dal supporto esterno di clan “con marcati interessi localistici”.

Armed militias that control the eastern city of Derna are terrorizing residents through summary executions, public floggings, and other violent abuse. The abuses are taking place in the absence of state authorities and the rule of law. The groups include some that have affiliated with the extremist group Islamic State (also known as ISIS).

Human Rights Watch documented 3 apparent summary executions and at least 10 public floggings by the Islamic Youth Shura Council, an extremist group which publicly pledged allegiance to ISIS in November. Human Rights Watch also documented beheadings of three Derna residents in what appear to be war crimes, and dozens of seemingly politically motivated assassinations of public officials, judges and members of the security forces, and others, including women.

“Extremist militias controlling Derna in the absence of any state authorities have unleashed a reign of terror against its inhabitants,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director. “Commanders should understand that they may face domestic or international prosecution for the grave rights abuses their forces are committing.”

Since May, an armed conflict between forces allied with the elected Libyan government based in Tobruk and led by General Khalifa Hiftar and Islamist militias has engulfed eastern Libya. In and around Derna, in addition to the powerful Islamic Shura Youth Council, the militias include members of Ansar al-Sharia and the Abu Saleem Martyrs Brigade.

Human Rights Watch spoke with Derna residents who fled the city to escape persecution by Islamist militias and in anticipation of an announced military offensive by forces allied to Libya’s elected government. One Derna activist, who said he left the city at the end of October after receiving death threats for speaking out against the militias, described Derna as “fully under the control of fundamentalists” who have imposed an extremist ideology, and enforced a strict interpretation of Shari’a law with public executions and floggings. He said extremist militias shared the same ideology and the only dispute between them related to the Islamic Youth Shura Council’s pledge of allegiance to ISIS.

The United Nations should urgently establish an international commission of inquiry or similar mechanisms to investigate alleged war crimes and other serious violations by all sides of the conflict in Libya, with a view to ensuring future accountability, Human Rights Watch said.

Derna has had no significant presence of state authorities, including police and a functioning judiciary, since the end of the 2011 revolution in Libya that toppled Muammar Gaddafi.

Since 2013, unidentified assailants in Derna have assassinated at least five judges and prosecutors, and two women – a former lawmaker and a former security official. Unidentified armed militias have also attacked and destroyed tombs in mosques, including Derna’s historic al-Sahaba Mosque, which extremists have repeatedly targeted since 2011.

The Libyan air force, allied with the elected government, has conducted air strikes against militia targets in Derna, Benghazi, and elsewhere, while the militias have mounted purported suicide and other attacks in Tobruk, al-Baida, and Benghazi. Both sides have carried out indiscriminate attacks that amount to war crimes, killing and injuring civilians and civilian objects.

All parties to the conflict in Libya are required to abide by the laws of war. Certain serious violations of these laws, when committed with criminal intent, are war crimes. War crimes include “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable.” Murder on a systematic or widespread scale when used as state policy or by an organized group is a crime against humanity. Those who commit, order, assist, or have command responsibility for war crimes or crimes against humanity are subject to prosecution by domestic courts or the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Libyan authorities have shown themselves powerless or unwilling to investigate and prosecute those responsible for unlawful killings and other serious rights abuses in the country. International accountability efforts for serious crimes have stalled despite an existing ICC mandate in Libya and a UN Security Council resolution threatening individual sanctions. The UN Human Rights Council ended the mandate of its commission of inquiry into violations in Libya in 2012.

“UN Security Council threats of sanctions become hollow if they are never acted upon,” Whitson said. “As each day passes, more people die and more opportunities to reverse Libya’s downward spiral are being frittered away.”
Security Council and ICC
The ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed in Libya since February 15, 2011, under UN Security Council Resolution 1970. Human Rights Watch has urged the ICC prosecutor to consider additional cases addressing ongoing violations by all sides in Libya. In a November 11 statement to the Security Council, the ICC prosecutor said that the combined effect of instability in Libya and lack of resources had undermined further efforts to investigate ongoing abuses. The Security Council, whose members unanimously gave the ICC authority to investigate in Libya, have special responsibility to extend their full support to facilitate the prosecutor’s continued work there, Human Rights Watch said.

On November 20, the Security Council added the extremist groups Ansar al-Sharia in Derna and in Benghazi to the Al Qaeda sanctions list. Members of these two entities are now subject to international travel bans and asset freezes.

