Russia wants further strengthen its position in the middle East. The media learned about what is being negotiated between Moscow and Cairo. According to preliminary information we are talking about the long-term lease on an air base, located on the territory of the Egyptian city of Sidi Barrani, near the border with Libya.

The base will hosted a contingent of Patriotic forces for the long term. True, at first, the number of soldiers is small, inform “news” referring to several reliable sources in the defense Ministry.

Obviously, military personnel data will be to upgrade air base for its full compliance the deployment of Russian aviation.

“Negotiations on participation of Russia in restoration of Egyptian military facilities located on the Mediterranean coast in the district of Sidi Barrani have been very successful. In the case of obtaining the agreement of both parties in 2019, the to start work. Cairo is ready to accept her rent Moscow for the solution primary geopolitical objectives in the interests of the Egyptian and side” – say the sources in the Russian defense Ministry.

true-news.info/

The Islamic State (ISIS) on Saturday formally announced the start of operations in Algeria. Previously, Algeria’s ISIS militants had been relatively quiet, beheading a single French tourist in September 2014.

In a statement published by the jihadi Amaq Agency, ISIS claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on a People’s National Army (PNA) convoy in Skikda Province.

ISIS militants detonated an explosive device adjacent to the army convoy as it passed near Tamalous town in northeastern Algeria. It was not immediately clear whether the explosion caused any casualties.

The ISIS leadership has vowed to continue their attacks in Algeria and pledged to extend their operations against PNA forces. According to reports, at least 200 ISIS militants are currently active in Algeria.

In September 2014, a group of militants deserted al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. As ISIS territory has receded in Iraq and Syria the group has been active abroad, establishing provinces called vilayats.

aranews.net

As a four wheel vehicle mounted by three fighters and a 14.5 machine gun departed from Sirte’s port, a trail of nine similar automobiles followed. Soldiers riding the convoy raised ‘V’ signs and chanted quotes of victory—they had just returned from battle with ISIS’ ultra-hardline militants.

The soldiers had been a part of the Libya effort called Operation Odyssey Lightning to free Sirte from terrorist hold. The operation includes U.S. military effort supporting the Libyan government against the ISIS terror group, Libya’s GNA had aligned forces to retake Sirte.

Five years after Libya’s dictator Moammar Gadhafi was deposed in a popular revolution, the country had remained trapped in a spiral of deteriorating security, economic crisis and political deadlock. Public trust in the nation’s weak government institutions has fallen to an all-time low as political elites, unable to agree on even a governmental structure, deploy armed militias to control territory and economic assets.

An additional challenge comes from ISIS and other violent extremists exploiting the situation to expand operations in Libya.

Meanwhile, a new, internationally recognized Government of National Accord, the product of a two-year United Nations-led process, continues its struggle to establish legitimacy and control beyond the capital.

Boubacar, a Libyan fighter waiting on the other side, raised his weapon in a gesture of glory mixed with happiness, believing that the approaching convoy of companion fighters was coming to aid in the fight against ISIS and help secure battle locations.

Soon enough, Boubacar’s gun was lowered, and a stupefied expression crossed his face as the regiment of nine packed vehicles passed right by him as if he were a stranded desert ghost, later disappearing into the heat of the southern arid desert.

Early on in the day, orders came in from Libya warlords ordering complete withdrawal. Boubacar along with fighters assigned to the ‘Lions’ brigade, partaking in the Operation Odyssey Lightning, stood in disbelief at what had happened. Victory was there to grab- ISIS militants at a disadvantage- yet soldiers were retreating.

A wave of depression hit the morale of Libya fighters, who at a young age had wasted away in their mission to hunt down and expel terrorists from their country. It is now apparent that the number of forces fighting ISIS had been gradually decreasing in Libya amid widespread confusion combined with rage and a hint of grief.

What remains a mystery is whether GNA’s elected Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj was informed of the withdrawal, despite him being the de facto official held accountable for the operation to free Sirte.

On a political level, even outlining the situation in Libya, namely Sirte, remains controversial– Tariq Al Qaziri, a political advisor at the national dialogue that elected Sarraj’s presidency and council, says that victory is nearing, while Justice and Construction Party’s official Jamal Harisha says that resolution for the war-torn country is far as the true status quo stands empowers militia warlords, leaving the GNA a symbolic value alone.

