On Tuesday the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced the formation of a “civilian council” to administer Syria’s Raqqa region after ISIS’ eventual expulsion. SDF spokesman Talal Silo said the SDF has already handed over towns captured from ISIS to this fledgling council, like reported by rudaw.net.

The Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), the leading group in the SDF, have stressed that Arab elements of the SDF will lead the Raqqa offensive and Arabs from Raqqa will govern it following ISIS’ removal, in order to minimize the possibility of an Arab-Kurdish conflict.

Late last month the co-chair of the ruling Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), whose armed wing is the YPG, suggested that Raqqa could become part of the Kurds’ democratic federal system.

“We expect [this] because our project is for all Syria … and Raqqa can be part of it,” he said before adding that “the people of Raqqa are the ones who take the decision on everything.”

The formation of the Raqqa council comes after the SDF’s establishment of the Deir ez-Zur Military Council to govern the country’s eastern province if they manage to capture that too, in December.

The only SDF military council to be actually put in place to date is the Manbij Military Council, which has administered that northwestern Syrian Arab city since capturing it from ISIS last August. The SDF had established other councils for the northwestern Syrian cities of al-Bab and Jarablus, but were unable to capture those cities before Turkey’s Euphrates Shield campaign did.

Meanwhile the Syrian Army is advancing against ISIS across central Syria. Russia’s state-owned Sputnik News recently quoted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s spokesman Bouthaina Shaaban saying that: “The Syrian forces will continue to advance in other areas, including Deir ez-Zur and in the direction of Raqqa.”

This Russian-backed Syrian regime offensive is unlikely to capture Raqqa before the US-backed SDF. The SDF are already in the city of al-Tabqa west of Raqqa after US forces airlifted them into battle there late last month. The last time the Syrian regime forces launched an offensive into Raqqa was in June 2016. However they were rapidly forced to withdraw from the entire province after ISIS reinforced their positions in Tabqa and launched a counteroffensive against them.

When ISIS is finally forced from Raqqa the regime will likely challenge the legitimacy of the SDF council there. It’s unclear how far the Americans would back the SDF against Assad after the ISIS threat is dealt with – especially in light of recent tensions between them, Assad, and Russia over the US rocketing of the Syrian regime’s Shayrat airbase earlier this month.

The future of Deir ez-Zur also remains in question. Any of these three possible outcomes could eventually unfold there:

1. ISIS overwhelm the isolated garrison of Syrian soldiers there and seize the entire city (possibly after withdrawing from Raqqa) before then losing it to a US-backed SDF offensive.

2. The SDF rout ISIS from part of the city and establish their council there, leaving the city divided between them and the regime forces. Not unlike the case with the YPG’s continued presence in Aleppo where the regime warned them last December to either withdraw or subjugate their forces under Syrian military command.

3. The Syrian regime arrive there before the SDF and seize the entire city before the council can establish itself there, like the aforementioned case with the Turks in al-Bab and Jarablus.

The SDF are reluctant to relinquish their hold over territories they’ve captured from ISIS through the sacrifice of their fighters and resources. They could possibly use Raqqa – and maybe even parts of Deir ez-Zur as well – in the future as a bargaining chip with the regime. Perhaps they could offer to cede control over it to Damascus in return for recognition of their federal system – which Assad recently called “temporary” – in the cantons and other areas of northeastern Syria they’ve controlled for years now.

SDF possession of these territories provide it with buffers against any potential future regime ground attacks on their territories as well as strategic depth against any potential Turkish invasion from the north. The main Kurdish cities of Kobani and Qamishli sit right on the Syrian-Turkish border in easy reach of Turkish artillery and tank fire. Therefore having territory controlled by friendly forces further south to withdraw to would enable the SDF/YPG areas to regroup and launch counterattacks. The SDF leadership are likely preparing contingencies to deal with such potential scenarios.

Ultimately whatever the case turns out to be it is clear that these future regions could become contentious, even bloody, flashpoints between the SDF and the Assad regime if their status is not conclusively resolved after ISIS’ removal.

Bangladesh has launched a unique war on home grown militants with clear ideological linkages with the Islamic State, even while dismissing speculations regarding the IS presence in the country, like reported by eurasiareview.com. Raids on militant dens, killings and arrests of militants have followed bigger and smaller terror attacks on Bangladeshi soil. Much of these terror neutralisation strategy, however, has remained mired in controversy and laced with allegations that the Awami League government could be attempting to protect its own interests while killing terrorists. This strategy of eliminating terrorism by eliminating terrorists may not be entirely effective, as Dhaka’spast endeavours demonstrate.

Overview

On 28 February 2017, 25-year old Amijul Islam was picked up by the Bangladesh police from Rajshahi district. A follow up official statement proclaimed Amijul to be the military chief (northern region) of the neo-Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), a militant group Dhaka describes as responsible for a number of terror attacks in the country in the past couple of years. Amijul’s family members, however, said that the young man was a petty electrician who struggled to make  a living by doing odd jobs. In the wee hours of 1 March, Amijul was killed in Bogra district. Police explained that Amijul who had been taken to the district to recover weapons and arrest his accomplices was shot by extremists who attacked the police van.

Similarly, 30-year old Khaled Hasan alias Badar Mama, the previous chief of neo-JMB’s north Bengal division too was killed in a mysterious pre-dawn shootout in Sherpur district on 29 August 2016.Badar Mama was allegedly involved in an attack on a temple and a bid to kill an Italian priest in 2015. In another incident, Hanif Mridha, arrested after the 17 March 2017 suicide attack on the barracks of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB),the country’s elite anti-crime and counter-terrorism force, died in custody the next day. While RAB claimed that Hanif, a neo-JMB cadre, was picked up while hiding in a bush, Mridha’s family members, however, claimed that he had been picked up by the police personnel on 27 February, three weeks before his death along with another friend Md Sohel Hossain Mantu. They also claimed that RAB personnel forced them to pay Tk 670,000 (US$ 8300) promising Hanif’s release. Hanif had a thriving transport business before his arrest. Sohel Hossain Mantu remains untraceable.

Kinetic operations plus

As Dhaka continues its counter-terrorism efforts against Islamist radicalism, especially after the 1 July 2016 terror attack on the popular Holey Artisan restaurant in Dhaka’ upmarket Gulshan area that killed 22 people, stories of such raids, encounters, and arrests appear on the front pages of newspapers, narrating the country’s progress in dealing with terror with an iron fist. Successive kinetic counter-terror operations- ‘Hit back’, ‘Maximus’, ‘Twilight’, ‘Storm 26′-have all been declared successes and have apparently ended up diminishing the strength of the Islamists. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, since the Holey Artisan restaurant attack, 78 Islamist terrorists have been killed and another 907 arrested across Bangladesh.

Arrested militants dying during incidents of crossfire or failed escape attempts, an euphemism for staged encounters, has at least a decade-long history in Bangladesh. The country broke the back of the ragtag left-wing extremism by relying on a similar tactic killing hundreds of so called extremists. Since 2005, the same tactic has been employed to subdue a new crop of militants. And Bangladesh earnestly believes that it can eliminate terrorism by eliminating terrorists. On September 3, 2016, Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan had said: “If you do not give yourself up to the law enforcement agencies, you will face what your accomplices have experienced in the immediate past operations.”

Killings of Amijul, Badar Mama, Hanif Mridha and others, thus, need to be seen in the wider context of the impunity that anti-terror forces such as the RAB, the police and the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) may have been provided with, to clean up Bangladesh. It is possible that majority of those eliminated were indeed terrorists. Even then, were they neutralised under a regime that promotes excesses and extra judicial killings and what would be the long and medium-term impact of such a strategy remain moot questions. That the ‘national’ desire to have a stable and trouble free Bangladesh may have eclipsed the principles of law was brought out by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in its 28 March 2017 report which criticised the country for high rates of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, muzzling of dissent and free speech. In addition, Bangladesh based human rights organisations like Ain O Salish Kendra (ASK) and Odhikar have documented the unceasing extrajudicial killings despite a 2008 promise by the Awami League in its election manifesto. According to the ASK, between 2010 and 14 March 2017, 793 such killings have taken place. The ASK says that killings have particularly increased since the formation of the RAB in 2004. “The incidence of ‘crossfires’ and ‘gunfights’ has increased in the name of ‘anti-militant drives’, it notes in a number of its documents. In 2017 (between 1 January and 14 March), at least 51 people were killed in gunfights or crossfires. Of them, 38 people were killed by police, six by RAB, five by Detective Branch (DB) police, one by joint forces and one by the army, according to an ASK report.

On 4 April 2017, Sveriges Radio, Sweden’s national publicly-funded broadcaster, aired parts of a conversation with a high-ranking RAB official.  The official, who himself has been involved in a number of extra judicial killings, confirmed that not all killing of militants are clean. “If you find him – shoot and kill him, wherever he is. And then plant a weapon beside him. This is often the order.” The official also said that such weapons are bought out of the money RAB collects from the criminals as bribes. He went on to explain the raison de etre: victims of extrajudicial killings are usually “people who they suspect of serious crimes, but who they consider too difficult to convict in a trial, or impossible to rehabilitate”. The RAB dismissed the report as “vague” and “unclear” and affirmed that it operates “in line with law”.

A Unique Effort

Notwithstanding the contradictory claims of the human rights groups and the security force establishment, massive operations against the Islamists in Bangladesh remains part of its unique counter terrorism policy. Firstly, as it continues to witness large as well as small terror attacks since past few years, the Awami League government continues to reject the claims and assumptions that the Islamic State could have been responsible for a majority of these attacks. Rejecting the claims made by the IS and evidences of inspirational linkages between the IS and the home grown radicals, Dhaka insists that the home grown neo-JMB is responsible for these terror attacks. Peculiarly, however, official estimates concede that the neo-JMB which surfaced in 2014, “is far more radicalized and fearsome” and is “influenced by the IS ideology”. Secondly, the country’s leadership  genuinely believes that reliance on a kinetic approach alone is sufficient to deal with such brand of terrorism. The official approach is best summed up in the 8 October 2016 statement of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina who said, “Our government has always taken stern action against terrorism and militancy and would continue to curb the twin demons with an iron hand”.