On August 27, the Security Council passed resolution 2174 (2014) broadening international sanctions on Libya to include people who engage in or support acts that “threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstruct or undermine the successful completion of its political transition.” Such acts include “planning, directing, or committing acts that violate applicable international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or acts that constitute human rights abuses.” The Security Council is still to deliver on this threat of sanctions by designating individuals to be subjected to a travel ban and assets freeze under the expanded sanctions regime.

Attacks, Abuses in Derna
Human Rights Watch spoke with Derna residents who witnessed militia members carrying out cruel punishments, including summary executions and floggings. Human Rights Watch also spoke with family members and friends of victims, and community activists, and reviewed available online content, including videos, photos, and statements.

An activist who recently fled Derna told Human Rights Watch on November 13 that the Islamic Youth Shura Council emerged in April, gradually took control of the city and created its own public administration to rule Derna. The group, which rejects democracy and only accepts Sharia law, established a Legal Committee for Dispute Resolution and Reconciliation and appointed judges to a new Islamic court who have interrogated, prosecuted, and pronounced sentence on those deemed to have offended against their strict interpretation of Sharia law. Information the Islamic Youth Shura Council published says it has also set up a body called the Diwan al-Hisbah to oversee the “promotion of virtue and prevention of vice,” as well as a bureau for education and its own “Islamic police” force. Derna residents told Human Rights Watch that some of the judges at the Islamic Court were foreign nationals.

Summary Executions
Derna residents said they witnessed militants of the Islamic Shura Youth Council carry out public executions of three men accused of murder in two separate incidents. On July 27, militants of the group shot Al-Sanussi Nasri al-Huweidi, a Libyan, and an unidentified Egyptian national, for the alleged killing of Hamad Miloud al-Hassadi on July 25. According to a witness, the family of the victim handed the two alleged killers to the Islamic Shura Youth Council, which interrogated and declared them guilty on the same day.

One witness said armed men belonging to the group took the two accused to Martyrs place at al-Sahaba Square at around 1:30 a.m., where a member of the group shot both the accused in the head, one with a single bullet and the other with two, after the victim’s family declined to shoot them:

The Shura Council, which now became ISIS, hardly waited at all before executing the suspects. It all happened so fast within just two days. The sessions at the Islamic Court where people are interrogated and sentenced by a panel of three judges are not public. Usually, the court announces if it will carry out a death sentence beforehand. In this case the family of the victims refused to pardon the suspect, so the court carried out the sentence.

On August 19, the Islamic Shura Youth Council oversaw the public execution of Mohamed Ahmed Mohamed, an Egyptian national, at a football stadium in western Derna, after accusing him of killing Khalid al-Drissi, a Libyan. In a six-minute video posted online, an unidentifiable masked man reads charges against the accused man, who is kneeling, blindfolded and with his hands tied behind his back, on a plastic covered stretcher. The masked man first asks members of the victim’s family if they wish to pardon the alleged murderer and, when they refuse, hands a pistol to one of the family members, who shoots the accused man in the head, killing him.

Public Flogging
A Derna resident told Human Rights Watch on November 18 that he witnessed the public floggings of eight young men in Derna’s Old Mosque Square on October 25 or 26. He said two masked men alternate in flogging the men:

Masked men from the Shura Council lined up eight young men at Al-Sahaba Square and punished each with 40 whips after they were caught drinking alcoholic beverages at a “bachelor party” together with the groom. The council member starts by whipping the shoulders and then continues all the way down to the feet, 40 lashes. If an individual is caught drinking alcohol, they [Shura Council] will implement the “whipping punishment” [had al-Jald] on the spot.

Photographs and accounts published by the Islamic Shura Youth Council on social media show two other public floggings in front of the Islamic Court. On each occasion, three men were flogged for allegedly drinking alcohol. Human Rights Watch was able to corroborate the floggings but not the dates on which they took place.

Assassinations
Human Rights Watch has tracked 250 cases of apparently politically motivated killings in Derna and Benghazi since the beginning of 2014. The victims included former and current members of the military and security agencies, as well as five judges and members of the public prosecution. In all cases, the killings were carried out by unidentified assailants. None of these unlawful killings have been investigated, and no one has been prosecuted or convicted for these crimes.

