The fronts of confrontation with Iran and its main allies are increasing. The ballistic missile that the Houthis launched against the Saudi Arabian capital Riyadh is a dangerous military development that cannot be separated from the regional conflict with Iran in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Diplomacy has failed due to Iran’s ongoing refusal to withdraw its forces and militias from Syria. It had previously refused to withdraw from Iraq, where it is operating militarily. The latest of these operations is the advance on the Kurdistan region, like reported by aawsat.com.

Iran is a remotely running the battles in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. The countries in the region, as well as the United States, have failed in adopting a suitable policy that can confront Iran’s expansionist strategy in the region. The Americans, who have incurred repeated losses in bombings and “Hezbollah” assassinations, have sufficed in confronting the proxy itself through kidnapping or assassinating collaborators or members of the party. Egypt and Arab Gulf countries have also made due with the policy of adopting political and economic measures against “Hezbollah.”

Iran is making its foes adopt one of two strategies: either a direct confrontation with the regime itself or creating regional proxies and engaging in wars with them. The first option, a war with Iran, is unlikely to happen, except in defensive cases should Tehran launch a direct armed attack. This however is not its style in managing its crises. Even when Iran lost eight diplomats and others in a Taliban ambush in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, it did not get involved in a direct war there. It instead relied on patiently and continuously growing local militias there.

Despite Iran’s clear hegemony in areas such as Iraq, the Iraqi army cannot confront the local pro-Iranian armed forces because its political leadership is dominated by Tehran. It is clear that Iran is playing a major role in directing the Iraqi forces, the Popular Mobilization Forces in particular, to eliminate the Kurdish presence in Kirkuk and beyond. This is an important regional battle that is not limited to Iraq. This does not acquit the Kurds however of the major political and military errors they have committed in this crisis as a result of their independence referendum. The vote was exploited by Iran in order to advance on the vital geographic and oil-rich region.

Countries will have no choice but to resort to a militia conflict in order to restore balance in the region. Syria is now entering the phase where governing arrangements are being made, the most important aspect of which is who controls the ground. The Iranian militias are committing mass executions against locals in regions they control. The victims are often former members of the opposition. Through these measures, Iran is seeking to impose security control of its regions, given that the Syrian regime no longer has the sufficient security or military means to impose its complete control.

In light of these circumstances, the regional countries will find themselves faced with a major Iranian project that is using Syria to control Syria itself, as well as Iraq and Lebanon, and at a later point, areas beyond these countries. Faced with this policy, there is no way to remove Iran from the equation or weaken it, no matter how much the Russians or Syrian regime try to convince themselves. Syria is therefore expected to turn into a country run by militias.

For the Iranians, this proxy war is very advantageous, especially with their investment in “Hezbollah”, their most valuable and long-term project, which costs them around $700 million annually. As for their Houthi agents in Yemen, their price is much cheaper because a fighter costs about $2 dollars a week.

The confrontations are increasing with Iran’s expansion and the lack of a deterrent to it. It is becoming more dangerous the more it achieves victories, most recently with the weakening of the Hariri camp in Lebanon and the strengthening of the Houthi missile capabilities that are directly threatening the heart of Saudi Arabia. With the elimination of the direct military confrontation with Iran, which no one really wants, bolstering local militias in the turbulent countries remains as the only option.

The UN-sponsored Libyan dialogue over the past few weeks has faced many obstacles as many concerned that the political agreement might fail due to military escalation in the east and the west of the country, like reported by xinhuanet.com.

“The military escalation may affect the course of dialogue and the efforts led by the UN to amend the agreement, because it comes at a time when everyone is waiting for a quick end to the political polarization,” Libyan lawmaker Faraj Abdulmalek told Xinhua.

“I believe that the recent escalation in the eastern city of Derna and the events taking place in the western city of Aziziya could end quickly, as the outstanding issues and differences will be solved,” Abdulmalek added.

Unidentified warplane carried an airstrikes on Derna last week, killing and wounding 47 people, mostly civilians.

The eastern-based army denied responsibility for the airstrike, confirming an immediate investigation into the incident.

The city of Aziziya, 30 km south of the capital of Tripoli, on Tuesday witnessed movements of the military forces of UN-backed Government aimed at eliminating crime in the area, according to the military council of Zintan.

Abdulmalek praised the results of the Cairo meetings for the efforts to unify the Libyan army.

“We strongly welcome the results of the recent meetings in Cairo which aimed at bringing together the military leaders from various cities in Libya to quickly unify the national army. This would end tensions and stop any military movements by any group,” he said.

According to Libyan army spokesperson, the Cairo meetings activated the role of the armed forces, “as the officers participating in these meetings came from different parts of Libya.”

“Amending the political agreement is possible, however, it faces obstacles again and again, which threatens to continue the crisis,” Imad Jalloul, a Libyan political analyst, told Xinhua.

“We all note that when politicians get closer to resolving their differences, local and international parties interfere and disrupt the efforts. This is often done through military escalation, in an attempt to show that a military solution is the only solution to end the conflict,” Jalloul added.

Jalloul pointed out that military movements, although ineffective to resolve the conflict, due to the imbalance of power on the ground, “may be an option imposed on the Libyans to resolve the political crisis, which casts a shadow on everyone.”

Over the past two months, Tunis has hosted two rounds of dialogues of Libyan unified drafting committee, representing the eastern-based House of Representatives and the Tripoli-based Higher Council of State.

The meetings discussed amendment of the current UN-sponsored political agreement.

According to the initial results of the negotiations, the committee agreed to form a new presidential council of three members instead of nine, and to separate the council from the government.

The only issues that remain are mechanism of selecting the members of the Council and the Prime Minister, as well as defining the functions of each body without interfering in its powers.

This led to the suspension of the dialogue by the Libyan House of Representatives. The House accused the Higher Council of State of attempting to take over its legislative power.

Negotiations are conducted in accordance with Article 12 of the political agreement, which states that a joint committee of the House of Representatives and the Higher Council of State, known as the Uniform Drafting Committee, must be formed to formulate those amendments, should parties want amendment of the agreement.