IS and Home-grown terror: Evidence of Linkages

Notwithstanding its denial, several pointers prove the ideological, logistical as well as inspirational  linkages between the IS and the Islamist radicals within Bangladesh.

Firstly, with regard to an end state, there is little that separates the JMB and the IS-inspired terrorists. Through the pamphlets left at the sites of the explosions in 2005, the JMB proclaimed itself to be the “soldiers of Allah” who have “taken up arms for the implementation of Allah’s law the way Prophet, Sahabis and heroic Mujahideen have done for centuries”. The Islamic State’s proposed caliphate works towards a similar objective, rejecting modernism and embracing anti-secular jihad against the apostates.

Secondly, Bangladeshi nationals have periodically featured in IS-sponsored videos calling for taking forward the group’s agenda of making Bangladesh a part of the proposed Islamic caliphate. Attacks have typically followed major IS announcements. The 17 March 2017 attack on the RAB barracks in Dhaka took place two days after the IS’ call for suicide attacks within Bangladesh.

Thirdly, amid IS claims owning responsibilities for a bulk of the attacks, investigations have established that funds, at least on one occasion, was donated to the neo-JMB terrorists by a doctor who fled to Syria. Rokonuddin Khondoker, a paediatrician of Dhaka Shishu Hospital who fled to Syria with his family in 2016 had asked several of his relatives and others who owed him around Taka 8 million (US$ 100,000) to give the money to the radical group instead of paying him back.Only a part of this money, however, reached the outfit. In addition, there have been instances when funds were moved from middle eastern countries into Bangladesh for carrying out terror attacks.

Fourthly, the pattern of attacks, since the attack on the Holey Artisan Cafe, too point at the consolidation of the IS in Bangladesh. Most recent attacks by the neo-JMB have targeted the security forces. This is a common occurring in countries where local outfits have graduated to become IS sympathisers. In Indonesia and Philippines, for instance,the recent IS-inspired attacks have mostly targeted the state structure.

Fifthly, the fact that suicide terrorism, arguably representing the highest state of radicalisation among the recruited, has been regularly employed in Bangladesh further point at a stark likelihood of IS influence over the trend of Islamist radicalism. In a country of moderate Islam, where culture is assigned prominence over religion, the terror formations have been able to recruit a sizeable number of people who are prepared to kill themselves in the name of religion. The neo-JMB carried out its first ever suicide attack on 26 December 2015 on an Ahmadiyya mosque in Rajshahi’s Baghmara. Since then a number of such attacks using suicide bombers have been carried out.

Contestations over Name

Even though similar attempts in the past to kill terrorists have not entirely succeeded in eliminating terrorism (the neo-JMB bounced back within few years of the marginalisation of its predecessor), Dhaka’s action reflects its concern regarding the rise of radicalism in the country. In this regard, the denial appears strange, although not completely out of place.

Firstly, Dhaka’s posture is a legacy of the past. There is an official history to this tactic of denying what is obvious. Even while the JMB carried out over 450 serial explosions in 63 of Bangladesh’s 64 districts in August 2005, then Home Minister of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) flatly refused to acknowledge the existence of the outfit. BNP’s senior policy makers described the bombings as the result of a “conspiracy”. Then Industries minister Maulana Matiur Rahman Nizami of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), BNP’s coalition partner, blamed India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Israeli Mossad for playing “an important role” in the attacks. It took eight days for the BNP government to admit that the JMB was behind the attack.

Secondly, Dhaka fears that admitting the intrusion of the IS into may affect the investment environment, especially in the country’s thriving garment industry, whichhas withstood world economic meltdowns and competitions from rival countries. Garment industry in Bangladesh is worth US$26 billion, represents 80 percent of Bangladesh’s exports, and employs four million people.Demonstrating that the terror is perpetrated by local actors who can be curbed effectively by state, the government hopes to prevent steps of the foreign brands who pulled out their staff following the 1 July Holey Artisan restaurant attack.

And thirdly, Dhaka also feels that admitting the IS presence may weaken its ongoing action against the Pakistan collaborators in the 1971 war of liberation. For a good measure the neo-JMB is linked to outfits like the Jamaat-e-Islami and Islami Chattra Shibir many of whose leaders have either already been hanged or are currently facing judicial action. There is some level of pressure from the Americans and the British on Dhaka to go slow on this processes which have been described as hasty and not entirely legal.

Conclusion

There is no denying that Islamist militancy poses a grave danger to Bangladesh’s security antid stability. However, the ability of kinetic operations alone to deal with the threat which has deep roots in the country’s polarised politics and unhindered mobilisation of radical Islam is limited. Since such efforts in the past against the JMB have only been temporarily successful, there are ample reasons to believe that present efforts, no more than replicas of the past, will only produce limited results. Moreover, with a licence to kill and arrest people, many of whom would probably be innocents, without legal oversight, such operations may actually contribute to the recruitment and mobilisation capacities of the Islamists.

After Syria, Afghanistan is emerging as a new theatre of Russian-American power struggle, with growing Russian involvement in the war-torn country, like reported by eurasiareview.com. The Western drawdown from Afghanistan in 2014 has allowed Moscow to flex its muscle in its backyard. This will lead to new geopolitical rivalries in South Asia.

The United States under President Donald Trump has snubbed a Russian invitation to attend its initiative on Afghanistan on 14 April 2017. This development has taken place as Afghanistan is emerging as a new theatre of Russian-American power rivalry with Moscow’s return to the conflict-ridden country after an aloofness of almost three decades. Buoyed by its strategic incursion in Crimea and the success of its military diplomacy in Syria, Russia is now overtly asserting itself in Afghanistan.

Taking advantage of the geopolitical opening created by an uncertain US foreign policy and the drawdown of Western forces from Afghanistan in 2014, Moscow is trying to outflank Washington in Afghanistan. This marks a significant shift in Moscow’s traditional Afghan policy of neutrality.

Russia’s Afghan Initiative

Russia held the third meeting of its Afghan initiative in Moscow on 14 April 2017. The stage for these talks was set in December 2016 when Moscow hosted a trilateral dialogue with Islamabad and Beijing. Another round of consultations, comprising six nations — Russia, China, Pakistan, India, Iran and Afghanistan — was held in Moscow on 15 February 2017. In both meetings, the NATO and United States were not invited. When Russia invited the US for the April talks, Washington refused.

The US refusal to participate in the 14 April meeting indicates its growing discomfort with Russia’s Afghan overtures. The Trump administration considers it as direct interference in Afghanistan.

This will potentially give birth to new geopolitical rivalries while further complicating the existing ones. Broadly, this will split the region into two rival political blocs of local and global powers: Russia-China-Iran-Pakistan-Central Asian States versus the US-India-NATO-Afghanistan.

US-Russian Divergences on Afghanistan

Russia and the US have divergent outlooks about the situation in Afghanistan. Moscow views the Islamic state of Khurasan (ISK), a regional affiliate of the self-styled Islamic State (IS) in the Af-Pak region—as the major regional security threat. On the contrary, America and its NATO allies view the Afghan Taliban as the major source of instability in Afghanistan.

Moscow maintains that its ties with the Taliban are limited to peace negotiations and countering ISK’s influence. On the contrary, Washington believes Russia-Taliban contacts are to undermine the US and NATO mission in Afghanistan. The former advocates a flexible approach towards the Taliban, while the latter considers renunciation of violence, delinking of Taliban’s ties with Al-Qaeda and the recognition of the Afghan constitution and government as pre-conditions for peace talks.

Moreover, Russia views the American proposal of moderate troop surge and increased military spending in Afghanistan as a recipe for more war and destabilisation. On the other hand, the US considers support of the Afghan Taliban by Russia, Iran and Pakistan as the major source of instability in the country.

In addition, Russia alleges that the US forces have not done enough to check the rise and expansion of ISK in Afghanistan. Moscow views the growing presence of ISK fighters in Afghanistan’s northern provinces near the Central Asian states with suspicion. It alleges that the US is using ISK as a proxy in Afghanistan.

However, the US rejects such allegations, pointing out that 15 top commanders of ISK, including its emir Hafiz Saeed Khan Orakzai, have been killed in US drone strikes and the territorial footprint of the terror group has been reduced from nine to three districts in Afghanistan.

New and Old Geopolitical Rivalries

Such divergent and opposing outlooks of the Afghan conflict, even before the start of a formal dialogue process, is ominous. It will complicate the regional geopolitics turning Afghanistan into a battleground for proxy wars. The inclusion of Russian competition with the US and NATO, in addition to ongoing power games between India and Pakistan, as well as between Iran and Saudi Arabia, will work to the advantage of the militant groups in Afghanistan.

US and NATO’s financial assistance bankroll the Afghan economy while their military presence in Afghanistan has ensured the survival of the Afghan National Unity Government (NUG). Without the US inclusion, a durable and realistic solution of the Afghan conflict looks difficult.

At the same time, continued US military presence without exploring a realistic and flexible political solution will further destabilise Afghanistan. Arguably, when 150,000 US and NATO troops in Afghanistan could not break the deadlock of the Afghan conflict, a meagre increase of 3,000 to 4,000 troops will not make any difference.

The failure of the US and Russia to reconcile their differences on Afghanistan can potentially turn Afghanistan into another Syria which will negatively affect the regional and global peace. The Russian and American concerns respectively over ISK’s presence and Al-Qaeda and Taliban links are best addressed if the two sides cooperate instead of compete for regional influence.

Old Peace Initiatives and Way Forward

If history is any guide, all major initiatives so far to broker a ceasefire agreement between Kabul and the Taliban have failed. The fate of the Russian peace initiative does not seem to be an exception to this rule. In 2013, the US-led initiatives known as the “Qatar process” crashed after the Taliban hoisted their official flag and plaque ahead of the talks in Doha. The then US administration and the former Afghan President Hamid Karzai rejected the move and pulled out of negotiations.