Mohamed Najib Hweidi, head of the appeals court for the Green Mountain region, was assassinated on June 16, 2013; Mohamed Khalifah al-Naas, deputy general prosecutor for the Green Mountain region was killed on November 9, 2013; Retired judge Youssef al-Kreimi died in Tunis on December 24, 2013 from wounds he sustained during an assassination attempt on November 25, 2013 in Derna; Abdelaziz al-Hassadi, Libya’s former general prosecutor, was assassinated on February 8, 2014; and former judge Mohamed Bouejeilah al-Mansouri was killed on April 28, 2014.

Unidentified assailants also targeted and killed two women, Fariha al-Barkawi and Salwa Yunis al-Hinaid, in 2014 in Derna in what appears to have been politically motivated assassinations. Two Derna residents, one an activist, said that the shooting death of a third woman in February only weeks after the killing of her husband, a former army officer, was not linked to politics but to a family dispute.

Unidentified assailants killed al-Barkawi, a former Derna city representative to the General National Congress (GNC), and a member of the National Forces Alliance, a political party with a non-Islamist agenda on July 17. One of her relatives in Derna, who spoke to Human Rights Watch on November 19, said al-Barkawi’s killing occurred five months after she resigned from the GNC, where she had called vocally for the presence of state authorities in Derna and criticized Islamist extremists. The relative said:

She was on her way to a market in western Shiha area to do some shopping for the month of Ramadan when she was killed by three bullets after her car was sprayed with a hail of bullets by a passing car with unidentified assailants. Although some passers-by tried to help her, it was too late. She died before she reached Al-Harish Hospital. There is no forensics examiner in Derna, so she was transferred to al-Bayda, which is 100 kilometers away and back the next day to be buried. The prosecutor’s offices are shut and the court was burned down early in 2011, during the revolution. There is no one who can investigate the killing.

Unidentified assailants gunned down al-Hinaid, a former employee of the state’s internal security apparatus under Muammar Gaddafi on September 9, 2014. A relative told Human Rights Watch on November 19 that gunmen killed al-Hinaid at around 8 a.m. as she left her house to buy bread, a regular routine. Several bullets hit her, and she died on the spot. No one has claimed responsibility.

Kidnappings and Beheadings
On November 1, a video statement by a group of nine masked young men, some of them armed, calling themselves Youth of Derna circulated on the social media. The statement pledged allegiance to the so-called Dignity military operation led by General Hiftar, who had been reinstated with 16 other officers in November by the elected government, and recognized the authority of the elected House of Representatives in Tobruk.

The group called on revolutionaries to take up arms and fight the “extremist militias in Derna including Ansar al-Sharia and ISIS,” and threatened to avenge unlawful killings and other rights abuses of the preceding three years that they alleged the “Muslim Brotherhood and extremist militias” had carried out, vowing to “show no mercy.”

The members of the group remain unidentified but they appear to have included at least one of three young men – Siraj Katish, Mohamed Btaou, and Mohamed al-Mismari – who were subsequently abducted in separate but seemingly coordinated incidents on November 5 in Derna. Their bodies were subsequently found in fields at Hisha, southern Derna. All three had been decapitated.

Derna residents identified al-Mismari as the likely spokesperson who appeared in the video, but Human Rights Watch was unable to confirm the identities of any of the nine youths. Derna residents said al-Mismari had spoken out against the Islamist militias in a June interview but that Katish and Btaou had no known public profiles as activists.

A Derna resident told Human Rights Watch on November 21 that unidentified armed men who arrived in three cars abducted Katish on November 5 as he stood in front of his house with three friends. A Derna resident familiar with the case told Human Rights Watch that on November 10 a shepherd alerted the Derna branch of the Red Crescent after finding the remains of two men, whose heads had been severed and were missing. The bodies were later identified by their families as those of Katish and Btaou. Al-Mismari’s was then found in an adjacent field; his head had also been severed, according to a news report. Human Rights Watch could not confirm the circumstances surrounding the abduction and killing of al-Mismari.

No one has claimed responsibility for these abductions and killings, although local residents have told Human Rights Watch they believe Islamist militants were responsible. One Derna resident who knew Katish said, “The extremists who pledged allegiance to ISIS are de facto in control of the entire city, they are now the strongest group there and they control everything, so they are undoubtedly responsible for the beheadings.”

