President Trump’s policies in the Middle East contributed significantly to changes in the rules of the game in the region, both in the Palestinian and regional contexts, like reported by jns.org.

The primary change was the breaking of the paradigm in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was at the heart of the Middle East impasse. The peace and normalization agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan illustrated the exact opposite. The agreements denied the Palestinians the veto they supposedly held on relations between Israel and the Arab world.

Another major change was the overturning by the Trump administration of the claim that Israel’s sovereignty over territory it had seized in the Six-Day War should not be recognized. In a precedent-setting move, the United States under Trump acted according to the opinion that United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 called on Israel to withdraw from “territories” it had seized, rather than “all territories.” The U.S. acknowledged Israel’s sovereignty in the Golan Heights, and Israel’s claim to sovereignty in eastern Jerusalem and 30 percent of Judea and Samaria, including the Jordan Valley.

Other rules of play that changed during Trump’s term were the rejection of allegations that Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria were illegitimate or illegal, that an agreement would require the evacuation of some of the settlements and that the security arrangements that would be established in the future between Israel and a future Palestinian entity would be based on Palestinian responsibility for security. The United States recognized the legality of Israeli settlement in Judea and Samaria, as well as Israel’s security needs, which require Israeli control of the Jordan Valley and overriding Israeli responsibility for security in the entire territory.

The previous paradigm demanded that Israel choose between two problematic alternatives. The first was maintaining the status quo. In order to convince Israel to disavow this alternative, it is portrayed by many as inevitably forcing Israel to choose between being a Jewish state or a democratic one. The second alternative is a return to the 1967 lines with minor changes and territorial swaps, so as to enable the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank that remains committed to defeating Zionism.

Instead, the alternatives put forth were implementing the Trump peace plan in its entirety or Israel expanding normalization agreements with the Arab states while maintaining the status quo in the territories and suspending the application of its sovereignty over parts of Judea and Samaria.

Implementing the Trump plan would have allowed the extension of Israeli sovereignty over territories vital to Israel’s security (the Jordan Valley and much of the settlements), while potentially establishing a Palestinian state in Palestinian-populated territories, conditional on the Palestinians meeting certain conditions.

In both of these scenarios, Israel’s Jewish and democratic nature is preserved.

A change in Palestinian Policy?

Some of these demands have already been translated by the United States and Israel into legislation, notably the Taylor Force Act, which secured wall-to-wall support in Congress and declares that the United States will not provide aid to the Palestinian Authority as long as it pays salaries to terrorists and their families. Israel passed a similar law, which also received broad support in the Knesset, and has determined that Israel will deduct the amount the Palestinian Authority pays in salaries to terrorists and their families from the taxes it collects for the P.A..

This deviates from the previous American practice of avoiding punitive measures against the P.A., even if the P.A. blatantly violated the Oslo Accords and supported terrorism. That American practice had been adopted to ensure the P.A.’s stability, and out of fear of a strong P.A. reaction. This Palestinian “deterrent” was also ignored when the United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and relocated the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, actions that did not provoke a widespread negative response.

As a result of these changes, the Palestinian leadership’s ability to advance its strategic objectives, primarily the struggle to defeat Zionism, has been significantly weakened. Within Palestinian society, one can see the beginnings of a re-evaluation of the logic of the Palestinian narrative that prioritizes confrontation with Zionism and places the quality of Palestinian life as a secondary priority.

On the other hand, there were, of course, those who pledged to adhere to the narrative at all costs and even considered promoting unification moves between Fatah and Hamas. The Nov. 3 U.S. election results were greeted with a sigh of relief among Palestinians, who believe that the pressure on them will diminish under a Biden administration, and perhaps even that personnel sympathetic to the Palestinians will be integrated into the president-elect’s team. But at the same time, the Palestinians understand that they have to come to terms with the new reality and the new rules. This is why they have announced that they will resume security and civilian coordination with Israel, without Israel announcing that it is giving up its intention to extend its sovereignty over parts of Judea and Samaria.

Changes on the Iranian front

In the regional context, the axiom that stated that Iran and its proxies enjoyed immunity from U.S. and Israeli actions against them has been overturned. U.S.-imposed economic sanctions on Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Hezbollah; the elimination of Iranian Quds Force commander Maj.-Gen. Qassem Soleimani; U.S. strikes in Syria and Iraq; and the succession of Israeli strikes against Iranian targets in Syria (and possibly several actions attributed to Israel in Iran itself) reflect this change. However, the rule still stands that direct military activity against Hezbollah in Lebanon, beyond intelligence gathering, should be avoided.

The most significant practical manifestation of the changed rules was the U.S. decision in 2018 to exit the nuclear deal with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and to impose ever-tightening sanctions on the Islamist regime in Tehran. These changes confronted Iran with severe economic hardship, affecting its control of countries where it gained significant influence during the Obama era (Iraq, Syria and Lebanon), and, in response, it chose to violate the nuclear agreement.

Iran was forced to leave, at least temporarily, the safe path to nuclear weapons guaranteed by the JCPOA, and instead return to the problematic trajectory of striving toward nuclear “breakout” capability. Today, the time required for an Iranian “breakout,” i.e., to produce enough military-grade enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon, stands at three to five months, compared to one year, the term set by the JCPOA according to the Obama administration’s interpretation of the deal.

Israel and the Arab world

The breakthrough in relations between Israel and the pragmatic Arab countries and the pressures on Iran also changed the rules of the game between the pragmatic camp and its radical rivals from the Iranian and Muslim Brotherhood axes. This led to the strengthening of the pragmatic camp, thanks to the growing commitment of the United States and Israel to its members’ security and prosperity (including arms deals with the United Arab Emirates, notably the F-35 deal).

During the U.S. election campaign, Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden and his entourage announced that they had not come to terms with many of the changes enacted by the Trump administration, and intended to reinstate the previous rules of the game. Messages in this vein were also heard after it became clear that Biden had, in fact, become president-elect. Biden and his top foreign policy advisers emphasized the U.S. interest in lifting sanctions on Iran and returning to the nuclear agreement, hoping that minor changes to the deal would be acceptable to the Iranians. They also expressed the view that the Palestinian issue is a key topic in the Middle East and that the new administration intends to renew U.S. ties and assistance to the Palestinian Authority.

