On February 26, the United States carried out an airstrike in eastern Syria targeting facilities used by Iran-backed militias in retaliation for recent rocket attacks on U.S. military sites in Iraq, like reported by nationalinterest.org. In the first military action taken by President Joe Biden, two U.S. Air Force F-15E aircraft fired seven missiles into a border-crossing station, destroying buildings used by Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sayyid al-Shudada, prominent Iran-backed Shiite militia groups in the region. Pentagon spokesman John Kirby defended the decision to strike these Syrian targets as “authorized in response to recent attacks against American and collation personnel in Iraq.”

These Iranian-backed militias in Iraq are Iranian proxies and have consistently targeted U.S. personnel, and military and diplomatic sites in Baghdad’s Green Zone in recent years. Following the targeted killing of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020, Tehran’s proxies escalated their attacks significantly. In February alone, three attacks that can be attributed to Iranian proxies targeted the U.S. presence in Iraq. On February 16, rocket fire near Erbil killed one U.S. civilian contractor and wounded five others. One week later, three rockets landed near the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, causing minor property damage.

Although Biden’s decision to attack Iranian-proxies in Syria was criticized by some Democratic and Republican lawmakers, the president was steadfast in his position that the airstrikes were consistent with the U.S right to self-defense. Biden later warned Iran to tread carefully, cautioning that the regime “can’t act with impunity.”

The Syria operation shows Biden is willing to use force to defend American lives. However, this operation appears to be an anomaly when considering what we know about Biden’s current Iran policy. Reentering the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran remains a top priority for Biden. Tehran knows this and has taken advantage of the leverage this issue has given it over the new U.S. administration.

Since the onset of Biden’s presidency, Iran has threatened to slash International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, produced dangerous levels of uranium-metal that could be used for bombs, and seized a South Korean tanker in an attempt to press Seoul to release billions of dollars in frozen assets. In addition to these provocations, Iran has directed its region-wide proxies to conduct attacks targeting American interests in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria.

Up until the February 26 Syria operation, the Biden administration has maintained a reconciliatory approach to Iran. Three days prior to the operation, South Korea’s foreign ministry confirmed it had reached a deal with the Biden team to free the billions of dollars in Iranian frozen assets. In Yemen, the Biden team removed the Houthi rebels from the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization list. Two days following this delisting, Biden officials were forced to warn the Houthis to halt its ongoing terror attacks against civilians.

Biden’s decision to strike Iranian assets in Syria was the right call. The retaliatory measure could alter the Iranian regime’s impression that Biden and his administration have a high tolerance when it comes to Tehran’s proxies and their attacks on U.S. personnel and interests. Going forward, Iran will likely continue to test Biden’s resolve with its militias region-wide. The Biden administration should minimize further concessions to Iran and work with Israel and its Gulf allies to coordinate and deter its regional ambitions.

Al Qaeda has a new leader, called ‘the Sword of Revenge’ who is reportedly set to make the terror group as dangerous as they were under Osama Bin Laden, like reported by albawaba.com.

Egyptian former general Saif al-Adel is in hiding in Iran and the ‘brilliant and ruthless strategist’ has now taken the reins from Ayman Zawahiri, according to reports.

The former leader was rumoured to be dead late last year, following speculation he had succumbed to asthma following ‘breathing issues’.

Now Saif, who has long been tracked by intelligence agencies both in the UK and the US, has taken the top job, and is preparing a ‘rebrand’.

A senior British terrorism expert told the Mirror: ‘Compared to Zawahiri he is likely to be a much more effective leader, at least so or more so even than bin Laden.’

Saif has been heavily involved in Al Qaeda activities for some 30 years, and already has a £7.5 million US bounty on his head, after the US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, which left 224 dead.

The veteran fighter was a leading member of bin Laden’s close protection unit in Afghanistan, named ‘Black Guard’ after the colour of their scarves.

A source described Saif as someone who was always ‘the least affected by the deaths of innocent civilians.’

Reports suggest the dangerous new leader is looking to build ties with ISIS, Iran and the Afghanistan Taliban.

Colonel Richard Kemp, who once monitored Saif for the British Government nearly 20 years ago told the Mirror: ‘There is co-operation between groups like this but Saif is so well-respected that he could cause even greater co-operation or even a merger.

‘He could make Al Qaeda a much more effective organisation than it has been for a few years.’

Last heard from in a message on the anniversary of 9/11, former leader Zawahiri’s health and longevity have long been in doubt, although reports of his death have proved incorrect in the past.

The Egyptian-born doctor was second-in-command to bin Laden and took over the terrorist network after the Saudi’s death in 2011, but its influence has waned and Al Qaeda is now widely seen as a shadow of its former self.

One of the sources who spoke to Arab News was an Al Qaeda translator said to maintain close ties with the group, who said Zawahiri had died in Afghanistan.

‘He died of asthma because he had no formal treatment,’ the translator told the outlet’s Pakistani edition.

Reports at the time suggested Zawahiri’s death would deal a further blow to the group after it emerged that Israeli operatives had secretly killed its deputy leader on a US-ordered mission in Iran.

Abdullah Ahmad Abdullah, also known as Abu Muhammad al-Masri, was shot and killed in Tehran by an Israeli hit squad on a motorcycle.

The operation is said to have taken place on August 7 on the anniversary of the 1998 US embassy bombings.

The killing of bin Laden in a US operation in Pakistan in 2011 left the group in the hands of Zawahiri, an Egyptian veteran of jihad and the key Al Qaeda ideologue, but without Bin Laden’s ability to rally radicals around the world.

The US government said last year that bin Laden’s son Hamza was also dead, removing a man seen as a possible heir to the Al Qaeda leadership.

The group has spawned several franchises across the world that bear its name, including in Africa’s Sahel region, in Pakistan as well as in Somalia, Egypt and Yemen.

But it does not control their actions or the alliances that they may forge on a local level.

Large cities like Raqqa or Mosul were under his rule and the world looked in horror at the images that came from the caliphate. But by March 2019 it was already in ruins. Their leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, had been killed in a military attack and they were cornered on a small strip of land in Baghuz, on the banks of the Euphrates River. But a secret plan to appoint a new leader was underway.