In another incident, gunmen killed Moataz Bouruaq al-Shalwi near his house on November 13, according to a Derna resident who lives close by. Soon after, news circulated that militants of the Islamic Youth Shura Council had detained three people alleged to have killed al-Shalwi. Activists and news sites suggested that they faced imminent execution by shooting if the victim’s family desired it. There has been no news of the three since.

A May 28 news report said that the severed head of Abdul Moaz Turkawi, a Derna student who had previously challenged militia manning a checkpoint, was found in the compound of the city’s Al-Sahaba Mosque.

Source:  hrw.org

For years, Iraqi Shiites have been immune to the Iranian copy of Shiism; the chemistry didn’t work. Iranians strained for years during the post-Saddam Hussein era to establish a solid footprint, but they always failed to reach their goals due to differences in mentality, ethnicity, the approach to political Islam and the de facto hostility that ruled the relationship between both nations.

That is not to say Iran wasn’t influential, but that it failed all this time to win the hearts and minds of its fellow Shiites.

The same applies to many other prominent Iraqi leaders. That’s why there was no Iraqi copy of Lebanon’s Hezbollah. This was until the Islamic State (IS) led by self-titled Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi invaded Mosul and reached only tens of meters from the shrine of the two Askari Imams in Samarra, north of Baghdad.

“That was another day,” an Iranian official with deep understanding of what’s going on in Iraq told me. “Hajj Qasem Soleimani [Quds Force commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] and his men showed that Iran cares for Iraq as a nation.

Our iconic commander himself went there and fought with the Iraqi volunteers who celebrated his presence,” the official said. “If it wasn’t for Hajj Qasem and his men, Daesh [IS] [would be] today destroying the shrines of the household of the Prophet Muhammad, and that’s why today is another day.”

Iran started a widespread effort to enhance its political and religious influence in Iraq. Iranians were on the ground, there’s no denying, but there was also an Iraqi cleric, Sayed Hashem al-Haidari, who appeared in the political and military arena giving the Iranian path in the neighboring Arab country a strong local legitimacy. Haidari’s videos show him as another copy of Lebanese Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, with his fiery speeches, his charisma and his strong relations with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Haidari has been active during Ashoura, the holy Shiite annual season that commemorates the battle of Karbala that saw Imam Hussein, the grandson of the prophet, killed by the Umayyad army.

“It’s very similar to what happened in Bosnia,” the official source told Al-Monitor, “Iran supported the Muslims against Yugoslavia’s Slobodan Milosevic, while the United States showed verbal support. It’s the same in Iraq. We are the ones fighting on the ground and that’s why the Iraqi forces, with the help of the volunteers and the peshmerga, were able to recapture several towns, while the airstrikes by the United States and its allies materialized nothing on the ground.”

According to the official, Iran’s participation in the battle with IS in Iraq is still within the framework of military experts and few hundred well trained officers on the ground, “but Iran is ready to enhance its presence if the Iraqi government requested, if the battle field needs such addition.”

Al-Monitor learned from an Iraqi military source on the ground that dozens of highly trained Lebanese Hezbollah military experts arrived in Iraq to help in the military management of the battle. “They aren’t fighting, but they are helping with the tactics, as they are well experienced in such battles. They understand the mentality of the IS fighters more than anyone on the ground,” the source said. Yet, he ruled out the possibility, at least for now, that Hezbollah’s fighters would get involved directly in the war. “Iraqi fighters, the army and the volunteers are capable of ending this war by themselves,” he said.

Another senior Iranian official, Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, accused the US-led coalition of supporting IS. He told Al-Monitor that the Western countries aim to secure their interests in the region: “Iran on different occasions warned the United States and Western countries about the IS threats and the growing presence of terrorists in the sensitive Middle East region. These terrorist groups will continue their operations unless the United States and the West adopt a clear approach to fight terrorism.”

It’s true that Iranian officials show some suspicions over the US-led coalition’s role in Iraq and Syria, but they know well that cooperation with the coalition will help end the battle quicker. The same applies to Washington; therefore both nations were negotiating over the nuclear file with their eyes on Syria and Iraq, it’s maybe one reason why they resisted the de facto failure to arrive at a deal and decided to continue. Both reached a consensus that they don’t have the luxury to disengage at this moment.

Source: Al Monitor

With Libya engulfed in chaos, the town of Derna in the east of the country is emerging as a new stronghold for the Islamic State group, experts say.

