If one battle in Yemen’s war seems designed to kill as many fighters as possible, it is the one currently taking place in Ma’rib Governorate. Five years of fighting between Ansar Allah, usually referred to as the Houthis, and armed groups loyal to the internationally recognized Yemeni government have killed thousands on both sides, and the battle has been escalating. Neither side has suffered a full defeat or won a convincing victory. Both are fighting in terrain that makes it difficult to advance. What is taking place in Yemen is a largescale war of attrition, the main consequence of which has been the exhaustion of all sides. Even if one of the parties is victorious, this is usually followed by subsequent battles of attrition, like reported by carnegie-mec.org.

The western governorate of Ma’rib first saw fighting in January 2015, shortly after the Houthis seized the capital San‘a, some 170 kilometers west of the city of Ma’rib. The Houthis then tried to seize cities across Yemen’s north, prompting many anti-Houthi residents to flee to Ma’rib Governorate, where local tribes mounted strong resistance to the new rulers in San‘a.

In March 2015, when the Saudi-led military coalition launched operations against the Houthis, it began sending military support to the Ma’rib front, strengthening it as a center of resistance to the Houthis and attracting many of their opponents. The government created a battalion called the National Army, made up of soldiers who refused to submit to the Houthis, along with tribesmen and fighters from the Yemeni Congregation for Reform Party, known as Islah. These forces have since recaptured some areas from the Houthis.

Despite three years of relative calm, fighting resumed with a vengeance at the beginning of 2020. The Houthis seized some areas that had been under government and loyalist tribal control, notably in neighboring Jawf Governorate and the Nahem district, close to San‘a. Today, fighting on various fronts along the northern and northwestern boundaries of Ma’rib Governorate is killing dozens of combatants almost every day.

The Houthis have launched several major offensives to seize Ma’rib, which is rich in oil and is the largest stronghold of their foes, paying little attention to the casualties. They see control of Ma’rib as a strategically vital military and economic prize. Taking the sprawling desert governorate would neutralize the biggest threat to their control over San‘a, namely the presence of pro-government forces controlling large mountainous areas within San‘a Governorate. Economically, controlling Ma’rib also means taking over the Safer oil refinery that provides many parts of Yemen with their fuel needs.

But the Houthis have faced determined opposition from pro-government forces in Ma’rib. For them, defending the governorate has become a matter of life or death. This can be seen in the intensity of the current fighting and the Houthis’ failure to make decisive advances (in contrast to their fortunes in other governorates), despite having launched blistering offensives.

The battle for Ma’rib, therefore, appears to be a zero-sum game in which neither side has any option but to continue fighting, regardless of the human and material costs. Both sides realize that the battle’s outcome will decide much of the future political landscape of the country and its alliances. It is not a marginal battle but a delayed confrontation that has lasted since 2014 and has become a seemingly permanent feature of the hills and deserts of Ma’rib.

But what is behind the recent Saudi reluctance to deal seriously with the Ma’rib battle? And what is the reason for the Houthis’ growing determination to seize the governorate now? The answers to these questions reveal important factors in the dynamics of the clashes as well as underline the Saudi-led coalition’s changing policy toward its allies on the ground.

Since the launch of the intervention in 2015, Saudi Arabia has been allied with Islah and has depended on the party’s ground forces in the fight against the Houthis. But Riyadh and Islah are little more than allies of military convenience fighting a common enemy. As Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy priorities have changed over the past two years, Turkey has emerged as a key regional rival, even ahead of Iran, which unlike Turkey does not pose a challenge to Saudi Arabia’s claims to lead the worldwide Sunni community. This has made Riyadh suspicious of groups and movements that are sympathetic toward Turkish policy. Islah is one such group, as it has ideological ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, Ankara’s most prominent ally in the Arab world and which is opposed by Riyadh.

Despite the presence of other military and tribal entities, Saudi Arabia doesn’t see Ma’rib as something other than an Islah power base. This view is reflected on the ground, with many fighters on the front lines not receiving their salaries from Saudi Arabia, a reduction in Saudi military and logistical support, and attacks against Islah by pro-Saudi newspapers and websites that accuse the party of inaction in the fight against the Houthis, or even of making secret deals with them. Saudi Arabia has also imposed restrictions on the movement of some leading Islah commanders, sidelining them and relying instead on Salafis and pro-Saudi tribal commanders. This aligns with the view of the United Arab Emirates, Riyadh’s main coalition partner, which regards Islah as a threat whose elimination is a priority.

Riyadh sees weakening Islah politically and militarily as an essential step toward preventing the movement from opposing Saudi policies. For the Saudis, weakening Islah will silence the demands of some of its commanders for an equal say, forcing them into full compliance with the goals of the kingdom. Riyadh has already imposed its decisions on the Yemeni government, which has become entirely powerless to influence events in the country. But the kingdom also realizes that it needs to continue providing some support to Ma’rib’s defenders in order to prevent it from falling to the Houthis.

Saudi efforts to weaken Islah do not mean that it favors the Houthis. Rather, Riyadh sees the battle on the Ma’rib front as chipping away at the capacities of both sides, diverting their attention away from fronts along the border with Saudi Arabia. Thus, the Houthis’ attacks on Ma’rib have been accompanied by the loss of certain positions they had seized months ago in Jawf Governorate. Saudi Arabia regards moving the Houthis away from its own borders as a priority, and has thus boosted its military supplies to fronts near the borders while cutting its support for forces deeper inside Yemen. Meanwhile, it has become clear that the Houthis’ weak point is fighting in open areas, given their lack of an air force similar to the Royal Saudi Air Force, a key asset the kingdom can control without needing a local ally.

On the other hand, the Houthis’ ability to recruit fighters has enabled them to step up their attacks on Ma’rib, taking advantage of Riyadh’s changing policy toward its allies on the ground. This has been accentuated further by the dismissal in late August of the former commander of coalition forces, Prince Fahd bin Turki, and his replacement by Lieutenant General Mutlaq bin Salem al-Uzayma‘. While these steps may not change the thrust of Saudi policy, they could alter some deployments on the ground. The Houthis appear to be carrying out preemptive attacks to exploit this transition.

