The proto-state established by ISIS between Syria and Iraq faces grave external threats caught between the international airpower and ground forces of the Syrian and Iraqi governments, Shiite militia and opposition groups. However ISIS’s elite will regard the brutal war it initiated in the Middle East as unfinished. The extremist groups regional and global war is constantly shifting, operates in a permanent shroud and its puritanical ideology and sectarian narratives with a potent brand of ultra-violence promoted by the leader of the group Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi (and its previous leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) have never been more powerful and influential on contemporary developments in modern jihadism.

Equipped with digital entrepreneurs, skilled fighters, and a new generation of ideologically committed youth, ISIS have shown no hesitation in expanding its war to the heartland of Europe and initiating a new stage in the age of hyper-terrorism. This new stage is likely to be more consequential than the violence spear-headed by Al-Qa’ida in Europe during the 2000s.

The key threat for the national state, as identified by policymakers, is the return of extremist foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq. In 2015, it was estimated by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation that ‘the total number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq exceeded 20,000 – of which nearly a fifth were residents or nationals of Western European countries.’ The threat of home-grown extremism, embedded terrorist cells and ‘lone-wolves’ has multiplied across the European continent since the Syrian War broke out as Europe and the United States have faced significant problems in preventing attacks against civilians from occurring. As the U.S and Russian coalitions have driven ISIS forces back and suffocated it of resources and territory, the gains have not been without consequence as it has increasingly encouraged vast numbers of ISIS’s foreign fighters to return home. They bring with them their battle-hardened experience, their post-traumatic stress disorders, their objectives and commitment to realise their ideology.

However it is an oversimplification to suggest ISIS-imported foreign fighters are the only threat to the continent. Europe’s and the United States’ own instability, its political polarisation, the poisonous atmosphere across European politics, soaring unemployment, the euro crisis, and rising anti-immigrant and refugee rhetoric and violence have been and will be the perfect tensions for ISIS to tap into. As writer and novelist Pankaj Mishra asserts‘Isis is only one of its many beneficiaries; demagogues of all kinds have tapped the simmering reservoirs of cynicism and discontent’ as demonstrated by the resurgence of far-right organisations and populist politics across Western states and the rise of politicians such as Nigel Farage, Jeremy Corbyn, Marine Le Pen, Donald Trump, Bern Lucke, and Geert Wilders.

ISIS’s eradication of physical borders and the ascension of globalisation and the technological revolution allowed the terrorist organisation to advocate the establishment of a digital caliphate across the globe. These have had terrifying implications for Europe as home-grown extremist and terrorist sub-cells are being established by European nationals.

Scattered across Europe, difficult to track, and fuelled by a variety of contextual factors under the guise of holy war these cells, inspired by Baghdadi and Zarqawi’s doctrine, have been eager to replicate their brutal tactics. ISIS will not be able to establish a caliphate, however it will be capable of conducting either stunning attacks, as illustrated by Brussels, Paris, London,  New York, Orlando and Madrid, or do-it-yourself attacks with rudimentary weapons against policemen, soldiers, and civilians as seen in Greenwich, Ottawa, Nice, Sydney, Lyonand San Bernardino. These acts of violence are designed to foment religious and racial war, strengthen hardliners and create disorder, civil unrest and violence. In-turn the toxic rhetoric of the far-right groups in Western states paranoid by a continent ‘overrun’ by Muslims and ISIS’s twisted narrative of an apocalyptic new world order feed off each other in the emotionally and politically charged aftermath of a terrorist attack. It is a predictable cycle of  provocation and retribution which has grown uglier and uglier since the 9/11 attacks.

ISIS is lethal because it is not a monolithic force despite being a state forged in the fires of Syria and Iraq. ISIS’s black banners are instantly recognisable, it ‘has built a global brand to rival Western corporations using tools like social media, product placement and targeting advertising.‘ ISIS have a target audience, ‘young, nominally Muslims…heavily influenced by propaganda videos and steeped in jihadi culture in the Internet and the real world’ (Burke, The New Threat, 210)

Its audiences take interest in the products on display even if the product is profoundly deceptive about the realities of the wars across the Middle East. While almost all Muslims across the world reject its poisonous ideology, its thousands of subscribers and outsourced activists are capable of delivering devastating impact in the captivating  pantomime and the world of 24/7 media and instant digitalised news.

The Middle Eastern wars have been crucial in giving ISIS a platform to attract subscribers to its vicious culture of violence. Outside the Middle East ISIS shifts from being a state and militia group to an interconnected, diverse movement which has rooted itself in a once marginalised branch of jihadi sub-culture. It has become an umbrella organisation for inspiring me-too zealotry in Pakistan, Gaza, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, France, Belgium, the United States, and the United Kingdom.’

ISIS is, as many commentators contend, an ‘anti-traditional ideology with a very significant debt to western political history and culture’. However it is its allure as an anti-establishment, social movement, and populist outlet which makes it deadly as it has rooted itself in contemporary socio-economic problems and grievances in post-modern European societies.  The creation of extremists in Europe does not predominantly take place in the places we would assume such as mosques, but in private homes, in cafes, university, gangs, crime, prisons, offices, harassment by security services, and group holidays. The suicide bombers who tore through the World Trade Centre in 2001 were well-educated, technically savvy men who blended well  with their communities.

ISIS’s threat to Europe is rooted in the uncomfortable truth that its Western supporters and fighters, while a small number, are not so different from us in the way they operate and think. ISIS and militant European jihadists exploit the best and worst of contemporary Western culture. ISIS seek to exacerbate a narrative exposing Western values and system for what they really are; hypocritical,  self-serving, full of false hopes and promises, neo-colonialist and a culture which systematically persecutes Muslim communities. These half-truths can be defined as grossly oversimplified whereas the reality is far more complex.

However in the age of entitlement, information as supposed to enlightenment, individualism, a time of extravagant promises which have been made redundant by austerity, and racism against immigrants, refugees and Muslims, it is understandable why ISIS have not struggled to find sympathisers, self-fashioned militants and freelance jihadists in our societies willing to pledge themselves to their cause. ISIS’s propaganda, while misleading, promises the individual which decides to commit mass-murder that they are part of a bigger story and that they matter. ISIS’s message promises the release of the anxiety and frustrations of the private life and channels it into horrifying violence against the establishment and status quo as exemplified by the Grand Theft Auto style attack in Nice.