The North African state has been wracked by instability since the overthrow of leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, providing a fertile ground for extremists.

IS fighters have already swept across Iraq and Syria, and their leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi recently boasted of vows of allegiance from militants in Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Some Western observers consider Derna, a town of 150,000, to be the home of a third IS franchise in North Africa, after Jund al-Khilifa in Algeria and Egypt’s Ansar Beit al-Maqdis declared their support earlier this year.

“The Islamic State is in Derna. It’s well documented. There’s no doubt,” said Othman Ben Sassi, a former member of the now-disbanded Transitional National Council, the political arm of the rebellion that overthrew Gaddafi. The group is exploiting “the absence of state authority and porous borders,” he added.

Statements and images have for several weeks circulated on extremist forums claiming to depict gatherings of “Libyan jihadists” belonging to IS – prompting concern in Washington.

“We have seen reports that violent extremists (in Libya) have pledged allegiance to IS and are looking to associate themselves with it,” said State Department spokesman Jeffrey Rathke.

Libyan authorities have struggled to control militant groups as well as powerful militias which ousted Gaddafi, and the internationally recognised government has been forced to take refuge in the far east of the oil-rich country.

‘IDEOLOGICAL FIGHT’
Derna and large areas of Benghazi, Libya’s second city, have served as strongholds for radical groups including Ansar al-Sharia, classed by the UN as a terrorist organisation.

In April, an offshoot of the group announced it had implemented Islamic sharia law in Derna. The self-proclaimed “Shura Council of Islamic Youth” has reportedly opened Islamic courts and established a religious police force in the town.

Dozens of masked members have appeared in military fatigues, regularly parading in pick-up trucks brandishing rocket launchers and heavy machine guns, and toting the black and white flag used by militants.
In August the Shura Council posted a video online appearing to show the public execution in a Derna football stadium of an Egyptian man accused of murder.

But the group has yet to formally pledge allegiance to IS, and analysts say there are divisions within its ranks.
“Several extremists in Derna are attracted to IS. But the majority of senior jihadists in Libya are former Al-Qaeda members and there is an ideological fight between IS and Al-Qaeda partisans,” said a Libyan expert on militants who did not want to be named.

The UN this month branded Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist organisation owing to its affiliation with Al-Qaeda’s North African franchise. “The decision was based on reliable intelligence,” the Libyan expert said. “Ansar al-Sharia has closer ties to Al-Qaeda than to any other group.”

‘ISLAMIC EMIRATE’
According to Claudia Gazzini, Libya analyst at International Crisis Group, some Derna factions have pledged allegiance to IS, but it is unclear which ones and how much support they enjoy.

“There is a misguided tendency to automatically associate the establishment of Islamic courts and the killings of soldiers with an IS agenda,” she said.

Derna was already considered by many analysts to be a de-facto “Islamic emirate”, entirely free from state control, before the reported claims of allegiance to IS. The town has long been suspected of harbouring and training foreign fighters who then go on to fight in Iraq and Syria, where IS has declared a “caliphate” and imposed its harsh interpretation of Islamic law.

“There are factions in Derna who reportedly swore allegiance to IS in the search for a group that could unify the Muslim community,” said a former Libyan official who also asked not to be named for security reasons.
“But ideological differences between jihadist groups and the international coalition offensive against IS means these factions have so far opted for discretion, or have gone to fight in Iraq and Syria,” the former official added.

According to one resident of Derna, life in the town goes on largely as normal – for most people.
“You go out, you do your chores, you visit friends. No one bothers you,” the resident said. “But if you are a policeman, a soldier or a lawyer, you’re dead.”

Source:  channelnewsasia.com

Three years after US troops left Iraq, Washington is considering reintroducing ground troops to fight the Islamic State (IS). Not advisers, not beefed up embassy details; regular infantry and special forces battalions.

The Islamic State’s bold victories contrast with the tired proclamations of aging al-Qaeda leaders and with the dismal defeats suffered by Arab armies over the years.

IS may reap a huge crop of recruits and win the allegiance of kindred Islamist groups across the Muslim world. It may also win the allegiance of local populations who will reluctantly prefer harsh rule to no rule at all – or to the rule of vengeful Shi’ites.

Compelling as the arguments for the deployment of US troops may be, caution is in order. The quick defeat of the Iraqi army in 2003 was followed by immense and unmanageable problems. The same may happen with a new round of US intervention.