Will Biden follow in the previous administration’s footsteps?

Biden and his advisers have asserted that their strategic objectives are no different from those of previous administrations, i.e., preventing Iran from arming itself with nuclear weapons; restraining Tehran’s dangerous activities in the region and the domestic arena; fortifying Israel’s security, in part by continuing security assistance and preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME); opposing Israel’s delegitimization; and promoting an agreement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the formula of two states—even if they are skeptical of the prospect of making significant progress towards this goal.

The ability of the new administration to advance its worldview in the Palestinian context, given the changing reality in the Middle East, will be influenced by a variety of constraints. Significant aspects of the new rules of the game appear to be irreversible, notably the normalization of relations between Israel and the pragmatic Sunni states, which have even adopted dimensions of moderation. For instance, in the agreement with the United Arab Emirates, the UAE recognized the existence of a Jewish People for the first time—a clear contradiction of the central principle underlying the Palestinian narrative that rules out the existence of such a people. Therefore, the ability of the P.A. to mobilize the Arabs to pressure Israel has been significantly reduced.

It is also unlikely (though not entirely impossible) that the new administration will ignore the Taylor Force Act and renew financial aid to the P.A., even while the P.A. insists on continuing to pay salaries to terrorists who murdered Israelis (and Americans). The P.A. has even announced that it will employ the terrorists who had completed their prison terms in the P.A. security forces. The Palestinians are considering changes in the system of payments to arrested terrorists, encouraged by sympathetic Democratic Party activists, but it is doubtful that they really mean to stop this practice or change it in any significant way that might satisfy Israel, the United States and other donors.

It appears that Biden will refrain from returning the U.S. Embassy to Tel Aviv or canceling the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the Golan Heights as part of Israel. If the Senate remains Republican-controlled, he will find it even harder to aid the Palestinians, despite expected pressure from the progressive camp in his party.

On the other hand, Biden may freeze or cancel Trump’s peace initiative and return to referring to the settlements in the territories as illegitimate or even lacking legal validity (in the language of UNSC Res. 2334, which the Obama administration allowed to pass in its final days), despite the opinion of the State Department under President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, which contradicted this claim.

Biden may re-adopt the Obama-Kerry peace plan of 2013-14, which included a security concept dangerous to Israel (the “Allen Plan,” which among its many flaws included a Palestinian Special Forces unit equipped with helicopters). In any event, it is likely that despite Biden’s sympathetic attitude to Israel he will show a more critical attitude toward it, especially compared to Trump.

Even in the Iranian context, the new rules of the game and current circumstances will make it difficult for Biden and his administration to turn the wheel back quickly. Some sanctions were deliberately imposed through mechanisms that cannot be readily repealed (such as those set under anti-terrorism legislation). Moreover, the Iranians are unwilling to agree to changes or additions to the original nuclear agreement, such as limitations on intercontinental ballistic missile development.

The Iranians are now busy preparing for Iran’s upcoming presidential elections and the consequential internal tensions. Meanwhile, more information about Iran’s nuclear program has emerged and is being discovered, both on the basis of the nuclear archives uncovered by Israel and on the basis of revelations by opposition sources, which could require the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to take action against Iran, complicating the situation further.

In the broad regional context, Biden is expected to adopt a more critical policy toward Saudi Arabia and other elements of the pragmatic Arab camp and move closer to Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated states and “reformists” in Iran. Groups in the United States, led by the pro-Iran National Iranian American Council (NIAC)’s Trita Parsi, and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), with its ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, had close relations with the Obama administration and supported Biden’s candidacy. They will be seeking “payback” for their support. Progressives in the Democratic Party will also pursue government posts in return for their support.

Maintaining the U.S.-Israel relationship

Ultimately, Biden will have to take into account that relations with Israel are crucial to protecting American interests in the region and that the pragmatic Arabs are close allies of the United States, while the regimes in countries led by radical elements, such as Turkey and Iran, are involved in activities that undermine stability and blatantly violate the human rights of their citizens, much more than the pragmatic Arab camp.

It is precisely the new rules of the game that create potential leverage to make significant changes in Palestinian and Iranian policy during the next U.S. president’s term. The distress in which the Iranians, their proxies and the Palestinians find themselves, and their high expectations that Biden will extract them from these pressures, create a convenient basis for the new president to demand flexibility from the Palestinians and the Iranians to further his foreign policy goals.

On the other hand, attempts to reinstate the old rules of the game unconditionally, and to reject everything achieved by the Trump administration, as expressed in some of the initial statements by Biden’s people, may dissolve the potential to bring about desired changes. Such a position could result in encouraging the Iranians to become more stubborn in their demands to reject any changes in the JCPOA.

Israel must do all it can to strengthen ties with the United States under the new administration, preserve as much as possible the new rules created in recent years, sharpen the positive potential inherent in these changes and emphasize the importance of support for the pragmatic Arab camp, even though it has its problems. The more Israel cooperates with members of this camp and expands the circle of countries that openly promote normalization of relations with it, the stronger Israel and the pragmatists will become as they seek to bring the new U.S. administration to support the positive changes in the Middle East and to realize their potential. At the same time, Israel will strive to maintain its fundamental positions and freedom of action toward Iran and the Palestinians.

The Ethiopian conflict in its Tigray region continues to intensify with Tigrayans fleeing into bordering Eritrea and Sudan, like reported by theafricareport.com. But as the fighting gathers more steam, will repercussions be felt among its regional neighbours?

While Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration has strengthened its ties with Eritrea following the 2018 peace agreement, the TPLF fired missiles at the Eritrean capital Asmara on 14 November.

This demonstrated the conflict’s potential for wider regional destabilisation. It also speaks to the ongoing animosity between the TPLF and Eritrea which dates back to the war they fought against each other from 1998 to 2000.

TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael justified the missile attack by claiming his forces had been fighting 16 divisions of the Eritrean army since the beginning of the conflict. Allegations that were denied by both PM Abiy Ahmed and President Issayas Afeworki.