In the Western world where individualism, rather than community, is the predominant social driver, ISIS’s very Western promises of fame, instant celebrity status, its use of manipulative mass media, creating an an illusion of identity and purpose, and fulfilling a sense of self are seductive even when it is small groups of men and women which commit utterly repugnant acts of violence against their own communities.

ISIS became several things at once after it established a caliphate in 2014. It is a corporation, it is a state, it is a movement, it is a financial and business network, it attracts poor and rich, its members vary from former criminals to middle-class thinkers, it is a digital and territorial caliphate, it empowers individuals (a very Western idea) and at the same time promises to realise the promise of the community of umma, it exports Holy War as a simplified product much like a corporation would, it uses mass-media, and it is multi-national with Baghdadi acting as its current chairmen while the likes of Mohammed Emwazi (a.k.a Jihadi John) and Zarqawi were its grotesque superstar celebrities. ISIS successfully bridged the gap between being a conventional terrorist organisation to become a mass social movement and cult of violence and with that its advert of martyrdom and ultra-violent ideology has gone mainstream. This is something Al-Qa’ida never quite achieved and precisely what makes ISIS more deadly as a concept across the Middle East and Europe.

theconflictarchives.com/

On June 28, 2016, a team of three suicide operatives arrived in a taxi at Istanbul’s Ataturk international airport dressed in heavy jackets concealing suicide vests and carrying bags with AK-47 assault rifles. The first attacker detonated his bomb on the second floor of the international departure hall. The other two attackers approached the x-ray security checkpoint inside the international terminal and opened fire against travelers and subsequently detonating their vests. The coordinated attack killed more than 40 people and wounded more than 230 in 90 seconds.

On November 13, 2015, eight terrorist operatives divided into three teams and equipped with assault rifles and suicide vests, simultaneously attacked six locations across Paris, France. The gunmen arrived by car at the various targets that included restaurants, bars, a concert venue, and a sports arena. A hostage standoff lasting nearly three hours unfolded at the Bataclan concert hall. In less than three hours, the three teams killed 130 and injured several hundred across Paris.

These attacks are two of several against soft targets in the past year, including hotels, nightclubs, airport terminals, and sporting events across the globe. The attacks are difficult to comprehend and easy to dismiss as senseless acts without any logic behind them. So, what is the underlying thought process behind attacking soft targets? And what measures can the private sector implement to detect and prevent future mass casualty attacks?

Soft Targets – Operational characteristics that are easy to exploit

Attacks against soft targets are attractive because soft targets have operational characteristics that make them vulnerable and easy to exploit, thereby ensuring higher success. To accomplish this objective, the layout of these venues must fulfill certain criteria, including an inviting atmosphere for visitors that is usually open and spacious.

Many soft targets such as shopping malls, movie theaters, hotels, and airport terminals have multiple entrances and exits and allow direct access from streets or subway stations. They also offer the ability to unload passengers and luggage close to the site perimeter. Soft targets also offer parking lots located in very close proximity to venue sites to accommodate families and the disabled.

Additionally, these sites frequently lack visible security guards and detailed screenings prior to entry to prevent deterring and scaring away visitors. Many security guards at soft targets also lack the training and proper equipment to respond to a terrorist attack.

Moreover, the lack of proper screening of individuals and cars allows actors to enter premises with weapons and explosives and park vehicle borne explosive devices in close proximity to malls, restaurants, hotels, and movie theaters.

Selection of soft targets is driven by strategic objectives

The first stage in the terrorist attack cycle, commonly referred to as the target selection process, is often driven by strategic and ideological objectives. Targets are also selected in response to what security measures exist in the operational environment.

Terrorists can be viewed as rational actors in the sense that they engage in a calculation of costs and benefits when selecting a target. If a high profile and symbolic target such as a foreign embassy or high-level meeting are hardened, a threat actor with limited capabilities can substitute the hardened target with a softer target that guarantees a higher level of success.

Primarily then, terrorists choose soft targets because they are easy to attack and do not require a long planning cycle. Soft targets are ideal for terrorist groups that are under pressure and seek quick retaliatory attacks eager to demonstrate their resolve and resiliency for enemies and supporters alike. ISIS retributive attacks against soft targets among U.S. coalition partners could be viewed as an attempt to demonstrate ISIS’ continued relevance amid territorial losses.

Attacks against soft targets with high civilian losses can generate global media attention that magnifies the terrorist groups’ cause, satisfies their supporters, and attracts new recruits.

From a terrorist perspective, attacks against hotels, shopping malls, and restaurants can maximize media attention. In particular, attackers take hostages that prolong the drama and result in live media coverage rather than after the fact coverage.

Terrorist groups also attack soft targets for other strategic reasons too. Attacks can aim to dissuade foreign investments and undermine industry sectors of an economy in an effort to weaken the adversary. For example, the Turkish tourism sector is currently under pressure and heading towards a 35-40 percent drop in revenues during 2016 due to continuous attacks by the Kurdistan Worker’s Party and ISIS.

Lastly, attacks against soft targets causing mass causalities are also motivated by ideology and worldview. Threat actors that subscribe to religious or apocalyptic causes are generally predisposed to attack targets with a high concentration of civilians.

Such actors view the world as a dichotomy between good and evil. They have absolutist or non-negotiable goals and often seek to purify a corrupt religion, expel foreigners, eradicate societal structures, or hasten the end of the world. Moral codes are absent and enemies are de-humanized, which eliminate any moral barriers towards committing mass killing of civilians, including women and children.

Measures to detect and prevent pre-operational surveillance and attacks on soft targets

The private sector can detect and prevent future attacks by paying close attention to the pre-operational or surveillance/reconnaissance aspect of the attack cycle. The surveillance/reconnaissance stage is conducted to gain a profile of the target, determine the most suitable attack approach, and determine the best time to attack.