Against this background, events in Ma’rib could well change course in the coming months. There are three possible scenarios in this regard. First, and most likely, loyalist forces will continue to fend off Houthi attacks and the current stalemate will persist. This is probable in light of the fierce defense these forces have mounted, along with Saudi Arabia’s determination to prevent Ma’rib from falling for the time being. Such a scenario would largely resemble the situation in the city of Ta‘ez, where fighting has taken place since the beginning of the war without the Houthis being able to seize it. This would prolong the current war of attrition. But the situation may not last, especially if there is a breakthrough in talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia that would enable the latter to secure its southern border. Things could also change if the kingdom stepped up its support for anti-Houthi forces and raised the pressure on them on other fronts.

The second scenario would see Ma’rib falling to the Houthis. This is unlikely to happen and would only come with major human cost for both sides. Yet if the Houthis were indeed to win, it would open the door to further battles in Yemen’s southeastern governorates, especially Hadhramawt and Mahra, which the Houthis would not hesitate to attack. That would mean Saudi Arabia would lose its influence on the ground inside Yemen, but would begin a wider war of attrition against the Houthis. Controlling a large swathe of territory could be a point of weakness rather than an asset for Houthi forces, especially as the areas in question are outside their main constituency.

There is a third scenario, which is also unlikely at present, namely that agreements will be signed between local forces to pause the fighting and reorganize the situation in Ma’rib in light of the latest military developments. Making this situation more improbable is the deep enmity between the two sides, accentuated by the terrible losses caused by the recent fighting. On top of this, neither side has much faith in battlefield agreements, which can quickly collapse. Moreover, Saudi Arabia would never accept such a violation of its wishes, and loyalist forces are not in a position to persuade it to acquiesce.

As the fighting continues, Yemen’s humanitarian catastrophe continues to be ignored. Hundreds of thousands of displaced people live in camps in Ma’rib in terrible conditions, made worse by the fighting that is approaching them. Despite this, the global powers have done little to bring an end to the disaster.

Euphoria is running high in Kabul and Washington after peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban opened last week in Qatar. These negotiations follow the February 29 U.S.-Taliban agreement, which commits the United States to a phased withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, and the Taliban to sever its ties with al-Qaida. As the peace talks continue over the next several months, the Afghans hope to reach an end to the relentless war in their country, and the Americans wish to finally go home without the fear of leaving Afghanistan a jihadist paradise, like reported by thediplomat.com.

Rightful hopes indeed, but the realities on the ground suggest a dubious future. Beside the Taliban, some 20 terrorist groups of various nationalities have been battling Afghan and coalition forces for years, and will not be part of any peace deal. Most notable among them is the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP), which has carried out some of the most gruesome attacks in recent years, including the infamous complex attack on a Kabul maternity ward in May. A potential peace agreement with the Taliban could result in strengthening ISKP, as it is poised to attract many Taliban and foreign fighters and exploit the shifting dynamics in its favor.

As a branch of the Middle East-based Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), ISKP emerged in late 2014 in southern and eastern Afghanistan. In the south, a disgruntled Taliban commander and former Guantanamo Bay detainee, Mullah Abdul Raoof Khadim, swore allegiance to ISIS, while in the east, six Pakistani Taliban commanders led by Hafiz Sayed Khan raised ISIS’s black flag. The group immediately came under heavy military attack by Afghan and coalition forces, resulting thus far in the death and capture of over 13,000 of its fighters, including five consecutive emirs, or top leaders. Nevertheless, the group has shown spectacular resilience, managing to replace and regain its lost manpower, expand its geographical foothold, and increase the number and intensity of its operations. With manpower estimated in the thousands of battle-hardened fighters, ISKP now operates across eastern and northern Afghanistan, as well as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan.

With the Taliban possibly exiting the war theater through a peace deal with the Afghan government, the stars seem to be aligned for ISKP to grow in size and strength, and assume the leadership position among terrorist groups in the region. It is ready to absorb a good number of Taliban fighters who would undoubtedly wish to continue to fight for reasons of ideology, employment, profit from the illicit economy, or personal and tribal enmity. Let’s not also forget the other 19 or so terrorist groups – everything from the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and others – that have for years worked with the Taliban. Reports show that ISKP has already fostered relationships with most of these groups, which would only accelerate once a peace deal with the Taliban is inked.

ISKP’s ideology resonates well with non-Afghan terrorist groups, as they pursue regional and global agendas. Unlike the Taliban, whose ideology is as much about the Afghan Pashtunwali code as it is about Islam, and whose objectives are limited to Afghanistan, ISKP follows a strictly Salafi-jihadi ideology and has a global outlook. Based on a skewed interpretation of Islamic theology, the Salafi doctrine defies all racial and geographical boundaries within the Muslim community, blames the West for the decline of Islamic civilization, seeks a resurrection of the Islamic Caliphate, and sanctions the use of unrestricted violence in that pursuit. This transborder, transracial, pan-Islamist ideology is more appealing to regional terrorist groups, which have framed the Taliban as “filthy nationalists.” ISKP thus has vast and diverse ground for recruitment, alliance building, and mustering support. In its vows to reestablish the historical “Khorasan” region, ISKP has already drawn fighters from over a dozen countries, including those in Central, South, and Southeast Asia, and even as far afield as France.

Although most of ISKP’s operations have thus far been limited to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the group has demonstrated serious intent at expanding its target zone to the region and beyond. For example, after attacking a Sikh temple in Kabul last March, ISKP claimed it as revenge for Muslim suffering in India-administered Kashmir. ISKP also enjoys close relations with the Islamic State-Bengal, which has carried out deadly attacks in Bangladesh and plotted to assassinate the country’s prime minister in 2017. ISKP’s inroads into the northern provinces of Afghanistan, especially as it collaborates with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and others, are centered on a single objective – to make its way into Central Asia and China. How much the group can expand terrorist operations beyond the region is to be determined, but currently Global Terrorism Index puts ISKP among the top four most lethal terrorist organizations in the world.