However, Asmara’s silence following the attack by the TPLF came as a surprise. Any official Eritrean support to Ethiopia would be “really bad for Abiy because it makes him look like he needs the Eritreans to control his own territory,” says Jason Mosley, a research associate at Oxford University’s African Studies Centre.

It could also invite other regional or global powers into the conflict. In this regard, Eritrea is an advantageous ally for Ethiopia, since it controls the northern border with Tigray.

The only other border is to the west, facing Sudan. It also hosts a major UAE military base in Assab. Getachew Reda, senior TPLF official accused PM Abiy of “enlisting the support of UAE drones based in Assab […]”.

While there is potential for military escalation, the fighting is mainly forcing people to flee. This includes Eritrean refugees currently in UNHCR camps in Tigray as well as Ethiopian residents.

The number of civilians seeking refuge in Sudan as a result of the conflict was estimated at 27 000 by the UN at the beginning of this week.

In support of Abiy and also for its own stability, Sudan has closed parts of its border with Tigray and stationed troops near Kassal. The country’s economic situation is already making internal peace difficult to achieve, notes David Kiwuwa of International Studies as the University of Nottingham.

Its eastern region has been volatile for several years and was rocked by pro-independence demonstrations in October. The human and potential weapons influx to this region could be a challenge to the fragile and freshly established Sudanese government.

Khartoum’s foreign policy has also significantly shifted under the new administration from an alliance with Iran, Turkey and Qatar to one with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the US. A choice it has to justify to its people when it is also hosting a Turkish military base and a Russian naval base is in the works.

Closer relations are envisioned with the US after being removed from its “state sponsors of terror” list and ultimately economic advantages once the sanctions are also lifted.

But with its northern neighbour Egypt, relations are more ambiguous. The “Nile’s Eagles-1” joint military exercise on 15 November was a new step in the Egypt-Sudan rapport. While it could influence Ethiopia’s position regarding the GERD (Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam), Sudan’s government also has to maintain a tight balancing act. One reason is its border conflict with Egypt in the Halayeb triangle, an issue that has to be resolved if ties are to be strengthened.

There has also been mention of Sudan taking advantage of the war to reignite its border dispute with Ethiopia in the Fashqa triangle. Given the apparent Eritrea-Ethiopia alliance, it is highly unlikely Sudan would risk being at war with two countries. Rather, Sudan has offered to mediate between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF. Similar calls for negotiation have come from Uganda, the AU and the UN.

Offers the Ethiopian government has refused.

Impact on regional issues
The TPLF has continuously contested PM Abiy’s legitimacy, including GERD negotiations with Egypt and Sudan. Perhaps seeking an alliance with foreign powers would be another way to oppose him.

A lasting conflict in Ethiopia would highly affect itsties with Egypt with regards to the GERD. Trump’s defeat means the loss of a significant ally for Egypt. It’s unlikely that the future US administration under Joe Biden would speak of Cairo bombing the dam as was seen under Trump.

In the absence of international support, Ethiopia’s negotiating strategy is to keep the GERD dispute at the African Union level where it has a better chance. A position Sudan supports. However, the situation could get tricky in the coming months as the DRC, an Egyptian ally, will chair the AU starting February.

The war also impacts Ethiopia’s peacekeeping missions in South Sudan and Somalia. Ethiopia has withdrawn 600 soldiers from Somalia since the start of the conflict. Kenya is expected to withdraw as well, come 2021 – an election year for Somalia.

Furthermore, the continuous militarisation of the horn region and the arrival of new players such as China, the UAE and Turkey could present a risk of proxy-confrontations. “The focus on joint efforts to promote regional security is currently being superseded by external military deployments to the Horn that are driven by geopolitical, commercial and military competition, often with negative effects for regional stability,” says Neil John Melin, Director of the Programme on Armed Conflict and Conflict Management at SIPIRI.

Ethiopia’s neutrality towards all present foreign powers in the horn has perhaps helped it to keep the war an internal issue.

Bottom line
“We understand the position of the Ethiopian government and the value of the law enforcement operation. We hope for a quick resolution as it could drag in the region and has humanitarian consequences,” Meron Elias, a researcher for the Horn of Africa Project tells The Africa Report. But PM Abiy has also promised “the final critical act” is due to take place “in the coming days”.

One can only hope it ends soon with a lasting solution for the people of the horn.

While French President Emmanuel Macron is working on the law against “Islamist separatism,” Islamists are threatening to separate many heads from the bodies of numerous mayors and professors, like reported by inn.com.

Writings threatening to behead Jérémie Bréaud, the Macronian mayor of Bron (Rhône), have appeared in various places in Lyon, leading Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin to place the first citizen under protection. “Jérémie Bréaud, we will behead you, son of Satan”. And again: “We will behead teachers and students.”

“I am not afraid and I will not give up,” responded Bréaud.

Threats identical to these were aimed at the mayor of the eighth arrondissement of Lyon, Olivier Berzane, on the walls of a school. The Association of Mayors talks about hundreds of threats that have arrived in recent days. According to France Info, two hundred investigations into death threats have been opened in relation to the beheading of Professor Samuel Paty in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine.

“There are many threats that target public figures and teachers,” says a judicial source to Le Parisien. In Essonne, a mayor was threatened with death after he paid tribute to Paty. This is Stéphane Raffalli, the first socialist citizen of Ris-Orangis. “O hateful Frenchman, you insult the Prophet Mohammed, we will tear your neck off.”

“Similar events against elected officials have been observed in Île-de-France,” Le Parisien said. That the climate was incandescent was understood during the homage to Paty in the schools, where “four hundred violations of the minute of silence” were reported, as the Minister of Education, Jean-Michel Blanquer, has just revealed. Students who whistled during the moment of recollection, others who laughed, others who spread the photo of Paty beheaded.

In a high school in Caluire-et-Cuire, near Lyon, a student threatened a teacher to “cut off his head.”. In Gisors (Eure), a girl distributed a photo of Paty kneeling to her companions. They range from 160 cases of refusal to participate in the minute’s silence to interruptions and, even worse, 150 cases of condoning Islamic terrorism.