Threat actors may visit their intended target several times before initiating an attack. Therefore, employees and private actors can play an important role by being observant to detect any suspicious behavior that could indicate an upcoming attack. This includes:

• Being cognizant of any unusual interest or questions about security procedures, including access controls, delivery gates, security badges, alarms, doors, gates, cameras, locks, and security reaction drills. Threat actors can conduct surveillance by using a variety of equipment, cameras, binoculars, zoom lenses, and global positioning systems (GPS).

• Being aware of unusual incidents such as multiple fire alarms or fictitious emergency calls to the same location. Such actions could indicate a test of security to gather information on security responses, behavior, and response times.

• Being conscious of any car parked in the same area or location over multiple days and efforts to avoid surveillance cameras. Prolonged static surveillance can indicate hostile reconnaissance.

• Being alert to an unusual interest in egress and ingress points, peak days, hours of operation, site plans, security guards, and other employees.

• Increasing security awareness among staff (security guards, cleaning staff, maintenance and contractors) and encouraging suspicious activity reporting.

• Private venues with security guards can perform active and unpredictable patrolling in internal and external areas, particularly before and during special events and holidays.

• Conducting pre-employment screening of new personnel and existing staff to identify any derogatory information.

• Installing and utilizing CCTC systems to help identify planning activity.

globalriskinsights.com/

A 17-year-old with an axe and a knife on a train. An 18-year-old with a gun at a shopping mall. The two terror attacks in Germany this week follow a pattern that security experts have warned could become more common: young attackers, acting alone.

In its latest report on terrorism in the EU, published earlier this week, Europol highlighted the rise in younger suspects arrested for suspected terror offenses. Alongside a sharp rise in arrests on terrorism charges overall, around one in four suspects apprehended last year was 25 or younger, up from one in six in 2013:

Terror groups like ISIL and Al Qaeda have focused their propaganda efforts on “radicalizing young people in particular,” Europol says. Although ISIL claimed responsibility for the July 18 axe attack by a 17-year-old Afghan refugee on a train near Würzburg, which wounded five people, it is not yet clear whether the teenager merely sympathized with the terror group or was actively directed by it. Police shot and killed the attacker after he fled the train.

In Munich, the motives of the dual German-Iranian national who killed nine and wounded more than 20 on July 22 are even murkier.

Europol highlighted “the operational difficulties in detecting and disrupting lone actor attacks.” So-called lone wolves—like the attackers in Würzburg and Munich—are almost always unknown to police or security services, and disproportionately suffer from mental-health disorders, Europol says. The influence of Islamist ideology may have “an aggravating effect” on these individuals, the agency noted. The impressionability of youth, it appears, may also play a role.

Europol stresses that such attacks remained a favoured tactic by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, and both groups have repeatedly called on Muslims living in Western countries to perpetrate lone actor attacks in their countries of residence.

Tragically, seven of the nine victims in Munich were teenagers themselves.

qz.com

For the third time in a year and a half, France has suffered a major terrorist attack. On July 14, Mohamed Bouhlel, a 31-year-old Tunisian-born Frenchmen unknown to intelligence officials, drove a large delivery truck into a crowd of thousands who had gathered to watch fireworks celebrating Bastille Day, France’s national holiday. When his attack had concluded, 84 people had been killed and more than 100 injured along a path of carnage stretching close to two kilometres.

While new information continues to emerge, this attack has all the hallmarks of an Islamic State-inspired homegrown terrorist assault. The latest incident demonstrates what has become the modus operandi of IS. The selection of a “soft target” or public event where thousands gather in celebration coupled with the use of an everyday or readily accessible weapon to conduct the attack.

In an exercise that has unfortunately become too commonplace, we continue to try and understand how each specific attack fits into the broader context of this phenomenon. The Nice incident potentially presents a new twist on a tried-and-true attack strategy and sets a dangerous precedent moving forward.

In order to understand this point, we need to identify the two different types of threats we currently face from Islamist terrorists. The first is the threat posed by the terrorist groups themselves who may train, organize and deploy individuals to conduct attacks. This was what occurred in Paris on November 13, 2015. This is different from the threat posed by what is known as Islamist-inspired homegrown terrorism where individuals are inspired by a group (or their Islamist ideology as a whole) but lack any direct links or support from the group or its agents. At this point, this appears to describe the Nice attack.

This distinction is important because of our assumptions about these different types of threats. Each one manifests differently and presents authorities with distinct challenges. Those directed by groups traditionally represent a greater threat casualty-wise because they are often more co-ordinated and sophisticated. These characteristics, however, make them increasingly vulnerable to detection, identification and disruption because they involve extensive planning and often have multiple moving parts. In comparison, we recognize that it is infinitely more difficult to identify and disrupt the lone actor because of their autonomy but, until recently, this was also felt to limit their ability to mount large mass-casualty attacks. This most recent attack clearly shatters that assumption.

This suggests we are witnessing an evolution in how lone actor or inspired attacks might proceed moving forward. We have previously seen other individuals use vehicles in the commission of attacks. Canadians will remember Martin Couture-Rouleau employed this tactic when he killed Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu in October of 2014. The attack in Nice, however, is on an entirely different level and, in a manner that will be surprising to most, represents thought and learning.

The thought process: If a small vehicle can kill a certain number of people, which earlier attacks show many individuals had previously calculated, a larger vehicle can kill many, many more people and is much more difficult for police to stop as the attack is unfolding. This is a troubling development because it represents a logical evolution of previous attacks. Whether Mr. Bouhlel consciously deduced this simple fact is inconsequential, the reality is that others who might be inspired to act will connect these dots and look to duplicate or exceed the carnage created by this recent attack.

We know that terrorists learn, adapt and evolve their tactics. Sometimes, this process can occur quite quickly, from one attack to the next. We also know that success breeds imitation. This most recent incident reveals a very simple but dangerous revelation: Attacks involving larger vehicles can exponentially increase the number of deaths and police face greater challenges in stopping such a vehicle as attacks are taking place. Couple this with the fact that larger vehicles are easily acquired and it represents a very concerning and dangerous evolution, adding yet another wrinkle to the challenges posed by lone-actor attacks. Essentially, the Nice attack paired the lethality of the co-ordinated and sophisticated strike with the disadvantages facing authorities in detecting and preventing them.

theglobeandmail.com

Too late did Erdogan realise the cost of the role he had chosen for his country – when you can no longer trust your army, there are serious issues that need to be addressed

Recep Tayyip Erdogan had it coming. The Turkish army was never going to remain compliant while the man who would recreate the Ottoman Empire turned his neighbours into enemies and his country into a mockery of itself. But it would be a grave mistake to assume two things: that the putting down of a military coup is a momentary matter after which the Turkish army will remain obedient to its sultan; and to regard at least 161 deaths and more than 2,839 detained in isolation from the collapse of the nation-states of the Middle East.