What, then, of the hopes of Afghans for peace and the wishes of Americans to close the 19-year old “war on terror”? A power sharing agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban is certainly a legitimate objective for Afghanistan and a major step toward ending America’s longest war. But it would be naïve to conclude that such a peace deal would be a silver bullet to bring peace to Afghanistan and extinguish the most serious terrorist threats to American interests in the region. What is required is a coherent, affordable, and long-term counterterrorism strategy in cooperation with NATO and the regional powers, particularly Russia and China, to fight ISKP and its affiliates well after peace with the Taliban is achieved. Unless such an arrangement could be made, the Islamic State – Khorasan Province will endure, evolve, and export terrorism to the region and beyond for years to come.

French President Emmanuel Macron has thrusted France into a leadership role by deciding to buttress Greek and Cypriot interests in the Mediterranean. Laying out his rationale in an August 29 speech, he depicted a Mediterranean beseeched by conflicts. He included clashes from Syria to Libya, disputes over energy, the never-ending peace process, failed states like Lebanon and intense demographic pressures, like reported by nationalinterest.org.

More worryingly for him, new developments are exacerbating the current state of affairs. These include the retreat of the United States and general European indifference. But there is also the reemergence of two great powers, Russia and Turkey, both of which arrive with considerable historical baggage. In Turkey, Macron perceives a dangerous revisionist power imbued with a sort of “fantasy” regarding its past history. He also has upped the pressure at the MED7 Corsica summit last week by encouraging Europeans to stand firm against Ankara.

This is because Ankara has deployed an armada of naval vessels that accompany its seismic research ships in pursuit of hydrocarbon resources and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkish vessels have crossed into the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of both Greece and Cyprus challenging their sovereignty. The Turks have made it clear that they are willing to use force if necessary, while carrying out these missions.

Greece and Cyprus do not have the military wherewithal to stop the Turks and this is where Macron comes in. Alarmed by the challenges to the sovereignty of two European Union members, Macron has deployed the French navy’s considerable assets to support both countries. He has said that he is laying down a red line intended to deter Ankara. In what perhaps is a first of its kind, he rebuked a fellow North Atlantic Treaty Organization member by pointedly maintaining that the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Turks respect only actions and not words.

Erdogan was quick to respond by accusing the French leader and others of being greedy and oblivious to the dire consequences of taking the Turks on.

At the heart of the dispute is Turkey’s decision to explore for hydrocarbon resources in waters deemed to be within the Greek and Cypriot EEZs. The EEZ is a legal designation, together with the concepts of continental shelf and territorial limits, agreed to by the signatories to the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention or UNCLOS. Accordingly, coastal states can claim up to a 200 miles area as their EEZ where they have the right to exploit existing resources. The problem is that the Mediterranean is a semi-closed sea where countries’ respective EEZs bump into each other. Turkey, while not a signatory to UNCLOS, has decided to interpret its provisions differently. It does not recognize the fact that islands also have a right to an EEZ and hence challenge much of Greece and Cyprus’s EEZ designations.

Turkey does have a valid issue. The hundreds of Greek islands that dot the Aegean Sea, some as close as a mile to the Turkish coast, effectively confine Turkish interests to a very narrow strip. Turkey’s answer is to assert that these islands are part of its continental shelf and hence ineligible to claim their own EEZs. Notwithstanding Turkish proclamations, the status of the Aegean deserves to be adjudicated. The Greek government has made it clear that it is willing to negotiate provided Ankara stops threatening them and remove its naval assets. Cyprus, however, is altogether another matter: Turkey has occupied some 40% of the island since 1974 and refuses to recognize Cyprus, making negotiations between Nicosia and Ankara unlikely in the near future.

The French have also been angered by Turkish interference in Libya in what they see an attempt by Erdogan to extend his influence in an area that is the soft underbelly of Europe. Last month, French and Turkish naval vessels were involved in a tense altercation off the Libyan coast. Turkey also concluded an EEZ agreement of its own with the Libyan government designed to cut the Mediterranean into two with the possible intention of preventing Cyprus, Egypt and Israel from exporting natural gas to Europe through a pipeline.

Macron’s forceful intervention may be having its desired effect. He is pressing the Europeans to take a stand as German efforts at mediation have not had much impact. European leaders will consider imposing sanctions on Turkey in their upcoming September 24 summit. Erdogan, in messages to the outside world, has of late softened his stand suggesting that he is open to negotiations with all parties except Cyprus which Turkey does not recognize. More importantly, he has removed Oruç Reis, the exploratory vessel from the Aegean and sent it back to port. This Turkish decision to dial down tensions taken in anticipation of the pending European Union Summit was also made all the more necessary by Moody’s unprecedented downgrade of Turkish debt deeper into junk category. In justifying its decision, Moody’s pointed to not just the government’s poor steering of the economy but also to the rising tensions, including in the Eastern Mediterranean, resulting from Turkey’s foreign policy stances.

Yet at home, Erdogan’s rhetoric remains rancorous; he is threatening the French as well as all the others and using the Eastern Mediterranean crisis to inflame nationalist sentiments. Facing a series of domestic setbacks, he faces the unenviable task of figuring how to climb down from the escalation ladder.

The jury may still be out on Macron’s step into the leadership vacuum; Turks have backed down for the moment. Back in 1996, when Greece and Turkey almost went to war over two nondescript rocks in the Aegean, Washington had stepped in to diffuse the situation. Today, not only is Washington absent, but President Trump is also seen as having emboldened Erdogan. In risking a showdown with Erdogan, Macron at least deserves recognition for trying.

Iran is concerned about the next steps Israel and its new Gulf partners will take in the wake of the Abraham Accords signed in Washington on Tuesday, like reported by jpost.com.

Tehran’s displeasure is difficult to measure but the overall context and hints in pro-Iranian media give away the sense that the regime in Tehran and its allies and proxies in the Middle East view the potential Saudi-Israel relationship with concern.

