Russia’s military intervention in Syria will not save President Bashar al-Assad, French President Francois Hollande said on Friday after an EU summit called for a political transition to a new leader.

“It is very clearly stated that Bashar cannot be the future. We must go as fast as possible to a political transition,” Hollande told a press conference after the summit in Brussels.

“Russia’s intervention from this point of view can bolster the regime but will not save Bashar,” he added.

Russia said on Thursday its warplanes had eased back on air strikes in Syria as regime forces pressed a widening ground offensive against rebels.

The Kremlin said the goal of the aerial operation that Russia launched in Syria on September 30 was to help Assad’s beleaguered forces fight the militant group ISIS.

More than 245,000 people have been killed in Syria since fighting broke out in March 2011, and more than four million have fled their country.

The publication in Ukrainian mass media of personal data of Russian pilots flying combat missions in Syria against the Islamic State (IS) shows that Kiev government authorities as accomplices of terrorism, dennounced a military source in this capital today.

The president of the Russian military retired association, Mej. Gen. (R) Alexandr Tsalko, said today that the provocation in Internet was revealed by Anton Gerashchennko, deputy and advisor of Ukraine’s minister of Interior.

Gerashchennko recently made a call to the media to publish in the Internet personal information of the pilots flying combat missions in Syria, in response to a request made by the constitutional Government of that Arab country.

The day after the call, the Peacemaker website made public in Russian, English, and Arab the information about the nine Russian top ranking military pilots, reported TASS.

The same website reached notoriety before through the publication of two opposition members to Kiev regime Oles Buzina (reporter) and lawmaker Oleg Kalashnikov, who were assasinated later near their residences, added the sources.

Tsalko slammed Gershchenko’s actions and said that Russia’s Investigation Committee opened a file against him for inciting terrorist activities.

Russian military officials at the moment denied that its sole aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, was on its way to Syria to help the Russian military in the conflict against Syrian rebels and the Islamic State militant group, also known as ISIS, according to Russian news site Sputnik. Initial reports from a small Russian news agency based in Moscow indicated the aircraft carrier was preparing to leave a dock in the Murmansk region — where it was undergoing repairs — to travel to the Mediterranean coast.

“The heavy aircraft carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov has no long-term missions or other military assignments to look forward to any time soon,” Northern Fleet spokesman Vadim Serga said, making it clear that the ship would not be commencing operations in Syria. “The ship will soon head out to the Barents Sea to perform planned combat training tasks and support a naval aviation regiment of the Northern Fleet.”

The Russian defense ministry was forced to respond to rumors after FlashNord published a story citing information from Russian defense officials claiming that the Admiral Kuznetsov would support operations in Syria. “The cruiser dock repair is completed at the end of the week, then it will go to the coast of Syria, where it will join the operation to destroy the Islamic State group,” said a Russian defense spokesman, according to FlashNord.

The addition of the Admiral Kuznetsov in Syria would add another platform for Russia to launch attacks against groups opposed to the rule of authoritarian leader Bashar Assad in Syria.

Russia has a naval base in Tartus, Syria, where ships from its Mediterranean fleet occasionally dock to take on supplies and conduct small repairs. While the aircraft carrier will likely not dock at Tartus, it would do so if necessary after Russian engineers dredged the seabed and enlarged the dock to accommodate the biggest ships in the Russian fleet, according to Russian liberal newspaper Kommersant.

Bombing operations against ISIS have been ongoing for two weeks, although Russia has been involved militarily in Syria since the beginning of September.

Berlin state police say they have arrested a 30-year-old Russian imam on terrorism charges, alleging he tried to recruit members and support for the Islamic State group online and also procured equipment to send to its fighters in Syria.

Police said Thursday that Gadzhimurad K., from Dagestan, a Russian republic neighboring Chechnya, was arrested Wednesday on a warrant from state prosecutors. The suspect, who went by the alias Murat A., had been an imam at a mosque in downtown Berlin.

Authorities did not give his last name, in accordance with German privacy laws.

In addition to trying to recruit for Islamic State, prosecutors say he acquired night-vision devices, range finders, and other equipment for the group.

The investigation is continuing.

Islamic State extremists have bought 2,000 Syrian passports in China – and could pose as refugees to unleash terror attacks on Europe, Tory Richard Drax revealed.

Home Secretary Theresa May was alerted to the scam within the last fortnight by a Tory MP.

Intelligence experts fear jihadists could use the documents to seek sanctuary on the continent before launching atrocities.

Conservative Richard Drax made the shock revelation as MPs discussed the refugee crisis gripping Europe .