Yes, this is Abdullah Qurdash. Or his other name. Amir Mohamed Saied Abdulrahman says Salem, an IS member detained by the Iraqi intelligence service, pointing at a photograph shown to him by Feras Kilani a journalist with the service. Arabic from But he was different from this photo, his beard was thick he remembers the new IS strongman, who even before the death of his predecessor already handled most of the affairs of ‘The Caliphate. This then is the story of a caliph without a caliphate. From the new leader of the Islamic State.

To start counting it, you have to travel 35 kilometers from Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq. There is Al Mehalabiya, the city that gave birth to the new leader of IS. Amid crumbling buildings and crooked electricity poles, cars of the Falcon Brigade, the anti-terrorist unit of Iraq’s security forces kick up dust in their wake. They are looking for Abdullah. Commander Ahmed is in charge of that mission a job that carries great personal risk. Famous for infiltrating spies within the jihadist group this brigade plays a key role in the fight against extremists.

A Respected Family
His father used to sing the call to prayer in one of the mosques and he had two wives says the commander. He had 17 children. Abdullah, one of them, was born in 1976. The locals still remember them they were polite and highly respected.

But despite leading a quiet life, it was said that Abdullah was being radicalized by local groups This is a remote spacious region Qaeda developed here in Iraq in 2003. They had a good fan base explains Abdel Rahman al Dawla, mayor of Al Mehalabiya. In fact, most of the Islamic State military and security leaders come from these areas, especially from nearby Tala’far, he says. Thus in 2003, when US-led forces invaded Iraq, Abdullah was already participating in smaller jihadist groups. But, like so many others, he would abandon them to join a much larger operation.

As Iraq plunged into violence, Abdullah’s religious upbringing and his long history with extremist groups quickly made him a prominent member. But in 2008, the Americans locked him up in Bucca Prison. For months, Abdullah was interrogated by US forces. They say that he gave them information on dozens of members of his organization, something that the And suddenly, in 2010, Abdullah was released.

Islamic State joins
Upon his release from prison, Abdullah immediately joined Abu Bakr al Baghdadi the then leader of IS. He became a senior member of the organization in Nineveh province explains Colonel Ahmed.

Without a doubt, one of the most prominent leaders, very close to Al Baghdadi. In May 2012, Abdullah receives a new ID. Their appearance changes slightly. At that time, the bulk of US forces had withdrawn from Iraq, giving the Islamic State time to regroup. Faced with an unpopular government, the group began to gain followers. By showing him the photograph a former leader of the IS security forces, now a valuable informant confirms to the BBC the identity of Abdullah. He claims that he met with him several times. Yes, this is it, he says. He may be very extreme on some issues in general, he doesn’t trust anyone, except those close to him, he says.

What I have noticed is that he is not an intellectual, usually, he does not have the ability to give speeches like Al Baghdadi. He once gave a public speech without papers in his hands, I don’t think Abdullah is capable of doing the same. As the ambitions of the EI expanded, Abdullah assumed the role of Justice Minister s upervisando executions and grisly punishments. Abdullah’s cruelty when IS entered the city of Sinjar in 2014, Abdullah’s cruelty and growing influence really showed. They killed thousands of members of the Yazidi minority. But the question of what to do with Yazidi women divided IS.

According to their own interpretation of Islamic sharia, some wanted to enslave women. Salem al Jubouri witnessed the dispute in the organization. He was close to then-leader Al Baghdadi. Regarding the captivity of Yazidi women, the opinion of Sheikh Abu Ali al Anbari was to prohibit it. This was because we were still new to the application of sharia law and the problems far outweighed the benefits he says. However, Abdullah insisted on it. Why?”He said as long as it is part of the religion we apply it we are reviving the Sunnah Islamic teachings.

He had a committee in Iraq and another in Syria. The Iraqis refused to enslave Yazidi women because they were Iraqis, they feared for their own wives and families,” says another witness who belonged to the group.”The Iraqis did not accept the idea of ​​enslaving the Christians. The Syrians were closer to Al Baghdadi, since then he lived in Raqqa. It ended up in a compromise, only to enslave Yazidi women and avoid Christian women,” he explains. Various human rights groups claim that 7,000 women and girls were captured and enslaved by IS. The UN lists his crimes as the equivalent of genocide. When they threatened to spread their brutality to major cities like Erbil and Baghdad, the international community began to act.

The bombings then followed, and many of the tops IS leaders were killed, moving Abdullah up the chain of command. He became the most important man in Al Baghdadi and there were many attempts to end his life, interviewed witnesses reveal. Only one of them was close, they say. He was on his feet and was targeted by a drone, I think American, and he was injured. His leg was amputated and he was in the hospital for four months or more until he recovered. Time passed and EI began to regress. In 2017 the loss of the second Iraqi city marked the beginning of the end for them.

His Rise As A Leader
The continual threat of airstrikes was pushing them back without remedy. Surely Al Baghdadi knew that we were going to lose our territories so he prepared orders for us to go back to the time before the declaration of the Islamic State, says Salem, one of the prisoners of the Iraqi forces.

Thus, in October 2017, Al Baghdadi and Abdullah crossed into the Syrian city of Al Bukamal. There they almost died in an air raid. The planes arrived and bombed Al Bukamal. Sheikh Abdullah suffered minor injuries but his escort was killed. Only some shrapnel hit Abdullah. He was taken to the hospital Salem recalls. With its leadership under constant threat, IS withdrew here to the small Syrian town of Baghouz, wherein in 2019 thousands of fighters and their families surrendered. Al Baghdadi appeared in a video a few months later from his secret residence in Idlib, in northern Syria.

Abdullah is believed to be one of three people who appeared blurred next to him. At that time, he was already being groomed to become the possible leader. On October 26, 2019, what seemed inevitable happened. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was killed in an American raid, giving Abdullah his chance to become a leader. This is where your trail is lost. Iraqi intelligence services say he is hiding in northern Syria, possibly in areas controlled by Kurdish forces. He is apparently working alongside a group of Iraqi leaders to rebuild his organization, capitalizing on the widespread sense of injustice among the Sunni populations of Iraq and Syria. A process that can take many years. Perhaps too many for a caliph without a caliphate.