Iran has been zig-zagging between hyperbolic condemnation of the UAE and Bahrain for working with Israel, to trying to ignore the setback that its threats have resulted in. Iran’s threats and its attempt to leverage the Iran Deal of 2015 to act with impunity throughout the region fueled the Israel-Gulf relationship.

Iran believed incorrectly that it had a blank check after the JCPOA signing to basically take over the Middle East. It sent drones and missiles in increasing numbers to Yemen in 2015, forcing Riyadh’s hand and brining Saudi Arabia and the UAE into Yemen’s civil war. Saudi Arabia didn’t want an Iranian-backed proxy on its doorstep.

Once Saudi Arabia was in Yemen the Iranians rapidly increased production of technical assistance for the Houthis. Soon ballistic missiles and drones were raining down on southern Saudi Arabia and even targeting Riyadh.

But Iran wasn’t satisfied even with this apparent accomplishment. It targeted the oil pump station at Al-Duadmi in Saudi Arabia in mid-May 2019 using drones allegedly sent to Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq.

Then Iran ordered the Houthis to strike at Shaybah oil field near the UAE border. The attack was a message and it was sent in August 2019.

In September 2019, Iran went one step further using 25 drones and cruise missiles to attack Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq facility. Iran, for some reason, has believed that the more it attacks Saudi Arabia the more it will pressure Riyadh, but then is surprised that Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies would become more willing to look to potential talks with Israel.

Similarly Iran began to increase its role in Syria after the Iran deal. This included construction of facilities and support for missile factories in Syria. By the fall of 2017 Iran had agents at Masyaf and other sites, such as Kiswa south of Damascus.

Those sites were targeted by airstrikes in 2018 and 2019. Iran began to pour resources into T-4 base and also the Albukamal border crossing area in 2018.
Airstrikes hit Kataib Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy, in Syria’s Albukamal in June 2018. By 2019 Iran had built a whole base called Imam Ali near Albukamal. In April 2018 Iran even tried to unload a 3rd Khordad air defense system at T-4, according to a Ynet report.

These Iranian projects, trafficking weapons to Hezbollah and building up a footprint in Syria to threaten Israel, while threatening Saudi Arabia from Yemen have been Tehran’s main strategies. Iran also funds Hamas and Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Riyadh is concerned about Iran’s role in Lebanon, summoning Lebanon Sunni leader Saad Hariri for consultations in 2017.

Now pro-Iranian media, such as Al-Mayadeen, is reporting about potential Saudi-Israel relations. “In the time of normalization there is no place for neutrality, with or against Palestine,” shouts a headline at Al-Mayadeen on September 16. “The day is recorded for those who would compromise,” say the Houthis, according to Fars News reports.

The headlines are the same basically. The Houthis, Hezbollah, Iran, Kataib Hezbollah and all the proxies and pieces and tentacles of the Tehran octopus across the region are being told to repeat the same mantra.

That is why Kataib Hezbollah is mobilizing a protest in Basra, not far from Kuwait and the Saudi border, to show off its strength, according to reports. Basra was the center off Iraq protests for a year demanding more employment and investment. Now the only investment they get is anti-Israel and anti-Saudi propaganda.
Iran’s Tasnim news also reports that, while Saudi Arabia supports the Palestinians, that it could work with Israel in the future. This leaves little doubt that after five years of Iranian attacks and threats and pressure against Israel and Saudi Arabia, that Iran’s main concern is the next moves in Riyadh.

Iran’s Press TV on September 16 says that Saudi Arabia is part of the “plots against Muslims,” and highlights Saudi air raids on Yemen as well as alleged Saudi nuclear facilities and a Saudi challenge to Qatar.

You don’t put five headlines against Saudi Arabia on your site the day after the UAE-Bahrain deal unless that is your main concern.

While Iran wants to downplay the UAE-Bahrain deal in its media, and highlight Saudi Arabia, it quietly knows that it has suffered a setback. Five years of trying to dominate Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen have encouraged Israel and the Gulf to work more closely and brought the Trump administration’s transactional deal-making foreign policy a string of successes.

Even though Iran has operationalized its lobby in the West to talk about how Iran is “surrounded,” Tehran knows that its aggression has had blowback and potentially backfired. It must now weigh the next step.

Last year it used drone strikes and pushed rocket attacks on US forces in Iraq as well as mining ships in the Gulf of Oman. It still has an expanding drone and missile arm and clandestine networks to move its weapons all across the region.

Israel, which on Tuesday was set to sign accords to normalize ties with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, has had a turbulent history with the Arab world, including eight wars, like reported by ynetnews.com.

The two Gulf states are the third and fourth Arab countries to establish formal relations with Israel, after Egypt and Jordan signed peace treaties with the Jewish state in 1979 and 1994, respectively.

Israel is created on May 14, 1948, formed out of part of Palestine three years after the end of World War II, when the Nazis killed more than six million Jews.

Israel immediately comes under attack by its Arab neighbors, but repels them.
More than 760,000 Palestinians are driven out or flee, becoming refugees.

In 1956, Israel attacks Egypt alongside Britain and France, which are seeking to overturn the nationalization three months earlier of the strategic Suez Canal.
They eventually withdraw under pressure from both the United States and the then-Soviet Union.

In June 1967, Israel wins a crushing victory over its Arab neighbors in the Six-Day War.

It seizes the West Bank, including east Jerusalem from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria as well as the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt.
In 1973, Egypt and Syria launch a surprise attack on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur to try to win back their lost territories but are held off.

First peace treaty
The year after the historic visit in 1977 by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem, Israel and Egypt agree on peace terms after talks brokered by the United States.

The Camp David accords are the first peace agreement between Israel and an Arab state.
The peace treaty is signed in 1979 by Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Sadat.

Lebanon invasion
In 1978 and again in 1982, Israel invades civil war-wracked Lebanon in a bid to halt cross-border attacks by Palestinian militants.

Israeli troops will remain in southern Lebanon until 2000.
Peace treaty with Jordan
A second peace accord, with Jordan, comes in 1994, signed by prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Abdel Salam Majali.