An armed group allied with the Government of National Accord in Tripoli, known as Tripoli Rebels Battalion, the largest military force of the Government, expressed willingness to participate in any military actions in western Libya.

“The Battalion is fully ready and willing to participate with the Western Military Region Command and the Zintan Military Council to clear Jafara and Aziziya areas of illegal criminal gangs,” the battalion said in a statement.

A member of the Higher Council of State explained that “denial of the Government of National Accord’s responsibility for the military operation is to avoid the accusation by the international community of mixing the cards and attempting to make a military solution in a strategic area such as Warshaffana.”

“Warshaffana, which surrounds the capital of Tripoli, is a strategically important area that could facilitate entry into Tripoli. These are concerns related to the armed forces led by General Khalifa Haftar, because he has troops and camps in the area. Therefore, we see many parties struggling over controlling these vast lands,” he added.

The member pointed out that these moves did not occur by accident, but were linked to the political process between the Libyan parties, which may develop to the extent of increasing division in the country.

“Everyone remembers the operation of Libya Dawn in July 2014 which created two rival parliaments and governments. Its objectives were close to the objectives of current military operation today,” said the member.

The eastern-based army on Thursday warned against continued attack by the forces of the Government of the National Accord on sites of the army units in Warshaffana.

Warshaffana suffers unprecedented security chaos, including kidnapping, armed robbery and murder by criminal groups.

On Wednesday, November 1, Russian president Vladimir Putin met with the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani. Putin was visiting Tehran for trilateral talks with Iran and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev but, as expected, Iran-Russia bilateral relations and the nuclear deal dominated the conversation, like reported by iranwire.com.

Declaring Moscow’s support for the nuclear agreement, the Russian president said, “We are opposed to any unilateral change in the provisions of this multilateral agreement, and we consider unilateralism as a violation of the international law and system.” In return, Ayatollah Khamenei called Putin “a strong man, determined to make decisions and take action,” whose position on the nuclear deal is “very good.”

At their last meeting in late 2015, Khamenei also had laudatory words for Putin, describing him as a “prominent figure.”

Khamenei’s recent praise for Putin was mostly directed at Tehran-Moscow cooperation in the Middle East and shared efforts to stand up to the United States. Replacing the dollar as the international currency was one of his key goals. “By ignoring the negative propaganda of the enemies that seek to weaken relations between countries,” said Khamenei, “we can nullify US sanctions, using methods such as eliminating the dollar and replacing it with national currencies in transactions between two or more parties — thus, isolate the Americans.”

Bilateral currency agreements are indispensable to achieve this dream. But in early 2017, Iranian officials announced that because of conditions set by the Russian Central Bank, a bilateral currency agreement was not possible. Now, with this announcement by the Supreme Leader, it is expected that Iran will redouble its efforts to reach such an agreement.

The other proposition Ayatollah Khamenei put forward was the expansion of economic exchanges between the two countries. He specifically mentioned the transportation sector, “using the main axis of Chabahar port to the port of Saint-Petersburg.” Chabahar is Iran’s main port on the Gulf of Oman, a relatively short distance away from the Indian Ocean. Access to the port has long been a big dream of Russian rulers, from the tsars to the communist regime to, one can assume, Vladimir Putin.

Usually the president of the Islamic Republic or other senior officials are the ones to put forward proposals for expanding economic relations. By speaking about economic expansion himself, Khamenei appears to want to leave no doubt that Iran plans to strengthen bilateral relations with Russia. “The good combination and the cooperative resistance of Tehran and Moscow against the sedition and corruption of terrorists in Syria is significant, and it has made Russia an influential player in the Western Asia region,” said Khamenei.

A “Strategic Partner”

Putin was no less enthusiastic about Tehran in his pronouncements. During the meeting, which lasted about an hour and 15 minutes, the Russian president expressed his satisfaction with his visit and his meeting with the Supreme Leader. “We consider Iran a strategic partner and a great neighbor, and we will take advantage of every opportunity to expand and consolidate relationships in all dimensions,” he said. He talked about expanding military and defense cooperation between the two countries as well as his opposition to any unilateral changes to the nuclear agreement (the JCPOA). Like the Supreme Leader, he praised the cooperation between Iran and Russia in Syria.

And Putin’s comments about US sanctions against the Islamic Republic resembled what Khamenei has been saying for years. He emphasized the importance of relying on domestic capabilities as the country’s main policy and a bulwark against US sanctions. “Some Russian producers and traders prayed that the US sanctions wouldn’t end,” he said, “because as a result of them, their capacities have started to attract attention. From 2014 — i.e., the start of US sanctions — we devoted our funds to scientific and technological progress, and we had significant growth in the fields of biotechnology, information technology, agriculture, and space industries. Now, in spite of the initial concerns, we have realized that we can do whatever we decide to.”

The similarities, even if accidental, could supply the Iranian Supreme Leader with good propaganda tools for pursuing his dream of a “resistance economy.”

Following the nuclear agreement, and especially after US President Donald Trump’s refusal to re-certify the nuclear deal, Khamenei has been trying hard to present a strategic alliance with Russia and China as the right prescription for Iran’s foreign policy.

But things are not so simple. Iranians have a deep, historical mistrust of Russians and the economies of both countries are weak. Still, the Supreme Leader hopes to overcome these obstacles, and Putin’s visit has certainly given him hope.

There are no winners among Iraq’s Kurds, just weeks after Kurdish president Masoud Barzani gambled away his people’s autonomy in a defiant independence referendum.

The losing bet has come at a steep price for everyone involved, like reported by reuters.com.

    Barzani has had to give up the presidency, his Kurdish political foes have angered their popular base, and the Kurdish people, who overwhelmingly voted to break away from Iraq, feel further than ever from their lifelong dream of independence.

    The ultimate winner, analysts say, is Iran, widely believed to have backed and orchestrated Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in his Oct. 16 offensive to recapture Kurdish held-areas, including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.

“The Iranians outwitted the Americans; they were the driving force behind the deal to hand over Kirkuk,” said Hassan Shaaban, a political commentator and rights activist in Baghdad.