More so, on national division, Libyan Front commander Salahddine Abdulkarim , says that the true war is being fought the armed forces led by General Khalifa Haftar and not ‘some unruly militias’, referring to efforts spent by the GNA.

Although the Government of National Accord is now functioning, its authority is still unclear as specific details acceptable to both sides have not yet been agreed upon.

The second Libyan Civil War, an ongoing conflict, is among rival groups seeking control of the territory of Libya. The conflict is been mostly between the government of the Council of Deputies that was elected democratically in 2014, also known as the “Tobruk government”, which is led by General Haftar, and internationally recognized as the “Libyan Government”; and the rival Islamist government of the General National Congress (GNC), also called the “National Salvation Government”, based in the capital Tripoli. In December 2015 these two factions agreed in principle to unite as the Government of National Accord.

Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper had launched a series of investigations devoted to uncovering the truth behind the heated clashes with ISIS in Libya, especially in rubble-rendered Sirte.

It is evident that the political unrest in Libya, was the chief reason behind withdrawing forces from the field, even when the fighting against ISIS had started playing into Libya’s favor.

aawsat.com

Roughly 20 years ago, Carlo Maria Santoro, a professor of international relations at Milan and one of Italy’s foremost experts on geopolitics, wrote a book titled, The Risk from the South. He warned of Libya’s centrality to the stability of North Africa and the countries of Southern Europe. He was, at the time, referring to the dangerous idiosyncrasies of Libyan ruler Muammar Qaddafi and his shrewd manipulation of the migrant trade, sponsoring of terrorism, and economic blackmail. Today, we are still facing all these threats, even without Qaddafi.

Today the threats from NATO’s south do not come from the politics of a state or a particular leader. They are fragmented and multifaceted, necessitating the need to undertake new strategies. The best way to confront these new threats stemming from widespread instability in the southern borders is to address the underlying factors causing this instability. NATO, which has shifted from focusing on collective defense to collective security, can assume a role in supporting stabilization processes that are supposed to be conducted by other entities, such as the European Union and the United Nations. State-building is necessary to restore stability to Libya and therefore tackle the major threats at the source.

The main risk emanating from Libya is that it may become a hotbed of terrorism. The Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) is just the tip of the iceberg. Large parts of the country are now fertile ground for the establishment of numerous jihadist organizations, each one with its own international connections. This phenomenon can easily destabilize a country whose importance for security in the region cannot be underestimated: Algeria. With its high unemployment and young population, Algeria—which is undergoing a political crisis and faces economic instability from high unemployment and a young population—is highly vulnerable. In particular, the political situation raises major concerns due to the age and ailing conditions of its president Abdelaziz Bouteflika. The low level jihadi presence in Algeria could receive a boost from the instability in Libya, which could provide training camps, recruitment opportunities, and financial resources by exploiting some of the illegal activities that have boomed there. Tunisia is also deeply affected by Libya’s instability, as are countries like Niger and Egypt that view collaboration between Islamist radicals in eastern Libya and, for example, Sinai-based militants in Egypt as a nightmare scenario.

For Europe, the security risk is theoretical so far since no terrorist attacks in the continent have been linked to Libya in any way. However, this could unfortunately change unless a solution to the Libyan crisis is found.

Another major perceived threat comes from the large flow of migrants leaving the shores of Libya heading to Italy. Migration is primarily a humanitarian issue, but its security dimension should not be underestimated. Libyan gangs and organized criminal networks have become the primary beneficiaries of illegal migration, which is estimated to be worth about $225-325 million per year. Many of the same gangs are smuggling drugs, alcohol, tobacco, and arms throughout the region and Europe. Should these operations fall under the control of jihadist organizations such as ISIS, Ansar Sharia, or al-Qaeda, it would be a powerful boost for their finances and operational capabilities. There is also the threat of the infiltration by terrorists via migration to Europe. While this is certainly a possibility, it has not happened so far. If the power of criminal organizations in Libya is not curtailed, it will soon reach a level whereby these organizations will be able to invest their illicit profits in Europe in search of new rackets, thus further corrupting the public order in these countries.