The Wadi Araba Treaty formally ends 46 years of war between the two neighbors.
Intifada, Oslo accords

The first Palestinian intifada, or uprising, erupts in 1987.
It ends in 1993 when Israel agrees to limited Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as an interim step towards a comprehensive peace agreement, which has yet to emerge.

The so-called Oslo accords are sealed with a historic handshake between Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Rabin, who is assassinated two years later by a Jewish extremist.

The second intifada breaks out in 2000 when right-wing Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon pays a provocative visit to the Al-Aqsa mosque compound in East Jerusalem.

The Israeli army reoccupies much of the West Bank in a series of large-scale military operations and begins building a separation barrier between the two communities.

In 2005, Israel withdraws all troops and settlers from Gaza after 38 years. It imposes a crippling blockade after Islamist group Hamas seizes control in 2007.
It carries out three deadly offensives against the territory in six years, the latest in 2014.

Trump’s support

In December 2017, US President Donald Trump recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, a declaration condemned by the Palestinians, who regard east Jerusalem as the capital of their future state.

In May 2018, Washington transfers its embassy to Jerusalem.
In March 2019, Trump formally recognizes Israel’s 1981 annexation of the Golan Heights.

On January 28, 2020, Trump unveils a controversial Middle East peace plan that paves the way for the annexation of swathes of the West Bank by Israel.
Normalization with UAE, Bahrain

On August 13, Trump, in a surprise announcement, says that Israel and the United Arab Emirates have reached a “historic” agreement to normalize ties. Under the deal, Israel agrees to “suspend” annexation of parts of the occupied West Bank, without saying for how long.

On September 11, Trump announces that Bahrain and Israel will also normalize relations.
The Palestinian authorities condemn the deal as a “stab in the back”.

The two explosions that tore through Beirut on Aug. 4 marked the latest catastrophe for Lebanon, a country beleaguered by a massive financial crisis and the coronavirus pandemic. The explosions killed at least 160 people, injured thousands and left many homeless. Lebanese officials blamed the disaster on a cache of 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate, which had been kept improperly for years in a warehouse at the city’s port, like reported by thehill.com.

This chemical long has been favored by Hezbollah for attacks, though the Iranian proxy has denied stockpiling it at the port, which it controls. While it is currently unclear who owned the ammonium nitrate behind the explosions, Hezbollah has stored and used the same material abroad, including in Europe — all while evading a full terrorist designation by the European Union (EU).

In 2012, for instance, a bus carrying young Israeli tourists was bombed in Burgas, Bulgaria, killing six people and wounding dozens. Bulgarian, American and Israeli authorities all linked the attack to Hezbollah, and law enforcement determined that “ammonium nitrate was an active ingredient in the explosives,” according to a US Justice Department complaint.

The Burgas bombing was not an isolated incident. Eighteen years prior, a suicide bomber drove a van packed with ammonium nitrate and fuel oil into a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, murdering 85 people and wounding hundreds. Argentine prosecutors have accused Hezbollah of carrying out the massacre under Iran’s direction.

Indeed, Iran has an extensive record of directing its Hezbollah proxy to conduct attacks on foreign soil. In the same year as the Burgas atrocity, Iran was accused of plotting against American, Israeli and Western targets in Azerbaijan; and orchestrating bombings against Israeli diplomats in India and Georgia. Plots were also uncovered in Thailand, Kenya and Cyprus, where a Hezbollah operative was arrested over his role in a bid to attack Israeli tourists. “I was just collecting information about the Jews,” the operative reportedly told police. “This is what my organization is doing, everywhere in the world.”

In 2013, the EU finally designated Hezbollah’s military wing as a terrorist organization. This paved the way for member states to freeze funds linked to Hezbollah’s military wing and for greater law enforcement cooperation. Yet the ban did not apply to the Iranian proxy’s political wing, effectively enabling it to continue operating in the EU and undermining the designation’s impact. Unfortunately, qualifying the terrorist designation between two wings is illogical, because all Hezbollah operations are coordinated and directed by its political elites. Indeed, even Hezbollah leadership has refuted and mocked this distinction.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah and its Iranian patrons have continued plotting terrorist attacks in Europe. In 2015, Hezbollah-linked operatives were caught stockpiling more than three tons of ammonium nitrate in the U.K., and 8.5 tons of the chemical in Cyprus. In 2018, France accused Iran of seeking to bomb an opposition group rally in Paris. In June, a Danish court sentenced a man over an Iranian plot to murder an Iranian opposition activist in Denmark. In July, reports emerged that Israel thwarted Iranian attacks on its diplomatic missions in Europe.

Hezbollah sustains its reach largely through Tehran’s support, which according to 2018 U.S. estimates amounts to $700 million annually. Yet it also maintains an independent fundraising apparatus, engaging in money laundering, drug trafficking, and other criminal operations across Europe, and exploiting businesses and charity front groups to funnel resources to its terrorist operations.

This April, Germany unilaterally banned Hezbollah in full, reportedly after being tipped off about a stash of ammonium nitrate in the country’s south. Lithuania designated Hezbollah as a terrorist group this month. Such positions align with those adopted by the U.S., U.K., Canada, Israel, Argentina and the Arab League, among others. Yet most EU nations continue to rely on the bloc’s insufficient designation, which grants Hezbollah’s fundraising activities valuable breathing room.

As Europol, the EU’s law enforcement agency, noted in a recent report, investigations into Hezbollah “face the difficulty of demonstrating that the funds collected are channeled to the military wing of the organization.” Aligning Hezbollah’s terrorist designation with the reality of its operations would empower European law enforcement authorities to comprehensively target the group and its resources within the EU.

A full designation also would help further delegitimize Hezbollah at a time when the Lebanese government has resigned, and furious citizens demonstrate against the ruling elite. Indeed, it is notable that some of these protesters are directing their ire at Hezbollah, and even hanging Hezbollah leaders in effigy. The Lebanese are justifiably outraged over the governing malfeasance that set the conditions for this tragedy after running the Lebanese economy into the ground. But there is also evidence that they are fed up with Hezbollah’s parasitic exploitation of their country. Ramping up this terror group’s delegitimization is more urgent than ever to support a Lebanese movement to free their country from Iran and Hezbollah.