An Israeli strike in Iran would be risky even with F-35s, given distance to the target – about a thousand miles from Tel Aviv to Tehran — Iranian air defenses (including Russian-made S-300 anti-aircraft missiles) and potential Iranian retaliation. But Tel Aviv to Baghdad is less than 600 miles, like reported by nationalinterest.org.

Israel’s F-35 stealth fighters are positively supernatural: here, there and everywhere. In 2018, the Israeli Air Force claimed its new F-35s had attacked Iranian targets in Syria. Also in 2018, Arab press made dubious claims that IAF F-35s had flown over Iran.

Now comes reports that Israeli F-35s have attacked Iranian targets in Iraq, according to Arab media.

Western diplomatic sources allegedly the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper that on July 19, “Tel Aviv carried out an airstrike earlier this month against an Iranian rockets depot northeast of Baghdad.”

El Arabiya television reported that the strike hit Iranian ballistic missiles being transported in refrigerated food trucks. Several Hezbollah and Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps members were reportedly killed.

A second strike targeted another Iranian base, according to Asharq Al-Awsat. “The Ashraf base in Iraq, a former base used by the Iranian opposition People’s Mujahedin of Iran, was targeted by an air raid,” according to the newspaper. “The base lies 80 kilometers from the border with Iran and 40 kilometers northeast of Baghdad. The sources revealed that the strikes targeted Iranian ‘advisors’ and a ballistic missile shipment that had recently arrived from Iran to Iraq.”

Compounding the mystery were initial reports that unidentified drones conducted the attacks.

Amos Yadlin, former head of Israeli military intelligence, told U.S. publication Breaking Defense that Israel probably did attack Iranian targets in Iraq. “Apparently, Israel is really operating in Iraq,” he said. “It is sensible that Israel will not claim responsibility for such an attack as it may complicate things for the U.S. Without referring to the specific attack I can say that the F-35 is the ideal aircraft for such an attack.”

As so often in the Middle East, especially in the shadow war between Israel and Iran, it’s hard to know exactly what happened. The tale changes with whoever tells it, and why they’re telling it. Still, we can make some educated guesses.

First and foremost is the fact that Israel has refused to accept being surrounded by Iranian missile bases on its borders. The Israeli Air Force has turned Syria into a shooting gallery, with hundred of strikes hitting Iranian convoys crossing Syria to supply arms to Hezbollah into Lebanon, as well as Iranian and Hezbollah bases in Syria itself.

“We can – and we intend to – make it as difficult as possible and inflict a price tag that the Iranians aren’t willing to pay,” an Israeli military official told me during an interview in Jerusalem last February. Which suggests that Israel would shy away from striking Iranian facilities in Iraq, especially now that the U.S. doesn’t have a major military presence there anymore.

An Israeli strike in Iran would be risky even with F-35s, given distance to the target – about a thousand miles from Tel Aviv to Tehran — Iranian air defenses (including Russian-made S-300 anti-aircraft missiles) and potential Iranian retaliation. But Tel Aviv to Baghdad is less than 600 miles. Israeli aircraft could fly over Syria or even Jordan (as they did in their 1981 attack that destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor).

Weakened by years of warfare and a dysfunctional government and military, Iraqi defenses wouldn’t pose much of a threat. Iraq would be a fairly safe test as the Israeli Air Force absorbs its F-35Is.

None of which is conclusive proof that Israeli F-35s struck Iraq. But as in any murder mystery, the prime suspect has motive, opportunity and capability.

In 2021, Task Force Takuba, bringing together the special forces of 7 European countries to fight terrorism in the Sahel, will become fully operational with an initial mandate of 3 years, like reported by globalriskinsights.com. France, stuck in what looks like an unwinnable war despite the mobilisation of 5,100 troops as part of Operation Barkhane since 2014, has been advocating for a “Europeanisation” of the military intervention in the region for quite some time. While Takuba will enable more tactical wins against terrorist groups and enable France to break with its diplomatic and military isolation, it is unlikely to change the direction of the conflict. In this context, what is the future of operation Barkhane?

On the first anniversary of the Pau summit, France finds itself at a turning point in a deadly and unpopular military engagement in the Sahel. As Takuba starts to fully deploy, the future of France’s support to the countries of the G5 Sahel remains ambiguous. But one thing is clear: the fight against Islamist terrorism in the Sahel cannot be definitively won until these countries become their own security and stability providers, an unrealistic scenario in both the medium and even long term.

On 13 January 2020, the Pau summit hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron gathered the heads of states of the G5 Sahel (G5S – Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mauritania). The objective was to strengthen military cooperation under operation Barkhane and pave the way for a more unified International Coalition for the Sahel. One year later, there has been no major breakthrough in the fight against terrorist groups proliferating in the region. In 2020, there were important tactical wins, with the neutralisation of terrorist cells and the killings of some terrorist leaders such as Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb’s (AQMI) chief Abdelmalek Droukdel in June. The optimistic “media buzz” surrounding such wins however only serves to hide what is in reality a rather pessimistic prospect of victory in a war already coined “France’s Afghanistan”, or “France’s African Forever War”. Despite a regular increase of French troops between 2014 and 2020 (including 500 more soldiers following the Pau Summit), France and the G5S have not achieved strategic wins in the region.

In fact, the security situation in the three-borders area (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), also known as the Liptako region, has instead continued to deteriorate. Conflict metrics show a spiralling of violence. Since 2016, terrorist attacks in this region have increased by 500%. A multitude of evolving terrorist groups are still active in the Sahel: Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), linked to Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Islamic State in the West Africa Province (ISWAP), a splinter of Boko Haram; and The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Terrorists have also expanded their territorial presence in the south and the west of the region, exploiting the failure of the states accelerated by the pandemic to recruit new fighters. In such instances, recruits have been joining largely for financial gain and social status, rather than shared ideological beliefs with radical groups. Recent kidnappings linked to ISWAP in the Northwestern part of Nigeria also highlights the role of local banditry and its interplay with terror groups to further challenge the authority of failing states.