    The balance of power has been transformed in the north of Iraq, exposing the limited hand the Kurds have to play in future negotiations. It has also exposed the dominant role Iran played in transforming the fate of the Kurdish region.

    Iran is poised to exploit the political aftermath, pushing to move the centre of power from the regional capital Erbil, where the Barzanis and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) have dominated, to its Kurdish allies in the city of Sulaimaniya.

    “Iran was always one step ahead on the referendum,” said Renad Mansour, an Iraq expert at the Chatham House think-tank.

They knew Barzani was never going to postpone the vote, he said, adding: “The U.S. was left scrambling while the Iranians were plotting.”

A senior Iranian official said Tehran had advised Barzani against the referendum but he would not listen.

“We tried to stop this referendum because it was not in their interest. But unfortunately Mr Barzani miscalculated his social base among Kurds and went ahead with the vote,” Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran’s National Security Council, was quoted as saying by Mehr news agency on Tuesday.

    IRANIAN MEDDLING

    Iranian Major-General Qassem Soleimani has for years been allied to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the main rival of Barzani’s KDP.

But the referendum has drawn the powerful Iranian commander even closer to Kurdish politics, and shown how far Iran’s reach has extended beyond the central government in Baghdad.

    Ahead of the vote, Soleimani warned Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq to withdraw their forces from Kirkuk or face a “fiery” onslaught by Iraqi forces and Iranian-backed fighters, according to Kurdish and Iraqi officials.

    The warning prompted Kurdish Peshmerga fighters to withdraw from most areas, and deepened the split between Barzani’s power base in Erbil, and the rival Talabani clan in Sulaimaniya, long allied with Iran.

    Iraqi politicians have voiced concern about the growing influence of Iran, despite praising Abadi for reining in Kurdish ambitions.

    “We feel worried seeing the octopus arms stretching deeper in the north,” said Ahmed Asi al-Obeidi, a Sunni tribal sheikh and a member of Kirkuk’s tribal council.

    “We all have seen the problems Iranian meddling has caused in other parts of Iraq, including mainly Sunni areas, and if the same amount of interference is repeated in Kurdish areas, then the worst is coming and instability will prevail.”

    Addressing his people, demoralized by humiliating territorial defeats, Barzani said on Sunday that he would step down, just one month after the vote he championed in the face of regional and international opposition.

    He accused his enemies of committing “high treason” in surrendering Kirkuk to Iraqi forces without a fight, while his rivals have directed the same accusation against him for holding the referendum in the first place.

    UNEASY SUCCESSION

    The vote and its ensuing political and military retribution from Baghdad – backed by Iran and Turkey – demolished the position of relative strength the Kurds had enjoyed for years.

    The blame has been placed on Barzani’s shoulders, both by his political opponents, notably the rival Talabani clan allied to Iran, and his Western allies, who were angered by his insistence on holding the vote against their advice.

    On Sunday, Kurdish lawmakers agreed to divide Barzani’s presidential powers between parliament, the judiciary and the government, in the absence of imminent presidential elections and a named successor.

    Barzani remains head of the KDP, which dominates parliament and government, and will still sit on the High Political Council, an opaque non-governmental body which emerged after the referendum. He will thus retain his ability to influence policy.

    Barzani could therefore mitigate the mounting political chaos. But his position instead highlights the lack of clarity over who is in charge as crucial negotiations with Baghdad get underway over the region’s future.

    Dominant since he became president in 2005, Barzani has consolidated the power of his office, and boosted his family members’ political profiles.

    Before the referendum, Barzani’s son Masrour was his likely successor, but he has been damaged by his backing for the vote.

    Instead, Nechirvan Barzani, Masoud’s nephew and the regional prime minister, has moved to the fore. He has gained some of Barzani’s newly devolved presidential powers, and maintained ties with the Kurdish opposition, making him a more palatable candidate to mend regional fences. He also enjoys a close relationship with Turkish president Tayyip Erdogan.

    On Monday, the United States commended Barzani for stepping down and said it would “actively” engage with Nechirvan, and his deputy, Qubad Talabani, a member of the rival political faction with whom he maintains a good relationship.

    Who emerges as the next leader of the Kurdistan Regional Government is anything but straightforward. In addition to an intra-Kurdish compromise, the influence of Baghdad and Iran will have to be considered.

    Senior Kurdish officials from both the KDP and PUK say their best bet is to present a united front in negotiations with Baghdad. But that now seems all but impossible.

    Iraqi forces, including the Iran-backed Shi‘ite militias, now control border crossings in the north, vital trade routes for the Kurds. The military capitulation in Kirkuk was a crushing blow to the Kurds, both morally and financially, halving the region’s oil export revenue overnight.

    Now the Talabanis are facing their own succession crisis, following the death of former president Jalal Talabani.

    “Iran saw the disintegration of their Kurdish ally in Talabani,” said Mansour, who added Iran needed a clear successor to ensure its continued influence.

    Another set of sons and nephews are vying for leadership in the aftermath of the referendum. But the PUK base has expressed more widespread disappointment with how their leadership handled the Kirkuk crisis.

    “We were betrayed by our leaders in Kirkuk, who stopped us from fighting the (Iraqi Shi‘ite) militias,” said a PUK-allied Peshmerga commander who asked not to be identified for fear of retribution. “They sold us to Iran for their own benefit.”

Despite claims by Nigerian authorities that Boko Haram is a spent force, the jihadist group continues to launch attacks, like reported by africacheck.org.

On 11 October 2017, the Nigerian military said it had foiled “several” planned attacks and captured many high ranking members, with many others surrendering.

In the five months before that, the Islamist terror group had killed at least 381 civilians, a grim toll that was more than double the previous five months’, according to rights group Amnesty International.

The group has in October ramped up attacks.

Of these recent attacks, the deadliest was an ambush of an oil prospecting team in the northern state of Borno in July, in which at least 69 people were killed.

What drives the increase in attacks?

Despite the continued military offensive against it, the sharp rise in attacks has been driven by the group’s increased use of suicide bombers, Amnesty International says.

