An Egyptian police officer was killed on Wednesday evening after gunmen ambushed Egyptian forces in the Sinai PeninsulaEgyptian security sources told Ma’an that the gunmen opened fire at police in the al-Masaaid neighborhood of the city of al-Arish in the Northern Sinai.

The Sinai Peninsula has been the stage of ongoing attacks, particularly targeting Egyptian military and police forces, which have increased since Egyptian President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi took power from democratically-elected Muhammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013.

The Egyptian president came under attack following his violent suppression of Muslim Brotherhood members following his rise to power, which Sisi has argued is necessary to deter future attacks in the Sinai and across Egypt.Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, the militant group responsible for a majority of attacks on security personnel, aligned with the Islamic State group in November 2014, changing its name to Sinai Province.

maannews.com

The US State of Department warned its citizens in Algeria of traveling near the eastern and southern borders next to Libya and Mali, for the real terrorist threats.

The US State of Department issued a warning, on Tuesday, for its citizens not to travel or move in the desert areas.

The statement referred to the terrorist attack in Tigantourine Gas Facility in In Amenas in January 2013, and warning them also from traveling to the tribes’ area including TeI Ozo, Bergaya, and Bouira.

The statement said that it was advised to avoid going for 50 km at least close to the eastern borders, claiming that the terrorist groups are still active inside Algeria. And terrorist groups still wage attacks using bombs, fake checkpoints in the desert area in the tribes’ region, or spots close to the borders with Tunisia.  Security in the major cities prompt terrorist groups to work in far insulated areas”.

libyaprospect.com/

The head of the Libyan National Army, Field Marshal Khalifa Hafter, has called on officers and soldiers to be ready for the offensive to free Tripoli. He was speaking to members of the LNA. A top LNA official confirmed to the Libya Herald this evening that Hafter had made the call.

Exactly what sort of offensive Hafter intends was not stated. He has previously stated that he would never go to Tripoli if it involved a fight. However, although there are reports of him being in contact with some forces in the capital, it is generally thought that any attempt by LNA forces to take Tripoli will unite the currently divided militia forces there against them.

For the past two and a half years Hafter has been regularly predicting the liberation of Benghazi.

Hafter also spoke about the rape case in Tripoli, saying that he had been deeply upset by it, as if it had affected him personally.

libyaherald.com

The Libyan Government’s Minister of Defence, Mahdi Al-Barghathi, received the Russian Ambassador, Ivan Molotkov, in Tripoli on Monday for a meeting.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss how Russia can work with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA)’s initiatives regarding opportunities for collaboration between the two countries in military initiatives, said the Ministry of Defence’s media centre.

“Russia is ready to expand its support on the military level for the GNA,” said the Russian Ambassador.

The Libyan Defence Ministry said Al-Barghathi will be visiting Moscow soon to continue the discussion on Russia’s involvement in Libyan military initiatives.

Last month, General Khalifa Haftar and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met in Moscow to discuss Russia’s support for Haftar’s alleged war against terrorism in Libya.

“Our relations are crucial, our goal today is to give life to these relations,” Haftar said before meeting with the Russian Foreign Minister.

“We hope we will eliminate terrorism with your help in the nearest future.”

Libya is struggling with political instability as two powerful political entities, the GNA in Tripoli and the Libyan parliament in Tobruk, struggle to find common ground.

Many of Haftar’s opponents claim that he is fighting to control eastern Libya and that his ultimate plan is to rule over the country.

While Haftar was in the Russian capital, Dmitry Peskov the spokesperson for the Kremlin, said, “Moscow is in touch with various Libyan representatives and contacts with Haftar take place as part of this process.”

libyangazette.net

Four soldiers were killed by a bomb blast on Monday in Egypt’s restive Sinai Peninsula, according to a local security source.

A military vehicle struck a roadside bomb during a security swoop in North Sinai’s city of Sheikh Zuweid, killing four soldiers, the source told Anadolu Agency on condition of anonymity because he was unauthorized to speak to media.

There has been no claim of responsibility for the attack.

Monday’s attack came one day after 25 churchgoers were killed when a bomber blew himself up inside a church in the Egyptian capital Cairo.

Since mid-2013, when Mohamed Morsi — Egypt’s first freely-elected president — was ousted in a military coup, the Sinai Peninsula has been roiled by insurgency, which left hundreds of Egyptian security personnel dead.