Operation Barkhane has been particularly costly, deadly and unpopular. 50 French soldiers have died in the Sahel since 2013 – not to mention the 200+ UN peacekeepers who have died in the same period. The level of support amongst French politicians and the French population is quite low: according to a recent poll, 51% of French people are against the intervention. Since none of the recent terror attacks in France seem to be connected to any terrorist group in the Sahel, the price to pay is politically hard to justify.

Barkhane has also been undermined by a lack of support for the foreign intervention by Sahelian peoples, where the high level of kinetic military activity and violations of human rights by regional armies are disenfranchising the local population. The somewhat inconsistent support from G5S top officials themselves is also problematic. While President Macron insisted in Pau that the time for ambiguity was over, a few days after massive protests against the French presence in Mali, members of the G5 Sahel have not shown a robust alignment with Paris over the past year. As early as February 2020, the Malian government considered starting negotiations with terrorist groups, a no-go for France, as it would contradict the strategic narrative of its military involvement in the region.

Militarily, the main change that Takuba will bring is a human and technological capacity to conduct more mobile and targeted elite-type operations against terrorist cells, especially in Mali, thanks to increased air-lift capabilities. This will enable France to redirect Barkhane geographically outside of Mali, where it has prioritised the fight against ISGS at the expense of other areas since the Pau Summit. It will also enable Barkhane’s forces to reallocate resources towards transferring military know-how to regional armies, a strategic dimension of the operation for which the results have been disappointing. Fundamentally, the G5S continues to depend on French troops to ensure the security of its territories and borders.

On top of improving operational capacities, Takuba can also play a more political role for France, whose presence remains contested. The long-awaited military assistance of other European countries will finally break France’s isolation in this conflict and justify what will realistically be its slow but sustained military disengagement. However, this political “discourse”, if it develops, would hide a very different reality. In the next few years, the Europeanisation of the military support to the Sahelian armies with Takuba will be very relative. Indeed, 300 of the 600 members of the Takuba come from the French Army, and these elite forces are placed under French command. In other words, France is set to remain the main and overwhelmed security provider.

Early January, Florence Parly, the French Minister of Defence, announced the reduction of the French presence to pre 2020 levels, with the repatriation of the 600 soldiers sent after the Pau Summit. A logical decision in the current political context, which is at odds with the calls of regional leaders, such as G5S’s Nigerian leader General Oumarou Namata Gazama, who stands against scaling down the French presence, even if Takuba grows.

One thing to watch in 2021 is how well Takuba will perform and to what extent the future of Barkhane will be intertwined with Tabuka’s performance. On the basis of Florence’s Parly comments on the fact that “by nature, [military] support is limited in time”, a likely scenario is the continuous reduction of French troops in the short-term, with the French military concentrating its efforts on the fight against ISGS and coordinating operation Takuba’s targeted interventions against other terror groups.

Regardless of the strategic choices that will be made by France or its European partners involved in Takuba, the security situation in the Sahel ultimately depends on the capacity of the states concerned to restore their authority. While security is a condition for stability, the societal roots of the violence cannot be simply eliminated by the use of force. As the chief of staff of French armed forces General Lecointre stated in November 2019: “We will never achieve a definitive victory” in the Sahel.

 

On Monday, 13 soldiers were killed by the Islamic State in northeastern Nigeria. A week ago, just after midnight on Friday morning, a Boko Haram suicide bomber blew up 14 villagers in northern Cameroon. These attacks — passing us by, as they do, in a stream of news and information — are becoming increasingly common in the beleaguered states of West Africa, like reported by spectator.co.uk.

At the end of last year, Islamists kidnapped 344 schoolboys in an apparent ransom attempt. While the raid saw a continuation of Boko Haram’s strategy (in 2014 the group kidnapped 276 schoolgirls, to global condemnation) it marked a change in the terror group’s ambitions. Previously the group had confined itself mainly to the Lake Chad Basin area, with its headquarters in Borno State, encompassing the intersection of northeast Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. December’s kidnapping saw the group travel some 500 miles west to Katsina in the north of the country.

The growing confidence of these extremist militias has seen Islamist influence spread across the region as deaths soar. During last month’s kidnapping, 110 civilians were butchered, including 76 rice farmers near the village of Zabarmari. Boko Haram, along with the Islamic State in West Africa Province, form a jihadist umbrella in West Africa, encompassing Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The group’s leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to Isis in March 2015, but differences between the core groups of Boko Haram and Isis led to the latter installing Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the chief of its West African branch in August 2016. The two factions, still labelled collectively as Boko Haram, have killed over 30,000 people and displaced millions in the region.

Last year saw Boko Haram launch its deadliest ever jihadist attack leading to the deaths of 92 Chadian soldiers. The group also orchestrated militant attacks on a refugee camp in Cameroon, slaying 50 Nigerian soldiers in an ambush, they massacred 30 motorists (and kidnapped yet more women and children) on a Maiduguri highway and annihilated 32 in a bomb blast on a crowded bridge in the northeastern town of Gamboru. Meanwhile, Isis’s African branch killed French aid workers in Niger’s capital Niamey, slaughtered at least 35 Nigerian troops in another military ambush and massacred over 140 in back-to-back attacks in Monguno, Nganzai and Gubio, to name just a few of their terror raids.

This bloody array of jihadist manoeuvres followed 2019 where Boko Haram launched three of the world’s ten deadliest attacks and remained the only major terror outfit to register a rise in activity, even as the Islamic State, the Taliban and al-Shabaab saw declines. The Global Terrorism Index 2020 ranks Nigeria as the third most affected country today, ahead of Syria, Yemen and Pakistan. The same year saw Boko Haram killings triple in Cameroon, where separatists have recently upped their presence. Burkina Faso and Mali have witnessed a five-fold increase in terror attacks since 2016, with the former registering an outrageous 22-fold increase in deaths over the past four years.

Along with Boko Haram’s westward surge and the expansion of Islamic State’s affiliates in the region, has come the rebirth of al-Qaeda’s remnants like Movement for Oneness, Jihad in West Africa and Support Group for Islam and Muslims, the latter grabbing global headlines following the abduction of French hostages in Mali.