In the first six months of 2017, the group launched 54 suicide attacks, which is more than in 2014, when attacks also notably increased. This is according to an August 2017 study of the tactic by the Combating Terrorism Centre, an affiliate of the US military.

Geography also plays a role. Boko Haram attacks tend to intensify in the rainy season from June to September. Many roads become impassable, slowing down the military offensive against the group.

Resulting thick vegetation also provides cover for insurgent camps against aerial surveillance, while allowing them to ambush the military and replenish low stocks, including of weapons and food.

Additionally, the study found that between 2011 and 2017, Boko Haram’s attacks peaked in June and July, when Ramadan is usually observed.

Attacks meant to mask battlefield losses

At the height of its power in 2014, five years after Boko Haram had begun its bloody insurgency, the group was estimated to hold 50,000 km² of territory (about the combined size of Rwanda and Burundi ). This covered the northern parts of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states.

It declared a caliphate in the region with its headquarters in Borno, the epicentre of the insurgency, following a series of victories against Nigerian troops, who were then poorly-equipped and demoralised. (Note: Read our factsheet explaining the group’s origins.)

Coordinated military operations by Nigeria and its northern neighbours of Chad, Cameroon and Niger, who have also been targeted by the group, have since considerably weakened Boko Haram. It is now confined to islands on the Nigerian side of Lake Chad as well as Sambisa forest, a game reserve-turned-jihadist enclave.

Residents in areas affected by the insurgency have also formed vigilante groups, further constricting the group’s activities.

Forced out of the region’s cities by vigilante groups and troops, Boko Haram has resorted to guerilla attacks and raids, a threat which Nigeria has been unable to contain eight years on.

Analysts say this is a way of proving the group’s resilience and adapting to a series of battlefield losses.

Wracked by internal leadership battles

The attacks are also seen by many as a strategy to pressurise the government into negotiations with Boko Haram, citing the unprecedented call by Borno elders for talks with the group to end the violence. Security analysts view it as a kite the elders are flying on behalf of the group to gauge public reaction.

Due to intense criticism of its inability to completely stamp out the group, the army modified its strategy, introducing what it called the ‘Safe Corridor’ project in 2016. This encourages Islamist fighters to surrender in exchange for amnesty and reintegration into society.

However, the project run by the office of the National Security Adviser is shrouded in secrecy and it is not clear what impact it has had in wooing Boko Haram fighters.

In addition to the external threat, Boko Haram is also wracked from within by factionalism.

At least four factions are identifiable, including a struggle between long-time leader  Abubakar Shekau and those allied to Abu Mus’ab Al-Barnawi, the 22-year old son of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf and who was appointed by the Islamic State as leader of Boko Haram in 2016.

Ironically, it was Shekau who had first pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. He rejected the change in leadership and insisted he was in charge, but the Al-Barnawi faction, based in the Lake Chad region, is seen as having the upper hand.

What next for Boko Haram?

It is clear that Boko Haram is gradually losing its original focus of establishing an Islamic state and turning into a criminal enterprise. It is enmeshed in armed robbery, kidnappings, cattle rustling, raids and looting to survive in the face of military offensives from Nigeria and its neighbours.

As the pressure mounts, Boko Haram may turn to even more lucrative criminal activities, like small arms and drug trafficking, across Nigeria’s porous borders to sustain itself.

If it continues to widen its criminal operations, Boko Haram may turn into the largest transnational criminal network in West Africa, relying on established cross-border networks to gain a solid foothold.

But this is easier said than done, with the competing factions threatening its top structure, where the only true organisation seemed to exist. As such, the greatest threat to its nefarious existence may end up coming from within.

Daesh has been routed in Iraq. On 5 October, the militant group lost the northern town of Hawija – its last urban stronghold after Iraqi forces recaptured Mosul and Tal Afar earlier this year. The brutal battles for these cities have been well documented. Less noticed, however, has been how the near-total defeat of Daesh is reshaping political and sectarian alliances in the region, like reported by middleeastmonitor.com.

The rise and fall of Daesh has had a sobering and unifying effect on relationships between Sunnis and Shi’ites. In Iraq, where thousands died in the vicious sectarian war that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein, residents of the mainly-Sunni cities of Mosul and Hawija nonetheless jubilantly welcomed the mostly-Shi’ite Iraqi forces who freed the cities from the Sunni extremists of Daesh. “They helped liberate us,” one Hawija Sunni leader told the New York Times of the fighters. Nor does a Shi’ite backlash against Sunnis seem imminent given Shi’ite recognition of Sunni suffering in the Daesh-occupied cities.

The Daesh experience has affected Iranian politics too. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei seemed to show a softer attitude toward Sunnis in a rare pronouncement – seen as carrying the weight of a fatwa – publicly prohibiting any discrimination against minorities. Sunnis have fewer rights than Shi’ites in Iran, and Khamenei’s August comment was made in response to an inquiry by Molavi Abdul Hamid, a prominent Sunni cleric from Iran’s impoverished Sunni-dominated Sistan-Baluchistan province on the Pakistan border. In Syria too, Daesh’s faster-than-expected battlefield defeats suggest that the group does not enjoy much local support among the Sunni tribes and populations it has been ruling for the past couple of years.

The biggest changes can be seen in Iraq, where Shi’ite leaders’ attempts to develop a post-Daesh foreign policy are driven in part by fear of Iran’s growing influence and in part by the Daesh-inflicted suffering in Iraq. Many observers believe that the pursuit of sectarian policies at the expense of Iraqi Sunnis – as systematically practiced under the former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki – expedited the rise of Daesh.

The result of the new dynamic is that Iraq’s main Shi’ite leaders are distancing themselves from Iran as they make once-unthinkable overtures to the region’s Sunni Arab bloc. In one of the latest signs of that shift, Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar Al-Abadi declined Tehran’s official invitation to take part in President Hassan Rouhani’s second-term inauguration ceremony on August 5. Such a refusal would have been unimaginable a few years ago.

Similarly, prominent Shi’ite leaders such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr snubbed Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the newly-appointed chairman of Iran’s Expediency Council – a governing body set up to mediate disputes between Parliament and the Council of Guardians over whether planned legislation conforms with Islamic law – during an official visit to Iraq as the envoy of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.