For the weekend’s events in Istanbul and Ankara are intimately related to the breakdown of frontiers and state-belief – the assumption that Middle East nations have permanent institutions and borders – that has inflicted such wounds across Iraq, Syria, Egypt and other countries in the Arab world. Instability is now as contagious as corruption in the region, especially among its potentates and dictators, a class of autocrat of which Erdogan has been a member ever since he changed the constitution for his own benefit and restarted his wicked conflict with the Kurds.

Needless to say, Washington’s first reaction was instructive. Turks must support their “democratically elected government”. The “democracy” bit was rather hard to swallow; even more painful to recall, however, was the very same government’s reaction to the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi’s “democratically elected” government in Egypt in 2013 – when Washington very definitely did not ask Egypt’s people to support Morsi and quickly gave its support to a military coup far more bloody than the attempted putsch in Turkey. Had the Turkish army been successful, be sure Erdogan would have been treated as dismissively as the unfortunate Morsi.

But what do you expect when Western nations prefer stability to freedom and dignity? That’s why they are prepared to accept Iran’s troops and loyal Iraqi militiaman joining in the battle against Isis – as well as the poor 700 missing Sunnis who “disappeared” after the recapture of Fallujah – and that’s why the “Assad must go” routine has been quietly dropped. Now that Bashar al-Assad has outlived David Cameron’s premiership – and will almost certainly outlast Obama’s presidency – the regime in Damascus will look with wondering eyes at the events in Turkey this weekend.

The victorious powers in the First World War destroyed the Ottoman Empire – which was one of the purposes of the 1914-18 conflict after the Sublime Porte made the fatal mistake of siding with Germany – and the ruins of that empire were then chopped into bits by the Allies and handed over to brutal kings, vicious colonels and dictators galore. Erdogan and the bulk of the army which has decided to maintain him in power – for now – fit into this same matrix of broken states.

The warning signs were there for Erdogan – and the West – to see, if only they had recalled the experience of Pakistan. Shamelessly used by the Americans to funnel missiles, guns and cash to the “mujahedin” who were fighting the Russians, Pakistan – another “bit” chopped off an empire (the Indian one) turned into a failed state, its cities torn apart with massive bombs, its own corrupt army and intelligence service cooperating with Russia’s enemies – including the Taliban – and then infiltrated by Islamists who would eventually threaten the state itself.

When Turkey began playing the same role for the US in Syria – sending weapons to the insurgents, its corrupt intelligence service cooperating with the Islamists, fighting the state power in Syria – it, too, took the path of a failed state, its cities torn apart by massive bombs, its countryside infiltrated by the Islamists. The only difference is that Turkey also relaunched a war on its Kurds in the south-east of the country where parts of Diyabakir are now as devastated as large areas of Homs or Aleppo. Too late did Erdogan realise the cost of the role he had chosen for his country. It’s one thing to say sorry to Putin and patch up relations with Benjamin Netanyahu; but when you can no longer trust your army, there are more serious matters to concentrate on.

Two thousand or so arrests are quite a coup for Erdogan – rather larger, in fact, than the coup the army planned for him. But they must be just a few of the thousands of men in the Turkish officer corps who believe the Sultan of Istanbul is destroying his country. It’s not just a case of reckoning the degree of horror which Nato and the EU will have felt at these events. The real question will be the degree to which his (momentary) success will embolden Erdogan to undertake more trials, imprison more journalists, close down more newspapers, kill more Kurds and, for that matter, go on denying the 1915 Armenian genocide.

For outsiders, it’s sometimes difficult to understand the degree of fear and almost racist disgust with which Turkey regards any form of Kurdish militancy; America, Russia, Europe – the West in general – has so desomaticised the word “terrorist” that we fail to comprehend the extent to which Turks call the Kurds “terrorists” and see them as a danger to the very existence of the Turkish state; which is just how they saw the Armenians in the First World War. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk may have been a good old secular autocrat admired even by Adolf Hitler, but his struggle to unify Turkey was caused by the very factions which have always haunted the Turkish heartland – along with dark (and rational) suspicions about the plotting of Western powers against the state.

All in all, then, a far more dramatic series of events have taken place in Turkey this weekend than may at first appear. From the frontier of the EU, through Turkey and Syria and Iraq and large parts of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and on to Libya and – dare one mention this after Nice? – Tunisia, there is now a trail of anarchy and failed states. Sir Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot began the Ottoman Empire’s dismemberment – with help from Arthur Balfour — but it continues to this day.

In this grim historical framework must we view the coup-that-wasn’t in Ankara. Stand by for another one in the months or years to come.

axisoflogic.com

The attack in Nice that killed more than 80 people is an example of a shift in tactics by terror groups who are encouraging followers in the West to stay home and wreak havoc with whatever means they have at their disposal.

The use of a truck to mow down victims in the French Riviera resort town late Thursday is part of a move to a do-it-yourself style terrorism used by lone wolfs or small terror cells to conduct attacks that require minimal planning and support, analysts say.

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack, but al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have advocated the use of vehicles to kill people over the years. These types of attacks are generally inspired, but not directed by, a terror group.

French authorities identified Mohamed Bouhlel, 31, as the main suspect in the attack. Bouhlel, who was killed in a shootout with police as he tried to flee the scene, was a French national of Tunisian descent and a resident of the seaside resort where the attack took place.

Analysts say the West needs to brace for an increase in such attacks on easy, or “soft,” targets carried out by easily available means.

“The high-impact/low-capability nature of the attack raises the risk of the repeated use of the tactic in France and allied countries in the coming months,” according to an analysis by IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, which tracks terror groups.

Vehicles have been used frequently in terror attacks in recent years. Palestinian militants have been using vehicles to attack Israelis and there have been several similar attacks in France, IHS said.