The Egyptian security forces, meanwhile, continue to wage a fierce campaign — involving elements from both the police and the army — against what they describe as Sinai-based “terrorist groups”.

Egypt’s army-backed authorities say they are battling the Welayat Sinai (Province of Sinai) group, which is said to have links to the Daesh terrorist organization.

thepeninsulaqatar.com/

On November 27, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) clashed for the first time with the Islamic State-linked group called Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed (“The Army of Khalid bin al-Waleed”) on the border between the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and the Yarmouk Basin region of southwest Deraa province. Though no casualties were reported on the Israeli side, at least three members of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed were killed. Do these clashes mean the Islamic State is opening up a front against Israel via the Golan borderlands? And what do they tell us about the ever-shifting puzzle of jihadist groups in Syria?

Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed is named for a companion of the Prophet Muhammad who led the Muslim armies that defeated the Byzantines in the Yarmouk Basin, leading to the conquest of the Levant region. It was formed in late May as a merger of three main factions, the most important being the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade that is native to the Yarmouk Basin area.

Its links with the Islamic State have been made clear in a number of ways. For example, Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed photo releases have the same high quality production values of Islamic State photo releases, and revolve around similar themes such as advertising normal life, nature scenes, implementation of Islamic law and military clashes. Further, the group’s media output is promoted on Islamic State media aggregate channels on Telegram. The Islamic State’s Amaq News reports on developments surrounding Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed and the Yarmouk Basin area.

Since late 2014, the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade faced accusations of links with the Islamic State as it clashed openly with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. Those links date back as far as summer 2014, when the Islamic State declared a caliphate and the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade withdrew from the Western-backed “Southern Front,” the framework for Free Syrian Army groups in the south.

The existence of an Islamic State affiliate on the border with the Golan Heights is naturally a concern for Israel. Until recently, however, no attacks had occurred. In an environment rife with conspiracy theories, the lack of open confrontation with Israel has sometimes given rise to the notion that the group has been secretly collaborating with Israel. When I put the issue of not fighting Israel to Omar Mardini, the media activist for Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed and previously the Yarmouk Martyr Brigades, he simply retorted: “Why don’t the Southern Front and al-Qaeda organization wage war on Israel?”

Of course, the logical explanation for refraining from all-out war on Israel is that Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed and other Syrian militant groups do not have the resources and manpower to afford such a conflict. At present, its war with the rebel factions is at a stalemate, and has been so for many months. The last major changes in territorial control came before Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed was formed: gains made by the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade in March that were all reversed by the following month.

One ex-Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed fighter from the Yarmouk Basin village of Jamla who quit the group a while ago, summed up his frustration with the stalemate to me in rather amusing terms: “There is no fighting. The battles have become something agreed upon between the Jaysh and the Sahwat only for photography.” For context, Sahwat is a common Islamic State/Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed derogatory term for Sunni rebel factions, referring to the Sahwa forces of Iraqi Sunni tribes that cooperated with the United States and fought the Islamic State of Iraq during the U.S. occupation of Iraq.  The former fighter expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of life in the Yarmouk Basin, and hoped to find a way to get to Turkey, but was also concerned the rebels would try to arrest him because of his affiliation with the Baridi clan, a local clan in the Yarmouk Basin that constituted the founding base for the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade.

On top of the siege conditions imposed by the war with the rebels, Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed has also been beset by internal problems, which have become more apparent since the assassination of the group’s commander, Abu Hashim al-Shami, in October. Abu Ahmad al-Shari’i, a cleric associated with Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed, told me that al-Shami was originally from Idlib. It is most likely that he had been sent by the Islamic State to run Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed when it was formed, as there is no evidence of prior involvement with its predecessors. The circumstances of his assassination suggest the operation was an inside job of some sort. The group’s security apparatus arrested a number of key figures who had been associated with the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade. The most notable individual among those arrested was Abu Obeida Qahtan, a Syrian-Palestinian who fought in Afghanistan and became commander of the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade after the assassination of the founder and original leader al-Khal (Muhammad Sa’ad al-Din al-Baridi) in November 2015. Also arrested was Nidal al-Baridi, a brother of al-Khal.