After a gap of two years, another effort was made to revive the peace talks in 2015, under the Quadrilateral Coordination Group comprising the US, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The QCG talks came to a halt in mid-2015 with the disclosure of the death of Taliban’s founding leader Mullah Umar. In early 2016, another effort was underway to rekindle the QCG dialogue, when the US killed the new Taliban chief Mullah Akhtar Mansoor in a drone attack in Pakistan’s Balochistan province and dashed hopes of restarting the peace talks.

Notwithstanding the divergent US and Russian perspectives of the Afghan war, the core dispute remains the discord between the Taliban and the NUG. The US presence in Afghanistan, regional states’ interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs and the rise of opportunistic groups like ISK are irritants and by-products of the lingering conflict. If a political compromise between Kabul and the Taliban is reached, it will be easy to tackle the irritants.

Pakistan, which has suffered the most because of the unrest in Afghanistan, along with China, should play a bridging role instead of taking sides in this emerging geopolitical situation. The regional and global powers need to take a bipartisan view of the situation in Afghanistan. Reviving the QCG process and expanding it to include Russia and India offers the most viable diplomatic framework to end the war in Afghanistan.

After a five-year hiatus, hijackers have taken five vessels in the past month, like reported by economist.com

Between 2008 and 2011, the waters off the coast of Somalia were the most treacherous shipping lanes in the world. More than 700 attacks on vessels took place in this period. In early 2011, 758 seafarers were being held hostage by pirates. Hijackings cost the shipping industry and governments as much as $7bn in 2012. But then, quite suddenly, the banditry stopped. The last hijacking of a merchant vessel occurred in May 2012. Until now. There have been five confirmed incidents of piracy on the Gulf of Aden in the past month, beginning with the kidnapping of a Sri Lankan crew of the Aris 13 oil tanker on March 13th (they were later released without a ransom). After a five-year hiatus, piracy seems to have returned to the Horn of Africa. Why?

Attacks had slumped in large part thanks to beefed-up security measures. Rocketing insurance premiums meant shipping companies were forced to invest in armed guards, and to chart longer, safer routes far from the Somali coast. Since armed guards first started crewing ships as protection against Somali pirates, none of their charges have been successfully hijacked. But smaller vessels keen to cut costs have grown complacent in recent months. The Comoros-flagged Aris 13 was sailing close to the shore, and slow enough to attract attention. There were no armed guards on board. There were also fewer international naval patrols in the area than there had been.

But as when the first wave of piracy struck these waters back in the early 2000s, conditions on shore matter most. Somalia remains under-governed and mired in conflict. Puntland and Galmudug, the two federal states nearest the most recent hijackings, are particularly troubled even by Somali standards. Galmudug currently has no president and the regional government is stuck in an existential battle against Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a, a local Islamist militia. Puntland’s government is more capable but has problems paying its security forces. Islamic State has been making inroads. And both, like the rest of Somalia, are suffering from a devastating drought. Young men are easy prey for the organised gangs that conduct piracy operations, especially those in coastal towns who have long complained about rampant illegal fishing in Somali waters, to which the international community has largely turned a blind eye.

Observers should be wary of proclaiming piracy’s return, cautions Timothy Walker of the Institute for Security Studies—since it never really went away. The same gangs still operate, much like the clan-based militias that plague Somalia on land. Many remain involved in other forms of criminal activity, such as drugs smuggling. While the Aris 13 was the first large merchant vessel to be hijacked in four years, smaller ones, most often local fishings boats, have continued to be targeted. It is suspected that many more incidents go unreported. A lack of international victims had made it easy for the world’s attention to move elsewhere. But until piracy ceases to be an attractive business opportunity it will remain a plague.

Trump has a limited agenda: Eradicate ISIS, empower the Kurds and eject Iran and Hezbollah from Syria, like reported by middle-east-online.com

In June 1982, US Secretary of State Alexander Haig warned Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin that he could not invade Lebanon without a viable pretext. Weeks later, Israel’s ambassador to Britain, Shlomo Argov, barely survived an assassination attempt in London by a Palestinian terrorist group led by the notorious Abu Nidal.

Israeli leaders knew that Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) had nothing to do with it and was even battling Abu Nidal itself.

That did not really matter to them. Rafael Eitan, Israel’s action-man military commander at the time, famously said, “Abu Nidal, Abu Shmidal. I really don’t care; we need to screw the PLO!”

The Argov shooting was the pretext they had been waiting for to invade Lebanon in Ariel Sharon’s grandiose plan to wipe out the PLO once and for all.

Israeli forces struck on June 5, 1982, in a war that did not really end until May 2000 when Israel terminated its occupation of South Lebanon.

Much of that analogy applies to Syria today.

When US President Donald Trump ordered a missile attack on Syria on April 7, perhaps he did not really care about the children who died two days earlier in a chemical attack allegedly by the Syrian Air Force on Khan Sheikhoun in north-western Syria.

It was not the first time this has happened, after all, and, in 2013, Trump famously opposed Barack Obama’s plans to strike the Damascus regime over alleged chemical weapons violations, tweeting: “What will we get from bombing Syria besides more debt and a possible long-term conflict?”

During Trump’s presidential campaign he was fairly consistent on Syria, saying he could tolerate the Damascus regime because it was fighting the Islamic State (ISIS) and that he would never pick a fight with Russia over Syria because that would trigger a third world war.

In early April, statements by White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and UN Ambassador Nikki Haley effectively abandoned the US policy of seeking Syrian President Bashar Assad’s removal.

Trump reportedly changed on all that after seeing photographs of children killed in the chemical attack. He decided to strike, without waiting for a proper investigation of the alleged atrocity, without consulting Congress and without going through the United Nations.

Even with nearly 60 Tomahawk missiles fired, it was a swift and limited strike, which unless followed by more serious action, will not deter Assad and his Russian allies and only adds another layer of complexity to an already convoluted crisis.

The strike infuriated Russian President Vladimir Putin. It was likely humiliating for him, both within Syria and internationally.

On April 9, the Joint Command Operations Centre in Syria, which includes the Damascus regime, Iran and Russia, warned the United States against further military action, reinforced support for Assad and accused the Americans of crossing a “red line.”

They cannot respond directly to the Americans if another strike is launched but they can certainly make life difficult for US allies in the region, starting with Saudi Arabia in Yemen and running through Israel’s border with Lebanon.

So why did Trump strike Syria? First, he badly needed to remind everybody, including the American public that, unlike Obama, he is a man of action.

The strike was made while he hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping, so the Tomahawks can be seen as a cautionary message to China of US military might as well as an early warning to North Korea over its provocative missile tests.

“It is in the vital national security interests of America to prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical weapons,” Trump declared, branding Assad a “dictator” but stopping short of calling on him to step down.

In Damascus and Moscow, many believe that Trump was under so much pressure to strike Syria that he finally did, and now has room to manoeuvre politically in hammering out a Syrian endgame.

From the tone of Russia’s joint statement with Iran, both are obviously worried but somewhat assured that US military action will not escalate.

Trump after all is certainly not after democracy in Syria. Far from it. He has a limited agenda: Eradicate ISIS, empower the Kurds who are vital for the war against the jihadists, and eject Iran and Hezbollah from Syria.

He might now add another priority, creating a safe zone that would prevent Syrian ground and air operations in places such as Raqqa, de facto capital of ISIS’s shrinking caliphate, which Trump hopes will soon be overrun.

What he likely hopes to have achieved with the April 7 strikes is convincing the Syrians that he means business and should not be taken lightly or as a natural ally of Putin.

In 2013 during the first confrontation over chemical weapons, for Syria the price of avoiding US intervention was surrendering its chemical arsenal or seeming to.

The price of avoiding confrontation now would appear to be accepting Trump’s terms on Syria — and they do not apparently include regime change in Damascus.

However, in the Kremlin many argue that if Trump can change his mind once in the course of a week, he could do so again.

The killer of British student Hannah Bladon is a 57-year-old east Jerusalem resident, much older than most lone wolf attackers seen previously

The latest terrorist attack Friday in Jerusalem, during which British student Hannah Bladon was murdered, differed in at least one aspect from the patterns which have characterized the wave of terrorism that has plagued Israel for the last 19 months, like reported by jpost.com .

Her killer, east Jerusalem resident Jamil Tamimi, who has a long record of psychiatric problems, was 57. This makes him one of the oldest, if not the oldest, Palestinian to be involved in such an incident.

Since September 2015, which the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) considers the beginning of the latest wave of terrorism, more than 40 Israelis and two foreigners have been killed. Most of the perpetrators fell under the definition of “lone-wolf” assailants. They didn’t belong to any organization and their decisions to kill Israelis were capricious and made without any serious preparations. Their weapon of choice was not a gun but instruments such as knives, stones or vehicles. And they were all much younger than Tamimi – many were teenagers or in their 20s.

Some of them sympathized with Hamas or Islamic Jihad, but had no previously known affiliation with such groups.

A significant number of the violent incidents happened in Jerusalem, some of them on the Jerusalem Light Rail, which travels through Arab neighborhoods of the city and thus is easily accessible for would-be killers.

We still don’t know what Tamimi’s motives were – he is still under investigation – but we do know that he tried in the past to commit suicide.

He may have been under the influence of Palestinian incitement, or was perhaps trying to copycat previous incidents. Nevertheless, what has been evident in this latest wave is that some of the assailants, both male and female, resorted to terrorism out of personal desperation or economic distress. Some of them took kitchen knives and approached soldiers or police officers hoping to be killed.

The murder of a British student who was on an exchange program at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem may have some effect on tourism, especially in the capital. Before Passover and Easter, the Shin Bet expressed its concern and issued warnings based on intelligence that the holidays pose a major risk. Indeed, before Passover or Bladon’s murder, there was a relative increase in violence compared to the period before.

But according to the Shin Bet, overall the number of Palestinian terrorist attacks in the West Bank, Jerusalem and throughout Israel as a whole has declined in the last few months. The overall estimate by the Shin Bet and the IDF remains the same.

Hamas is interested in increasing terrorist attacks in the West Bank and Israel, while it is in the interest of the Palestinian Authority and its security services, which are cooperating with their Israeli counterparts, to restrain violence.