In France, two vehicle attacks were conducted in December 2014 in Dijon and Nantes that killed one and wounded 20. Another such attack wounded a soldier this January in Valence, IHS said in the analysis.

These kinds of simple attacks are increasing as the Islamic State loses territory in Iraq and Syria, where a U.S.-led air campaign is backing ground forces and pushing the militants out of their self-proclaimed caliphate.

The Islamic State has lost about 45% of the territory they held in Iraq at the group’s peak last year, according to the Pentagon. The militants have lost about 20% of the territory they once controlled in Syria.

The Islamic State has been encouraging followers in the West to remain home instead of trying to get to Iraq or Syria. That shift is a way of staying relevant, analysts say.

“They are losing territory, but they can still do these attacks,” said Mubin Shaik, a former counter-terror operative for Canadian security and intelligence services. “They are going to do what they can do.”

He said groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda encourage followers to conduct attacks and tell them they will claim credit for successful assaults, Shaik said.

Attacks on easy targets, such as families gathered to watch fireworks, can wreak havoc and garner headlines with limited planning and oversight. They are also hard to prevent.

“There’s some planning and logistics that go with it, but it’s not the most sophisticated attack you’ll ever see,” said Patrick Johnston, a terrorism analyst at Rand Corp. “This is sort of the next tactical shift.”

While attacks have increased lately, the Islamic State was encouraging these types of assaults against Westerners as far back as 2014, even recommending vehicles as a way to kill foreigners.

Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami in a 2014 statement encouraged followers to kill “disbelievers” in the West by any means possible, including rocks, knives, choking, poison or running them over with a car.

Even with less planning and logistical support, the attacks achieve the objectives of radical Islamic groups, Shaik said.

“They demoralize people and create more anti-Muslim sentiment,” he said. “It’s deliberately done like this to cleave societies apart.”

usatoday.com

Since the attack in Orlando on June 12, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has claimed or is suspected of responsibility for ensuing terrorist attacks in Jordan on June 21, Lebanon on June 27, Istanbul on June 28, Dhaka, Bangladesh, on July 1, Baghdad on July 3, and Saudi Arabia on July 4. Are these attacks part of a new global strategy by ISIS or, except for the ISIS label, a coincidence? Whatever the investigations ultimately reveal, the facts may be portrayed (or ignored) to fit narratives written even before the blood has dried.

Do the recent attacks represent a surge in terrorist violence? Not really. In the course of the ongoing conflict, similar spates of attacks have occurred from time to time. People tend to view them as evidence of escalation or a strategic shift, as something new and significant, when the cluster of activity is little more than a reflection of chance — several groups of attackers getting lucky at the same time and causing the world to take notice. A similar spike materialized in January with terrorist attacks in Libya, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, Indonesia and Egypt.

Another part of the equation is that Islamist extremists, both al Qaeda and ISIS, annually call for attacks during the holy month of Ramadan, which this year ended on July 5. While mainstream Muslims regard bloodshed during the religious period as sacrilegious, jihadists are persuaded that what they misguidedly perceive as noble acts — like killing infidels — will earn them greater reward if carried out during Ramadan. Even greater violence was seen during last year’s Ramadan.

On June 26, 2015, as ISIS massacred over 200 civilians in Kobani, Syria, jihadists elsewhere carried out a series of terrorist attacks: Al-Shabaab militants attacked an African Union military post in Somalia, terrorists gunned down tourists at a beach resort in Tunisia, bombed a Shiite mosque in Kuwait, carried out another suicide bombing in Syria, and beheaded one person and injured several others in France. Altogether, more than 400 people were killed in these June 2015 attacks. This year, the reported combined death toll for jihadist terrorist attacks since Orlando, including at least 250 killed in Baghdad, is 385.

The 2015 attacks were unconnected with one another. It is not yet clear whether all of the attacks are linked this time around.

The terrorist attacks in Paris in November and Brussels the following March clearly were part of a terrorist campaign conducted by a network of French and Belgian fighters recruited and led by Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a Belgian foreign fighter who joined an ISIS unit in Syria in 2013. Other members of his network included ISIS veterans returning home assisted by an underground of local confederates. That network has been largely dismantled, but European authorities are discovering and dismantling the embryos of new networks.

The more recent attacks in Orlando, Istanbul, Baghdad, Jeddah and Medina in Saudi Arabia, and Dhaka might be explained in one of several ways.

1. Except for inspiration, the attacks may be unrelated and only coincidentally carried out around the same time. ISIS has been conducting terrorist attacks in Iraq, Turkey and Saudi Arabia for some time; these attacks may be viewed as part of the ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq and reflect the group’s general strategy. For example, ISIS terrorists have continued an intense terrorist campaign in Baghdad, carrying out more than 100 bombings and killing more than 500 people in the first six months of 2016. Bangladesh may be a separate phenomenon. The country has seen growing radicalization and increasing violence. Bangladeshi volunteers have been involved in various jihadist fronts around the world. Orlando is clearly a “standalone” attack with only a tenuous connection to ISIS.
2. Alternatively, at least some of the attacks may reflect the dispersal of foreign fighters — ISIS volunteers now returning home determined to carry on the jihad — as well as new inspiration for homegrown violent extremists determined to go on their own warpath. This phenomenon is going to be a big driver of future terrorist violence as ISIS, under external military pressure, frays from within and its foreign fighters disperse. ISIS encourages and facilitates such attacks, but the above list does not reflect a strategic decision by ISIS leadership to launch a global terrorist campaign. In other words, ISIS is the incubator, but not the central command, of a global terrorist campaign.
3. Or possibly, ISIS’s leadership has made a strategic decision to do whatever it can to stay in world headlines even as it loses ground in Syria and Iraq. This also has a strategic logic. Jihadist strategy is based upon manipulating perceptions: maintaining its image of strength, momentum and success. This does not mean that every attack is centrally directed or that ISIS leadership is involved in its planning. ISIS seeks as much violence and chaos as possible, but appears to be opportunistic — it exhorts, facilitates, assists and, in some cases, may provide general direction. Much appears to depend on individual initiative.