He said: “What better way to get a terrorist into the West amidst all this chaos?”

He was tipped-off to the potentially lethal fraud by a “very distinguished” constituent who had been in China on business for “many, many years”.

Mr Drax “immediately” passed on the warning to Mrs May.

Meanwhile, a senior Tory has accused David Cameron of blocking a Commons debate on the refugee crisis.

Sir Bill Cash claimed the Prime Minister had “interfered” in a bid to thwart MPs tackling the issue.

The European Scrutiny Committee Sir Bill chairs has been pushing for a full Commons debate on the situation.

He told last night’s committee meeting: “It has come to my attention that No 10 have been interfering in this process and if that is the case, it would not be a good idea for them to continue to do so.”

Appearing before MPs, Immigration Minister James Brokenshire insisted there had been “a number of debates in one form or another” in early September, focusing on migration across the Mediterranean.

He added: “While we have been unable to schedule the debate that had been specifically requested by this committee, I think there have been other means by which the House has not simply been able to ask questions, buts also to express a view as well.”

Mr Brokenshire admitted talks with Commons business managers were “ongoing” about a fresh debate.

A No 10 spokeswoman said she was “not aware of any discussions” about blocking MPs from discussing the issue.

MPs are expected to vote later this year on extending RAF bombing raids against Islamic State from Iraq and into Syria.

Supporters believe that tackling the terrorists in their Syrian strongholds would ease the refugee crisis.

But SNP Westminster leader Angus Robertson yesterday warned of “growing scepticism about the drumbeat towards war”.

Speaking at Prime Minister’s Questions, Mr Cameron said the “consequences of non-intervention are also worth considering”.

He has repeatedly stressed he will only seek Commons approval for air strikes in Syria if he believes he can win a vote.

Up to 30 Tory MPs are likely to rebel, meaning the Government would lose unless Mr Cameron can persuade enough Labour MPs to back him.

According to Munich daily the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) from the beginning of 2016 German soldiers could strengthen the UN mission in the north African country, supporting Dutch troops in the dangerous northern region of the country.

The Bundeswehr is considering sending reconnaissance teams into the hostile area along with drones.

Germany is currently engaged in an EU training mission in the south of Mali with around 200 troops.

In the larger UN mission it currently only has seven officers and two junior officers involved.

The army laid out plans to extend its presence in the desert country two months ago. But the return of a fact-finding mission last week confirmed the recommendation that the Bundeswehr prepare “for a self-reliant and robust mission.“

That means that the army is likely to send front-line infantry troops, the SZ reports.

Soldiers will be stationed in regions with “considerable or high levels of threat“ the fact-finding mission stated.

The Defence Ministry confirmed that it is working with the Foreign Ministry on “a possible extended support“ of the UN mission in Mali.

French bombs have been falling on Syria since the end of September, reinforcing France’s tough new image in the international and English-speaking press. The French have been known for many years as “cheese-eating surrender monkeys” owing in part to their refusal to participate in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This new intervention further contributes to France’s transformation from a caricature into “frogs of war.”

France’s absence in Iraq might make its recent interventionism seem surprising. However, Iraq is the exception that proves the rule: France refused to join the 2003 coalition not out of pacifism or cowardice, but because it viewed the intervention as illegal, illegitimate, and potentially counterproductive (doubts that were subsequently proven justified). France conducted a large number of external operations since the end of decolonization, mostly in Africa including in Benin, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Somalia. A sizable number of French operations also took place in the Middle East: in Lebanon (since 1978), the Egyptian Sinai (since 1982), Iraq (1990-1991), as well as in Cambodia (1992-1995), the former Yugoslavia (1992-2014), Afghanistan (2001-2012), Colombia (2003), Haiti (since 2004), and the Indian Ocean (since 2008). In the last few years, French interventionism accelerated: Libya in 2011, Mali in 2013, Operation Barkhane in Mali, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso since 2014, the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2014, Iraq in 2014, and as of this week, Syria, where France had almost intervened following the chemical attacks of August 2013.

How can this apparent evolution be explained? “French interventionism” is nothing new, but this international activism and its sudden visibility, particularly as seen from the United States, is the result of a combination of factors.