Israel is probably not facing a new major wave of terrorism, and the pattern – ups and downs in intensity – will probably continue to repeat itself in the foreseeable future. However, the Palestinian predicament – lack of diplomatic progress, the feeling that the Israeli government is interested only in the status quo, mistrust between the two sides and the loss of hope of achieving a deal, any deal – is not going to fade away. All of these problems are ingredients for perpetuating the patterns of violence and terrorism.

Organizational structure, current leadership and clues to inner workings in Syria and Iraq, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

If ISIS were the German Nazis, the Emni (al-Amnyah in proper Arabic), i.e. the ISIS security/intelligence forces would be the Gestapo and the Abwehr combined. The civilians in its held territories would be the Imperial Japanese Army’s comfort women. The Emni is feared by ISIS members and civilians alike. As one of the most ruthless non-state actors,

ISIS is terrorized by a devil of its own making, with Saddam’s former intelligence officers in the core of its inception. Since its origin, the Emni has instilled fear in its members, rival fighting groups, and civilians alike. From the killing of journalists and rivals, both in their strongholds and abroad, to plotting terrorist attacks in Europe, the Emni is instrumental in the execution of most, if not all, of ISIS’ atrocities. Arguably, the Emni also has far reaching influence on the global psyche and policy. This faction of ISIS is creating events on a monthly basis that are fuelling anti-immigrant sentiments and Islamophobia globally. From the rise of right wing movements and parties in Europe to the Muslim travel ban in the United States, the Emni, through their continuous operations and threats, have elicited tribalism across the globe as well as eroded sympathy for Syrians fleeing both Assad’s and ISIS’s brutal atrocities.

We are not asking you to be Philip K. Dick, but if you were to imagine a world without ISIS, would Brexit have happened? Would the United States limit, or prevent, victims of the Syrian war from finding a refuge in the nation of immigrants? If you have that vivid of an imagination, would Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, and Geert Wilders be global household names? The irony here is of course is that these three loathe nothing more than globalization. Which leads to the question of whether ISIS has had significant influence in making the liberal world order and globalization become so indecent in the West? Would the party of Reagan have abandoned its President’s hallowed faith in the brotherhood of men if it weren’t for embracing public paranoia fuelled by free trade and amplified by terrorism? If terrorism is a tool to exert influence on a rival’s psyche, then unfortunately ISIS is already winning. Terrorism only works when we are scared of the perpetrators enough to radically change our behaviors and political stances. For ISIS, Islamophobia and fear great enough to block helpless Syrians fleeing the terrorist group, equate to their mission accomplished. We cannot imagine that the mess we are in is the result of some sort of grand strategy by the Emni. However, we are witnessing devolution from the new world order; the EU has been hit hard and members of NATO have had to put up with many compromises, and the West is increasingly abandoning its multilateral commitments and liberal values.

Even if the Emni has only a marginal influence on the aforementioned historical events, we must understand the impact and role of this entity within ISIS. However, to reach this understanding we need to know what is the Emni? How did it come into being? Who is behind it? What kind of influence does it exert? Where does it operate? Why does it cultivate such a reputation of forcefulness? Approaching this topic we have both the need and the urgency to learn more. The first step to resolve a problem is to identify and gather as much information as possible about it. Realizing this mission would be insufficient if it relied only on published research and open-source information, it also incorporates a number of trusted on-the-ground local Syrian sources to gather intelligence information about the Emni and relies on previous ICSVE research.

The Arabic Teacher

Delving deep into our investigation endeavouring to understand the Emni, a pattern in the puzzle pieces starts to emerge, the repeating name of Abu Luqman or Abu Luqman al-Soori. To even our bravest and most courageous sources, the name brought horror, dismay, and bitterness. It became clear that only way to learn about the operations of the Emni lay in our sources’ ability to collect information about Abu Luqman who was born as Ali Juma al-Shwakh in the Syrian town of al-Sahel, Raqqa governate in 1973. At thirty-four years of age, he is a father of five; three boys and two girls. Abu Luqman graduated in 2002 from the faculty of Arts and Humanities (Department of Arabic) from the University of Aleppo.

After graduating with a bachelor’s degree in Arabic literature, he started his mandatory military service in the Syrian army. As a first lieutenant in the Syrian Military Intelligence, Abu Luqman spent a part of his uniformed service in the city of Ras al-Ayn, al-Hasakah. During his time in Ras al-Ayn, he was an effective operative and was well liked by his superior. First lieutenant is the highest achievable rank for mandatory service recruits, suggesting that Abu Luqman managed to get the recognition of the permanent professionals at the Military Intelligence Directorate. That recognition took him to the headquarters of Military Intelligence at the Defence Ministry in Damascus. As a Sunni Syrian, a minority in Syrian intelligence, his Damascus assignment implies that he was highly trusted—for a Sunni.

After concluding his military service Abu Luqman returned to al-Sahel, Raqqa governate to teach Arabic in al-Sahel al-Garbi School from 2005 to 2010. During his time as an Arabic teacher, he used to frequent Iqra book store in the city of Raqqa where he was exposed to Salafi books, CDs of executions and their sharia justifications, speeches and audio books promoting militant jihad. In hindsight and in reconciliation with available data, we suspect Abu Luqman’s second half of uniformed service at the Military Intelligence Directorate headquarters may have pushed him towards the dark and extreme corners of the Sunni sect alongside political events occurring in the region. The Military Intelligence Directorate is largely made of Alawites, a sub-branch of Islam that is also al-Assad’s sect. Sunni Syrians are mostly excluded when it comes to permanent positions within the directorate. Abu Luqman was not a permanent professional but rather among the recruits serving their mandatory service. The general sentiment within the directorate is that Sunnis are not to be trusted or promoted to high ranks, something that may have weighted heavily on a Sunni who had managed to penetrate their ranks.

Meanwhile as of 2002, the Syrian regime permitted Iranian agents to preach in Raqqa governorate. One of the Iranian Islamic Revolution’s missions was to spread Shiites’ values and revolutionary ideals globally. In this same time frame the U.S. Coalition forces had invaded Iraq followed by Jordanian leader Abu Musab Zarqawi having entered the fray and setting of horrific sectarian violence there. Zarqawi named the Shia as al-Qaeda in Iraq’s main enemy and strongly encouraged all Sunnis to unite under the banner of militant jihad. This at a time when Syrian Sunnis were also feeling increasingly marginalized and targeted. It is suspected that the discrimination and lack of trust that Abu Luqman experienced during his time at Military Intelligence Directorate, anger over the U.S. invasion of Iraq along with the increasing sectarian tension between Shiites and Sunnis there, precipitated his finding refuge in an Islamist political movement that opposed the Syrian regime and claimed to unite Sunnis in the search for a just Islamic form of governance. Moreover, information obtained from trusted sources confirm that Abu Luqman idealized Saddam Hussein and had some positive views of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

For a marginalized Sunni Baathist (the Baath Party currently leads Syria and used to be Iraq’s leading party, although in Iraq—unlike Syria, the Iraqi Baathists were predominantly Sunni), al-Qaeda in Iraq appealed to him. One element would have been their common enemy i.e. Shiites as rivals and proxies of the Iranian-led anti-Sunni campaign which was becoming bloodier and increasingly barbaric in neighbouring Iraq. This occurring as Shiites were increasingly put into power in Iraq while prominent Sunni Baathists serving in the military and intelligence had been sent home without jobs or even pensions. Being a marginalized Sunni and a Baathist, Abu Luqman likely identified with al-Qaeda in Iraq given the role former Iraqi Baathists played in that organisation.

Abu Luqman’s affection to al-Qaeda in Iraq put him on the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate’s radar. In early months of 2010, Abu Luqman was arrested on charges of sedition. He was detained at the Sednaya military prison. On the surface he was just an Arabic teacher, a marginalized Sunni who was arrested in a wave of another political suppression campaign. However, information obtained from trusted sources suggests that Abu Luqman was already at that time at least an al-Qaeda sympathiser and perhaps already much more.

Sednaya-Jihad Connection

The Sednaya military prison, 30 kilometres north of Damascus, is known for torture and extrajudicial executions. The facilities are used to detained political opposition, be it Islamists, Kurds, or Communists. According to WikiLeaks, the American embassy in Damascus cabled the Central Intelligence Agency, among others, details confirming a massacre that took a place in Sednaya prison in 2008. Contents of the leak suggest that most of the detainees at the facilities were Islamists and Kurds.

It is known that Bashar al-Assad feared the U.S. led coalition of Iraq and worried that he might be next on the list of dictators toppled by Western powers. As a result, Sunni insurgents and suicide bombers were allowed to launch through Syria. Haji Bakr, a former Saddam’s Iraqi intelligence official who is credited with providing the game plan for forming ISIS in Syria and later its launch into Iraq worked hand-in-hand with Assad’s intelligence during the U.S. led invasion of Iraq to launch these Sunni actors to fight the Americans. Based on obtained leaks information, after the toppling of Saddam’s government the Syrian regime also offered Islamist detainees in Sednaya prison military training in Syria to join the Islamist insurgency fighting against American forces in Iraq. Moreover, the cable also showed that upon the return of these militant Islamists from their time in Iraq, some were sent by the Syrian regime to Lebanon, some remained at large, and others were rearrested and detained at the Sednaya prison. Starting in July 2008, a cadre of those re-incarcerated led two riots in the prison resulting in the deaths of approximately one hundred detainees, a number of military personnel, and unspecified numbers of injuries. By December 2008 the Syrian regime regained control of the facilities. The cited leak suggests that one justification for the Islamists’ success in holding hostages, getting their demands of food met, and retaining control over parts of the facilities was due to the training they received from the Syrian regime and the combat experience they had gained in Iraq.