With the Middle Eastern Islamic State’s ‘defeat’ in 2019, the world has largely ignored this precipitous rise of West Africa as the new epicentre of jihadist terror. There are thousands of fighters, agitating and killing for an equatorial Caliphate. Boko Haram, the initiator and still the chief proponent of jihadist terror in the region, is today the world’s greatest counter-terror failure.

Like all jihadist groups, Boko Haram’s operational infrastructure is dependent on power vacuums, sustained by young disaffected minds and radical teaching. Boko Haram, which translates into ‘Western education is forbidden’, uses anti-West rhetoric to discredit existing governments and muster support for its puritanical Islamist vision.

Amid rhetoric denouncing ‘modernisation’ and ‘globalisation’, Boko Haram has seamlessly incorporated the latest technologies — from the use of drones to carry out terror raids to social media disseminating radical Islamist propaganda. Even so, as is the case with other jihadist outfits, the anti-West orientation ends up being more of a smokescreen for de facto annihilation of local Muslim populations by declaring them ‘infidels’ and apostatising Muslim leaders and governments. This bloodshed doesn’t appear to factor anywhere in the minds of Islamist ideologues who argue that a genocide of Muslims is taking place in the West.

Beyond the excommunication and execution of Muslim populations, jihadists brutally target other religious communities. Boko Haram, makes Christians a regular target, with the group burning down a Christian village, killing at least 11 people in Pemi on Christmas Eve. Some 2,200 Christians were slaughtered in the Middle Belt of Nigeria in 2020 alone, with over 11,500 Christians massacred in the country since 2015.

To safeguard the historical pluralism of western and sub-Saharan Africa — and prevent the extinction of indigenous cultures fast eradicated by jihadist usurpation — the world needs to wake up to the escalating threat of Boko Haram. A critical role has to be played by the global Muslim leadership to discredit the Islamist narrative peddled by Boko Haram and other jihadist groups.

Unfortunately, however, populist leaders across the Muslim world are instead propagating narratives that play right into the hands of, nay echo, radical Islamists. Many are focusing the entirety of their energy on Muslim minorities in the West, whose concerns pale into insignificance in the face of the actual genocidal threat in places like West Africa. Similarly, far too many Muslim states have codified the same Islamist logic that is taken to its gory conclusion by the likes of Boko Haram. Naturally, instead of tackling jihadist terror, such duplicity nourishes these breeding grounds of jihadism.

Bangladesh Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal on December 1, 2020, disclosed that the government was moving to re-activate the investigation of 83 cases of Hefazat-e-Islam’s (HeI) ‘terrorist activities’ in 2013, adding, “Terrorism cases cannot be postponed for so long. Details of the cases are being checked. The government is determined to take strict action against the accused”, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

He admitted that “seven years have passed for various reasons, which is a big mistake.”

Previously on May 5, 2013, HeI enforced their ‘Dhaka Siege’ programme to mount pressure on the Awami League (AL)-led Government to implement their 13-point demand, including the demand to “pass a law providing for capital punishment for maligning Allah, Islam and the Prophet Muhammad… and smear campaigns against Muslims”. Four civilians were killed and several others injured as cadres of HeI fought running battles with the Police across Dhaka, turning the capital into a city of panic. 70,000 Islamists marched down at least six highways and took positions at the entry points of the city, stopping road transport and cutting off Dhaka’s road links with the rest of the country, while they raised slogans of ‘Allahu Akbar’ (God is great) and “One point, one demand: Atheists must be hanged.”

More than 10,000 personnel drawn from the Police, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and paramilitary Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) jointly launched a drive late on May 5, 2013, to clear demonstrators from Dhaka. As violence moved beyond the capital on May 6, 2013, at least 27 persons, including three Security Force (SF) personnel and an HeI cadre, were killed and several were injured in Narayanganj, Chittagong and Bagerhat Districts. Two of the injured died on May 7 and another one on May 9, 2013.

Police later filed cases and investigations began. However, the Sheikh Hasina Government allegedly slowed down the proceedings because the then leader of HeI, Shah Ahmad Shafi, (who died of sudden illness on September 18, 2020), had decided to change the organisation’s stance and strengthened his ties with the Hasina Government.

Now that a faction of the HeI, Hefazat-e-Islam–Babunagri, led by newly appointed Amir (chief) Junaid Babunagri, has started asserting radical views and engaging in violent protests, the Government has decided to reactivate the cases. On November 27, Junaid Babunagri put forth four demands before the Hasina Government: stop International Society for Krishna Consciousness’ (ISKCON’s) activities in Bangladesh; officially declare the Ahmadiyas ‘non-Muslim’; close the Embassy of France and expel the French Ambassador; and pass a resolution condemning France in Parliament. They are protesting against French President Emmanuel Macron because he has held his ground against attacks by Islamist forces extremists and terrorists on his country’s values and the freedom of belief.

Junaid Babunagri also threatened to pull down and destroy all sculptures, no matter which party put those up. He added that if a new sculpture of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was set up as planned, “it will be dragged down.” The outfit is leading violent protests across the country against installation of sculptures of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for his birth centenary celebrations this year.

Since coming to power in January 2009, the Hasina Government has been following the policy of ‘zero tolerance’ in dealing with extremism and terrorism. It has weakened almost all the Islamist terrorist outfits which were creating trouble in the country before she assumed power. Since January 2009, at least 344 Islamist terrorists have been killed and 25,241 arrested by Bangladeshi Security Forces. The major terrorist outfits are all currently dormant.

Radical elements, however, continue to operate and remain a threat.

Adding to concerns is the danger emanating from a radicalised Bangladeshi Diaspora, elements among which are planning to create trouble in and around the country after their return, even as others fund extremist elements within Bangladesh. ‘War returnees’ – those who have returned from terrorist campaigns in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and other theatres of Islamist terrorist strife, also have similar and sinister designs. Reports indicate at least 50 Bangladeshis have travelled to Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, to join Islamic State. Several Islamist extremist organisations in Bangladesh also have links with al Qaeda, the Tehreeq-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Taliban in the Af-Pak complex.