Libya’s economic crisis could also have security implications for NATO’s south. Libya is home to Africa’s largest proven oil reserves: 48.4 billion barrels. Libya’s oil is cheap to extract, which translates into lucrative profit margins for oil companies operating there. Even after the revolution, Libya maintained an output of 1.7 million barrels a day, accounting for over 10 percent of European oil imports. After the 2014 crisis, this output collapsed, reaching as little as 360,000 barrels a day. Neglect and widespread attacks have hit the oil infrastructure hard. Europe, especially after the Ukrainian crisis, needs to lessen its energy dependence on Moscow. Libya could play an important role to this end. Aside from energy security, the economic crisis facing Libya and a possible economic collapse could cause a humanitarian crisis with millions of people seeking refuge not only from violence but from food and water scarcities. The threat for the southern European countries from this scenario is self-evident.

There are several policies that could be implemented by NATO to address these risks. Closer cooperation with international organizations, in particular the EU, is needed. Although the cooperation between the two organizations has already produced concrete results in the shape of NATO’s activity in the Aegean Sea as well as its support for EUNAVFOR Sophia in Central Mediterranean, these are still “ad hoc” initiatives to stifle migration by sea that do not reflect standing coordination of efforts. Especially when it comes to crisis prevention, where the two organizations could leverage substantial weight by acting together especially in providing training where EU member could capitalize on their expertise in training police and civic society organizations, whereas NATO’s can focus more on training traditional military forces. But so far, they seem to prefer instead to act separately (or, in some cases, to not act at all). In the case of Libya, such close coordination is both unavoidable and desirable and should constitute a long-term project. NATO, which has already expressed its availability to play such a role when a degree of stability and security is guaranteed, should take the lead in supporting the rebuilding of the Libyan Armed Forces and the reintegration of armed militias into the country’s defense and security structures. NATO is no stranger to such a role, having played it in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the EU should take the lead in rebuilding and reforming police and civil institutions. Some deconflicting may be necessary in areas where respective responsibilities might overlap, such as in the longstanding Libyan project to establish a “National Guard” or in the establishment of border and gendarmerie-like forces. This should take place under a UN “umbrella” although, should direct UN deployment on the ground be lacking, UN legal cover in the form of a Security Council Resolution might suffice to allow implementation by the EU and NATO.

NATO knows and understands the challenge on its Eastern flank, which originates from a state actor that is the successor to the Alliance’s traditional adversary. No such level of understanding and responding has been achieved in the South so far, where the threats originate either from non-State actors (such as ISIS) or are non-military in nature (such as uncontrolled migration). NATO is starting to develop the kernels of a potential strategy based on stabilizing local actors and helping them respond to crises in their own neighborhood, but this has not translated yet into a full-fledged policy. More detailed planning and more resources need to be made available. In the case of Libya, this means that any defense rebuilding and reform should be aimed at identifying the most likely threats to Libya’s security (both external and internal) and train the new Libyan Armed Forces to specifically confront those threats.

atlanticcouncil.org

6 residents of the village of Ghajar, among them three brothers and their cousin, are suspected of smuggling explosives from Lebanon to be used in attacks in northern Israel; plot discovered after Israeli farmer found the bombs hidden in a grove

Six residents of the village of Ghajar in the Golan Heights were charged on Thursday with receiving explosives from Hezbollah to carry out terror attacks in Haifa.

The plot was foiled after the main defendant, Diab Kahamuz, had forgotten where he had hidden the explosives, which were later discovered by an Israeli farmer.

Diab Kahamuz, 31, is the son of Saeb Kahamuz, a drug dealer and Hezbollah member who escaped to Lebanon during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. Saeb allegedly contacted his son using encrypted emails, suggesting that Diab used his drug smuggling infrastructure to smuggle explosives from Lebanon into Israel. The senior Kahamuz also told his son how to directly contact Hezbollah operatives.

Among Diab’s accomplices are his two brothers—Jamil Kahamuz, 29, and Yussef Kahamuz, 34, their cousin Mohssan Kahamuz, 21, and two other residents of Ghajar—Adal Ayunat, 29, and Ibrahim Mamdouh, 21. Ghajar is an Alawite-Arab village on the Hasbani River on the border between Lebanon and the Israeli Golan Heights.