IS forces and the war against them
It might be said that US troops have been less than successful against insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam. That may give rise to the conclusion that an Iraq redux will fare no better.

However, IS forces are not insurgents. As a putative state, they fight in the open in large units, rely upon routine logistical systems, use armor and artillery, and maneuver as would conventional units. The most important characteristic of an insurgency is substantial support from local populations, and IS has little if any. Indeed, it is widely despised for imposing an austere form of Islam of dubious provenance on the hapless inhabitants of towns and villages it captures.

If put into Iraq again, US troops will face conventional forces against which they are well trained. Hence, a more useful comparison will be the US fight against Iraq’s army in 1991 and 2003 – wars in which US maneuverability, firepower, and unit cohesion overwhelmed the enemy in a shockingly short period of time. Regardless of one’s perspective on the desirability of American intervention, their effectiveness in conventional operations is unmistakable.

Ground operations
American forces may be used in several ways. Operations will of course include some indigenous troops whose contributions will be prominent in Iraqi and American public affairs presentations.

Conventional land operations: First, troops can be deployed on the long front with IS. The militants are badly outnumbered and overstretched; US and allied troops can mass overwhelming numbers at several points. These may be on main roads, around key towns, and near assets such as dams and power stations.

Such drives will force IS to withdraw rapidly or concentrate troops for a major battle. Whether in retreating convoys or defensive positions, IS troops will be vulnerable to airpower. These operations will seek to replicate the battles of Baiji and Kobane, where IS troop concentrations were hit hard by from the air.

Commando operations: Quick insertions by air-mobile or airborne units, perhaps no more than a few hundred, can attack IS command and control centers, logistical hubs, training bases, and economic assets well behind the lines and even in Syria. These strikes would be of short duration and designed to maximize IS casualties and the destruction of its assets. The threat of such operations will force IS to keep more troops off the lines with adversaries, making regular ground operations against IS more effective.

Large-scale insertions: There may be a bolder effort to force IS into large-scale battles by inserting thousands of troops into key towns along the Syrian-Iraqi border, again either by airmobile or airborne landings. This would confront IS with the dilemma of fighting large-scale battles – even larger than Kobane and Baiji – or seeing their forces divided in two.

There are risks for US troops as well. They would be isolated and would have to supplied by air. However, owing to the US’s airpower and ground force, large-scale battles will not favor IS.

Any of these operations will be designed to inflict serious and perhaps unsustainable casualties and break the aura of invincibility and inevitable victory that IS enjoys with Islamic youth. Simultaneously, the attacks will bolster the confidence and aggressiveness of Iraqi and Kurdish forces. However, a complete victory over IS will prove elusive as it has options in both Syria and Iraq.

Risks and problems
It should be apparent to policymakers in Washington that their plans in the region have not always worked out. Some potential problems readily occur and might diminish any promise of a short-term operation that may be circulating in the corridors of national security bureaus.

Islamist recruitment : Reintroduction of ground troops will underscore prevalent narratives in the region proclaiming that the US is trying to humiliate and subjugate the Islamic world. This can boost recruitment for IS and kindred militant groups throughout the region. It is already widely believed that IS and al-Qaeda were created by the US and Israel to weaken existing states. Renewed ground operations will be interpreted as an obvious followup in the grand scheme.

Reluctant allies : Instead of strengthening the resolve of Iraqi and Kurdish troops, American ground troops may have the opposite effect. Indigenous forces, content to let American troops and airpower assume the burden of the fighting and casualties, will be tempted to be less aggressive. Their reluctance to fight will be supported by the calculation that Iraqi and Kurdish troops may well fight each other in the near future as issues of autonomy return to the fore.

Involvement in Iraqi politics : US troops will almost certainly find themselves enmeshed in sectarian hostilities once more. This was the case in 2003 when the fall of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni regime brought a Shia majority to power, which then pushed their former oppressors into the margins. The Sunnis are now seeking autonomy from their sectarian foes and will press for US support.

The US will be inserting itself into the conflict between the Kurds and the Baghdad government. The Kurds already have their own army, flag, constitution, and oil pipelines, and they now seek greater autonomy, if not independence. There is the further problem of Sunni land and oil infrastructure seized last summer as the army retreated from the IS offensive.