Underscoring the point, Baghdad publicly slammed a deal made by Hezbollah, Iran’s chief proxy in the region, to evacuate a group of Daesh fighters from Lebanon to eastern Syria, near the Iraqi border. The Tehran-backed agreement was “unacceptable” and “an insult to the Iraqi people,” Prime Minister Abadi said in August.

Iranian influence on Iraq’s domestic politics is shrinking too. Ammar al-Hakim resigned as head of the Tehran-backed Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq – the country’s largest Shi’ite party – a month after a June meeting with Khalid al-Faisal, the governor of Mecca and an informal advisor to Saudi Arabia’s King Salman. Hakim promptly went on to form the National Wisdom Movement, a political party to “embrace” all Iraqis.

At the same time, Iran-funded, Shi’ite-dominated militias known as Popular Mobilization Forces are divided over whether they should be integrated into the regular Iraqi army – a measure that would loosen Iran’s foothold in Iraq’s security apparatus – or whether they should remain independent of the Iraqi government. Groups loyal to Sadr and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani have started taking steps to register with the army; those led by Hadi al-Amiri of the Badr Organization and Qais al-Khazali of Asaib Ahl al-Haq remain in the pro-Iran camp.

Against this backdrop, Iraq is trying to improve its ties with Saudi Arabia. In addition to several recent diplomatic visits between the two countries, including one by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to Riyadh, Moqtada al-Sadr – an influential Shi’ite cleric with a large following among Iraq’s urban poor – made rare and well-received visits to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. After meeting with Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, Sadr issued a statement saying that he was “very pleased with what we found to be a positive breakthrough in the Saudi-Iraqi relations,” and that he hoped it was “the beginning of the retreat of sectarian strife in the Arab-Islamic region.” Sadr’s 13 August meeting with Emirati crown prince Zayed al-Nahayan appeared equally successful. “Experience has taught us to always call for what brings Arabs and Muslims together, and to reject the advocates of division,” Nahyan told Sadr, in a veiled reference to Iran as one of the dividers.

It is clearly in Iraq’s strategic interests to diversify its relationships beyond reflexive sectarian or ideological lines. Improved ties with Riyadh pave the way for Baghdad to receive much-needed financial aid from Saudi Arabia and establish an economic relationship that could help counter the political and military influence established when Iran cultivated Shi’ite proxies to fight US-backed forces in Iraq. The outreach can also signal to Iraq’s Sunni minority that the Baghdad government is not an Iranian stooge.

Iraq’s post-Daesh foreign policy could have broader regional benefits too. For Riyadh, closer ties with Baghdad can help the Saudi leadership feel less threatened by Iran’s rising influence and the perception that Riyadh’s share of regional power has diminished as a result. That in turn may lead to a thaw in Iranian-Saudi ties and a broader contribution to regional security.

While this balancing act could help mitigate the Shi’ite-Sunni tensions in the Middle East, it would be naïve to assume that deeply-rooted ideological and religious schisms will disappear anytime soon. The recent Kurdish referendum, for example, already seems to have made Baghdad more willing to invoke Iran’s military and economic leverage to dissuade Iraqi Kurds from declaring independence. Nor will Iraqi Shi’ites quickly forget their anger over actions like Riyadh’s unequivocal support for the Sunni-dominated regime of Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980 – 1988, or Saudi Arabia’s harsh treatment of its Shi’ite minority.

Nonetheless, the fact is that neither Riyadh nor Tehran can achieve sustainable hegemony in the region at the expense of the other. It’s ironic that it may be the routing of extremist Daesh that serves as the catalyst to ease the bitter sectarian rifts that have divided them for so long.

A massive blast in Somalia’s capital of Mogadishu on Oct. 14 and more recent terror attacks in Somalia, Niger and Egypt highlight Africa as a new battleground against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as they are being driven out of the Middle East, like reported by usatoday.com.

The Islamic State, or ISIS, is seeking a safe harbor after major losses in Iraq and Syria. And al-Qaeda looks to secure its future by expanding operations and alliances in the sub-Saharan region, analysts say.

“The collapse of the Islamic State’s stronghold in Raqqa (Syria) will cause a re-coalescence of fighters on the continent, most of whom come from North African countries,” said Ali Bakr, an analyst specializing in terrorism at Future Advanced Research, a think tank in Abu Dhabi.

Tunisia alone has sent at least 6,500 volunteers who joined al-Qaeda and ISIS in Syria and Iraq, said Bakr. Many are now likely to join an expanding terrorist network in West and Central Africa, he said.

“The region is likely to be hit by a severe wave of returning Islamic State fighters while al-Qaeda expands into other states such as Niger, Burkina Faso and Nigeria,” Bakr said. “Niger has become a new source for recruits, and Ansarul Islam, an al-Qaeda franchise, is now active in Burkina Faso.”

On Oct. 4, militants believed to be affiliated with ISIS ambushed a team of U.S. troops in Niger, killing four soldiers and wounding two. The attack came as U.S.-supported Syrian rebels were on the verge of retaking Raqqa, the Islamic State’s de facto capital that fell on Oct. 17.

Massive attack in Mogadishu

Somalia has been a frequent target of attacks, including one outside Mogadishu on Wednesday that killed at least 17 people. It followed the horrific truck bomb 11 days earlier in Mogadishu that was one of the deadliest terror strikes since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. The blast killed more than 350 and injured hundreds more. While no group claimed responsibility, the Somali government suspects al-Shabab, an al-Qaeda affiliate behind a wave of terror attacks in the region.

“I’ve seen seven suicide explosions in my life,” said Mohamed Haji Ingiris, 35, a Somali and political analyst at King’s College in London. “But this was the most devastating and traumatic experience ever.”

Ingiris had arrived in Mogadishu three weeks ago to conduct research, including interviewing defectors from al-Shabab.

Al-Shabab has been involved in 987 of 1,827 attacks by militant Islamist groups in Africa this year, according to the Africa Center for Security Studies in Washington, D.C.