White House and Pentagon announcements that U.S. airstrikes have killed specific ISIS commanders, giving their name and position, imply that American intelligence has a detailed wiring diagram of ISIS leadership. But do we have detailed information on its decisionmaking or do our assumptions rest upon what we observe? What we see are some attacks that appear to support a logical strategy: destabilizing Turkey, stoking sectarian tensions in Baghdad, shaking up Saudi Arabia. Other attacks carry the banner of ISIS to bolster the credentials of their perpetrators, but reflect local contests and offer little evidence of direct ISIS involvement. Most of the homegrown terrorists, like the shooter in Orlando, simply declare themselves to be ISIS fighters, and while ISIS applauds their actions, it cannot be said to have carried them out.

A displaced terrorist group can still carry on a global campaign. Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the dispersal of al Qaeda in late 2001, a global campaign of terrorism unfolded with major al Qaeda terrorist attacks in India, Pakistan, Tunisia, Yemen, Indonesia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Turkey, the Philippines, Spain, Egypt, the United Kingdom and Jordan. These were carried out by alumni of al Qaeda’s training camps augmented by new recruits.

Between September 2001 and April 2006, 33 major terrorist attacks were linked to al Qaeda and an even greater number of terrorist plots had been uncovered and foiled. By 2006, the global terrorism campaign was on the decline as local governments — some of whom might have preferred to stay on the sidelines in the U.S.-led global war on terror — joined the international effort and ripped up local al Qaeda networks when faced with attacks on their own soil. The point is that even while al Qaeda’s leaders were on the run, their followers were able to wage a worldwide terrorist campaign. We may see a time lag here, as well, with a global terrorist campaign inspired by ISIS lasting long after its demise as a territorial entity.

A number of the members of the terrorist network responsible for the Paris attack in November and the Brussels attack in March are in custody and should be able to tell authorities more about that network, which, in turn, may offer some clues about the role of ISIS in the current attacks. But will members of the network know whether its leader, Abaaoud, was an entrepreneur who persuaded ISIS leaders to support his initiative to launch a terrorist campaign in France and Belgium, or whether he was merely a lieutenant acting on behalf of higher-ups in ISIS? (One has to be cautious even about what those arrested say: Abaaoud was the local fighters’ only contact in Syria and he may have presented himself more as the leader than as a subordinate taking orders from others.) And we still don’t know to what degree Abaaoud was a unique figure and therefore whether ISIS retains this capability with him gone.

Turkey has identified the attackers at Istanbul’s airport and has additional suspects in custody. The quality of this attack suggests that the attackers, like those in Paris, may have had ISIS support, but we are not sure. Are they another version of the Abaaoud network? Did the attackers all spend time in Syria? Where did their orders come from? Is there evidence of communications with ISIS while they were in Turkey?

Authorities in Bangladesh have identified the attackers in Dhaka and should be able to indicate whether they also spent time in Syria and if there is any evidence that they took orders from ISIS, or were homegrown terrorists inspired by ISIS. The same is true of those who carried out the attacks in Jeddah, Medina and Qatif in Saudi Arabia.

Political agendas invariably complicate analysis. Some government officials may wish to downplay the homegrown aspect of the threat and instead blame all terrorist attacks on a central command center in Syria. The idea of a central command is tantalizing. During the Vietnam War, the United States spent years searching for the enemy’s “Pentagon,” a central command center believed to be located somewhere in western Vietnam or Cambodia. It was never found and it is not certain that any such physical headquarters ever existed. Adventure films end more satisfyingly with the hero escaping as the headquarters of some evil enterprise blows up in the background.

Other officials may wish to portray all of the attacks as an escalating terrorist campaign, which, in turn, calls for an escalation of allied military operations to quickly crush ISIS or requires increased security measures at home. According to this view, the attacks prove that current efforts are not working, or are not working fast enough. In contrast, still others will prefer to portray the attacks as the death throes of an increasingly desperate ISIS that is losing ground. In other words, the attacks are evidence that current military efforts are succeeding.

Or some may wish to portray the attacks as an escalating terrorist threat posed by Islamic radicalism in order to support broader biases against Islam or immigration, and the admission of Syrian refugees in particular. This interpretation makes no distinction between a strategic decision by ISIS and a troubled shooter in Orlando — all manifest the same threat.

Each interpretation will have different political and policy consequences. This is not to suggest that the intelligence services will bend information to support political positions, but rather that — given the reality of incomplete, inconclusive and sometimes contradictory information — political players will have ample opportunities to portray these events in a way that suits their agendas.

Few observers are likely to be satisfied by a messy, but possibly more realistic analysis, which suggests that the recent attacks reflect a combination of ongoing and not necessarily related campaigns in Syria, Iraq and adjacent countries; entrepreneurial terrorists using the space provided by ISIS as a launching pad for their own jihadist ambitions; scattering foreign fighters heading back home to carry on the fight; ISIS exhortations to local supporters to take up arms; and the appeal of ISIS ideology to angry and often troubled individuals pursuing their own trajectories.

rand.org

theprovince.com

Hallel Ariel’s murderer’s behavior was exactly what experts warned of: From a happy and active teen, he became a threatening loner. ‘Everyone has the right to die, and I demand that right to myself,’ he wrote on Facebook. But no one saw this, and no one handled it.

The Israeli demolition teams have already surrounded the home of the Taraireh family in the village of Bani Na’im near Hebron, “taking measurements” ahead of the demolition. The father, Nasser, was arrested and taken for questioning and his work permit has been confiscated. Security forces also confiscated the computer and cell phone of the teen/monster Mohammed Taraireh, who stabbed to death 13-years-old Hallel Ariel in her bed. That is the procedure for deadly attacks.

A study—whose findings will not be released to the public—about the trend of minors from the west Bank who carry out terror attacks, sought to profile them but had a hard time pointing to their common denominator. Over 230 cases were examined over the past nine months in a cooperation (which was neither full nor close) between Israeli experts and the Palestinian security forces. The Palestinians provided information; the Israelis cross-referenced it and wrote down the analysis and segmentation. The conclusions were passed back to the Palestinians in an effort to stop the next attacker, but our side knows well it must trust only in its own abilities.