A Brave New Post-Cold War World

First, France stepped into the gap created by the end of the Cold War, which, like the fall of Napoleon or the end of the Second World War, was seen as the beginning of a new era. It was also a fresh start for the United Nations. As Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar claimed in 1991, “the extinction of the bipolarity associated with the cold war has no doubt removed the factor that virtually immobilized international relations over four decades.” While the UN Security Council only authorized 14 peacekeeping operations in its first 40 years of existence, five operations were authorized in 1988 and 1989 alone. Between 1945 and 1990, the traditional opponents to the concept of intervention were the Eastern Bloc, weak states in the southern hemisphere, and young states anxious about their sovereignty. However, the end of the century heralded the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the rise of democracy in the global south, the maturing of young states, the evolution of international law to increasingly concern itself with individuals as well as states, and the greater media visibility of humanitarian crises that compelled politicians to take action. In other words, the international obstacles to interventionism disappeared.

Second, with the Cold War in the past, interventionism took on a new importance for France as it sought to maintain its status in an increasingly competitive international environment. Rachel Utley explains,

This was most symbolic in respect of France’s permanent seat on the United Nations’ Security Council, as suggestions that economic giants such as Japan now had a greater claim to that position than a medium-sized, albeit nuclear-armed, power such as France.

France’s competitive advantage lay in its military power, which it thus needed to demonstrate. Intervention was therefore used as a way of preserving French prestige in a transforming world. Proving the value of its military power was even more important in a world where nuclear tensions had largely dissolved with the collapse of the Soviet Union. France’s nuclear force greatly contributed to its status during the Cold War, but suddenly seemed less relevant. It may have incited French leaders to employ conventional military means to demonstrate its power and achieve results.

The Roots of French Interventionism

The first driving force behind French interventionism is France’s image of itself as a great nation, “home of human rights,” bearer and defender of universal values. This doctrine developed from the intervention d’humanité (humanitarian intervention) of the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries to the droit d’ingérence (right to intervene) of the 1980s and 1990s. Irrespective of the sincerity of its exceptionalist convictions, these humanitarian convictions became part of the French identity and therefore part of French national interests (much as in the United States). The guilt felt from allowing the Rwandan genocide to occur reinforced French humanitarian convictions and led to an obsession with preventing “another Rwanda.” This explains the recent intervention in the CAR, for instance, a country in which France has very few material interests, but an overriding interest in not being the country that allows another genocide to occur in a former colony toward which it feels a special responsibility.

On a more realist note, the desire to preserve its sphere of influence in Africa and the Middle East also plays a role in French interventionism. Owing to its colonial heritage, France continued to maintain a network of special contacts and partners in these regions that supported the political and financial interests of many significant groups in France.

The desire to preserve its independence, especially against American influence, is another important factor. Though France and the United States remain ideologically very close owing to shared universalist, exceptionalist, and interventionist self-images, these similarities sometimes lead to competition rather than cooperation.

Finally, Paris acts because it can. France is part of an exclusive club of military powers capable of deploying first into a theater of operations and projecting power globally. This ability, as illustrated by the expeditionary campaign in Mali, provides an incentive to intervene in and of itself.

The Reasons for Acceleration Since 2011

While the English-speaking media often interpret the recent multiplication of French interventions as proof that President François Hollande is a strident neoconservative, French interventionism is not the product of an ideological shift. Rather, the French political left and the right share a perspective on foreign affairs and, contrary to another common fabrication, neither Hollande nor Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius are surrounded by “neocon” advisors. Furthermore, French foreign policy does not satisfy two of the five neoconservative criteria: internationalism, supremacy, unilateralism, militarism, and democracy. France does not practice unilateralism and is not militarist. Its defense budget accounts for 1.8 percent of GDP, beneath its nominal commitments to NATO’s recommended 2 percent, and British spending of 2.1 percent — all of which means that France does a lot with very little.

The real reasons behind the acceleration in French interventions since 2011 lie elsewhere.

Greater global instability, as demonstrated by the proliferation of crises, means that there are objectively more reasons to intervene now than there were 10 years ago. This greater instability is the result of several factors. First, an increasing diffusion of power caused by the erosion of American unipolarity, the emergence of powerful states, the increasing number of non-state actors and transnational armed groups, and the democratization of destructive technologies and information, which allows individuals and small groups to use military force more easily. Thus, Western states with more limited means must contend with a greater number of adversaries.

Second, recent instability stems in part from the absence of usual regional mediators, such as Egypt and Turkey, who are either preoccupied with internal political and security challenges or merely ambivalent. Third, the “effect of diversion” means that the more crises there are, the less attention each receives. New crises grow because they are overshadowed by others.

France also occasionally intervenes following the inaction of others. Obama’s America is a “reticent power,” more discreet, though no less engaged. The United States has always oscillated between phases of introversion and extroversion, and its current phase is nothing more than an ordinary stage in the cycle. Rather than withdrawing from the world, the Obama administration simply started using force with greater discretion. Its subtle strategy, based on the trinity of drones, special forces, and cyber, demonstrates a shift from the large land-based deployments of the Bush era, but does not amount to disengagement.