Diab Kahamuz was indicted for aiding the enemy in wartime, espionage, contact with a foreign agent, giving information to the enemy, conspiring to aid the enemy in wartime, weapons offenses, attempt to import weapons, and conspiring to commit a crime.

His brothers were charged with aiding in these offenses, while their cousin was charged with giving information to the enemy among other offenses.

On July 30, a farmer from the northern city of Metula found a bag containing two explosive devices in a grove near Highway 90. Explosives experts who examined the two bombs, which had delay fuses and were found to be very powerful, determined they were made by Hezbollah.

An investigation by the Israel Police and the Shin Bet found that the explosives were smuggled into Israel from Lebanon in May. Diab, who retrieved the explosives after they were thrown over the border fence, put them in a bag and hid them in the grove.

He was instructed to use the explosives to carry out bombings in crowded places in Haifa.

Diab scouted the locations he was instructed to target but decided they were unsuitable due to the tight security and numerous cameras. Instead, Diab suggested to his father and their handlers to plant the explosives in other areas, including the nearby northern city of Nesher. He allegedly brought his two brothers, Yussef and Jamil, in on the plan, planning to use the latter’s help in carrying out the attack.

Diab also suggested to target the Golani Interchange in the lower Galilee, where many soldiers gather every morning.

“While he was driving through the Tur’an Junction, the defendant noticed a bus stop filled with many soldiers,” the indictment noted. “The defendant thought this place to be a suitable target for an attack—as it would allow harming many soldiers—and took photos of the place with his Samsung (cellphone).”

The indictment goes on to describe how Diab and his brother Yussef drove along the route between the Golani Interchange and the Tur’an Junction, taking photos and filming videos of the road and the bus stop. Diab’s other brother, Jamil, aided by sending the photos to their Hezbollah handlers.

Later, Diab went to retrieve the explosives from their hiding place but was unable to locate them.

On September 4, Diab and the other suspects were arrested and taken for interrogation. Investigators seized computers and cellphones belonging to the suspects, where they found photos that were sent to Hezbollah of possible targets for attack—including military bases and sensitive locations in the village of Ghajar itself.

“Hezbollah and other terror organizations are making great efforts to carry out attacks inside the State of Israel, while working to recruit collaborators from among the citizens of the state. A quick and thorough investigation into several lines of inquiry has led to the arrest of all of the members of the terror cell and prevented a mass-casualty terror bombing,” the police said in a statement.

ynetnews.com

The Islamic State group is looking to expand its global terror efforts deeper in Africa, according to a new report. While the militants have already established a presence in both East and West Africa, it is now looking to the North amid reports it continues to be pushed from it Middle East strongholds.

ISIS’ primary target? Libya, which is a “strategic gateway” to other Northern Africa locations that are growing hotbeds for the terror group’s operations and recruiting efforts. An Islamic State supporter penned an essay saying in part that Libya is “the key to Egypt, the key to Tunisia, Sudan, Mali, Algeria and Niger too,” the Daily Beast reported Tuesday.

That assertion has been backed up by recent ISIS activity but primarily in Libya but also across other areas across the continent’s north.

At least three civilians were killed in Benghazi after Islamic State militants were blamed for launching several rockets in the center of the city Tuesday, News of Africa reported. The location targeted is just a few miles from ISIS-controlled territory.

Those deaths were reported less than a week after nearly two dozen U.S. airstrikes devastated the Libyan city of Sirte, where ISIS “enemy fighting positions” had been reported, according toNews 24.

Elsewhere in North Africa, ISIS-affiliated fighters in Egypt ambushed a group of policemen this past Saturday, killing five of them in the latest Islamic State group attack in the country. In that instance, the group Ansar Beit el-Maqdes claimed responsibility. Other authority figures in Egypt targeted by ISIS and its affiliates include judges and members of the national military, NDTV reported.

But it’s in Tunisia where local officials have expressed serious concern over the spread of ISIS, as the country has proven to be fertile ground for Islamic State recruits. About 1,000 Tunisians are estimated to be fighting for ISIS in Libya, Al Arabiya reported last month. Other reports say the number could be as high as 3,000 Tunisians.

“The war against terrorism is an all-encompassing one. If we confront terrorism only on the security or military fronts, we lose the war,” Tunisia Defense Minister Farhat Horchani said during a security conference in Paris before using another term to reference ISIS. “We must instill in young people that Islam is not this… If not, within a couple years we will have a monster more dangerous than Daesh.”