On November 24, it was announced by Singapore’s Home Ministry that, on November 2, security agencies had arrested a Bangladeshi man, identified as Ahmed Faysal, a construction worker, who they claim was plotting attacks against Hindus in his home country, Bangladesh, and planning to fight in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir as well. Ahmed Faysal reportedly immigrated to Singapore in 2017. Faysal was arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA) for “terrorism-related activities.” Officials believe he was radicalised in 2018 after “imbibing online propaganda on ISIS [Islamic State in Iraq and Syria]”. The arrest was part of a crackdown during which Singapore authorities initiated counter-terrorism probes against 37 people, of whom 14 were Singaporeans and 23 foreigners, mostly Bangladeshis.

Earlier, in January 2016, 26 Bangladeshi construction workers who were supportive of global terror outfits Al Qaeda and Islamic State, were deported from Singapore to Bangladesh. The workers had discussed carrying out terrorist attacks upon returning to Bangladesh. According to reports, 14 of the 26, after their return, were jailed on terrorism charges, while the remaining 12 were released.

On May 10, 2020, Spain’s national court in Madrid sentenced Ataul Haque, a British citizen of Bangladeshi origin, to seven years imprisonment for financing and supporting terrorism. Haque, the brother of the head of the Islamic State’s technological wing, Siful Haque Sujan (killed in a targeted US drone strike in Syria in 2015), had reportedly sent 47,000 euros from Spain to Bangladesh via China, using an informal channel known as “hundi”. Haque, was arrested in 2017 after his home in Merida in western Spain, was raided by the Police.

On May 5, 2019, Bangladeshi authorities arrested a Saudi Arabia-born Bangladeshi, Motaj Abdul Majid Kafiluddin Bepari, who returned to the country in February 2019, after fighting in Syria. According to the Police’s first information report of the case recorded under the Anti-Terrorism Act, Bepari and five or six unnamed people were accused of planning sabotage with different militant organisations to establish a Caliphate in Bangladesh after displacing the government.

Jihadist returnees are seen as a key challenge by the Bangladeshi authorities. Since the time of the Soviet War in Afghanistan to the latest Islamic State war zones, Bangladeshi fighters returning to their country bring back their own understanding of society and jihad, and eventually try to influence others in favour of establishing Sharia rule in the country.

Although Bangladesh has succeeded in maintaining a sustained peace, the roots of radical thought are still strong. There is a real danger that the extremist sentiment will be exploited by a radicalised Diaspora, both through the social media, and on the return of some elements, including ‘war returnees’ to the home country. Security and intelligence agencies will, consequently, be under constant pressure to identify and neutralise such elements, and to contain the activities of the Islamist extremist organisations that remain active in the country.

The intra-Afghan peace talks entered a crucial phase in Doha after making progress in two areas last week. First, the Taliban and the Afghan government reached consensus on the peace talks’ procedures. And, second, the formation of Afghanistan High Council for National Reconciliation Leadership Committee in Kabul, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

After two years of struggles, the Taliban entered peace talks with the Afghan government. The intra-Afghan peace talks are ongoing behind closed doors and seek to end the four decades of conflict in Afghanistan. Particularly, the delegations have negotiated to set agenda items for the talks. According to the US-Taliban peace deal, the Taliban has declared a ceasefire with the US in Afghanistan — while the group has continuously been fighting the Afghan government that has resulted in the killings of civilians. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reports there were 5,939 civilian casualties from January to September this year.

The international community and the Afghans urge the Taliban to declare a ceasefire, and yet that group to date has been reluctant. It is vital to find the root causes of why the Taliban have refused to declare a ceasefire?

Here are four reasons:
First, the Taliban are losing their fighters. Under a ceasefire, the Taliban explore the big cities that they have never been to and are controlled by the government. In June 2018, the Taliban announced a first ever three-day ceasefire over Eid. Reportedly, thousands of Taliban fighters did not return to the battlefield after the truce. Most of the Taliban teenagers have been recruited from remote villages and have not been to the big cities. They are misinformed that the population in the cities are not allowed to practice Islam. The Taliban fears they would lose their fighters should they return to the cities and realize real Islam.

Second, a ceasefire fragments the Taliban. The political leaders in Qatar might want to declare a ceasefire but its military commanders on the battlefield are reluctant and insist on fighting to take over the country. Taliban’s political leaders in Qatar are easy to work with. Since the establishment of their office in Doha in 2013, the political leaders have learned that without the world, the movement can’t survive their regime post-US withdrawal. However, the group’s military commanders in Afghanistan strongly believe that they can win the war and can overthrow the Afghan government should the US withdraw according to the US-Taliban peace agreement inked in February 2020.

The Taliban are also doubtful whether the movement can enforce a ceasefire on all its commanders. Differences within the Taliban have been revealed recently during the peace talks with the US and the Afghan government. The Taliban declared a three-day ceasefire in May this year, and yet, despite the declaration, some elements within the group killed 14 Afghan army officers.

This was not the first of its kind. The Taliban had also announced the first-ever ceasefire in June 2018. Notwithstanding, some Taliban militants killed over 40 Afghan security forces across the country. Should the Taliban declare a ceasefire, some elements within the group would not obey. This will raise doubts within the international community, and the Afghans over the unity of the Taliban and that after any peace deal, that no other different flags would arise.

Recent attacks of the Islamic State in Kabul have already created doubts over the peace process. Afghans believe that should the Islamic State attacks continue, the peace deal with the Taliban would not bring lasting peace to the country. The Taliban assert that the group has eliminated the Islamic State in Afghanistan. Should the Taliban declare a ceasefire, it would be revealed in a post-Taliban deal, that the Islamic State could get stronger and peace with the Taliban would not bring lasting peace to the country.

Third, the Taliban feel that a ceasefire would take the group far from its goals. The Taliban have two main goals – the withdrawal of US forces and returning the Taliban to power. After the US-Taliban peace deal that the US will withdraw its forces from Afghanistan in 14 months, the Taliban jubilant and claimed that its movement had won the war. President Donald Trump also announced that he would withdraw all the US forces from Afghanistan.

As a result, the Taliban feel that they are close to achieving what they have been fighting for and will return an Islamic Emirate to the country. If the Taliban announce a ceasefire, the group argues that it would lose its heavy weapon, which is violence, and will not get closer to its goals.