The Somali group has had a long affiliation with al-Qaeda but now appears to be cooperating with ISIS, controlling much of the countryside, analysts said.

“Some told me they trained with Nigerians sent by Boko Haram,” said Ingiris, referring to the Islamic State-linked militants that have run rampant throughout West Africa. “Al-Shabab in East Africa is now stronger in Africa than al-Qaeda is in the Middle East and no longer looks to them for mentorship but still benefits from funds raised by their network in the Arab Gulf countries.”

In Egypt on Friday, dozens of police were killed in clashes with militants in the Western Desert, which is part of the Sahara. Three-quarters of the violent events linked to ISIS in Africa this year have occurred in Egypt.

A day later, gunmen in pickup trucks and motorcycles killed at least 12 soldiers in an attack on their base in Niger, about a mile from where the U.S. soldiers were ambushed near the Mali border.

Militant threat grows

The groups operating in the Sahara and Sahel are growing in size and reach, analysts and the U.S. military said.

The Islamic State has been battling rival forces in Libya, where the U.S. has targeted the militants with drone strikes.

France and other European countries stepped up anti-terror operations in Africa last year after an al-Qaeda affiliate attacked a beach resort in the Ivory Coast, a former French colony, and subsequently struck targets in Mali and Burkina Faso.

About 4,000 French troops are deployed in West and Central Africa, with headquarters in Chad, which has been battling extremists along with Cameroon and Nigeria. Germany has sent 1,000 troops to support a U.N. counter-terrorism operation in Mali.

The U.S. military has stepped up its anti-terror fight elsewhere in Africa to meet the growing threat, staging exercises and conducting training operations.

American military leaders have established a drone and air base in Agadez, Niger, and deployed 800 troops in the country to operate alongside anti-terror efforts in Nigeria and Mali, according to the U.S. Africa Command and the Defense Department.

The number of U.S. troops in Somalia has also quadrupled in the past year to 400 personnel, according to the Defense Department.

“We are assessing the needs of those who are directly fighting against al-Shabab,” said U.S. Army Maj. Leah Mock at the American military’s security cooperation office in Mogadishu. “This mission plays a critical role in enabling our partners to fight violent extremists.”

The escalation of that fight against al-Shabab may have led to the devastating Mogadishu truck bomb, analysts said.

Investigators in Somalia told local media that the bomber was a defector from the national army who joined al-Shabab after a U.S.-supported raid on the town of Barire about 80 miles southwest of the capital led to the deaths of 10 local civilians.

Analysts say the battle against the new wave of terror in Africa will require more than military operations. Also needed are better living conditions so people lacking basic necessities aren’t lured to work for the militants.

“Greater (economic) capacity has to be developed to countermand and understand this threat. That’s not really happening,” said Matt Bryden, chairman of Sahan Research, a Nairobi-based think tank.

Impoverished African governments also worry that even as they receive international military assistance, Western nations will scale back on desperately needed development programs.

They point to the landlocked nation of Burkina Faso, where on Sept. 3 the U.S. evacuated 124 Peace Corps volunteers from the country following an Aug. 13 terror attack at a restaurant in the capital, Ouagadougou.

“Peace Corps volunteers worked in rural areas, in remote villages, where the living conditions are tough,” said Boureima Ouédraogo, a city council member in Bokin, about 80 miles outside the capital. “The Peace Corps team was improving agriculture and education here. Now we need to find expensive temporary contractors to replace them. It’s a grave loss to our community.”

Underscoring the need for non-military aid, a report issued this week by the International Crisis Group found that the rise of Islamic militancy is a response to social problems.

“Economic conditions, especially poverty, underdevelopment and unemployment compounded by corruption and bad governance are incentives for terrorism,” said Augustin Loada, director of the Center for Democratic Governance, an independent policy research group in Ouagadougou. “These factors fuel the risk of violent extremism.”

With Islamic State in fatal decline and the edges of Kurdistan afire, the Middle East is entering a new era, dominated by the Saudi-Iranian power struggle. The United States, which did so much via its unnecessary invasion of Iraq and tragic handling of the post-incursion period to nurture the growth of Islamic State, will be largely missing from the scene. Instead, the struggle will, as it did during the fight against the Sunni extremists of Islamic State, involve shifting Sunni and Shi’ite allegiances, like reported by opinion.bdnews24.com.

For the moment, there seems to be an easing in the historic tensions between the two main – and often warring – branches of Islam. Religious differences are not the focus; this is a classic geopolitical power struggle for control of Iraq, Syria, and Kurdistan, and for expanding diplomatic and strategic reach throughout the region.

Iran is lined up to be the big winner in Syria. Islamic State’s defeat will significantly lessen Sunni influence, and Tehran’s role as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s protector will only increase now that it appears Assad will remain in control of some portion of the country. Iran will have pieced together a land corridor to the Mediterranean. The Saudis will be left with little influence.

The same goes for the United States. American forces have been largely relegated to playing traffic cop among various on-again off-again allies such as the Turks and Kurds, each with its own agenda in Syria. Any influence Washington thinks it still has is further diluted by the presence of the Russians, who are there to support Assad while maintaining a permanent presence in the heart of the Middle East. American efforts may wind up as little more than fumbling around to keep Israel and Jordan from overreacting to the increased Iranian influence on their borders.

In Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, Riyadh appears to be pivoting towards warmer relations with the Shi’ite government in Baghdad. That a Saudi airline is announcing the first return of direct service between the two countries since Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990 is no coincidence, nor is it an isolated event.

The Saudis also appear ready to take advantage of a looming intra-Shi’ite power struggle in Baghdad among Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Sadr, the most religiously zealous of the group, has always been something of a nationalist and is wary of Iranian influence. It is thus not surprising he made friendly trips under official invitation to Sunni Riyadh, and the United Arab Emirates, in recent months.