Tunisia itself has also been a target of the Islamic State group, which attacked a luxury beach resort near the capital city of Tunis during the summer of 2015. At least 40 people were killed in that instance, including British tourists on vacation that at the time was called the country’s worst terror attack.

Most recently, a suspected ISIS terror cell in Morocco made up of all women was arrested after authorities caught wind of an impending suicide bombing there. The arrests shined a spotlight on another area of concern for the Islamic State’s terror strategies: using women as suicide bombers.

Multiple suspected ISIS fighters were arrested in Morocco almost a year ago after it was announced the ringleader behind the November 2015 Paris terror attacks launched by ISIS was from the North African country. The arrests came after officials there had just recently foiled a terrorism plot.

The recent spate of Islamic State activity in North Africa harkens back to two years ago when 21 Egyptians Christians were kidnapped and beheaded on a beach. ISIS would later produce a video of the gruesome mass executions, which is suspected of having been filmed on the Mediterranean coast of Libya.

ibtimes.com

alalam.ir

A new surge of violence hit the Lebanese district of Arsal near the Syrian border, as heavy clashes broke out on Tuesday between Islamic State (ISIS) militants and the al-Qaeda splinter group Jabhat Fateh al-Sham.

ISIS initiated the clashes by attacking a checkpoint for the Fateh al-Sham in the Malahi neighbourhood of Arsal, using mortar shells. Scores of Fateh al-Sham fighters were killed in the attack, and ISIS eventually took over the checkpoint, local sources reported on Tuesday.

“Fateh al-Sham fighters responded by storming an ISIS security checkpoint in the al-Shir district near the Arsal border heights,” a media source close to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham told ARA News.

At least 15 ISIS militants were killed at the hands of Fateh al-Sham fighters, before the group took over the ISIS security checkpoint in al-Shir.

Both ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham [previously al-Nusra Front] hold positions in the Arsal region and al-Qaa heights near the Lebanese-Syrian border.

In August 2014, ISIS militants attacked a Lebanese Army base and took dozens of soldiers as hostages, nine of them are still held by the militant group.

aranews.net/

At first, it seems surprising. Algeria, the largest country in Africa and home to 40 million people, knows extremism well. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Algerians were among the first to join the newly formed mujahideen. Then, during Algeria’s civil war in the 1990s – known locally as the “black decade” – Islamist groups established a presence across the country.

Attacks and bombings, followed by counter-offensives from the government, led to the deaths of more than 150,000 people and the disappearances of another 7,000. Only in 2001 was the conflict finally brought to an end.

Fifteen years later, radicalism appears to hold relatively little appeal in Algeria. There could, of course, be a spectacular attack tomorrow and statistics don’t tell the whole story, but in terms of IS’s recent recruitment of foreign fighters, Algeria lags far behind other countries in North Africa.

In numbers published in December, Tunisia, Algeria’s much smaller neighbour, tops the list with 6,000-7000 recruits to extremist groups (mostly IS) in Syra and Iraq; Morocco, bordering on the other side, had between 1,200 and 1,500 recruits. Algeria, in comparison, was the origin of only about 200 fighters.

Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center who is also Algerian, has spent the past 10 years studying radicalisation but was still taken aback by the low numbers.

“I was very surprised [at] first,” she told IRIN. “How come a land like Tunisia, the happy child of the Arab Spring, has higher numbers than us?”

The main explanation, she believes, is Algeria’s own legacy of conflict. The experience of living with extremism remains fresh in the country’s collective memory and works as a form of psychological deterrent.

“The war was a massive trauma for the Algerian population,” Ghanem-Yazbeck explained. “People are still scared and absolutely do not want to repeat it. When images come from Libya and Syria today, they are daily reminders of what millions of Algerians have lived through.”

Akram Kharief, an Algerian journalist and expert on security issues, agrees. Looking at Algeria today, he sees it as proof that the “jihadist promise” can fail.

“It can [fail], because it has already done so here. Interestingly, when you look at those who have committed terrorist crimes in Algeria in the past 10 years, the average age is 39 years. That is people coming from what remains [of radical groups], not new recruits.”