As of the time of writing, both apparently remain imprisoned and are said to be undergoing a tahqiq (verification process), though Abu Uday al-Ansari, a one-time supporter of the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade who remains well-connected with Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed members claimed to me that Qahtan was secretly released around two weeks ago and that there may be a plan to transfer him Islamic State territories in the north of Syria. He adds that the reason his release has not been publicized on the ground is because the affair is a “big scandal.”

The precise nature and explanation of these events remain somewhat murky. One line of testimony suggests that Qahtan and his associates have been framed for Abu Hashim al-Shami’s assassination with charges of betrayal and collaboration with Israel. This turn of events is thus portrayed as a kind of internal coup by those who had been affiliated with the Islamic Muthanna Movement, a component of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed that had once been an influential group in Deraa but clashed with the rebels in January 2016 on accusations of conducting assassinations and kidnapping operations, including the killing of the head of the main southern rebel judiciary authority in December 2015.

The Islamic Muthanna Movement eventually set up its own enclave near the Yarmouk Basin but then lost its new territorial holdings by April and had to seek refuge in the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade’s territory, numbering perhaps no more than a few or several dozen individuals. In fact, the Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed merger came about shortly after the mysterious death of Abu Omar Sawa’iq, the deputy head of the Islamic Muthanna Movement who had rejected a merger and may have been assassinated. In mid-summer, the man who had led the Islamic Muthanna Movement- Naji al-Masalama- left the Yarmouk Basin, apparently heading for the Islamic State’s territory in the north of Syria. Others who had been part of the group had quit the fighting and tried to flee Syria all together.

Even so, Ibrahim Mardini, a civilian resident of the Yarmouk Basin, cautions against the assumption of knowing the charges against Qahtan and others, telling me: “No one knows what he [Qahtan] has been accused of, and the issue of treason is a falsehood.” Portraying the Yarmouk Basin area as stable in comparison with rebel-held areas despite the hardships of life, he added that one should not forget that “there are groups still coming to the area [i.e. to join Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed]. And their number has increased.”

In light of the preoccupation with fighting the rebels and the internal problems, one must wonder why the IDF was attacked by a Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed contingent. The testimony provided to me points to the clash as a one-off incident, caused by perceived Israeli infringement on the group’s territory. “The Jews trespassed on the lands of the Dawla [Islamic State] and the soldiers repelled them,” explained Abu Kinana al-Yarmouki, a member of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed. Another source, calling himself Abu Ali Takfir, said: “They [the Israelis] were not able to enter but tried to enter.” This testimony matches the fact that the Israeli forces were inside Syrian territory in an enclave they claim to be Israeli.

As far as the execution of the attack on the IDF itself goes, Abu Uday al-Ansaritold me that the attack was done “without the order of the leadership. The leadership was very angry with them [those that carried out the attack]…out of fear of the Jews’ response.” This is so despite some social media rhetoric from at least one member who expressed hope that there would be a replay of the Muslim expedition against the Jewish Banu Qurayza tribe in what is now Medina in Saudi Arabia. The expedition culminated in the massacre of the Banu Qurayza. A more level-headed assessment was provided by the ex-Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed fighter: “If God wills, there will be this [a war between Israel and Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed], but there is nothing of the sort.”

Indeed, no further incident has taken place despite the retaliatory Israeli airstrikes on Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed territory. The group must focus in the meantime on a new rebel offensive aiming to take its territory, though past evidence suggests that there is unlikely to be any meaningful change in the situation. None of this is to say that Israel should not be concerned about the Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed presence on its border, but the prospect of an all-out war remains unlikely for the foreseeable future so long as the group’s priorities lie elsewhere within Syria.

For Israel, a policy of keeping a cautious distance, while making clear that any aggression will be met with severe retaliation in the form of airstrikes rather than deploying troops inside the Yarmouk Basin area, makes the most sense. Meanwhile, the backers of the Southern Front based in Amman need to provide better incentives for the Southern Front to amass forces and try to capture the Yarmouk Basin in a swift offensive. The continuation of the prolonged siege with its hardships for the locals will only increase resentment towards the rebels and make securing the area all the more difficult.

warontherocks.com/

Two incidents in recent weeks showcase the complexity of the challenges facing Israel on its northern front.