As mentioned earlier, Abu Luqman was arrested and detained in the Sednaya prison in early 2010. In the course of our investigation we obtained evidence indicating that during the period of his incarceration, Abu Luqman became a very close friend of Fiwaz Muhammad al-Kurdi al-Hiju (a.k.a. Abu Ali al-Shari) and Ahmad al-Nasir (a.k.a. Abu Yousif). Sources reported that al-Hiju had fought against the American forces in Iraq sometime before 2008. He was born in 1956 and spent some time in Saudi Arabia before 2002. Al-Hiju was also a Salafist whose knowledge of sharia rules and justifications was highly respected among Islamists in the prison. It is suspected that al-Hiju tipped the scale in transforming Abu Luqman from a radical Islamist sympathizer into a violent jihadist.

In early stages of the Syrian uprising, Assad’s regime blamed the upheaval on foreign conspirators, the U.S. and its allies, and terrorists. That narrative was largely ridiculed by the media and watchdogs. The Syrian regime issued a number of amnesties releasing a large number of Islamists from the Sednaya prison perhaps in hope of their subsequent actions supporting Assad’s narrative of terrorists threatening the regime. Three of the most prominent prisoners released at that time went on to become the heads of three of the most powerful Islamist groups in Syria. Those Islamist leaders are: Hassan Abboud, the former leader of Ahrar al-Sham; Zahran Alloush, the former leader of Jaysh al-Islam; and Ahmad Aisa al-Shaykh, the former commander of Suqour al-Sham Brigade.

Our investigation shows that Abu Luqman and his friends, Fiwaz Muhammad al-Kurdi al-Hiju and Ahmad al-Nasir; all became key members of ISIS. Al-Hiju became the highest sharia judge during the early months of ISIS’ takeover of the city of Raqqa. As of late March 2017, Ahmad al-Nasir was the Emir (head) of ISIS’ death squads and Abu Luqman had become the Wali (general director) of the ISIS Emni (ISIS’s intelligence and security forces). To establish a better understating of the Emni, it is important to examine Abu Luqman’s activities after his release from prison and before he became its Wali, or general director.

Al-Nusra Front and the Conspiracy

A while after his release from Sednaya military prison, sometime after February 2012, Abu Luqman joined the ranks of al-Nusra Front (a.k.a. Jabhat al-Nusra, renamed now as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. He operated as a low-rank fighter for the group in Tabqa in Raqqa governate, Syria. In March 2013, Abu Luqman appeared in Raqqa governorate emerging as a key player there for al-Nusra Front. During his rise in the ranks, he was in contact with Fiwaz Muhammad al-Kurdi al-Hiju (a.k.a. Abu Ali al-Shari), his friend from the Sednaya prison. As mentioned earlier, al-Hiju was one of the detainees trained by the Syrian regime to fight against the American forces in Iraq who was then rearrested and detained in the same prison after returning to Syria and who later rose to a leadership role in ISIS.

At the time Abu Luqman recontacted his friend, al-Hiju had become a key player in ISIS. A number of trusted sources reported that the two men held five meetings in al-Sahel, Raqqa. Through al-Hiju, Abu Luqman clandestinely met the leadership of ISIS in Raqqa during his time in al-Nusra. ISIS has shown itself adept at co-opting al-Nusra leadership into their ranks but not openly, instead sending them back to gather intelligence, assassinate key leaders and clear a path for overtaking the rival group in battles. Many defectors told the second author of such plots carried out by ISIS to overtake al-Nusra leadership. Abu Luqman is reported to have clandestinely switched over to ISIS and that he proposed a plan through which he would eliminate Abu Saad al-Hatherami, the leading figure of al-Nusra Front in Raqqa, thereby helping ISIS to takeover their territory.

Abu Luqman’s uniformed service in Syrian Military Intelligence as a first lieutenant had arguably made him an effective undercover operative. He succeeded in providing evidence against al-Hatherami to the Nusra leadership, casting doubt on his superior loyalty to al-Nusra Front and causing al-Hatherami to be labelled an infidel and enemy of Islam. Abu Luqman proved his worth to ISIS’ leadership after executing al-Hatherami and succeeding him. Already as a leading figure of al-Nusra Front in Raqqa, Abu Luqman had gained the respect of violent jihadists in Raqqa. He alone had executed around 50 solders of al-Assad’s army in a public display of ruthlessness. That act of savagery alone made him the most feared jihadist in Raqqa.

Abu Luqman’s mercilessness, calculating, increasing popularity and rise in al-Nusra Front’s ranks did not deter him from pursuing the plan he proposed to ISIS’ leadership in Raqqa. In fact it helped him to rise in ISIS as well as he defected from al-Nusra while helping to destroy it from the inside. Abu Luqman, while still inside al-Nusra, but already working for ISIS effectively facilitated the desertion of around 630 foreign and local fighters from al-Nusra Front, persuading them to join ISIS when his defection and switch to ISIS became publically known, which raised the number of ISIS fighters to 2,300 in Raqqa city. That in turn weakened al-Nusra Front significantly. Two weeks after his public desertion from al-Nusra Front, Abu Luqman emerged as a key player in ISIS’s ranks.

The Rise of the Emni’s “Father”

As already discovered, the ISIS plans to take over villages, set up intelligence cells and to conquer from within was conceived by Saddam’s former intelligence operative, Haji Bakr whose files were discovered in Syria after his death and reported by Christopher Reuter of der Spiegel. Haji Bakr conceived the blueprint to set up the ISIS Emni, but now following Haji Bakr’s death, Abu Luqman was rising to become an increasingly prominent member of ISIS as the Emni became a formalized entity within the now declared Islamic State. Two events were reported to be behind his rise. First, he managed to use his tribal connections to recruit a significant number of fighters. Belonging to the Syrian al-Ajeel tribe, he used the help of Ibrahim al-Hindi, a key tribal figure, to recruit members of al-Ajeel. Secondly, he led a large group of hundreds of hardened fighters that had deserted al-Nusra Front to operate for ISIS. Under his leadership, that group managed to defeat a number of groups that were affiliated with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) –one of ISIS’s most hated enemies.

In April 2013, Abu Luqman and his fighters executed 1,273 captured fighters from groups affiliated with the FSA, making a public display of their remains in the yard of the Public Hospital in Raqqa. Moreover, he gave the remaining FSA’s affiliates an ultimatum: “Either join ISIS or suffer the same fate.” The remains of the executed FSA’s affiliates were buried in two locations; one in Salhabia Charqui, Raqqa governorate, and the other to the south of the main irrigation canal. A week after that ultimatum, around 5,750 new recruits joined the ranks of ISIS. A significant portion of these new recruits was from his tribe and former FSA affiliates. A middleman was entrusted by Abu Luqman to oversee the recruitment and vetting of former FSA affiliates to ensure their loyalty. Assigned because of his tribal connections and friendship with Abu Luqman, this middleman was Hwaydi al-Shlash from al-Mishlab, Raqqa governorate.

During the first few months of ISIS’ takeover of Raqqa, (after April 2013) Abu Luqman became an increasingly prominent member and key operative for ISIS. He was reported to oversee and conduct the public executions and following display of the corpses of foreign nationals (fighters and civilians), journalists (local only), and fighters from rival groups (e.g., Ahrar al-Sham, al-Nusra Front, FSA’s affiliates). At first, he used the administrative building at Tabqa Dam as an operations base. It was from this base that he established a key detention facility, ran the ISIS Emni (ISIS’ security and intelligence forces), Nukta 11 (Point 11) death squads, Chechen squads (i.e. the hardened fighters coming from the Caucases Emirate), Islamic police (i.e. the hisbah), military police, and the special operations office.

Within a year of joining the ranks of ISIS, Abu Luqman became Raqqa’s Wali or governor. Notably, ISIS also set up sharia and training camps for its new recruits near the Tabqa prison making it possible that beheadings of prisoners could be arranged for new recruits to carry out at the end of their sharia training as they gave their bayats to ISIS.

It is remarkable that Abu Luqman has chosen to leave the position of the Wali a number of times. It is reported that he currently spends most of his time with the organization as the leading figure of the Emni in Syria and a leader of infiltration squads in the battlefield. The infiltration squads (a.k.a. Anghmasiiyn) are made of armed units that penetrate rival forces. They do so by advancing undetected or stay behind to cause maximum damage, as major forces retreat. Moreover, Abu Luqman was very close to Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (born as Taha Subhi Falaha). Al-Adnani was the official spokesperson and a senior leader of ISIS, acting as the second in charge to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. He was also in charge of the ISIS Emni including planning and executing operations outside of ISIS territory Abu Luqman and al-Adnani were seen together a number of times in the city of Raqqa. Additionally, before U.S. forces killed al-Adnani in the city of al-Bab, (near Aleppo) Syria in August of 2016, Abu Luqman was fighting alongside him. As of late August 2016, Abu Luqman was seriously injured around al-Bab city, sustaining injuries to his back. And in early September 2016 he was brought to the outskirts of Raqqa to obtain medical attention.

Taken altogether, in reconciliation with information obtained from trusted sources, a number of factors that facilitated Abu Luqman’s radicalization and rise in ISIS’ ranks were thoroughly demonstrated. His story, at certain level, resembles the one of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Both were educated, spent time in detention in the company of violent jihadists, and were part of al-Qaeda affiliated groups in some capacity before joining ISIS and turning against al-Qaeda. This section mentions that Abu Luqman is one of the key architects of the ISIS’ security/intelligence forces or the Emni. It is noteworthy that the Emni’s operations and structure has evolved over the years following its inception. Like Saddam’s former intelligence officer, Haji Bakr before him, Abu Luqman’s years of uniformed service in Syrian military intelligence allowed him to put his same experience of tactics employed by the Syrian regime into practice.

The Current Organizational Hierarchy of The Emni

The organizational structure of the Emni has been deduced from collected intelligence. As shown in the following figure, the Emir or General Director reports to the Caliphate House Office. The Emni encompasses two committees; one operates from Syria and the other from Iraq. Each committee is made up of six members, including the Emir or director of the committee. Information obtained indicates that the Emir of the Emni in each country maintains influence over death squads, Chechen squads, Islamic police or the hisbah, military police, and the special operations office. The aforementioned squads, both police units, and the special operations office also operate independently of the Emni. However, the later maintain a supervisory role over them. The intelligence also uncovered that orders, as usual for ISIS, flow top to bottom while operation reports go in the opposite direction.