Deep reforms are needed if Lebanon has any hope of restoring governing normalcy. Unfortunately, Hezbollah, which exploits Lebanon’s weak political system to operate with no transparency or accountability, presents a major barrier to such reform and the hopes of the Lebanese people. By comprehensively blacklisting Tehran’s top proxy, the EU would decisively signal that Hezbollah is not a legitimate actor, directly threatens stability in and beyond Lebanon, and must be countered if Beirut is to have a hope of a true recovery.

Communist China claims that its goal is to bring “peace and security to the world.” Why, then, is it preparing to establish a far-reaching military and economic partnership with Iran? Why would a country concerned with peace and security align with the world’s leading state sponsor of terror?

As the agreement states, China and Iran have a shared geopolitical outlook: “Two ancient Asian cultures, two partners in the sectors of trade, economy, politics, culture and security with a similar outlook and many mutual bilateral and multilateral interests will consider one another strategic partners”, like reported by washingtonexaminer.com.

China lies when it uses rhetoric about “peace and security”; no peace-loving country has a similar geopolitical outlook with Iran, a country that proactively undermines security in the Middle East, supports global terror networks, and wants to wipe Israel off the face of the planet.

The reality is that China wants power, world power — and there is a sinister, Soviet-style plan to achieve it.

Since gaining power in 2012, General Secretary Xi Jinping has mimicked Soviet Russia’s playbook: Create a bloc of global partners through strategic investment and political cajoling, steal American technology, and prop up authoritarian leaders.

In building strategic alliances, the Soviets used military power and territorial conquest to extend its reach beyond the Iron Curtain. China primarily expands through economic influence and exploiting our globalized system.

The country’s strategic vision is manifested in Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, a lending project that provides China with alliances in over 140 countries under the guise of “economic cooperation.”

Targeting less-developed countries, China agrees to front the cost of infrastructure projects and data centers, knowing the governments are unable to repay the loans. In Djibouti, China built a naval base after 70% of Djibouti’s GDP contained debt to Beijing from Belt and Road Initiative projects. In Sri Lanka, China obtained a 99-year lease for a strategic military and trading port in exchange for forgiving $1 billion of Sri Lankan debt. China has partnered with other strategically located countries such as Panama, Egypt, Kenya, and now, Iran.

As Beijing has expanded its investments, it has also acquired political partners, reminiscent of the Warsaw Pact. While facing scrutiny at the United Nations for its oppressive security law in Hong Kong, 53 countries supported China. Forty-three of them were signatories to the Belt and Road Initiative. Xi’s “investments” paid off.

Also like the Soviets, communist China regularly steals American information, technology, and research. Declassified CIA reports explain how Moscow maintained a national policy that prioritized stealing military technology.

In 2008, the Chinese Communist Party developed its “Thousand Talents Program,” which uses strategically placed academics to bring research back to China. Its focus is not just military technology, but also medical research, technological advancements, and infrastructure plans. Most recently, U.S. and U.K. intelligence reports outlined communist China’s intention to steal or sabotage research into a coronavirus vaccine. And over the past five years, Chinese researchers have stolen American naval technology for submarines, $1 billion worth of petroleum-related trade secrets, and American cellular and telecommunications technology.

And just as the Soviet Union supported Marxist revolutionaries, China props up leaders who support its worldview, providing regular financial support to totalitarian leaders in Cuba, Venezuela, and North Korea. It also maintains military partnerships with central Asian authoritarians under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

There is no question that our posture with Communist China constitutes a “New Cold War.” Chinese aggression against India and on the South China Sea reminds us that Beijing has the same taste for territorial expansion as Soviet Russia. And Xi’s 2017 address to the Chinese Communist Party makes clear that he doesn’t want China to merely compete in global affairs — he wants to set the terms of debate and isolate the United States and our allies.

As I stated in February at the Hudson Institute, “Communist China does not want to join the community of nations so much as it wants to rule it. The result, whether we want to admit it or not, is a new Cold War.” No debate is needed, and the U.S. must respond appropriately.

Stop buying anything made in China. De-list Chinese companies from stock exchanges. Re-shore the supply chain and support American jobs. Indicate products’ place of origin for online shoppers. Refuse to publish Chinese propaganda in newspapers. Reevaluate relationships with Chinese researchers at universities and hospitals. Cancel travel plans to China. Cut ties with Confucius Institutes at universities. Move the 2022 Olympics Games out of Beijing.

I have been sounding the alarm in the Senate on these issues, and I am thankful the Trump administration is working towards a proactive, strategic approach to combat the Chinese threat. But everyday people can step up now and treat China like the adversary it is.

Beijing and Tehran are preparing a whopping 25-year economic and security deal according to which China would invest up to $400 billion in Iran. We need not go into details on the proposed agreement as it has already been discussed at length, but it is worthwhile to delve into the geopolitical and historical background that drives the two countries toward one another, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

When the provisional document was leaked, many analysts expressed the opinion that China and Iran are now more closely aligned because of increased US pressure. This is an understandable assumption, but there is much more going on. Iran’s turn to China did not appear out of the blue; it has been in preparation for years. The deal represents a logical reaction of the Iranian political elite to the changing geopolitical order in Eurasia, namely the rise of China.

Like most states in the world, Iran is interested in engaging with the emerging Eurasian powerhouse. China was Iran’s major trading partner during the administration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who initiated the Islamic Republic’s “Look to the East” program.

Iran is being opportunistic, as the center of global energy consumption is shifting from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. Between 2017 and 2040, oil and gas demand is projected to grow significantly and Iran quite naturally wants a share of that market.

Tehran’s shift to the East is also driven by a lack of options. The regime’s relations with Russia are generally described as close, but their mutual distrust in a number of geopolitical theaters prevents Tehran from “going north” to seek Russia’s Eurasian alternative. Nor is the collective West an option as pressure from the US continues to mount. That leaves China as the only viable alternative through which to alleviate Iran’s difficult economic situation.