The phenomenon is so widespread that in Albertville, Savoy, the police had to summon four ten-year-old children and their parents to the police station because in the classroom, in words addressed to the teachers, they said that “that teacher deserved to die.”

Even the mayor of Le Touquet, Daniel Fasquelle, was the subject of death threats after a post on Paty, as Mohamed Boudjellaba, mayor of Givors: “Macron we are going to cut your head off with that bastard of Boudjellaba.”

An engineer has just been arrested for threatening Laurent, the professor of History and Geography in the Grenoble area and who appears on the reality TV show “Koh-Lanta” with beheading, saying “I will behead you.” Laurent was preparing a video tribute to Paty. “Do you know what we do to teachers?” wrote the Islamist.

Another teacher of History and Geography from the Jacques Prévert middle school in Noisy-le-Grand was threatened. In Reims, a policeman heard a driver saying: “I’ll cut your head off like Paty”.

Béchir Ben Hassen, an imam banned from preaching in Tunisia, appeared on video on social media, recalling that the four legal schools of Islam validate beheading for anyone “offending the Prophet”. The teachers are notified and with them the mayors who support them. In an interview with Le Soir, the French Minister of Education Jean-Michel Blanquer said that professors who feel threatened can ask for protection.

“My father will behead you.” a student told his teacher at the Pierre Mendes France school in Saumur. He did it in class, in front of everyone. Like ISIS did to Raqqa’s teachers. The soundtrack of this widespread Islamization nightmare was broadcast yesterday by a rapper from Paris who calls himself “Maka”. The piece is titled “S ***** P ***”, the initials of the decapitated professor. “Let’s cut Samuel Paty, without empathy.”

In his hand, a machete. The one that is dividing France in two.

In the last five years, the French city of Nice has been targeted twice by jihadist terrorism. Both times the perpetrators were young men from Tunisia, the smallest country in North Africa, situated between Algeria and Libya, like reported by lowyinstitute.org.

The first incident came on Bastille Day in 2016, when an attacker ploughed a cargo truck through a crowd on the Promenade des Anglais, killing 86 people. The attack by 31-year-old Tunisian man Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, who had been living in France since 2008, was subsequently claimed by the so-called Islamic State.

In the most recent attack, on 29 October this year, 21-year-old Tunisian man Brahim Aouissaoui stands accused of using a kitchen knife to kill three people in Notre-Dame church in Nice. Aouissaoui is reported to have arrived in the French city the night before the attack, coming from Italy, a country he is believed to have illegally crossed to on a boat on 20 September.

Why has Tunisia, a country with only 12 million inhabitants and one which had been so deeply secularised under president Habib Ben Ali Bourguiba (1955–1987), become so prominent as a source of jihadists? Tunisia was famously the cradle for the so-called Arab Spring in 2010–11, yet in the years since has had the highest ratio per capita in the world of people to join Islamic State to fight outside their country (in both relative and absolute terms).

The answer lies in the failure of raised expectations. Indeed, there had been expectations the Arab Spring would bring to power moderate Islamist parties that accept democracy and would be able to pragmatically participate within existing constitutional and political frameworks. For instance, Qatar’s Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr al-Thani told the Financial Times in 2011 that moderate Islamists can assist in the fight against extremist ideology:

We shouldn’t fear them, let’s co-operate with them … We should not have a problem with anyone who operates within the norms of international law, comes to power and fights terrorism.

It was assumed that these developments would eventually undermine dictatorships, eliminate terrorism and strengthen human rights. Unfortunately moderate Islamism, represented mainly by the Muslim Brotherhood, failed in these aspirations, even in Tunisia, the only Arab Spring country that completed a transition to democracy in which the Islamists played a leading role.

The new Tunisia taking shape in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution has seen Islamists take power and be confronted by two acute challenges, unemployment and terrorism.

The Islamist Ennahda party, founded in the late 1970s by Rached Ghannouchi (a member of the Muslim Brotherhood) and forced underground during the 24-year-rule of Ben Ali, which ended in 2011, has imposed itself as a major political force following the revolution. Having led a governing coalition from 2011 to 2014, Ennahda lost its majority in parliament in the 2014 and 2019 elections, but has remained the main parliamentary group with an omnipresent role in the circles of power.

The focus over this era has been on matters related to the transition to democracy, yet as a consequence of endless political squabbling, the economic situation has been left to deteriorate. While the democratic transition has led to various freedoms, notably the freedom of expression, this has not effectively fostered a functional democracy. Instead, the country has been caught in a deadlock due to a dysfunctional political system – a parliamentary system within which the executive has two leaders, often leading to a highly divided parliament which is unable to agree on a government.

All the while, an acute economic crisis has grown. The various responses, principally during the period when Ennahda was in power, have failed. Major sectors of the economy have struggled, such as tourism, textile production and the mining of phosphates. The rate of unemployment, affecting primarily younger Tunisians, including a large proportion of university graduates, reached 18% in the second quarter of 2020, while it was around 13% in 2010 before the revolution. The crisis has led to a significant increase in the trend of illegal immigration into Europe via Italy, swelling the operations of smuggling networks on the Libyan and Algerian borders.

At the same time Tunisia’s own security challenge has continued to grow. The country suffered attacks in 2015 targeting a tourist resort and the national museum, while a steady stream of jihadists left to fight in foreign conflicts. What’s more, Salafist ideology has been finding support in mosques, associations, the media and even parliament. Today the Tunisian parliament includes individuals accused of criminal involvement and even terrorist supporters, such as members of al-Karama Coalition, a parliamentary group with Salafist leanings. Following the recent Nice attack, an independent MP aligned with the al-Karama Coalition was investigated over a Facebook post which claimed that “insulting the prophet of God is the greatest of crimes and anyone who commits it, whether a state, a group or an individual, must accept the consequences”.

The unfulfilled expectations of the Arab Spring have left Tunisia as a country marked by crisis. Despite a decade during which moderate Islamists have played a leading role both in government and parliament, jihadism continues to proliferate. The cost is not only to Tunisia, but felt on the streets in the French city of Nice.