Sadr is an interesting choice for the Saudis to use to gain influence in Baghdad. Real progress for Riyadh means untangling years of close Iranian cooperation in Iraq, to include limiting the power of the Iranian-backed militias. Sadr has significant influence in that respect, and can use his popularity and credibility to sell Saudi cooperation to his followers who remember Saudi funding of al Qaeda in Iraq and Islamic State over the years. Enhancing Sadr’s Shi’ite religious status can further Sunni Saudi goals. During his visit, the Saudis gifted Sadr with $10 million for “rebuilding,” and also astutely threw in some visas for this year’s Hajj pilgrimage for Sadr to distribute.

The Saudis otherwise have little to work with in Iraq compared to Iran. Tehran’s ties to officials in Baghdad are just a tiny part of a deep relationship forged in the bloody fight against the American occupiers and the ousting of Islamic State. Iranian money continues to support Iraq, and the Shi’ite militias are still mostly under Iranian influence.

Iran is also probably the most stable Muslim nation in the Middle East. It has existed more or less within its current borders for thousands of years, and is largely religiously, culturally, and linguistically homogeneous (though keep an eye on the Kurdish minority.) While governed in significant part by its clerics, the country has held a series of increasingly democratic elections. And unlike the Saudi monarchs, Iran’s leaders do not rule in fear of an Islamic revolution. They already had one.

Power struggles create flashpoints, and the Saudi-Iranian fight post-Islamic State is no exception. The Saudi-Iranian proxy war in Yemen has settled into a version of World War One-style trench warfare, with neither side strong enough to win nor weak enough to lose. In an ugly form of stasis, the conflict seems likely to stay within its present borders.

The powder keg is Kurdistan. Though arguably a de facto state since 2003, after the Kurds voted formally voted for independence in a Sept. 25 referendum, Iran and the Iranian-backed government in Baghdad were pressed to make clear they will not tolerate an actual Kurdish nation. With Islamic State nearly defeated and combat-tested Shi’ite militias ready for their next tasks, Tehran and Baghdad no longer need to keep the Kurds on their side. Fighting has already broken out around Kirkuk, an oil-rich city in Iraqi Kurdistan, between forces supported by Baghdad/Tehran and Kurdish fighters – leaving a gap for the Saudis to offer financial or covert support to the Iraqi Kurds.

Saudi involvement could morph an Iraqi civil war into a new proxy struggle right on Iran’s own western border, with the possible complication of further unrest inside Iran by its Kurdish minority.

While it may seem odd to write about the changing balance of power in the Middle East largely leaving out the United States, that may well describe America’s range of options post-Islamic State.

Washington’s influence in Baghdad is limited and relations with Iran are in shambles under the Trump administration. It is highly unlikely America will join Iran to fight against Kurdish allies who helped defeat Islamic State. Nor are American troops likely to battle Iranian-led militias in support of Kurdish independence that Washington says it doesn’t really support right now.

That leaves the United States sidelined, with few options other than perhaps supporting the Saudis from afar in whatever anti-Iranian meddling they do in Iraq. A long fall from the heady days of 2003 when America was going to remake the Middle East. The victor after some 14 years of overlapping struggles? In the post-Islamic State Middle East, look for Tehran to emerge dominant.

On Sunday, Iraq Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi began a historic visit to Saudi Arabia, where he is meeting the king of Saudi Arabia and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.

It came at the same time that Iraq is strengthening its control over disputed areas seized from the Kurdistan Regional Government over the last week, like reported by jpost.com. The intentional weakening of the Kurdistan region comes less than a month after it held an independence referendum and has wide implications for the region. This affects Israel as well because of Jerusalem’s opposition to Iranian hegemony.

The main affect of Iraq’s decision to take back disputed areas from the Kurdistan region has been to reduce the areas the Kurds controlled and liberated over the last three years battling ISIS.

In addition Iranian influence has played a central role through Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani’s role in advising and attempting to broker a deal with some Kurdish officials to give up control around Kirkuk.

Despite conflicting accounts from different Kurdish and Iraqi officials, the result was that the Kurdish Peshmerga withdrew in the face of overwhelming firepower the Iraqi army brought to bare, including US-made tanks and Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.

This has weakened the Kurdistan Regional Government’s hand after the referendum, depriving it of a major city and half its oil revenue. The Peshmerga, lauded as a partner for fighting Islamic State, were not able to stand up to the partly US-trained Iraqi army, which has re-drawn the power relationship between Erbil and Baghdad.

While the US is concerned about clashes between Kurdistan forces and Baghdad and called on both sides to “cease all violence,” it is not making the crises a priority. Instead the priority lies in Riyadh.

The US is working to bring Baghdad to Riyadh and encourage it to grow closer to the Saudi alliance system in the region, the Iranians have other plans.

They see the conquest of Kirkuk as a means to expand influence through the Shi’ite militias, which are part of the Iraqi government.

This includes sending those militias, called the Popular Mobilization Units, to the Syrian border near Rabiah, potentially cutting off the Kurdistan region of Iraq from the Kurdish region of Syria.

The recent crises has Jerusalem concerned because Israel fears an Iranian “road to the sea,” the arc of Iranian influence that goes from Tehran through Iraq to Syria and Lebanon, connecting the IRGC to its proxies and allies such as Hezbollah. A Hezbollah official recently celebrated what he called a  “Kurdish defeat” by Iraq as a victory.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin and German Chancellor Angela Merkel about not letting the Kurdistan region be further destabilized. So far that has not produced results, although Russia is invested in the Kurdistan region via its Rosneft government oil firm. Israel is concerned about Iran being emboldened by another victory in Iraq at the same time that a Hamas delegation is in Tehran.

The logic of US diplomacy now is to work with regional powers Turkey and Saudi Arabia on what happens in Syria and Iraq. The US is trying to patch up a visa row with Ankara. This leaves US allies in Syria – the Syrian Democratic Forces, which includes many Kurdish fighters – wondering what comes next as well. They recently liberated Raqqa from ISIS and are pushing toward the Iraqi border.

However they have seen what happened to the Kurdistan Regional Government, and the ease with which the Iraqi central government and Iran hobbled it. Iraq shut down the Kurds’ two international airports and has moved to impose other controls that would reduce its autonomy to 2003 levels. The SDF in Syria has just gained a bit of autonomy in the last years fighting ISIS, now it wants reassurances that in the post-ISIS region it will have friends.