In the first, an air strike killed four members of the Islamic State-affiliated Khalid Ibn al-Walid Army after a patrol of the Golani reconnaissance unit in the southern Golan Heights was targeted by the organization. Israeli aircraft then targeted a facility used by the group in the Wadi Sirhan area.

In the second incident, according to regional media reports, Israeli aircraft operating from Lebanese airspace fired Popeye missiles at targets in the Sabboura area, 8 km. northwest of Damascus.

There were no casualties, according to SANA, the official Syrian news agency.

London-based Arabic newspaper Rai al-Youm reported that the Israeli strike was targeting a Hezbollah-bound weapons convoy. The paper also reported that Israeli aircraft carried out a second strike on a facility of Syria’s 4th Armored Division, near Damascus.

Israel neither confirmed nor denied the second incident. But on a number of occasions over the last four years of war in Syria, Israel has used its ability to operate in the skies over Syria to prevent weapons transfers to Hezbollah in Lebanon from the Syrian regime. It is possible that this incident was the latest act in this effort.

These two events are of tactical importance only. Neither is likely at this stage to lead to broader engagements, but they reflect a reality in which some of the world’s most powerful non-state military organizations are deployed close to Israel’s border with Syria, making war against one another while planning and organizing for a future war against the Jewish state.

The Khalid Ibn al-Walid Army is a franchise of the Islamic State. It was formed from the merger of two Salafi organizations operating in southern Syria – the Shuhada al-Yarmuk group and the Muthanna organization. The group controls an area of the border east of the Golan Heights, from south of the town of Tasil, down to Syria’s border with Jordan.

From this area, Khalid Ibn al-Walid is conducting a war against the Syrian rebels to its north. It does not fight the forces of the Syrian government because they are not deployed in its immediate vicinity.

Israel has long eyed the Islamic State-affiliate with particular suspicion, expecting that sooner or later a clash would be inevitable. This week it came.

The volume of the Israeli response was clearly intended to reestablish deterrence against the Sunni jihadis, with the hope that it will cause them to think again before engaging with Israeli forces.

Islamic State is facing battle for survival in its main domains farther north and in Iraq and it is unlikely to be in a position to contemplate opening a front against a newer and more powerful enemy farther south.

The non-Islamic State rebels who control the rest of the border, with the exception of a small regime-controlled part at the northern edge near Beit Jinn, are of lesser concern to Israel. Indeed, a relationship of tolerance and cooperation exists between Israel and elements among those rebels.

Israel’s main concern, rather, is the Iran/Assad/Hezbollah side. The reported strikes in the Damascus area, if they took place, were the latest incidents in a limited Israeli campaign against these elements intended to produce two outcomes: first, to limit the transfer of complex weapons systems to Hezbollah, and second, to keep the Iran-supported militia and its allies from replacing the rebels along the borderline.

As of now, it is difficult to assess the extent of the success of the first objective.

Hezbollah is known to now possess advanced SA-22 anti-aircraft missiles and Yakhont anti-ship missiles. So, as might be expected, it appears that the sporadic Israeli efforts have not succeeded in sealing the Lebanese-Syrian border from efforts by the Assad regime and Iran to supply their ally to the west.

Regarding the border, however, as of now, it remains almost entirely out of government hands, reflecting greater Israeli success.

Nevertheless, Israeli planners are carefully observing events farther north. President Bashar Assad’s regime, with Russian help, is set to reconquer the northern city of Aleppo. This will represent the greatest setback for the rebels since 2012. Once the reconquest of eastern Aleppo is completed, regime forces will hope to move against remaining areas of rebel control in Idlib Governorate.

If they succeed also there, then eventually the southern front will come back on to the agenda. At this point, the Israeli concern will be that similar methods to those that helped the regime to prevail elsewhere will be used here too. The Russian entry into the Syrian arena has tilted the balance for the regime and complicated the picture from Israel’s point of view. It is Russian air power that is enabling the regime to advance in the north. If employed in the south, it can be expected to eventually produce similar results.

It is probable that Israel will be quietly lobbying Moscow to take account of Israel’s security needs on the border when contemplating action in the south. The Russians are not hostile to Israel, but will act according to how they perceive their own interests. Their decision as to whether to allow Assad to reconquer the southwest of his country – and by so doing to allow Iran and Hezbollah to reach the border with Israel – will be decisive.