Donald Trump is the most pro-Israel president in history. Barack Obama was the most anti-Israel president in history, like reported by jns.org.

And now, the likeliest outcome of last week’s presidential election is that Obama’s vice president, Joe Biden, will be inaugurated on Jan. 20 and Trump will depart the White House.

Trump is rightly exercising his right to cause a vote recount in Wisconsin and Georgia and suing to fight alleged voter fraud in Michigan and Pennsylvania. But to win the race at this point, Trump will need to win in Arizona and Georgia and either reverse the vote count in Wisconsin or Michigan or win the election in Pennsylvania. Trump owes it to his 71 million voters to ensure that the election results reflect the will of the voters, and so, he will exhaust all legal avenues. But the probability his efforts will win him the election is low.

The Israeli media grotesquely cheers the apparent defeat of Israel’s best friend ever in the Oval Office and his replacement by the vice president of the most hostile U.S. leader in history. While doing so the commentators soothingly insist Biden is a great friend to Israel.

While comforting, this claim is untrue, particularly in relation to Iran.

Biden is not known for his strong principles. Long a weathervane for popular opinion, Biden has changed his positions on everything from the politics of race to international trade to criminal justice to social security and Medicare. But while he has been quick to align his position on nearly all issues with the prevailing political winds, Biden has maintained allegiance to one, deeply controversial position throughout the years. That position is sympathy and support for the theocratic regime in Iran.

In the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, Biden advocated giving $200 million to Iran to show America’s good intentions to the Islamic world. During the Iraq War, Biden was one of the most powerful voices calling for the United States to cut a deal with Iran which would essentially transform post-Saddam Iraq into an Iranian satrapy.

Biden was one of the chief advocates of nuclear appeasement towards Iran, both in the years preceding his ascendance to the vice presidency under Obama and throughout Obama’s nuclear talks with Iran. Those talks, of course, led to the conclusion of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal that gave Iran an open path to a nuclear arsenal within a decade.

Since announcing his run for office, Biden—who was viciously critical of Trump’s decision to abandon the nuclear deal—has pledged repeatedly that he will reinstate the United States’ commitment to the deal if elected, ensuring Iran acquires a nuclear arsenal.

In response to this anticipated policy change in Washington, Israel and its allies in the Persian Gulf have a keen interest in taking action during the next two months to minimize Iran’s prospects for achieving military nuclear capability.

Those allies, in particular Saudi Arabia, are undoubtedly concerned at the prospect of a Biden administration. And their concern is well-placed.

In an election-eve interview with the Dearborn, Michigan-based American Arab News, Biden’s running mate Sen. Kamala Harris pledged to upend U.S.-Saudi ties.

In her words, “Instead of standing by as the government of Saudi Arabia pursues disastrous, dangerous policies, including the ongoing war in Yemen, we will reassess the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia and end support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen.”

In other words, the United States will support Iran’s Houthi proxy in its war against Saudi Arabia.

There is an upside for Israel in Biden’s anticipated turn towards Iran. Saudi Arabia, which was diffident about joining the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan in normalizing its ties with Israel, may choose to do so in the coming weeks. Such a move, which would vastly widen the Arab-Israel peace forged by President Trump through the Abraham Accords, would present the Biden administration with a major alliance opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran.

In the same interview, Harris pledged to work against Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria and block all Israeli moves to implement its sovereignty there in accordance with the Trump peace plan, while reopening the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem that specifically served the Palestinians independent of the U.S. Embassy to Israel. U.S. aid to the PLO-run Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria and to Hamas-run Gaza will also be forthcoming, she promised.

In anticipation of these hostile moves, over the next two months, Israel should take concerted and meaningful action to dismantle illegal, strategically located Palestinian settlements in Area C.

If the Republicans are able to maintain their control over the Senate, and with a diminished Democrat majority in the House of Representatives, Biden will have difficulty passing the progressive domestic policy agenda he ran on. With the Israel-Sunni alliance system that Trump has strengthened and expanded, he will also face obstacles on his way to reinstating Obama’s Middle East policies.

Muslim Brotherhood activists and media outlets have seemed very enthusiastic about the Democratic candidate Joe Biden’s progress in US election results, like reported by thearabweekly.com.

Analysts attributed this enthusiasm to their wish for an encore of their experience in the era of former President Barack Obama, during which they played a remarkable role riding the wave of the “Arab spring” uprisings. These analysts, however, note that Biden is not Obama, and that the American project of relying on the Brotherhood has gone with Obama, probably forever.

The Muslim Brotherhood media were not alone in celebrating Biden’s advantage so far. The Iranian media as well, and the pro-Tehran media in the Middle East seemed enthused by the results of the democratic candidate, not only to spite his rival Donald Trump, who has tightened the American siege of Iran and prevented it from exporting its oil, but also in the hope of bringing back the lenient treatment it enjoyed during the Obama era.

Pro-Muslim Brotherhood activists and media professionals in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and the Gulf states did not hide their prayers for a Biden victory.

They kept up with his results in each state, moment by moment, and mocked Trump’s statements and his speech about fraud and resorting to the courts. It was as if Biden was the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate and not the candidate of the American Democrats.

Lists of the expected victory spoils for the Muslim Brotherhood started appearing on Brotherhood and pro-Brotherhood media. They are hoping for US pressure to be exerted on Cairo to release Brotherhood leaders convicted in court cases related to terrorism and conspiracy against Egypt’s security, as well as for pressure on the Arab quartet countries to lift their boycott of Qatar and restore relations with it.

From the outset, the Muslim Brothers did not hide their bias towards Biden. They presented him as a supporter of Islam and Muslims, highlighting the fact that he cites the Prophet’s hadiths, and as a fierce opponent of Islamophobia. American Islamic associations, such as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), which are associated with the Muslim Brotherhood or are seen as close to it, promoted Biden’s candidacy among Americans and participated in his election campaign at state and national levels.

The Muslim Brothers are eying the benefits that could accrue to their American Islamist brothers through their “partnership” with Biden in case of the latter’s victory, such as obtaining advisory roles, sealing their influence within the Muslim community, and lifting the authorities’ constant monitoring of their propaganda and financial activities. They also betting on making gains for the mother organisation and its branches outside the United States.