But the proposed deal is not only about the evolving geopolitical order in Eurasia. China and Iran have much in common historically. Both are continuous, millennia-old civilizations that precede the Western Westphalian concept of state-to-state relations and indeed effectively oppose that notion. A strong sense of history in both China and Iran makes their political elites particularly sensitive to a Western military or economic presence near or inside their home countries. Both detest Western colonialism and have spent decades trying to neutralize the last vestiges of that bygone era.

But the distrust China and Iran share toward the collective West (we would include Russia as well) is also driven by the states’ similar geography. Iran and China are both effectively closed in. Deserts, mountains, steppes, and seas surround the densely populated Iranian and Chinese heartlands. Historically this has helped both to be better defended against invaders, but it also created a fear of foreign encirclement that is deeply ingrained in the psyches of both political elites. This common anxiety drives the two states closer to one another as Western pressure ramps up.

Both states also find common ground with regard to connectivity across the Eurasian landmass and see themselves as central to any large-scale infrastructure projects or trade routes spanning the continent. This centrality on the ancient or modern Silk Road is a foundational block in the Chinese and Iranian geopolitical self-perceptions. It is no wonder that one of the key clauses in the proposed deal deepens Iran’s integration into China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This also explains Iran’s vision of the BRI as a geo-economic rather than an imperialist initiative. This perspective contrasts with that of the West, which often calls the BRI a “neo-colonialist” project.

Beyond their common perception of the Silk Road, there is much inherent in Persian and Chinese historical and ideological ideas that pulls the two states toward one another. Tehran and Beijing both support the concept of a multipolar world, seek limits on US power, and try to pursue independent foreign policies.

Thus what Iran and China are trying to achieve—while motivated to an extent by immediate geopolitical developments—reflects long-term civilizational and ideological motives.

It can even be argued that Iran’s agreement with China fits into its historical strategy of hedging against larger geopolitical rivals. Today it is the US; in the 16th century it was the Ottoman Empire against which the Persians tried to create coalitions with Europeans. In the early 19th century the Persians allied with Napoleon’s France ostensibly against the British Empire, but on the ground, the move was more against the Russians and their gains in the South Caucasus—lands traditionally regarded by the Persians as part of their imperial domain. In the 1820s the Persians worked with London to halt Russia’s onslaught. This pattern of hedging continued into the 20th century, when the powerful Soviet Union drew Iran closer to the US. The playing of the “Chinese card” is thus a traditional Iranian diplomatic method rooted in the country’s history and perception of changing regional or global balances of power.

The proposed Iran-China deal is huge and might well have a defining influence on the regional balance of power and China’s economic expansion in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. However, the widely held assumption that the deal will be completely fulfilled is debatable.

Contrary to what many argue, China’s and Iran’s past economic involvement with one another was less than uniformly positive. Iranians remember how Chinese companies tried to exploit their lack of economic alternatives by demanding tougher trade terms, setting high prices, and bringing little economic results for the local workforce and budget. In 2012, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) stopped operations at the South Pars natural gas field when Iran moved to abrogate the company’s contract. CNPC was later substituted with Petropars. In 2014, another of CNPC’s contracts—the Azadegan oil field—was canceled, and difficulties continued into the following years.

Moreover, it is not clear how effective the deal will be in light of existing US sanctions. The Chinese have been hesitant to undermine their international position over anti-Iranian sanctions. Similar behavior has been observed in China’s relations with sanctions-hit Russia.

In Iran there is also a general distrust toward greater powers. If all the points in the proposed deal are carried out, the Iranian political elite risks ceding a portion of state sovereignty to China. That is very much against the principles of the 1979 revolution and makes the likelihood of the complete success of the deal questionable at best.

Iran is entering a difficult point in its history. Regional and wider Eurasian geopolitics are driving the country toward the Indo-Pacific and specifically China. But the regime’s engagement with Beijing is fraught with problems. Past experience was not positive, and the Iranians are highly sensitive to foreign pressure—whether that be from the Americans or from Asian companies seeking to exploit Tehran’s weak bargaining position. This is bound to cause internal political tensions. Indeed, many from the Iranian political elite have already criticized the Iran-China deal. This means that despite its mammoth size and ambitions, it is far from guaranteed.

The U.N. counterterrorism chief’s statement to the Security Council on the continuing presence of Islamic State (IS) terrorists in West Asia, Africa and elsewhere should be seen as a serious warning by the countries in these regions, like reported by thehindu.com.

Two years after the Sunni jihadist group was declared defeated, more than 10,000 IS fighters remain active in Iraq and Syria, said Vladimir Voronkov. IS-driven terror attacks are on the rise. Besides these two countries, where the IS had established a proto-state in 2014 — destroyed by multilateral war efforts that lasted four years — the terror outfit has a “province” in West Africa with nearly 3,000 fighters, according to the UN.

In war-torn Afghanistan, it continues to stage attacks, targeting ethnic and religious minorities. The IS may no longer control any big city, but its rise from a breakaway faction of al-Qaeda in Iraq to one of the world’s most potent terrorist groups should be a lesson for all stakeholders. Ever since they lost territories, IS fighters withdrew from the front lines and started operating in cells in the deserts, mountains and hinterlands of conflict-ridden countries.

Iraq and Syria are particularly vulnerable to the IS’s resurgence as these countries are yet to be fully stabilised after the wars. In Syria, the Bashar al-Assad government has practically won the civil war. But Syria is now a divided country.

While the government controls most of the territories, a coalition of jihadists and rebels is running the Idlib province. In the northeast, the Kurdish rebels have declared autonomy. On the Syrian-Turkish border, Turkey, backed by pro-Turkish rebels, has carved out a buffer and has been in permanent conflict with the Kurds.

Though there is an uneasy quiet in Syria, the situation is inflammable. Iraq, after months of protests and instability, has finally got a government. But Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi is torn between the U.S. and Iran. Pro-Iran Shia militias continue to target U.S. troops inside Iraq, which could turn the country into a battlefield between Washington and Tehran.

The story is not very different in Africa. Libya has two governments, which were fighting each other till last week’s ceasefire. The Libyan conflict has spilled over into Mali and Burkina Faso, where jihadists have established a solid presence. Chaos breeds militancy, and as the main group here is the IS, it would remain active as long as these countries remain unstable.