Of course, even in the worst case scenario in which they decide to allow this, the task facing Israel on the border will not fundamentally change. It will mean that instead of needing to deter hostile but relatively weak Sunni jihadi forces from contemplating action against the hated Zionists, Israel will need to deter hostile and less weak Shi’ite jihadis with the same intentions.

Iran/Hezbollah and Islamic State agree about relatively little, but on the goal of destroying Israel and returning Jerusalem to Islamic rule they are entirely in consensus.

Israel, naturally, prefers the weaker, non-state enemy in close proximity to the stronger. The events of this week show that it is engaged in a tacit, ongoing, unstated and limited war against both.

meforum.org

The guns have fallen silent after Libyan forces captured the coastal town of Sirte from ISIL earlier this month, but the question remains – where did the militants go?

So far, less than 500 fighters have been accounted for – the bulk of them dead – since the ruined town fell on December 6.

Yet in June this year, CIA director John Brennan told the US congress that ISIL had between 5,000 and 8,000 fighters in Libya.

Three months later, French defence minister Jean-Yves Le Drian warned that the fall of Sirte, the ISIL headquarters in Libya, would bring with it the risk that militants would flee to other parts of Libya.

“We should begin to look seriously at the question of the spread of the terrorists once Sirte is emptied (conquered),” he said. “They don’t disappear, there’s a new risk that appears.”

ISIL arrived in Libya in August 2014 and took advantage of the chaos in the country to gain a foothold in several areas, including establishing a 250-kilometre self-declared “caliphate” around Sirte.

In February last year, the group filmed the execution of 21 Christians, 20 of them Egyptians, lined up on the Sirte shore in orange jumpsuits for ceremonial beheadings.

France has helped lead the fightback against the extremists in Libya, and agreed in July last year to take the lead in anti-ISIL operations in North Africa, with the US already engaged against the militants in Iraq and Syria.

A total of 3,000 French troops are stationed in Niger on Libya’s southern border, attacking militant convoys as they cross in and out of Libya.

In May of this year, units from the northwestern city of Misurata, the largest militia allied to the new UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), began their offensive against ISIL in Sirte.

By mid-June, the Misuratans had overrun most of the territory ISIL had controlled around Sirte, with the militants holding only the town itself.

Then on August 1, US jets began a bombing campaign to support the offensive in Sirte, with more than 400 air strikes hitting ISIL positions.

The last buildings belonging to ISIL fell on December 6, with two female suicide bombers rushing out to detonate themselves near advancing troops.

Since then, Libyan forces have been searching for any dead or alive ISIL fighters in the town, with media reports saying that more than 400 militant bodies have so far been found and about 20 prisoners taken.

Meanwhile, Ibrahim Baitulmal, head of Misurata’s military council, estimated that 1,700 bodies of extremists had been recovered during the campaign, adding that the total number killed would have been higher since the militants retrieved some of their own dead.

But one Libyan fighter in a Misuratan unit, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that until quite late in the Sirte campaign, the perimeter around ISIL positions was loose, giving many opportunities for militants to escape the town.

In late October the head of the west Libyan branch of ISIL, Abu Hudhayfah Al Muhajir, admitted that most ISIL fighters had already left the town.

“Most of our people in Sirte have moved to neighbouring areas six months ago – and are still moving – during which they experienced the worst,” he told Al Naba, an ISIL newsletter.

He acknowledged that the group had suffered in Libya but said it would continue its campaign for “conquest and empowerment” and was still attracting a steady flow of foreign fighters.

“The mujaheddin in the Libyan provinces are still well … Their security detachments are still spread in all the cities and the areas, and their brigades move in the east and west of the desert.”

Now, the hunt for ISIL’s missing fighters has begun, with many believed to have vanished into Libya’s vast desert interior. Leaders of the western town of Beni Walid have complained of ISIL units setting up camp nearby and appealed to the GNA for help in safeguarding the town.

Diplomats say that since the summer, ISIL units have also been detected in the desert outside the southwestern town of Sebha, using routes leading to the Algerian and Niger borders. Some ISIL units are also in southern Benghazi, besieged by the Libyan National Army which is loyal to the House of Representatives parliament – an administration rivalling the GNA.

But as long as Libya remains split between two rival administrations, the Tripoli-based GNA, and the House of Representatives, which is based in the eastern town of Tobruk, ISIL may be able to take advantage of the chaos to reestablish itself.