The Brotherhood’s first objective, in case of a Biden victory, will be to enrol his administration’s to put pressure on Egypt and especially on President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, whom they’ve never stopped maligning. They will also seek to have the restrictions on Hamas lifted and to facilitate the militant organisation’s access to donations and funds collected by the Brotherhood and its various affiliates for the benefit of the Islamist Palestinian organisation that the US had classified as a terrorist organisation.

Observers, however, say that it will be difficult for the Muslim Brothers and their supporters, especially Qatar, to regain the same advantages they enjoyed during the Obama period due to major changes in the region.

President Sisi, for example, has become an active actor in making arrangements in many issues related to the region, such as the Libyan or Palestinian or Sudanese files, or even in the new peace path between Israel and the Arab Gulf region.

Joe Biden has yet to outline, in case he’s elected, his strategy in the Middle East. But this strategy, analysts say, will not go against US interests and is unlikely to run against the stream of changes in the region. He will not do the opposite just to please the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar or any other actor in the region. In addition, Biden’s priorities will be to focus on the situation within the US and make arrangements in light of the emerging balances in the US House of Representatives and the Senate. He will strive to reassure the American public about the seriousness of the social reforms he intends to introduce.

Ellen Laipson, former US senior official and current director of security studies at George Mason University, believes that Biden will work to restore confidence within the US before sailing the waters of the Middle East.

In an article published by the opinion website Syndication Bureau, she pointed out that the Middle East is not the most urgent place for work on repairing US alliances, compared to Europe and Asia, noting that “Biden will be able to re-establish positive personal relationships with key Middle East leaders – with the likely exception of Saudi Arabia.”

Iran will also constitute a “tricky test” a Biden administration, according to Laipson. “Simply restoring US adherence to the 2015 nuclear agreement will not suffice; Biden’s non-proliferation experts might take the lead in proposing amendments to the accord and working with allies to salvage it, while Iran’s regional behaviour would be the responsibility of regional officials in the State and Defence Departments,” she explained.

Obama had worked during two presidential terms on the international rehabilitation of Iran and allowed it to enjoy the benefits of a favourable nuclear agreement that lifted the sanctions against it and gave it access to its frozen funds so that it would invest them in regional interventions threatening the security of the Gulf and the Middle East. Obama is accused of facilitating Iran’s entry into Syria and of giving free hand to its allied militias in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

Diplomats and political analysts believe that Iran’s confidence in the benefits of a Biden victory is exaggerated, noting that the US president does not take actions alone, and that he will implement policies that do not contradict the interests of the United States, especially in light of changes taking place in the region with the emergence of a new Saudi Arabia looking to build more balanced bi-lateral relations with Washington, as well as the start in the region of a momentum of peace agreements with Israel, which may expand to include more Gulf countries in the foreseeable future.

They say that the peace path has become a pressure card and a manoeuvring tool in the hands of the Gulf countries, in addition to obvious reforms undertaken in the field of human rights, rights of foreign labourers and women, and in internal democracy, especially in the area of freedom of belief such as allowing members of different religions communities living in the Gulf to build places of worship. All of these areas were cards used by the West to pressure the Gulf countries into accepting policies that were not compatible with their national interests.

On October 17 protestors stormed the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Baghdad, attacking Iraq’s largest Kurdish political party. The protestors are linked to the Hashd al-Shaabi, or the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). Two days later, the bodies of ten people from Iraq’s Sunni majority Salahuddin province were discovered. The kidnapping and murder of these individuals are reported to be at the hands of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, another PMU offspring, like reported by nationalinterest.org.

The various Shiite militias which make up the PMU have evolved into Baghdad’s most pressing security threat. Although the PMU is technically part of the Iraqi Security Forces, radical splinter militias openly defy Iraqi law and work against the prime minister’s interests. The wrath of these violent militias has most recently been directed at Kurdish groups and U.S. diplomatic sites in the country. In late September, a series of rockets hit a U.S. installation in Iraq’s Kurdistan region. Within twenty-four hours, a rocket targeting a U.S. base by Baghdad’s airport hit a civilian home in a nearby district, killing several people. In fact, Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone, home of the U.S. embassy among other foreign diplomatic sites, has been the target of dozens of rocket attacks at the hands of these militias since January.

As the attacks by PMU militias have continued to escalate at an alarming rate, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi has made some steps to rein them in. In early July, a raid ordered by Kadhimi led to the arrest of fourteen Kataib Hezbollah (PMU) militiamen accused of planning an attack against Baghdad’s Green Zone. Although many were released within a few days, Kadhimi demonstrated his commitment to prioritizing these militias which have never been confronted by previous Iraqi administrations.

Although the threat Iraq faces by PMU forces is paramount, the prime minister’s attention has been diverted by an equally menacing peril—Turkey. Under the direction of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Ankara has led several military operations against targets in Iraq, violating the country’s sovereignty. On August 18, two high-ranking Iraqi security officials were killed by a Turkish airstrike near the Iraqi-Turkish border. Two months earlier, Turkey and Iran launched joint military operations against Kurdish targets in Northern Iraq. These coordinated land and air operations, dubbed Operation Claw-Tiger and Operation Claw-Eagle, underscore Turkey’s escalating military campaign along its shared border with Iraq.

Evidence of Turkish and Iranian meddling in external disputes is not just limited in Iraq. Under Erdogan’s direction, Ankara has inserted itself in several regional conflicts across the globe. In addition to Turkey’s flagrant aggression in the Mediterranean Sea, its involvement in the current Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict unfolding in Nagorno-Karabakh is alarming. Ankara has provided troops, military equipment, and incessant propaganda on behalf of Azerbaijan, stirring the bloodshed which has already led to hundreds of deaths.

Similarly, Iran’s malign involvement extends throughout the Middle East. Tehran uses terror proxies like the Popular Mobilization Units and Hezbollah to support and export the authoritarian interests of its leaders. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has extended its influence over the country’s economy, political sphere, and military complex. The terror proxy has thousands of active fighters on the ground and has successfully smuggled funds and weapons from Tehran for decades. In response to fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh, Iran has recently deployed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) troops to its northwestern province along the disputed territory’s border on October 25.