It is unclear whether the key architect of the Emni as it now stands, Abu Luqman, had this grand scheme in mind when he established the forces. Given Haji Bakr’s similar structure that he was putting in place before Abu Luqman came to power it appears it was their mutual grand design, one building on the foundation left by the other. That said, the structure of the Emni provides its Emir or general director with the ability to influence critical operations and departments. To that effect, presenting the organizational hierarchy at this stage is the appropriate point of departure before delving into the complex relationships and operations associated with the Emni.

Making of a Wali

As of late September 2016, following the assassination of al Adnani, Abu Luqman stepped up to becoming the Emir (director) of the Emni in Syria. At that point Abu Luqman seemed unstoppable. He managed to gain even more power and influence. In just two weeks he was promoted to lead and oversee the militant operations of foreign fighters in ISIS-controlled territories in Syria. His expertise and connections allowed him to become the direct commander of ISIS fighters (foreign and local) in Raqqa governorate. As the Emir of the Emni in Syria, one of his first actions was to lead a successful operation to apprehend Sadam al-Jammel, the Wali (governor) of Raqqa and his accomplices who tried to desert from ISIS and escape into Turkey.

As of late October 2016, Abu Luqman ordered the release of Abdul Rahman al-Faisal form a detention center belonging to the Emni. Al-Faisal had been sentenced to death by the general sharia judge for reasons we were unable to discover. This release escalated an existing feud between Abu Luqman and his Iraqi counterpart, Abu Anas al-Iraqi. Al-Iraqi was the Emir (director) of ISIS security forces in Iraq and was, in part, behind the arrest of al-Faisal. Abu Luqman totally rehabilitated al-Faisal, making him his assistant.

Intrigues occur everywhere and ISIS is no exception. According to chatter that was difficult to verify by sources with direct contact with ISIS, Abu Luqman was detained briefly due to ordering the release of al-Faisal. Moreover, it was reported that it was Abu Anas al-Iraqi who ordered Abu Luqman’s arrest. However, according to these reports, Abu Luqman was released by his loyalists in the Emni. By the end of October 2016, Abu Luqman was promoted to the Wali (governor) position of Raqqa governate He also became in charge of the Emni’s committee in Syria. So far, he has been the only Wali who also oversees the operation of the ISIS Emni. It is noteworthy that he had left that position of Wali a number of times before this promotion, seeming to prefer the battlefield.

The Wali and Bureaucrats

As the Wali of Raqqa, Abu Luqman has two deputies. First, the head of his executive office is an Iraqi national from Rawi, Iraq known as Maktab Tanfithy, though his real name is Usama al-Abdul al-Gani (a.k.a. Abu Haritha Rawi). Al-Gani is in charge of overseeing the operations of directors from departments that fall under the control of the Wali (e.g. public services, energy, communication, finance, etc.). He delivers orders from the Wali to directorates in Raqqa governorate, oversees the implementation of such orders, and assists in nominating potential directors of these sectors (a.k.a. Emirs). Moreover, the Emir of the directorate of administrative affairs, Abu Muhammad al-Magribi, reports to al-Gani. The directorate of administrative affairs oversees the operations of administrative departments within the directorates falling under the control of the Wali.

Second, the Wali’s security adviser is a Syrian national from Idlib Governorate. He is known as Abu Muhammad Tarmini. Originally from Mount Zāwiya, Idlib, less is known about Tarmini compared to Abu Luqman’s other deputy. What is known was that he used to lead ISIS operatives in al-Dana town in Idlib. He then joined the fight in Idlib and moved to Raqqa after Abu Luqman was promoted to the Wali of the city. The two deputies operated from the same building where the Wali’s office is located.

In early November 2016, Abu Luqman promoted two loyal operatives to head the directorates of fighters and of agriculture. Moreover, as the Wali of the city he was actively engaged in recruiting new fighters. Information obtained from trusted sources show that Abu Luqman managed to recruit around 730 fighters from his tribe at this time. The lion’s share of these recruits was less than 18-years-of-age and a significant portion of their recruitment was not voluntarily. The measures that he took as Wali to increase taxes and these forced recruitments had, arguably, made him unpopular in Raqqa governorate.

By late November 2016, Abu Luqman was injured for the second time. His injuries, however, were not life threatening. After incurring these injuries he went into hiding. Trusted sources reported that, as of late December 2016, Abu Luqman was staying with his family in a military compound in Tabqa, Raqqa governorate. However, he frequently visited the city of Raqqa to hold meetings with the leadership of the Emni. During those visits he was heavily guarded. The aforementioned meetings took place in his Wali office.

During his time in Tabqa from late December 2016 to mid-January 2017, Abu Luqman managed to get an exemption from having to obtain permission to carry out executions from ISIS’s general sharia judge. For the period between December 2016 and early January 2017, a period in which Abu Luqman operated from the administrative facilities at Tabqa Dam, the executions numbered 3 per day. As described in a previous report, the Emni managed a detention center in the administrative facilities of the dam. The detainees were those accused of threating the security of ISIS. To that end, it is noteworthy that the aforementioned number of executions per day represented a significant rise from earlier months. In addition to those executed were others charged with threatening the security of ISIS.

ISIS’ Chief Spooks in Syria

In late January 2017, Abu Luqman returned to the city of Raqqa and started operating from the Wali office working as the Wali (governor) of Raqqa. Abu Luqman was also the highest ranked member of the Emni in Raqqa. It is important to note that it is uncommon for the Wali to retain influence over members of the Emni. It is within the power of the Emir (director) of the Emni and his deputies to remove a Wali of a city. However, having been the chief architect of the Emni as it is now formulated and given his previous position as the Emir (director) of the Emni in Syria certainly made have made him more powerful than most Walis. His particular background implies that he cannot be removed from the position of the Wali by the Emni operating in Syria.

In late January 2017 Abu Luqman operated from the center of Raqqa city. His office faced Naem Roundabout, a famous spot in the city where public executions, including brutal beheadings, frequently take place. He was in the office from 10 am to 4 pm. As a display of power he patrolled the city every Friday. Abu Luqman resided with his wife and five children in a house with an exterior of yellow marble. The house used to belong to a former figure in the Baath party. Pedestrians and those driving were not allowed to enter the street where Abu Luqman resided unless they lived there and there was a checkpoint at the entrance of the street. Before he moved into that house, the Coalition forces hit a gas station in its immediate vicinity. To go to work, Abu Luqman drove in a grey van with a motorcade of two other cars.

During that time, Muhammad al-Abdullah (a.k.a. Abu Atika, Haj Idris), a lanky man from Tunis, became the Emir (Director) of the Emni in Syria. As the Emir of the Emni he reported to Abu Luqman, the Wali of Raqqa and director of the Emni’s committee in Syria. Al-Abdullah was also the sharia judge of the Emni and a member of its committee in Syria. That judgeship meant that he received details on potential attacks, both in ISIS-held territories and abroad. In addition, it also made him a source of theological and ideological justification for such attacks.

Information obtained from trusted sources uncovered a number of key operatives who reported to Muhammad al-Abdullah, the Emir of the Emni in Syria, and Abu Luqman, the Wali of Raqqa and director of the Emni’s committee in Syria. Our investigation showed that the operatives we learned about are members of the Emni’s committee in Syria. Their roles and details are as follow:

Abdul Rahman al-Sahu (a.k.a. Abu Adam), a Syrian man, is reported to be in charge of infiltration and intelligence operations conducted by the Emni. The infiltration squads are units that penetrate rival forces. They do so by advancing undetected or stay behind to cause maximum damage, as major forces retreat. Emni has used more sophisticated infiltration tactics like activating sleeper cells or ordering their spies to carry attacks within rivals’ territories. Al-Sahu was also a sharia judge within the forces. He is in charge of the office of the Emni in the town of Maadan, Raqqa governorate.

A Syrian man by the first name Abdul Aziz (a.k.a. Abu Al-Zahraa and commonly known as al-Khal) is one of those in charge of ISIS armaments in Syria. He operated from a weapons arsenal in the immediate vicinity of the General Organization for Drinking Water and Sanitation.

A Syrian man by the alias Abu Muhammad al-Jazrawi was reported to be in charge of death squad raids conducted by the Emni.

An Iraqi man by the alias Abu Hasan al-Iraqi was reported to oversee the medical care and protection of key figures. He operated from the Modern Medicine Hospital, Raqqa. A civilian population is always present in the hospital.

Mosul, Sirte, and Raqqa

Based on details obtained from trusted sources, as of early March 2017, Abu Luqman was in Mosul, Iraq. He was promoted from his position as the Wali of Raqqa to the general director or Wali of the Emni in Syria and Iraq, the highest rank within the Emni. That gave him the power to oversee the operations of the two committees of ISIS security forces. As such, he would report to the Caliphate House Office. Moreover, from Mosul, Abu Luqman managed to promote his assistant, Abdul Rahman al-Faisal (a.k.a. Abu Faisal), to both the position of Wali of Raqqa and as the head of the committees of ISIS security forces in Syria.

By mid-March 2017, Abu Luqman emerged, according to our sources, in Sirte, Libya. It is unclear whether he had travelled to Syria before appearing in Libya or travelled there directly from Mosul, Iraq. Forces loyal to Abu Anas al-Iraqi, the leader of the Emni’s committee in Iraq, arrested Abu Luqman soon after he arrived in Sirte. The tensions between Abu Luqman and al-Iraqi were mentioned earlier. The feud had escalated in the past when Abu Luqman released Abdul Rahman al-Faisal who had previously been detained by al-Iraqi’s forces. The drama between the two operatives, more on al-Iraqi’s side, might have reach its tipping point after Abu Luqman became the highest ranked member of the Emni for both Iraq and Syria and al-Faisal, who al-Iraqi hated, was promoted to be al-Iraqi’s counterpart in Syria. However, sometime around the 20th of March 2017, Abu Luqman managed to communicate with the Caliphate House Office, which then ordered his release.