The information collected about Mohammed Taraireh is right on the money when it comes to profiling the new kind of terrorist. The house that will get demolished is not a tin shack or a tiny crowded apartment of those living in poverty. His family is part of the Palestinian middle cast. And, indeed, one of the conclusions of the study is that attackers are no longer the younger generations of lower-class families, who were easily recruited because of despair or promises of monetary reward, but a growing number of children from “established” families.

In the wake of the study’s findings, teachers in the Palestinians education system were given a task list. For example, they were asked to dedicate special attention to “loners”—teens aged 11-18 who see themselves as “unpopular,” begin to draw inwards and appear to have lost their joie de vivre. These teens miss school and there is a noted drop in their grades and submitted assignments. The teachers were asked to be vigilant to such teens, initiate talks with the “unusual” kids and report it.

The researchers examined social media. When looking at attackers’ pages, they identified sudden changes in their posts, like Taraireh’s Facebook page that has gone through a 180 degrees change. He dropped out of school and went to work at a bakery, came home only every other day, withdrew to his room and spent a lot of time on the computer, browsing ISIS recruiting websites.

His behavior was exactly what the researchers alerted to: From a happy and active teenager, Taraireh became—following the death of his cousin who carried out a vehicular attack against Israelis—to a threat and a loner. “Everyone has the right to die,” he wrote, “and I demand that right to myself.” No one saw this, and no one addressed it.

When Prof. Mohammed Dajani started the “Middle Ground” initiative teaching how to be angry without resulting to violence, his office was vandalized and his car torched, leading him to flee to Washington.

The researchers warn against children and teenagers who post photos of the al-Aqsa mosque on their Facebook page. Taraireh was quoting phrases from the Quran that could have pointed to his intentions. He passionately wrote of “bravery” and “the knife” and in his last post, hours before committing that terrible murder, he uploaded a photo of himself. Without words or explanations—a kind of goodbye.

On his way to carry out his “mission,” the Palestinian minor does not think about the fact their family’s home will be demolished. Suspects who were questioned, both boys and girls, told interrogators they were sure their family would “manage” and that it “won’t be abandoned.”

In their first reaction, Taraireh’s mother and sister tried to hide their shock. In their next response, they already accepted the fact they are going to become homeless and expressed “pride.”

What normally happens in the Palestinian Authority is that the ministry in charge of martyrs starts paying the family a monthly stipend, while the extended family takes the terrorist’s immediate family in.

So far, we haven’t heard a condemnation from Abbas about the horror that took place, and it is frustrating to see how the Palestinian media covered the incident. The headlines focused on the teenager who was shot to death while carrying out a “mission,” he was dubbed a hero, and writers complained of “Israeli incitement.” According to reports on the Palestinian side, Taraireh encountered “difficulties” in his mission. He planned on continuing his murdering spree and killing more Israelis.

ynetnews.com

Narratives determine our perception of a problem and the reality within the specific environment which it resides (Zalman & Clarke, 2009; Esch, 2010). This in turn, affects the means and the approach to solve that issue. One side effect of an established narrative and is to limit how a particular issue is constructed and viewed, often at the expense of alternative explanations and views. This can be to the detriment of solving the problem/task at hand. “The central fallacy at the heart of the current narrative is that it employs a single prism to view a complex world” (Zalman & Clarke, 2009: 111). This is clearly seen within the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) that was launched in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US mainland by terrorists linked to Al Qaeda.

In the ensuing battle for hearts and minds that has taken place since, between the Western world and Islamic-based extremism, messages and counter-messages of these opposing sides have been flooding the information space and especially social media. Conventional wisdom postulates that the appeal of Islam has been drawing a steady stream of sympathy and recruits to the cause of the insurgent and terrorist forces (McClanahan, 2002; Fernandez, 2016). However, now may be the point in time to reconsider this basis after numerous efforts to unsuccessfully communicate with different narratives based on this assumption. Is religion (namely Islam) the foundational basis for those insurgent and terrorist forces engaging the Western world in armed conflict or is it ‘merely’ an excuse for legitimacy? If religion is not the basis for drawing sympathy, support and recruits to the side of the insurgents/terrorists, then what is drawing people to their cause?

Narratives and Their Significance

Information and how it is conveyed is critical to all societies. “The telling of stories lies at the heart of human communication and underpins the development and cohesion of all societies and cultures. […] Stories, quite simply, are one way of depicting reality and of revealing what lies beneath the surface of events” (Brophy, 2009: ix). Therefore narratives are more concerned with meaning rather than pure ‘facts’, and therefore indicate what is significant and important in our environment. However, a narrative is not merely the objective conveying of the meaning of events and people that take place in a particular society. They can also be posed and used as a means to prime and call a target audience to political action.

The political call for action can be seen within the framework of advocacy networks that operation across borders in international affairs, which impact upon perception and relations.  Actors not only include state-based actors, but non-state actors too. They use high value content based upon norm and value-based appeals in an environment of informational uncertainty. Information exchange is the central basis of the relationships that are created by various actors.

What is novel in these networks is the ability of non-traditional international actors to mobilise information strategically to help create new issues and categories and to persuade, pressure and gain leverage over much more powerful organisations and governments. Activists in networks try not only to influence policy outcomes, but to transform the nature of the debate (Keck & Sikkink, 1998: 2).

Non-state actors can gain additional influence value with their target audiences by serving as an alternate source of information and ideas. Credibility and drama are key elements in the communication strategy, powerful messages (often emotional rather than rational in nature) influence perception and reaction by the audience. As noted by Payne (2005) media are the conduit of the information flows, the significance being the outcome of wars is decided by political factors (as opposed to individual battles being decided by military factors) that is driven by information and perception.

Communicating a Narrative in Political and Armed Conflict

The information sphere is in an intangible existence and reality, however, it plays a critical role. Failure to control or at least manage information flows can gradually result in negative impacts upon the operational environment. One of the key determinants of success is the ability to colonise and occupy the information sphere, which bestows privileges and advantages to those that are successful. “Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups have been enormously successful in using the Internet as a means of occupying that battle space, issuing statements and assertions of fact that largely have gone unchallenged” (Eder, 2011: 11). By being inactive or through using the wrong tactics, an actor essentially yields to their opponent.