U.S. policy has largely focused on isolating Iran and its militant proxies in recent years. At the same time, Turkey has been able to extend its military influence unchecked across the globe. As the upcoming U.S. election looms, presidential candidates must contend with how best to confront the growing threat Turkey poses.

A month of fighting has taken place between Armenia and Azerbaijan, leaving cities smoldering and thousands of civilians forced to flee, and thousands of soldiers killed and wounded, with regional countries benefiting from the suffering, like reported by jp.com. The war against Armenia was fueled by Turkey which supplied drones, sent Syrian extremist mercenaries and encouraged Baku to attack Armenian forces in Nagorna-Karabkah in September. A month later Azerbaijan has been slowly pushing back Armenian fighters in a grinding war.

On October 25 US President Donald Trump congratulated Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev and Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on a ceasefire agreement. It was brokered after US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun had met with his Armenian and Azerbaijan counterparts. It is not clear if the latest agreement will hold or if it is only temporary for humanitarian reasons.

Turkey continues to push for more fighting. Turkish media, which is entirely pro-government and does not permit criticism of Ankara’s leadership, daily has splashy headlines encouraging people to cheer the war. Anadolu, for instance, has a section of the homepage where one can experience the “frontline” along with numerous stories about how Armenia has committed “war crimes” and Armenia violated a “ceasefire” and then stories about Ankara offering military support to Azerbaijan. Turkish media makes it clear that the war against Armenia is a Turkish war, all about making Ankara dominate the region and sell its drones abroad.

Turkish media makes clear the government’s role in the conflict through reports that the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is operating in Armenia, a totally invented story with no evidence which is part of how Ankara’s media repeatedly invents stories of “PKK terrorists” operating in areas Turkey wants to invade. Turkey has claimed the “PKK” operates from Sinjar in Iraq and Syria, even though there have been no “terrorist” attacks on Turkey from these areas. In 2018 Turkey claimed it had to invade and ethnically cleanse Afrin in Syria, expelling Kurds and minorities, destroying churches and Yazidi graveyards, to fight “PKK terrorists.” It created the same rhetoric to justify war against Armenia.

Iran and Russia have also benefited from the fighting by being made to appear as responsible countries pushing for a ceasefire. While Turkey pushes tensions, these two countries claim they want the fighting to end but that they also want international law observed. Azerbaijan claims that Nagorna-Karabakh is its territory based on international law. While that same law would not justify war to attack the area, Azerbaijan receives support from Moscow and Tehran on this point. They want mediation, whereas Ankara was conflict. Overall the three countries already worked to partition Syria into spheres of influence and Russia and Turkey have also partitioned Libya into spheres of influence, which means the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is not a conflict between these regional powers, but one in which they manage the conflict together and economically they benefit because both sides buy their arms to continue fighting.

The fighting so far has destroyed a massive amount of Armenian material. Drones have been key to revolutionizing Azerbaijan’s war effort. Baku has used precision strikes to make tanks and artillery appear obsolete. They have also used drones to hunt down air defense systems of Armenia. More than 100 Armenian T-72 tanks have been destroyed according to videos and dozens of other vehicles have been destroyed. Armenia also claims hundreds of Azerbaijan vehicles and drones have been downed. It is impossible to confirm the Armenian claims because there are few videos as evidence. Baku puts out videos almost daily of drones striking vehicles. It is believed around 1,000 Armenian soldiers have been killed in fighting.

Most of the fighting is done within the areas around Nagorna-Karabkah, especially near the Iranian border. This means that Armenia and Azerbaijan are not directly at war but that Baku is technically only fight the Artsakh Armenian republic in Nagorna-Karabkah. Azerbaijan was careful not to expand the war into the rest of Armenia. However Armenian rockets have fallen on Azerbaijan cities, leading to claims of war crimes. Similarly an execution video of two Armenians being killed have led to complains of Azerbaijan war crimes. Both sides have shelled civilian towns and cities. Turkey has sent extremists from Syria to fight Armenians, part of Ankara’s pro-Islamist zeal that exports extremists to fight against minorities and terrorize Christians. This appears to have led the US embassy in Baku to warn about terrorism.

Azerbaijan is making steady progress on its frontlines. Russia helped broker a ceasefire on October 10 that was immediately violated. Russia has tried this mediation since fighting in July and had hosted meetings in September. Azerbaijan has ruled out concessions, sensing it has the upper hand. Russia and the US had urged a ceasefire since September 28 but the US refused to play much of a role. Armenian protests across the world have tried to pressure France, Canada, the US and others to stop the conflict and stop arms sales to Turkey. Many countries, like Germany, appear to prefer the arms sales over mediating conflicts like this one. This has enabled the conflict to continue.

Iran has been concerned about destabilization on its border, sending troops and armored vehicles and saying that the conflict could spill over if everyone is not careful. Although Russia appeared like it might push a second ceasefire mediation on October 21 it was left to the US to help broker the new ceasefire on October 25. It is believed half of the people in Armenian-controlled Nagorna-Karabkah have fled fighting. Some 75,000 have fled in some areas, according to reports. Azerbaijanis are being encouraged to return to areas that they claim. The US has expressed concern about shelling of the Ghazanchetsots Cathedral in Nagorna-Karabkah. The US refused to name Azerbaijan as the culprit, although Armenians said Azerbaijan shelled the site. After Baku’s gains it is unclear if the country will stop the conflict a this stage. It has achieved gains, but it likely wants to show it has “liberated” more to justify the conflict. Turkey, having exported Syrian extremists, many of them known for ethnic-cleansing of Kurds and brutal attacks on minorities such as Christians and Yazidis, will want to keep the Syrians in Azerbaijan so Turkey can have a permanent occupation of Nagorna-Karabakh. This is Ankara’s model in Cyprus, Libya, Syria and Iraq. There will likely be an expanding Turkish presence now in Azerbaijan and Ankara will try to prod Azerbaijan into more conflicts.