As of early April 2017, Abu Luqman arrived back in Raqqa. Information obtained from trusted sources indicates that he and his brother-in-law had travelled to the cities of Mosul and Sirte before that. It was clear that Abu Luqman was on a mission. However, the nature and objectives of such a mission remain unclear. Upon his arrival in Raqqa, Abu Luqman summoned Abu Nasir al-Shami an Iraqi national who is in charge of ISIS’s forces in Tabqa. It appears that they had a meeting regarding the developments around the Tabqa dam.

To that effect, as the Wali of the Emni, Abu Luqman might have travelled to Sirte to establish another Emni’s committee in Libya. ISIS currently seems to be on the defeat in Syria and Iraq and is assessing its next moves. Moreover, the terror group has a history of carrying out attacks in Europe when pressure on their strongholds mounts. If Abu Luqman was on a mission to expand the presence and operations of the Emni in Libya, such a move likely also has significant national security implications for European countries. In other words, having an operations base for the Emni in Libya is especially dangerous given the smuggling routes from Libya, and North Africa in general; to Europe and the access it could provide ISIS in plotting and conducting terrorist attacks in European cities. Additionally, such a move would also be expected to strengthen ISIS in North Africa. As already radicalized North Africans reside in Europe, particularly Belgium, Netherlands and France, this may also bode badly for Europe.

Furthermore, being the highest ranked member of the Emni, Abu Luqman is arguably the most significant target for American forces in Syria. As demonstrated earlier, Abu Luqman groomed his assistant and most loyal operative, al-Faisal, to be the director of the Emni’s committee in Syria and the Wali of Raqqa city. Having such influence arguably makes Abu Luqman the most prominent member of ISIS-held territories. He is also expected to have access to potential terrorist attack plots in the West.

The Emni’s Intra-Departmental Influence

As displayed in the organizational hierarchy, the Emni maintains influence in Syria and Iraq on: death squads, Chechen squads, Islamic police (the hisbah), military police, and the Special Operations Office. Details obtained from trusted sources uncovered some aspects of the operation and leadership of the aforementioned departments. However, we were unable to gather information on the Special Operations Office.

Death Squads are unique in the sense that they don’t need to get the permission of the sharia judge to conduct operations, carry out arrests, or eliminate targets that the Emni decides upon, be it enemy fighters, civilians, or other ISIS members. Up to now the whereabouts of their bases were unknown. In mid-March 2017, one of their bases was uncovered. The base was located at the administrative building at the Tabqa Dam11. The squads operate under the full control of the Emni. Its current leadership was put into place and promoted by Abu Luqman and thus likely totally loyal to him. Ahmad al-Nasir is the Emir (Director) of the death squads. He was promoted to that position in December 2016. Like Abu Luqman he was born in the 70’s and graduated from the faculty of Arts and Humanities (Arabic Department), University of Aleppo, and was also detained in Sednaya military prison. Al-Nasir was also an Arabic teacher. Al-Nasir was a major player who was intrusted with very critical positions, one, which was the Emir of the Syrian Emni sometime around May 2015. Al-Nasir has green eyes; but he is always masked when in public.

The Military Police is led by Abdul al-Kafi al-Shmari (a.k.a., Abu Hajir), a Saudi national from the city of Tabuk. As the Emir of the military police, he oversees the enforcement of sharia laws related to jihad (e.g. paying jihad-based taxes, arresting ISIS members who don’t have legitimate reasons to abstain from fighting jihad) and military cases (e.g. cases against fighters). He had a feud with operatives from the Emni. However, he obeyed and reported to the Emir of the Emni to resolve this feud. Al-Shmari is thirty years old. He has a degree in architectural engineering and used to work in real estate in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

The Islamic Police or hisbah is led by Muhammad al-Bazi, a Syrian national who was born in 1972. Before becoming the Emir of the Islamic police, he was the Emir of al-Jarnia, Raqqa and the Emir of Tishrin Dam. As the head of the Islamic police he is associated with torture and death. It was reported that he managed to lure two men who had been on the run by detaining their wives and children. The two women and children were put in small cages. The display was shown to the tribal leaders of the two men, who then surrendered themselves to the Islamic police so that their families would be freed. The men were accused of conspiring against ISIS and executed by operatives of the Islamic police. It is noteworthy that al-Bazi moved to Raqqa after Kurdish forces took control of the town of al-Jarnia. He was selected by Abu Luqman to lead the Islamic force after the Emni executed his predecessor. Clearly crossing the Emni can have disastrous results.

Chechen Squads are led by Abu Omar al-Shishani. His kunya implies that he is Chechen. Al-Shishani is the Emir of al-Muhajirin (immigrants/foreign fighters) Directorate. This man with three silver teeth is in his 50s. Al-Shishani oversees social, economic, and legal affairs that relate to foreign members of ISIS who come from over 80 countries worldwide. Under his leadership, the directorate gained a reputation of spying on foreign members who may have been sent from their home countries to infiltrate and spy on ISIS. Upon their arrival new members are sequestered temporarily and hand over their passports, phones and fill out paperwork about their previous military training and desires for serving ISIS. During this time period the Emni conducts investigations on all new foreign fighters and immigrants to ISIS, checking on the references they provide, searching their phones which are turned over upon joining, downloading their contacts and trying to ascertain that they are who they say they are. Al-Shishani constantly reports to the Emni to handle the arrest of suspected members.

The Emni gave the Directorate of Immigrants the permission to be the sole trader of cars in Raqqa. The money generated from the trade goes to the directorate budget which is responsible, we have learned, for arranging housing for foreign fighters, paying widows pensions, paying salaries of foreign fighters, etc. Also, under the supervision of the Emni, al-Shishani was allowed to conduct business in Raqqa to generate more income for the Directorate of Immigrants. His business activities include real estate, agriculture, and hospitality. As of March 2017, Al-Shishani had generated just above USD 10 million. Al-Shishani managed an operation through which estates and businesses of those departing the city get redistributed to agents of the Directorate of Immigrants. Al-Shishani had been in charge of the directorate since the 9th of December 2015. The directorate reportedly has two clandestine offices outside ISIS-held territories; one in Turkey and the other in Germany. These offices report to al-Shishani. Reports from the aforementioned offices are submitted to the leadership of the Emni. The Chechen squads are Caucases Emirates fighting forces operating under the leadership of al-Shishani.

Conclusion

The involvement of the ISIS Emni in both inspiring and actually directing terrorist attacks and assassinations, both in neighbouring countries to Syria and Iraq, and in Europe and beyond, makes its operations and leadership of special interest to policymakers worldwide. Through terrorizing civilian populations, it has made itself instrumental to spreading ISIS’ message of fear and also helped divide democratic societies against their Muslim populations. This sowing of suspicions and hatred that plays right into ISIS’s recruiting methods and ideology that intones that Muslims are reviled and being attacked by the West. The Emni’s shrewd terrorist plotting and ability to portray the after-effects of their attacks in slick videos has also helped the terrorist organisation to preach its doomsday ideology, portray itself as still strong even while losing its territory and whip up support for further recruitment. Clearly, its activities have resulted in Islamophobia and anti-refugee sentiments—to the sorrow of many fleeing ISIS’s brutality, reinforcing ISIS’ narrative among radical and marginalized Muslims in the West. The Emni’s far-reaching influence reveals an immense need to understand the entity. Using our limited resources and contacts on the ground, the operations and leadership of the Emni were investigated as deeply as we were able to penetrate. Reporting on information obtained from trusted sources in ISIS-held territories and neighbouring countries, the organizational structure of the Emni is demonstrated here including biographical details of its leadership. However, elements of the hierarchy in Iraq require more information. That said, the details discussed in earlier sections allow a clearer understanding of the leadership and operations of the Emni in Syria.

Moreover, the obtained details enable an inference of the stages of one of the Emni’s chief architect’s radicalization, which is similar for many of the Syrian ISIS leaders. As shown in this report, his prior grievances as a marginalized Sunni during Assad’s regime while watching the Coalition invasion of Iraq and the rise of al-Qaeda in Iraq and the sectarian violence that followed, coupled with his intelligence experience, effectiveness in the battlefield, callous nature, Machiavellianism, and recruiting skills have facilitated his rise to the highest rank in the ISIS Emni. The network of Islamists who have spent time fighting alongside the insurgency in Iraq and those loyal to him have made Abu Luqman, the Emni’s father, one of the most popular and feared operatives.

Furthermore, the Emni’s powers within ISIS allow its leadership to micromanage and exert influence on the various directorates that operate in its strongholds. The Emni in Syria has started to promote its operatives to govern cities and towns while having permanent seats in the committee. That in turn provides the Emni with enough power to seize control of all major functions within its territories in Syria. It is unclear whether the same trend applies in Iraq. It is noteworthy that with this level of influence the Emni should not be viewed only as intelligence forces. To that end, the tension between the Emni and other entities within ISIS has been steadily increasing but it’s likely that with its ruthless power it will continue to dominate, at least in Syria.

This report also documents the movement of the Emni’s leadership between Raqqa, Mosul, and Sirte. Notwithstanding Sirte’s drama, the Emni seems to be expanding into North Africa. Having access to the smuggling route between Libya and Europe could result in devastating events in Europe, although the Emni has also been successful directing attacks within Europe without it. The Emni presence in Sirte will likely also complicate the Libyan government’s operations against ISIS. They might also direct attacks to capture oil and gas fields in Libya. That might trigger illegal oil and gas trade across North Africa and increase the resources ISIS has for further attacks and payments to its cadres. The Emni’s expansion into Libya also presents a nightmare to neighbouring countries. The potential expansion from Libya to Mali, through Niger or Algeria, has highly significant military implications.

Recent activities of the Emni suggest that the entity is also overseeing ISIS operations in battling American forces and their Syrian allies. Recently obtained information indicate the instalment of IEDs and presence of BM 21 Grad multiple Launch Rocket Systems in the north of al-Mansoura, Raqqa. The operation of the aforementioned capabilities is believed to be handled by forces within the Emni. The leadership of the Emni is recently more present in the city of Raqqa. To that effect, the entity might be plotting retaliatory attacks around Tabqa against the American forces and their Syrian Allies.