Moreover, the United Kingdom also suffers from a temporary eclipse after its armed forces were left weakened by campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention severe defense cuts. British capacity had already been called into question by a need for reinforcement by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United Kingdom’s strategic crisis redounded somewhat to France’s benefit, as French performance in Mali garnered America’s interest and endorsement. Furthermore, the French–American counterterrorism partnership in the Sahel reinforced military links between the two countries.

There is also no such thing as “European defense.” To fight together, it is necessary to either have shared fears or shared objectives, both of which the European Union lacks. France has committed itself to military action because, unlike the majority of European states, it has interests in Africa. It distinguishes itself from other risk-averse European states or Brussels by an acceptance of greater risk.

Avoiding the loss of French influence is also an important factor explaining contemporary interventions. France still possesses numerous assets that make it a global power, including its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its military power (nuclear and conventional), its diplomatic network (the second largest in the world), its transnational companies, its space program, the francophonie, its maritime resources (the second-largest exclusive economic zone in the world), and its soft power. Yet in a decreasingly “Western” world — and especially with decreasing European influence — France’s relative importance is falling. Its military activism helps compensate for this.

There are also the usual domestic political reasons. Nicolas Sarkozy used the Libya intervention to consolidate his presidential stature and restore the reputation of French diplomacy after its failures in Tunisia and Egypt. Hollande has equally benefited from external operations (Mali, Barkhane, the CAR, Chammal, and Syria), which were more widely supported than his domestic politics. Hollande has also been criticized for being soft and indecisive, and so uses French military power to correct this image. Moreover, Foreign Minister Fabius and Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian are probably the strongest and most influential ministers in Hollande’s government, which predisposes the current executive to international activism.

Current domestic threats give another reason to intervene abroad, as external crises and internal security are deeply interrelated in France. More interventions take place in response to a greater threat to national security. The intervention in Mali was already justified not only by the will to assist the Malians in their fight against jihadists, but also by the will to avoid having a terrorist safe heaven that could threaten others, including France. France has been hit by terrorism four times this year (in Paris in January, in Villejuif in April, in Isère in June, and on the Thalys train in August). It now deploys more soldiers in domestic anti-terrorism patrols (10,000 troops in Operation Sentinel) than externally (7,000 in five current external operations, but more than 12,000 others in 10 permanent overseas missions). It is that level of threat that triggered the decision to extend the strikes against the Islamic State to Syrian territory. Politically, this last intervention is justified by the need to prevent attacks in France that might be planned, organized, and directed from Syria. Its official legal basis, though, is not individual but collective self-defense, i.e. assisting Iraq in accordance with its requests.

French military intervention is not a novelty; rather, it is based on a long tradition and deep expertise. Nevertheless, the international situation and the current French political context together give French interventionism a new visibility, particularly in the United States. An entire generation of American decision-makers had been socialized to dismiss the “cheese-eating surrender monkeys” following France’s refusal to intervene in Iraq. They are now discovering that French foreign policy is compatible with Washington’s. The question is to what extent this renewed Franco–American friendship will be durable, and whether it will influence America’s privileged partnerships in the Euro-Atlantic zone. (Warontherocks)

France is looking to sell new ships to Russia in the future despite the cancellation of a controversial deal for two Mistral-class warships this year, French President Francois Hollande said Tuesday.

“Things went well with Russia, which has agreed to cancel the contract. And I even think we’ll get partnerships for new ships,” Hollande said during a visit to the shipyard of Saint-Nazaire in western France. He didn’t specify whether they could be military ships.

Hollande came aboard one of the warships that was originally named the Vladivostok, in reference to the Russian port. The inscription on the hull has been erased and replaced by grey paint.

The Mistral sale was supposed to be the biggest arms sale ever by a NATO country to Russia, until the deal fell apart because of the Ukraine crisis. France refunded the 950 million euros ($1 billion) already paid by Russia and sold the ships to Egypt, which signed a 950 million-euro contract last week.

“I had to sell them to a country that needed to ensure its own security but didn’t threaten anyone,” Hollande said.

Egypt is increasing its military capabilities as the country tries to assume a more prominent role against Islamic State militants.

The assault ships can each carry 16 helicopter gunships, 700 troops and up to 50 armored vehicles. They are due to be delivered to Egyptian authorities in March 2016.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel will hold talks with Turkish officials this weekend to discuss terrorism concerns in the country, amid fears the recent violence in Turkey may spill over into Turkish and Kurdish communities in Germany.