Fourth, the Taliban will use the ceasefire as a playing card in intra-Afghan talks. Violence gives the Taliban the upper hand in negotiations. The group might agree to a truce should Kabul meet their heavy conditions in the negotiations: The release of their over 7,000 prisoners in Kabul and elimination of the current government, and the Taliban to take over the country and form an inclusive Islamic government with other Afghan politicians. The group also believes that should the Taliban agree to a truce, Kabul would continue governing the country and would not take the peace process seriously, said Shahabuddin Delawar, Taliban negotiator in Qatar in talks with the Afghan analysts in the US.

Violence is the only weapon the group has. Should they declare a ceasefire, the group has nothing to rely or fall back upon. The group has miscalculated by not declaring a ceasefire. Even if the Taliban take over the country and govern the Afghans it will never govern their minds and hearts. A lasting ceasefire is the first and foremost demand of all Afghans. Unless the Taliban declare a durable ceasefire, the group will face Afghans’ hatred.

On October 15, Islamic State (IS) fighters in Mozambique staged their first claimed attack into southern Tanzania, killing at least 20 people in Kitaya, Mtwara Province. The fighters also burned down houses, destroyed an armored vehicle, and stole money and military equipment, like reported by jamestown.org. Mtwara borders Palma district in the Mozambican Province of Cabo Delgado, which is the base of the group known as Ahlu al-Sunna Wal Jamaa or al-Shabaab (“The Youth”) locally but officially as Islamic State in Central Africa Province (ISCAP) (The Citizen, October 23; Club of Mozambique, October 20).

Some ISCAP members were initially followers of Kenyan Islamist ideologue, the late Aboud Rogo, and resettled in northern Mozambique after Rogo was killed extrajudicially in a drive-by shooting in Mombasa in 2012. ISCAP also has religious, commercial, and training ties with jihadist networks in Kenya, Tanzania, and elsewhere in East Africa (Club of Mozambique, June 14, 2018). The group, however, only started carrying out attacks in northern Mozambique in 2017 and has since killed an estimated 700 civilians. Like other Islamist militants in Africa, ISCAP demands that governments rule by sharia (Islamic Law) (The Africa Report, July 29).

Since IS’ ‘territorial caliphate’ in Syria and Iraq began collapsing, its leadership has been keen to expand in Africa. In August 2018, IS’ former “caliph,” Abubakar al-Baghdadi, indicated plans to create a Central Africa province (wilaya) (Twitter.com/SimNasr, August 22, 2018). Less than one year later, in April 2019, IS claimed an attack in Beni, Democratic People’s Republic of Congo (DRC), killing two soldiers and one civilian, which heralded the launch of ISCAP as a formal IS province (The East African, April 19, 2019). By that time, attacks were also intensifying in northern Mozambique, whose fighters, along with the DRC insurgents, soon became subsumed under ISCAP.

Islamic State’s Ambitions in Tanzania

ISCAP’s attack in southern Tanzania underlines IS’ ambition to expand its territory in Africa. While ISCAP has gained some success around Beni in DRC and Cabo Delgado in Mozambique, it has been slower to gain traction in Tanzania and Kenya, where, in contrast, al-Qaeda had success historically. In 2017, Tanzanian officials blamed an unidentified terrorist network for the killing of eight policemen in Kabiti district. Although the attackers had disappeared with the policemen’s guns, officials said the attackers were linked to another attack in Dar es Salaam, in which the gunmen stormed Sitakishari police station and stole 17 guns. Four policemen were killed in that attack. The police later said they had killed four suspects in connection with the murders of the policemen in Kabiti (The East African, April 22, 2017; African News, April 14,2017).

Therefore, with its first official attack claim in Tanzania, IS and ISCAP have scored a victory. Moreover, Tanzania’s police inspector general estimated at least 300 militants took part in the attack before they retreated to Mozambique. This attests to large numbers of fighters involved in the operation (The Citizen, October 23).

The jihadists gained access to Kitaya village after entering into Tanzania by sea and moving up Ruvuma River, which forms the border between Mozambique and Tanzania (Club of Mozambique,October 20). Photographs of the attack that IS released on its social media platforms and that were released outside official IS media channels further showed an attacker decapitating a man and throwing his head on the road as well as weapons and ammunition that the fighters pilfered (Club of Mozambique, October 20). In a video, the attackers were also heard speaking in Swahili, which is widely spoken in East Africa. They were also heard speaking Makua, which is a Bantu dialect in southern Tanzania and Mozambique, and Mwani, which is a Swahili dialect spoken in Cabo Delgado. This language diversity indicates northern Mozambique is a meeting point for East African jihadists from the Swahili Coast and perhaps elsewhere in East Africa (Club of Mozambique, October 20).

Nearly a month after the October attack, Tanzanian police announced the arrest of an unspecified number of Tanzanians suspected to be travelling to join ISCAP in Mozambique. The alleged recruits were from Kigoma in the west, Mwanza in the north, and other parts of Tanzania. After these arrests, the police said they had learned that many Tanzanians were involved in the attack in Mtwara and local villagers had helped ISCAP identify targets, including houses to set ablaze (Club of Mozambique, November 20).

Tanzanian Leadership’s Responses

ISCAP’s Mtwara attack occurred on the eve of Tanzania’s national elections, but information gathered from the videos indicates that the militants’ motivations were unrelated to the polls. According to utterances heard during the attack, the motive was to kill “what they [the militants] considered infidels,” and spread ISCAP’s teachings in Tanzania (Club of Mozambique, October 20). Incumbent president, John Pombe Magufuli, whose party is Chama Cha Mapindunzi (CCM), won the elections by receiving 84 percent of the vote. However, his main challenger, Tundu Lissu of the Party for Democracy and Development (CHADEMA), said the elections were riddled with irregularities, such as ballot-stuffing (Capital FM, October 29).

Ahead of Magufuli’s inauguration, key opposition figures were arrested and later released with no charges. A senior police officer in Dar es Salaam later said they would be charged with acts of terrorism and endangering national security (The Africa Report, November 5). These allegations were, however, not linked to the threat posed by ISCAP or any known violent threat.