In addition, Lord (2006) argues that there needs to be matching and supporting physical deeds to reinforce the rhetoric to ensure and enable a greater sense of credibility of the communicator. He used the lessons ideological conflict embedded in the Cold War to reinforce this particular point, and especially the public diplomacy efforts of the United States in Eastern Europe. In his opinion, communication and influence played a key role in the eventual outcome of the Cold War, but sees a number of problems in the current conflict, which he refers to as being a war.

It is time to recognise that public diplomacy and strategic influence are similarly broken, and for our political leaders to begin to address how to fix them. Particularly in the kind of war that we are engaged in, these instruments could well prove to make the difference between victory and defeat (Lord, 2006: 13).

Western governments need to be able to make their case to a multi-varied target audience, it concerns the need to align messaging, with counter-messaging and physical deeds. Waller (2007: 38) notes that “words and images are the most powerful weapons in a war of ideas. Used skilfully, they can serve the cause well. Used carelessly, they cause collateral damage and the equivalent of death by friendly fire.” This is to say that words and images shape the reality of the information space, whether a reality is real or not is secondary to whether it is believed or not. Therefore it is necessary to not only know oneself, but how the ‘Other’ communicates and interprets people and events. Possible impediments to achieving these ends “include ignorance, political correctness and the unwillingness of officials to make words work to help win the war” (Waller, 2007: 75).

Political correctness has a profound effect on the contemporary battlefield (not only physical, but also psychological) that limiting or limited military action had historically. This is owing to a shift in the nature of how battles are fought and how wars are won or lost, which in this context means that the increasing relative importance of intangible (belief in political and military leadership, the will to fight) over tangible (size of military forces, the type and quality of military equipment) elements.

The current battlefield is located increasingly in the global information space, which knows none of the historical constraints of geopolitics (namely space and time). When examining the role and nature of how information is used within military operations, a significant difference is found between Western military forces and insurgent/terrorist forces. Western military forces tend to use information operations to support military operations, in order to legitimise those operations (increase belief in the political and military leadership). Information operations play a subordinate role to military operations. Insurgent and terrorist forces use military operations to support information operations, the intended outcome is to shape the perception of its opponents (military and civilian) and project greater tangible and intangible power than they may in fact have. The intended effect is to reduce their opponents’ belief in their political and military leadership, and erode the public’s will in continuing the fight. Therefore, political correctness has the disastrous effects and consequences of hobbling our own efforts, whilst emboldening the enemy.

Social Media and Geopolitics in the GWOT

The mechanisms of geopolitical mobilisation through communication have been gradually evolving along with the developments in New Communications Technologies. Mathew Fraser speaks of geopolitics 2.0, he notes three significant shifts: 1) States to individuals; 2) real world to virtual world mobilisation and power; 3) old media to new media. He also notes that states have reacted to these changes by either censoring and/or deploying web platforms to achieve their goals and assert their influence (Fraser, 2009). This has already had a noted and significant impact upon the nature of the foreign policy process. Henry Kissinger (2015: 330-360) has noted that there is much less concrete and unified knowledge for policymakers in the age of social media as there is an instantaneous deluge of information available. Thus the days of shared accounts of knowledge are fading as knowledge is being increasingly contested. Another point being the nature of the instantaneous communication, which often carries selective and emotionally based material forces a more rapid and less reflective reaction to people and events in the world. This increases the risk of applying inappropriate or incorrect remedies to global problems, such as terrorism.

New media communication is dialogic in nature, a many-to-may form of message flow, which witnesses the simultaneous sending and receiving of messages between numerous individual via platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn (Cunningham, 2010: 111). The new media environment differs from the traditional media (print and broadcast) as it is a rapid paced and interactive environment that has implications. “A dialogic new media communication strategy must be persistent and adaptive over time. It represents at a conceptual level a war without end, although it is a war waged in the information sphere” (Cunningham, 2010: 113). As influential as social media’s role is in communicating and spreading dissent, the role should not be overstated and nor should the role of traditional media be completely discounted in the process (Khondker, 2011).

Insurgent and terrorist groups have been adept at social media communication, which concerns not so much about dictating to an audience how to think, but more what to think about. “The siren call of ISIS, promoted through its now-infamous use of social media, is, like that Wahhabism before it, a worldview that has motivated tens of thousands toward extreme action, caused extreme suffering and dislocation, is extraordinarily ambitious and aggressive” (Fernandez, 2016). Fernandez notes that ISIS messages revolve around three core concepts – religion, grievance and utopian vision. Those that draw the hearts and minds of certain segments of social media users are the grievances and utopian vision. Recent research has shown that isolated and marginalised groups and individuals are more likely to be lured by the messages of vengeance (perceived social and political justice) and a utopian life of the Caliphate (perceived sense of belonging and purpose) (CVE, 2016; Simons, 2016).[i] In this regard, religion may play a different role in the communication plan.

An astute observation by Waller (2007) is that the insurgent and terrorist forces use Islam as a means of legitimising their political and armed struggle against the West, by adopting this approach and characterising the GWOT and subsequent conflicts as a war against Islamic extremism the West in fact runs the risk of entering the geopolitical trap of framing the conflict as between the West and Islam in terms of a Huntingdon-type clash of civilisations (Simons, 2010).

Conclusions

In the insurgent and terrorist narratives, the different rhetoric aspects play a critical role in the overall picture and effect of the message. Logos is the logical appeal to the audience, even if the logic is false, it only needs to be believed. This plays a role in capturing influence from the target group.  Pathos acts as an emotional primer for the audience to carry out physical acts that serve the political agenda of a group. Ethos is featured in the use of Islam and the Quran, which play the role of providing a façade of ethical justification for what may otherwise be unthinkable, let alone doable.

Given that the current communication strategies seem to be addressed at the underlying ideological legitimacy of terrorist and insurgent groups, it may be a case of administering the right medicine to the wrong problem. Undermining the perceived legitimacy of an opponent is certainly important, but should not be the only task. This is one of three necessary tasks. The other two messages of the narrative should also focus on shaping and engaging audiences in their perception of grievances and anger, and lastly to reduce the vulnerability and susceptibility of marginalised and isolated groups in society through active communication. This should align defensive communication (protect own information space), offensive communication (attack opponent’s information space) and deeds (to support and engage communication with target audiences).

smallwarsjournal.com