Clearly it is to the West’s advantage to understand and then destroy the ISIS Emni, which as this report makes clear, grew out of expertise and knowledge gained from operatives serving under Saddam Hussein’s and Bashar al- Assad’s intelligence operations who have taken that knowledge and expertise and turned it into building a terrorist “state” and an intelligence operation which has shown itself to be a formidable opponent to the West.

When it comes to the Syrian war, Iran is in the driver seat, not Syrian President Bashar Assad. For Tehran, Syria is a core pillar of its hegemonic strategy, like reported by eurasiareview.com

Iran has penetrated every Syrian governmental organization, including its security and military infrastructures. It boasts about orchestrating battles and having thousands of fighters on the ground across Syria. Iran is the most important guarantor and supporter of Assad.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its elite Qud Force, which operates beyond Iran’s borders, are key elements behind the continuation and escalation of Syria’s civil war. Iran also relies on its paramilitary groups and Shiite militia proxies such as Hezbollah to fight for Assad.

As such, one of the most effective ways to resolve the war is to eliminate or cut down Iran’s intervention. A multilateral approach is required: Economic, political, humanitarian, military and diplomatic.

The most important dimension is economic. Iran is hemorrhaging billions of dollars on Assad’s forces, and paying foreigners to fight in Syria. Tehran’s financial assistance to Assad is among the most critical factors in prolonging the civil war, so cutting this lifeline is vital.

In 2014, Iran was in a difficult situation financially due to the UN Security Council’s (UNSC) four rounds of sanctions. The pressure on Tehran was reflected in speeches by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who anxiously called on Assad to control the situation in Syria. Iran showed signs of willingness to abandon Assad, but not his Alawite state.

Unfortunately, the nuclear deal changed things. Billions of dollars poured into Iran’s treasury, providing significant relief. Financial and military support for Assad increased, and Tehran publicly acknowledged having forces on the ground in Syria.

One way to cut the financial lifeline to Assad is to re-impose sanctions on Tehran. These sanctions can be unilateral, multilateral, coalition-based or passed by the UNSC. Tehran has already violated the nuclear deal several times. It should be closely watched for other violations of the agreement and held accountable.

Significant pressure will be felt if a coalition of regional powers cuts economic ties with Iran. This will result in Western powers avoiding trade with it. Sanctioning Iranian organizations and figures, including the IRGC, is also vital.

If governments, particularly regional and Islamic, begin cutting diplomatic ties with Iran, it will be pressured to rethink its role in Syria. Tehran’s legitimacy will be damaged, and it will be unable to effectively project itself as the leader of the Muslim world. Such diplomatic pressure will resonate worldwide.

Establishing a no-fly zone near the Syrian border is crucial. This can be carried out in unison by the US, EU and regional powers. A no-fly zone will put significant pressure on Tehran’s aerial operations in Syria, and restrict Assad’s aerial support of Iranian fighters on the ground. This will be a critical boost to Syrian opposition groups.

Cases should be pursued to bring to justice Iranian leaders and organizations engaged in crimes against humanity in Syria. The International Criminal Court (ICC), Amnesty International, the UN and human rights organizations can be used to achieve this. Also, the international community needs to draw more attention to human rights abuses in Iran.

Implementing this multilateral approach will diminish its support of Assad and its intervention in Syria. This could significantly change the regional balance of power and the direction of the war in Syria, as well as put an end to atrocities there.

Russia is the “rock,” Iran is the “paper,” and the United States is the “scissors”…

Iran’s strategy is to envelope Syria like a piece of paper, topologically combining Iran’s Iraqi “paper,” along with Iran’s Hezbollah/Lebanon “paper” to form a patchwork-quilt Shiite Empire spanning from Iran/Persia through Iraq, and Syria, and Lebanon into the Mediterranean Sea.

As an example of this, Iran just announced it was to build a trans-Iran/Iraq/Syria/Lebanon railroad.

Russia is the “rock” trying to bash the Sunni opposition to pieces in order to carve-out its eastern Mediterranean naval outpost and military enclave.

The United States, through Sec of Def Mattis, under the strategic cover of defeating ISIS in Eastern Syria is the “scissors” against Iran’s “paper” Shiite Empire.

The United States with its indigenous allies is trying to efficiently occupy eastern Syria from the Kurds in the north to Jordan in the south.  By topologically “cutting” off Iran’s patchwork piece of paper, Iraq, from Iran’s patchwork piece of paper, Syria, the United States is attempting to defeat Iran’s waxing paper Shiite Imanate.

Before Iran’s chemical attack in the name of Assad, the western Syrian rock strategy of Russia, and the eastern scissors strategy of the United States were avoiding each other, complementing each other, and together quietly weakening the whole Syrian paper envelopment strategy of Iran.  This was great for Russia and the US, but bad for Iran.  Iran saw the United States’ cutting its patchwork-quilt in two in eastern Syria as an existential threat to the grand strategic arc of its contiguous Mesopotamian/Levantian/Mediterranean swatch of Empire.

Therefore, Iran had to do something to instigate a hot war between the United States and Russia.  And presto, Iran bombs civilians with Sarin using Assad’s planes, Assad takes the fall, and Russia and the United States are escalating against each other.

Russia and the United States urgently need each other to thwart Iran’s scheme to control the Middle East.  It is in both Russia’s and United States’ worst strategic interests to allow Iran to become the colossus of the Middle East.  Syria is big enough for Russia and the United States to find a modus vivendi and  live with each other, allowing each to achieve strategic goals.

Russia and the United States have a mutually exact goal i- both aim to defeat the ISIS Sunni Caliphate and the Iranian Shiite Imanate. To defeat both Islamic radical terror threats requires Russia and the United States to work together, and not fight each other.

In the current war against both Sunni and Shiite radical Islamic terror, the United States and Russia are critically necessary for one another as allies, not inimical enemies.

Bereft of trade or investments in the Middle East, Putin’s intervention in Syria is pointless great-power posturing, like reported by haaretz.com

As the United States and Russia trade barbs over the Syrian chemicals weapons and the U.S. missile attacks, it’s a good time as ever to ask the fundamental question: What is Russia doing in Syria in the first place?

The usual answers trotted out are that Moscow is determined to root out the threat of Islamic fundamentalism before it reaches Russia’s Muslim minority, which comprises 7 percent of the population. Or, that Putin hopes fighting ISIS will distract the West from its maneuverings in Ukraine. Or, that Moscow needed to prop up the regime of Bashar Assad to ensure Russia could continue to operate its naval base in Tartus.

But No. 1 on the list of Putin’s agenda items was to restore his country’s status as a player in the Middle East. He just wanted to show the world that Russia is no less a superpower than it was during the good old days of the Cold War.

Eighteen months later, the results have been mixed, at best.

The Assad regime is back from the brink of defeat at the hands of the rebels. Not only does Russia have Tartus: it added an airbase at Latakia.

On the other hand, the West hasn’t shown much inclination to ease the sanctions it imposed over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the St. Petersburg subway bombing on April 4 shows that Russia still faces the threat of Islamic extremism. And, the sudden U.S. missile attack on Syria following the Assad regime’s alleged use of chemical weapons abruptly halted the warming relations with the Trump White House.

Smoke, mirrors and fire

Yet regarding Russia’s great power status, Putin has certainly won the image war. The conventional wisdom is that Moscow is now the go-to address to get things done in Syria and that its status in the region has risen.

Unlike the feckless Americans, Russia has shown that it comes to the aid of its friends without raising pesky objections over human rights, democracy or even the use of chemical weapons.

The region’s dictators and monarchs should easily prefer Moscow over Washington as an ally and benefactor, although there is little sign that they are doing that. My guess is that they understand that Moscow’s great power status is all about the smoke and none about the fire.

Putin’s thinking seems to be that you assume the mantle of great power status by sending fighter jets to a distant war, launching cruise missiles that can hit their targets 900 miles away and dispatching an (admittedly decrepit) aircraft carrier to the Mediterranean. But it’s all empty posturing.

Russia has no interests in the Middle East except to be interested in it. Real interests begin with guys and girls in suits carrying briefcases filled with contracts to build and sell things. Only later do the generals, warships and airbases arrive to help protect them.

Trade and investment is what bring a distant power like the U.S., Europe or China to a region like the Middle East. Military involvement follows.

Putin hasn’t just put the cart before the horse, he doesn’t have much of a horse to begin with.

Nukes and wheat

Russia is for all intents and purposes an underdeveloped economy, with little to offer the world apart from arms, nuclear power technology, energy and wheat.

As far as those go, Russia hasn’t done badly for itself. Last year it topped the U.S. for exports of the grain for the first time in decades and is now the supplier of choice to Egypt. Russian arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa amounted to $12.7 billion from 2006 to 2015, double the level of the previous decade.

Yes, Russia also has agreements to build nuclear power plants in Egypt and Jordan, and Iran is eyeing a Russian-developed expansion if its Bushehr facility. Russian energy companies are active in Egypt and Iraq.

Moscow has used Syria to showcase its portfolio of weapons, but as marketing campaigns go, that’s an expensive one and might not yield much in the way of deals.

It is true that Russia has signed arms deals with Egypt and has even gotten a toehold in the Gulf, but that has little to do with the prowess of Russian weaponry in the Syrian civil war and a lot more to do with the West’s hesitance to sell weapons to oppressive regimes.

As for the nuke deals Moscow signed with Egypt, they aren’t economically viable, and Egypt doesn’t even need them, it turn sout, after finding large fields of natural gas offshore.  It’s hard to see Mideast powers opting for Russian energy companies over their more technologically sophisticated Western peers.
In any case, by great-economic-power standards, none of this adds up to much.

The EU and China, or for that matter South Korea and Japan, have much deeper and wider business interests than Russia in the region, but they don’t win contracts (of for that matter eat up their profits) by sending troops into the region. Wisely, they let the U.S. do that. And, even the U.S. has come to recognize the cost-benefit of intervening in the region’s problems. Washington spent a $2 trillion by some estimates in Iraq and got nary an order nor an ally in return.

If she hasn’t learned it yet, Russia will sooner or later realize that power arises from the pocketbook, not from the barrel of a gun.