The IS has its roots in the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It started growing by exploiting the civil war in Syria. The regional governments as well as their international backers (and rivals) should be mindful of this fact. If they fail to address the regional fault-lines and continue to fight each other, the jihadists could emerge winners once again.

A week ago, justice of sorts was meted out to those suspected of being behind the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005; one member of the Iran-backed Hezbollah militia was charged with the crime and three others were acquitted. Although the result of that UN trial was not the shockwave that many had hoped for, in that it did not hold Hezbollah directly responsible for the killing, it was hailed as at least one step closer to justice for the renowned statesman, like reported by middleeastmonitor.com.

Just days after that verdict, however, another assassination took place in Iraq, where an activist named Reham Yacoub was gunned down in Basra. The suspects are also members of an Iran-backed Shia militia, probably Lebanon’s Iraqi counterpart Kataib Hezbollah. The murder sent shockwaves across the country and its vulnerable community of journalists and activists, especially since it came a month after the well-known political analyst Hisham Al-Hashimi was also assassinated, allegedly by the same group.

Azhar Al-Rubaie, a Basra-based journalist who was a friend of Yacoub, told Middle East Monitor that the killing was meant as a warning to the recently-appointed Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi who was visiting the US on the same day. “[As he landed] for his first foreign visit to Washington DC, militias reactivated and killed… Reham Yacoub to send a message to [the] US that Al-Kadhimi is failing to run Iraq’s security,” claimed Al-Rubaie.

The recent assassinations, as well as Hariri’s 15 years ago, mirror the rise of Iran-backed Shia militias in the region from Lebanon to Iraq. Lebanon’s Hezbollah is by far the most prominent.

Since its foundation in the 1980s as a resistance movement against the Israeli occupation and its Christian Maronite proxies in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah has grown to become a dynamic and increasingly important player in Lebanese society and politics. It has expanded beyond its militant roots and now has a prominent political wing.

Its expansion into the political sphere culminated in the election of Christian President Michel Aoun in 2016, who is allied with Hezbollah, and enabled two of the group’s members to enter parliament with 15 of its political allies appointed to government posts. This, effectively, presented the image that it could take part in the democratic process legitimately.

1Such political success, added to its possession of an estimated 130,000 rockets and missiles, as well as tens of thousands of fighters, has made Hezbollah the most powerful non-state actor in the world. That is not even counting its supporters in the West, where governments have largely overlooked the group’s influence and presence until earlier this year when the German authorities banned it and raided mosques with which it is affiliated.

Despite the democratic image, though, the group has failed to integrate with the Lebanese Armed Forces and to disarm itself, defying demands by the US and the UN to do so. Instead, it has infiltrated the Lebanese authorities and security services so that they comply with Hezbollah’s own interests and overlook its actions. This was noticeable in reports of the militia’s secret black sites across Lebanon and its kidnapping and torture of journalists and critics who threatened to expose its wrongdoings. The latter even included the son of one its deceased leaders.

Over the years, Hezbollah militants and members have fired on crowds of protestors – without facing any repercussions from the Lebanese security forces – who were against the group and its influence in Lebanon. There are also reports that the Lebanese Armed Forces are unable to enter Shia-majority areas and villages, particularly in the south, without permission from the militia or a Hezbollah escort.

There is a similar situation in Iraq, where Kataib Hezbollah has entered the political sphere by participating in parliamentary elections following the territorial defeat of Daesh. With its leading role in the political alliance of Shia militias called the Fatih Alliance, Kataib Hezbollah has succeeded in winning the second highest number of votes for Iraq’s parliament.

The same calls have been made for the militia to disarm itself and integrate with the Iraqi military under the Ministry of Defence, with former Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi issuing a decree last year for all Iran-backed groups under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) to become an “indivisible part of the armed forces and be subject to the same regulations.” Rather than complying, Kataib Hezbollah ignored his warning that they would be seen as outlaws and simply continued to fire on protestors and started to assassinate critics.

These militias’ military capabilities coupled with their new-found political influence have caused many to view them as states within states, undermining the sovereignty of both Lebanon and Iraq. “Militias are stronger than the government, they have weapons, IDs to cross checkpoints, [and] also have support from Iran,” Al-Rubaie told MEMO.

Despite these obstacles, over the past few months since Al-Kadhimi took over from Abdul-Mahdi, Iraq has revived the hope of those desiring reforms and the checking of the power of the Iran-backed militias in the region. The new Prime Minister has, for example, made efforts to crack down on some of the prominent militias, as evidenced by the security forces’ raid at the headquarters of Kataib Hezbollah in June and the arrest of several members.

Mustafa Al-Kadhimi’s visit to the US last week to meet President Donald Trump was also proof of that, as well as his visit to the son of Al-Hashimi and family of Yacoub following their murders. How far the Iraqi Prime Minister will be willing to go in limiting the power and influence of the Iran-backed militias in his country, and whether they would pose enough of a threat to his government, still remains unclear. What is certain, though, is that critics of their influence have every reason to fear for their lives.

Lebanon, on the other hand, is now suffering from a severe lack of leadership following the Beirut explosion and the resignation of the entire government, meaning that Hezbollah is free to operate with neither limits nor restrictions. The remaining Lebanese leadership has not taken any steps to rein-in the group or even question its possible involvement in the blast or the corruption that led to it. President Aoun has said, somewhat conveniently, that it is “impossible” for Hezbollah to have any responsibility for the explosion that devastated the capital city.

Both Lebanon and Iraq, with varying degrees of resistance, have fallen into the firm grip of the Iran-backed Shia militias by allowing their military presence and granting them political legitimacy. In order to take back control they must either remove them from the political sphere and any political representation whatsoever, or force them to disarm and be absorbed into the national armed forces. Disarmament is unlikely; Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah insisted in June that such efforts would be “useless”. The status quo thus looks set to remain, with both Lebanon and Iraq fighting an uphill battle to reclaim their national sovereignty.