The French defence minister, Mr Le Drian, warned in September that ISIL will be eradicated from Libya only “if the Libyans themselves secure real political and military coherence”.

thenational.ae

The spokesman for the Third Force that is securing the southern region in Libya, Mohammed Glaiwan, confirmed Saturday that the security apparatuses in Sabha and its surrounding districts had declared the alert state for fear that IS militants, who managed to somehow escape Sirte, would venture to regroup in the south.

In a statement to the press, Glaiwan stressed that the alert state is a natural procedure to be taken in Sabha and its suburbs to prevent any possible regrouping of IS militants in the southern Libyan region.

“The Third Force personnel are ready to respond powerfully to any security violations in the southern region.” Glaiwan added.

Meanwhile, the Third Force denied the news that said the pro-Haftar forces of Mohammed Ben Nayel had seized the Barak Al-Shatti military base in the south, saying it is under the control of its forces as usual.

Misrata-led forces liberated the last hideout of the IS terrorists in Sirte last Tuesday and announced full eradication of the terror group from the coastal city of Sirte after seven months of all-out war.

libyaobserver.ly

Islamic State has lost senior figures in an unsuccessful seven-month battle to defend its coastal stronghold in Libya, but there are already signs it will try to fight back through sleeper cells and desert brigades.
Libyan officials say hundreds of Islamic State militants may have escaped before the start of the battle for Sirte in May or during its early stages.
That has prompted fears of a counter-attack or insurgent campaign that could enable the militants to show they are still in business despite the rout, a heavy blow for a group that is also under intense military pressure in its core territory of Iraq and Syria.
Some cells have already been active.
Islamic State is thought to be behind at least two dozen attacks or attempted attacks to the south and west of Sirte since August, said Heni Nsaibia of Menastream, a risk consultancy that monitors militant activity in the region.
Before May, IS was thought to have several thousand fighters stationed in Sirte – estimates of the exact number varied widely.
Both leadership and rank and file had a heavy foreign presence, drawing on recruits from north and sub-Saharan Africa, according to Sirte residents and security officials in Misrata, the city that led the campaign to retake the militant stronghold.
Much of that force has likely been wiped out over the past seven months, with dozens killed on both sides during the heaviest days of fighting.
Islamic State was targeted by nearly 500 US air strikes since August1. Local officials say a number of high-level Libyan figures perished, including preacher and commander Hassan al-Karami, and senior official Abu Walid al-Ferjani.
Foreign commanders have also died, according to messages of mourning posted on social media accounts close to the militant group, though it is unclear how far up the hierarchy they were or how important to the group’s future operations, said Marco Arnaboldi, a researcher of political Islam specialising on Libya.
Misratan officials refused to comment on reports of Islamic State militants being killed after capture, but fighters and commanders say they took few, if any, prisoners.
Ibrahim Baitulmal, head of Misrata’s military council, estimated that 1,700 militants’ bodies had been recovered during the campaign, adding that the number killed would have been higher since the militants retrieved some of their own dead.
He said among those killed in the final days of the battle in Sirte was Abu Habib Jazrawi, who is thought to have taken the name Abdul Qadr al-Najdi before being named as Islamic State’s leader in Libya in March.
Islamic State has not announced his death.
Regional media reported that Najdi was replaced in September by a Tunisian, Jalaludin al-Tunsi, possibly appointed to carry on the fight outside Sirte.
“He’s one of the leaders who is going to prepare the next wave of Islamic State from south of the city,” said Arnaboldi.
The militant group has made no secret of its plans to continue the fight, in a country still roiled by the turmoil it exploited in the past.
In August, the new leader of its east Libyan branch, Abu Musab al-Farouq, said high-level figures who had escaped from Sirte were helping it regroup not far away.
In late October the head of the west Libyan branch, Abu Hudhayfah al-Muhajir, acknowledged that the group had been suffering, but said it would continue its campaign for “conquest and empowerment” and was still attracting a steady flow of foreign fighters.
“Most of our people in Sirte have moved to neighbouring areas six months ago – and are still moving – during which they experienced the worst,” he said in an interview with Al Naba, an Islamic State newsletter.
“The mujahideen in the Libyan provinces are still well. Their security detachments are still spread in all the cities and the areas, and their brigades move in the east and west of the desert.”

gulf-times.com