In the past, Tanzania has frequently expressed its willingness to support global counter-terrorism efforts (Daily News, March 12). Tanzania is also aware of the threats posed by ISCAP. In May, the government sent troops to the border with Mozambique to bolster security after ISCAP escalated attacks on security forces and civilians in nearby Cabo Delgado (The Citizen, May 7). In August, Tanzania also carried out an operation on the border with Mozambique to flush out jihadists who were believed to be hiding in the forests there (Club of Mozambique, August 11).

Conclusion

The claimed attack in Tanzania by ISCAP represents a well-planned move that fits into IS and ISCAP’s ambitious designs for the future. Congo and Mozambique are now part of IS’ ‘caliphate.’ Security agencies in Kenya, Uganda, and especially Tanzania must continue to be on alert given the speed at which ISCAP is gaining ground.

Debate raged in Iran on Sunday over how and when to respond to a top nuclear scientist’s assassination blamed on arch-foe Israel, like reported by thearabweekly.com.

Two days after Mohsen Fakhrizadeh died from wounds sustained in a firefight between his guards and unidentified gunmen near Tehran, parliament demanded a halt to international inspections of Iranian nuclear sites while a top official hinted Iran should leave the global non-proliferation treaty.

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council usually handles decisions related to the country’s nuclear programme, and parliamentary bills must be approved by the powerful Guardians Council.

President Hassan Rohani has stressed the country will seek its revenge in “due time” and not be rushed into a “trap.”

Pointing to Israel

Iran’s English-language Press TV said on Monday that the weapon used in the killing of a prominent Iranian nuclear scientist last week was made in Israel.

“The weapon collected from the site of the terrorist act (where Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated) bears the logo and specifications of the Israeli military industry,” an unnamed source told Press TV.

But speaking before the Press TV report, Israeli Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen told radio station 103 FM on Monday that he did not know who was responsible.

Israel says Fakhrizadeh was the head of an Iranian military nuclear programme, the existence of which the Islamic republic has consistently denied, and Washington had sanctioned him in 2008 for activities linked to Iran’s atomic activities.

Israeli experts saw the hand of Israeli intelligence in the operation. But if Mossad was responsible, experts were zeroing in on the significance of the timing.

Did Israel simply see a chance to carry out an operation long in the planning, or was there a direct link to US President Donald Trump’s imminent departure from the White House?

For Israel’s left-leaning Haaretz newspaper, the Trump link was clear.

“The timing of the assassination, even if it was determined by purely operational considerations, is a clear message to President-elect Joe Biden, intended to show Israel’s criticism of the intent to return to the nuclear accord with Iran,” it said.

Trump withdrew the US from a multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran in 2018 and then reimposed and beefed up punishing sanctions as part of its “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran.

Biden has signalled his administration may be prepared to rejoin the accord, but the nuclear scientist’s assassination has revived opposition to the deal among Iranian conservatives.

Yossi Kuperwasser, the former head of Israel’s strategic affairs ministry, also tied the assassination to Biden’s January 20 inauguration.

Those responsible for the killing “had a short period of time to take action to weaken the Iranian nuclear program and to convince Biden that once he becomes president he should not return to the (nuclear) agreement,” he said.

Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman, author of a 2018 book documenting Israel’s covert assassination of its enemies over the years, said Sunday that such an attack, deep in enemy territory, “has to be planned for many months, if not for years.”

“It cannot be carried out merely by pressing a button,” he added, writing in top-selling Israeli daily Yediot Aharonot.

Bergman’s piece highlighted Netanyahu’s 2018 television appearance to announce that Israeli agents had penetrated a “secret atomic archive” in Tehran and removed tens of thousands of files proving its arms plans.

Netanyahu said that Fakhrizadeh played a central role in those plans, adding “remember this name.”

Calling for strikes

The scientist’s body was taken for a ceremony on Sunday at a major shrine in the holy city of Qom before being transported to the shrine of the Islamic republic’s founder Imam Khomeini, according to Iranian media.

On Monday, live video from Tehran, shared by national outlet Iran Press, showed uniformed men gathering around images of Fakhrizadeh seemingly ahead of a procession.

His funeral will be held in the presence of senior military commanders and his family, the defence ministry said on its website, without specifying where.

The head of Iran’s Expediency Council, a key advisory and arbitration body, said there was “no reason why (Iran) should not reconsider the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.”

Mohsen Rezaei said Tehran should also halt implementation of the additional protocol, a document prescribing intrusive inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilitates.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called Saturday for Fakhrizadeh’s killers to be punished.

Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf called Sunday for “a strong reaction” that would “deter and take revenge” on those behind the killing of Fakhrizadeh, who was aged 59 according to Iranian media.

Iran’s ultra-conservative Kayhan daily called for strikes on Israel if it were “proven” to be behind the assassination.

Kayhan called for the port city of Haifa to be targeted “in a way that would annihilate its infrastructure and leave a heavy human toll.”

Iran has responded to the US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal by gradually abandoning most of its key nuclear commitments under the agreement.

Nuclear card

In the rhetorical storm about reactions to the killing, Iranians leaders seemed to shift towards using the nuclear card instead of undertaking a retaliatory act that could risk sparking the wrath of Trump during his last weeks in office. They also know that striking at Israel or Israeli interests will trigger a no-holds-barred reaction from Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.

Rezai called on Iran’s atomic agency to take “minimum measures” such as “stopping the online broadcast of cameras, reducing or suspending inspectors and implementing restrictions in their access” to sites, ISNA news agency reported.

Iran’s parliament said the “best response” to the assassination would be to “revive Iran’s glorious nuclear industry.”

It called for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to be barred from the country’s atomic sites, said the legislature’s news agency ICANA.

Some MPs previously accused inspectors of acting as “spies” potentially responsible for Fakhrizadeh’s death.

But the spokesman for Iran’s atomic energy organisation, Behrouz Kamalvandi, told IRNA on Saturday that the issue of inspectors’ access “must be decided on at high levels” of the Islamic republic’s leadership.

Iran will give a “calculated and decisive” response to the killing of its top nuclear scientist, said a top adviser to Iran’s supreme leader.

“Undoubtedly, Iran will give a calculated and decisive answer to the criminals who took Martyr Mohsen Fakhrizadeh from the Iranian nation,” Kamal Kharrazi, who is also head of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, said in a statement.