The role of the state

This does not mean extremism has become a non-issue in Algeria. There have been a number of incidents in the past years, including the deadly hostage taking at a gas facility in In Amenas in 2013 and the killing of a French tourist by an IS-aligned group in northern Algeria in 2014. The regional branch of al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, continues to retain its standing and reputation.

But IS has been less successful. The group that killed the French tourist Jund al-Khalifa was eliminated less than three months after the killing; a replacement group was also finished off within a few days. The reason, Ghanem-Yazbeck believes, is Algeria’s investment in its security forces.

With a vast and largely uninhabited desert, and long borders with countries including Mali and Libya, maintaining control is a formidable task but one that Algeria has poured resources into.

The country is the largest importer of weapons in Africa, and is alone on the continent in spending more than $10 billion on its military every year. Its police force also far exceeds that of others: 209,000 people were employed in Algeria’s national security service in 2014, in comparison to Morocco’s 46,000 or the 143,000 in France, which has 65 million inhabitants – 25 million more than Algeria.

“[The army] has become a massive force,” said Ghanem-Yazbeck. “If you add to that the police, gendarmerie, and intelligence branches, it has avoided many Algerians from reaching out [to groups like IS].”

Countering extremism

The years of conflict in the 1990s gave the government valuable expertise in heading off extremism before it has time to flourish, even if the methods it uses are sometimes questionable.

A source who works on anti-radicalisation in Algiers described to IRIN, on condition of anonymity, what happened to a young man whose friend was recruited by IS.

“When [the IS recruit] arrived in Syria, he shared a photo on Facebook. The friend in Algiers saw this and pressed ‘like’, that’s all. Next morning, the security service came knocking on his door.”

And while questions remain about the effectiveness of strategies that fall under the umbrella of “Countering Violent Extremism”, Tarek Hadjoudj, a physician and civil society activist who works with youth projects across the country, says Algeria’s experience with conflict makes even informal programmes more effective.

As part of a reconciliation process after the civil war, many former fighters were granted amnesty and reintegrated into their communities.

“They are now talking to youths, telling them that violence leads to nothing,” he explained, mentioning the case of a long-time fighter who lives in Jiel, a conservative northern area of the country.

Today, Hadjoudj said, that fighter is “actively reaching out and discouraging youth from joining [IS]”.

He added that in his conversations with young people who sympathise with Islamist extremism, they don’t tend to mention a desire to go abroad and fight. “There is a consciousness today, especially in many low-income neighbourhoods, that what happened during our years of terrorism led to nothing.”

Government buy-in

The Algerian regime, led by 79-year-old president Abdelaziz Bouteflika from the National Liberation Front (FLN) has an interest in fighting radicalisation not only to keep the peace – the issue has become one of its best instruments for remaining in power.

“The state is capitalising on the fact that Algerians are fed up with violence. It was very enlightening to see that the FLN’s latest slogan was ‘stability and continuity’,” said Ghanem-Yazbeck.

She describes a government that is trying to leave the traumatic years of the 1990s behind, but not willing to actually resolve what happened.

“There was a reconciliation after the war which was good, but we still haven’t talked about those years. We need to do that in order to really move on.”

One thing the government has done, she explained, is control the Algerian religious sphere. Radical preachers were shut out from the mosques after the 1990s, and the government has since kept them under its authority. A national union to unite the country’s imams was formed in 2013 to act as a “bulwark against imported religious ideas”. There are also plans for the launch of a university programme to train imams.

Ghanem-Yazbeck points to another reason why IS has little appeal in Algeria: Dawa Salafiya, or “quiet Salafism”, as it is sometimes called. This alternative Islamic movement, which spreads its messages through a number of media channels, has gained ground in Algeria since the end of the civil war.

“Being very disappointed with the Islamist parties in the 1990s, people increasingly started turning to Dawa Salafiya, which doesn’t have any involvement in politics. In fact, it believes that politics has a damaging effect on Muslims. In that sense, they are an alternative to jihadism,” she said.

Ghanem-Yazbeck thinks Algerians may be “vaccinated” against this kind of radicalisation for now, but the vaccine won’t last forever.

“The memory of what happened in the 1990s is fading away a bit with every year, and new generations are growing up who did not experience the war, and violence will return. It is only a question of when.”

albawaba.com