US global leadership suffered another loss in the conflict as the US showed that for a month it could achieve little and didn’t bother sending high level diplomats. This is part of the Trump strategy of “America first” and not dealing with what he calls “far away places.” This is a major departure from the rules-based international order envisioned in the 1990s when the US was a global hegemon. Today Turkey, Iran, Russia and China help determine more regional and global affairs as the US has retreated from dealing with foreign conflicts and what many see as “endless wars.” This has led to unprecedented levels of new conflicts, many of them fueled by countries like Turkey that prod others to use a “might makes right” approach to foreign policy.

The war in Armenia and Azerbaijan was part of that. Frozen since the 1990s, Baku claims that the international community failed to help it get back territories. It tried various processes, such as the “Madrid Principles” and “Minsk Group” talks. Since the international community and its various discussions have tended to fail to end conflicts like the one in Syria many countries see the Iranian, Russian, China and Turkish approach as more appropriate than waiting for the EU, NATO, UN or US to do anything. The people of Ganja and Stepanakert, under shelling during the recent war, have paid the price.

Israeli officials have warned of Turkey’s attempts to extend its influence to the Palestinian territories and replace Egypt’s leading regional role, with the help from Qatar and other parties, like reported by aawsat.com.

They considered these attempts harmful not only to Palestinians and Israelis, but they could deteriorate the situation and lead to clashes, violence and tension.

“Egypt plays a decisive role in providing calm and stability in the region,” a former pro-peace Israeli minister was quoted as saying.

“It has prevented war on the Gaza Strip several times and has been trying to rid Palestinians of their basic weakness, which is division, to be more powerful in negotiations,” he added, stressing that for this very reason Egypt is being challenged.

The official stressed that people in the region will pay the price for the deteriorating situation, that is, Israel and its neighbors, while Qatar, Turkey and others watch from afar.

He slammed the Israeli government’s policy in this regard.

Palestinians have been resorting to Ankara and involving themselves in a “radical” camp while the government is standing idle, he stressed.

Zvi Bar’el, the Middle Eastern affairs analyst for Haaretz Newspaper, shares this opinion and wrote on Tuesday that Israel also contributes to that.

The Palestinian Authority is concerned about the collapse of the economy in light of coronavirus pandemic and is seeking sources of funding, he said.

“On one hand, the PA refuses to receive its tax revenues from Israel as long as it deducts the money paid to the families of the martyrs and the prisoners, and on the other hands, it suffers cuts in Arab and international aid, and Europe refuses to offer any alternative aid.”

Bar’el pointed out that the Israeli government refuses to compromise, hoping the financial crisis suffered by the PA leads to it receiving tax funds again and accepting US President Donald Trump’s peace plan.

However, the PA has resorted to Qatar, which has become a bank for the Gaza Strip and Hamas movement, while awaiting the results of the upcoming US elections to settle its issues.

October 18 may turn out to be a day which will live in infamy. The falling of the conventional arms embargo against Iran is not just dangerous because of the SU-30 attack aircraft and defensive S-400 anti-aircraft missile system which Iran may now purchase from Russia, like reported by jpost.com.

It is not just dangerous because it legalizes and could streamline weapons deals between the Islamic Republic and its proxies in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza.
October 18 may turn out to be a day which will live in infamy.

The falling of the conventional arms embargo against Iran is not just dangerous because of the SU-30 attack aircraft and defensive S-400 anti-aircraft missile system, which Iran may now purchase from Russia.

It is not just dangerous because it legalizes and could streamline weapons deals between the Islamic Republic and its proxies in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza.

What may be most dangerous about the lifting of the arms embargo is that it could permanently disconnect the issue of Iranian terror from the issue of the ayatollahs obtaining nuclear weapons.

A major premise of the Obama administration’s 2015 nuclear deal with Iran was that separating the issues in the short and medium term was a good thing.

The rationale was that if Tehran getting nuclear weapons could be pushed off for a decade or more with a deal, maybe during that time the regime would moderate, see the benefits of dealing with the West and start to lower its terror footprint.

This never happened.

One can debate whether it was strategically wise to pull out of the nuclear deal in 2018 while Iran was complying with its nuclear limits, as opposed to waiting until the last year or two of the deal to pick a fight, as recommended by former IDF intelligence chief Amos Yadlin and former CIA director Michael Hayden.

But there is no debate that after the deal, Iran promoted terror as much or more in the Middle East and globally as before.
Separating the issues to deal with them one at a time did not work with Tehran.

What the Trump administration has tried to do with its “maximum pressure” campaign is to reconnect the issues.

To date, it has not succeeded.

Iranian terror and provocations in the Middle East may have morphed, but did not go away.

The ayatollahs may have less money to pay Hezbollah and Shi’ites in Syria to build their Shi’ite crescent, but they attacked Saudi oil fields in September 2019 and several British, UAE and other ships.

The Islamic Republic started to violate the nuclear limits in retaliation.

It is unclear whether the maximum pressure campaign without some major change can or would succeed even given more time, and it may soon be out of time.

However, one unequivocal positive of the campaign was that it had reconnected Iranian terror and its nuclear program.

The problem with Tehran was not one line item or another that could be separated, but a package of issues, each of which independently threatened Israel, the Middle East, and down-the-line, other parts of the world.

Without the arms embargo, it will be pressing for Israel to unite a group of countries to press Russia not to sell Iran the SU-30 and the S-400.

Israel will also need to start contingency planning for how to combat the SU-30 in Syria and elsewhere to maintain security on its borders, and for how to overcome the S-400, should the need to preemptively strike any Iranian nuclear facilities come up.

But most importantly, Israel must rethink how to convince whoever is US president in January 2021, as well as the EU and others, that connecting Iranian terror and nuclear weapons is unavoidable.

That the issues can only be solved together and that, in fact, possibly the greatest practical threat of Tehran getting a nuclear weapon, would be expansive and unrestrained Iranian terror.

If the disconnect which was created on October 18 is maintained, whether sooner or in five or 10 years, the world will eventually wake up to an Iran far more deadly than anything it has seen to date.