Advancing Kurdish and Iraqi army units are destroying the dwellings of Sunnis and pushing residents into Anbar province. Amid increasingly intense ethnic and sectarian politics, the US mission could find that intervention will become an open-ended peacekeeping mission – or worse, US troops will face the wrath of one or more of the antagonistic groups.

IS responses
Faced with superior ground troops, and powerless against airstrikes, IS may abandon conventional warfare operations in Iraq. This will not come easily to an organization that sees itself ordained to conquer and rule the region.

IS may retreat into urban hideouts and wage a bombing campaign against US troops and the Shi’ites. This would be done with the help of extant Ba’ath party and army networks, which have helped IS and its al-Qaeda predecessors since the 2003 invasion. IS may also benefit from the support of Sunni tribes whose efforts to get support from Baghdad and the US have thus far brought little.

IS in Syria : Efforts to find reliable troops in Syria to carry on the war against IS have not met with success. Some Free Syrian Army leaders, fearing that they will be seen as US proxies, have even rebuffed Washington’s appeals. American success in Iraq, then, may set the stage for a protracted war with IS in Syria. This in turn may tempt Washington to launch ground offensives into Syria.

Iran
An increased US presence in Iraq will set off alarms in Iran – despite the fact that the US and Iran are on the same side regarding IS in Iraq. Combined with Republican gains in the US Congress and the growing possibility of a Republican president, Iranians will look warily to their west and rethink the diplomatic opening with the US.

However, US-Iranian cooperation against IS in Iraq, limited and unheralded though it is, may prove useful to Iran. The same can be said of US-Iranian cooperation to the east in Afghanistan, where Tehran’s support for northern peoples’ fight with the Taliban predates the US entry in 2001. This makes Iran important in limiting Taliban efforts to regain much of the country as International Security Assistance Force troop levels dwindle. A neoconservative-influenced White House in 2017 may find itself handcuffed in its dealings with Iran by ongoing events in Iraq.

Source:  atimes.com

Con l’odio e la violenza dal 2002 Boko Haram (“La cultura occidentale è peccato”)  terrorizza la Nigeria per centrare il suo vero unico obiettivo: creare uno Stato islamico nel nord del Paese e imporre la Sharia come unica legge da rispettare.

Recentemente il gruppo ha dichiarato fedeltà allo Stato Islamico del Califfo Al Baghdadi, anche se non sono chiari i termini del patto d’alleanza.

Il suo leader è Abubakar Shekau.

Scomparso da tempo dalla circolazione se non per apparire di persona in sporadici video di propaganda, Shekau è un personaggio di cui si sa fondamentalmente ben poco.

Anche la sua stessa nazionalità sarebbe incerta.

Secondo l’ONU è nato non lontano dalla frontiera con il Niger, nello stato nigeriano di Yobe (adesso parzialmente sotto il controllo di Boko Haram) e sarebbe cresciuto nelle periferie di Maiduguri.

Fedele a Mohamed Yusuf, guida spirituale e fondatore del Gruppo della gente della Sunna per la predicazione e la jihad (movimento poi diventato Boko Haram), ne sarebbe diventato il braccio destro per poi succedergli, alla sua morte, nel 2009.

Rispetto al suo predecessore gli mancano il carisma, la formazione religiosa e le capacità oratorie.

Tutte caratteristiche cui in questi anni Shekau ha sopperito facendo leva sulla sua mostruosa brutalità.

Se dal 2002 al 2009 Boko Haram si era limitato a compiere prevalentemente attentati contro le forze dell’ordine e contro le istituzioni di governo, dal suo avvento gli obiettivi si sono moltiplicati: prima i cristiani del nord e i “cattivi musulmani”, poi chiunque si opponeva alla dottrina salafita, in seguito i “collaboratori” dello Stato e, infine, l’intera popolazione senza più alcuna distinzione.

Il primo attentato nel centro di Abuja risale al 2011.

Da allora l’escalation di violenze è disarmante.

Negli ultimi 5 anni sono stati ridotti in cenere interi villaggi (oltre 10mila morti e 700mila sfollati tra donne, bambini e uomini), fino all’episodio che ha portato Boko Haram sotto i riflettori internazionali, vale a dire il rapimento lo scorso aprile di oltre 200 studentesse nel villaggio di Chibok, nello Stato del Borno.

Da allora altre decine sono state prese in ostaggio per essere date in sposa ai loro carcerieri o per essere vendute come schiave.