The results of Iraq’s moves against the Kurdistan region also seem to fly in the face of US President Donald Trump’s stated foreign policy to roll back Iranian influence throughout the region. Instead of rolling back, Tehran and its allies are moving forward using chesslike stratagems to outplay their enemies.

As the US appears to not stick by its word regarding Iran, Jerusalem will wonder if Iran’s allies such as Hezbollah and Syria might sense weakness.

Last week, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev went to North Africa on official visits to Algeria and Morocco — two days in each country. In Algeria, Medvedev was privileged to meet with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, prompting the pan-African weekly news magazine Jeune Afrique to remark acidly that French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel are still on the waiting list to see Bouteflika, like reported by al-monitor.com.

In Morocco, Medvedev was conferred an honorary doctorate from Mohammed V University. Speaking of prospects for the bilateral relationship between Russia and Morocco, Medvedev quoted the movie “Casablanca,” saying, “I think this is the beginning of a beautiful friendship.”

He added, “The friendship between Russia and Morocco began long ago, and there is every reason to believe that it will only grow stronger and develop for the benefit of the peoples of both countries.”

Should the Medvedev tour be seen as a manifestation of Russia’s new strategy? Its approach until recently barely extended over to the Arab world’s “Far West.” Is it a symptom of some internal changes within the Russian political apparatus, given that Medvedev has been largely preoccupied with domestic affairs, whereas foreign policy and especially the Middle East were very much in the domain of Russian President Vladimir Putin?

Neither of those scenarios appears to be the case.

Medvedev’s visit didn’t come out of the blue. A Russian diplomat with knowledge of the visit’s details told Al-Monitor both Algeria and Morocco had been put on the prime minister’s travel schedule at least six months ago, with intense preparations across several ministries ever since.

He has long been engaged in Algeria. In 2001, Russia and Algeria signed an agreement on a strategic partnership. For the next 16 years, economics and — to a larger extent — military-technical cooperation have come to dominate the bilateral agenda. By 2016, the annual trade turnover between the two countries, according to Medvedev, amounted to $4 billion — the lion’s share of which came from Russian weaponry. More than 90% of Algerian arms are exported from Russia. Algeria’s annual exports to Russia are limited to several hundred million dollars.

In an interesting diplomatic twist, this trip marked a reunion of sorts between Medvedev and an old confrere. In 2010, when Medvedev was Russia’s president, he met with Ahmed Ouyahia, who was in his third term as Algeria’s prime minister. Just two months ago, Ouyahia was unexpectedly tapped to return to the position, enabling him to resume working with Medvedev.

Among the dozen documents signed during Medvedev’s recent visit, the most notable included those on oil, gas and nuclear power development. Some sources reported the two parties might have discussed Algeria’s potential purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems, and Su-32 and Su-34 fighter bombers, as well as the potential for Russian companies to manufacture trucks and bulldozers in Algeria.

As is often the case with senior Russian officials’ tours to the region, Medvedev’s trip to Algeria was combined with his visit to Morocco. Not only does the strategy make sense for logistical reasons, it’s also designed not to offend either neighbor.

As with Algeria, Medvedev’s economic dealings with Morocco heavily dominated the agenda. Although the Russian-Moroccan trade turnover of $2.5 billion is much lower than that between Russia and Algeria, it has a different structure and is on a constant rise. With Algeria, the prevalent component is military-technical cooperation, but Russia’s trade with Morocco centers on agriculture, with a number of small- and medium-sized businesses being important players, which nurtures deeper bilateral ties. Also, trade relations between Russia and Morocco seem much more balanced than those between Russia and Algeria.

In Morocco, Medvedev signed a dozen accords, mainly in agriculture, but the parties also reportedly reached key agreements for Russia to supply liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Morocco. Last month, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak was also in Morocco, where he said that the construction of an LNG regasification terminal was underway and that the two states discussed gas deliveries by the Russian companies Gazprom and Novatek.

What can be called the “pedantic parallelism” that Moscow pursues in constructing relations with Algeria and Morocco likely indicates Russia’s unwillingness to dive into complex regional games in the Maghreb, and its aspiration to limit, by and large, its relations to an economic agenda.

Another indicator of Russia’s balancing act in the region is Moscow’s neutrality on the Western Sahara issue. Delegations of the Algerian-backed Polisario Front — the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara’s movement for independence from Morocco — visit Moscow every spring, hosted by the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Federation Council (Russia’s Senate). Russian officials have always been careful not to make any anti-Moroccan statements. Algeria has accommodated Western Sahara refugees in camps for decades.

The “parallelism,” however, should not be misconstrued. Russia is perceived differently in Algeria and Morocco and occupies a different place on each one’s list of foreign policy priorities.

For Algeria, Moscow has always been an important partner. From 1954-1962, the Soviet Union actively supported the country’s national liberation movement and the National Liberation Front, a socialist political party. Soviet universities educated future leaders of the Algerian military and a large part of the national intelligentsia. And when the Soviet Union began allowing cybernetics into its own academic curriculum, Algerians were among the first lecturers the Soviet leadership invited.

Today, the Museum of Modern Art of Algiers hosts a collection of both Soviet and Algerian artists who used to live in Russia. The “special relationship” between the two countries survived the downturns of the 1980s — against the backdrop of the crisis of socialism — and the economically rough 1990s. Moreover, the very nature of Algerian statehood makes its leadership refrain from an excessive rapprochement with Europe and keep an emphasis on its independence from its former parent state, France.

It’s a totally different case with Morocco. Its traditional association and cooperation with the EU, as well as the political familiarity between the Moroccan and Saudi monarchies, are all natural constraints to a more intimate alignment with Russia.

This background implies that no matter how skillful Russia is in its parallelism diplomacy, should Moscow have to increase its political involvement in the region it will need to further diversify its contacts with both countries. In Algeria’s case, Russia is likely to actively develop humanitarian ties, to boost existing military-political interaction. With Morocco, Russia would have to place more emphasis on promoting economic ties to compensate for the lack of vibrant joint political formats.

That, however, is a matter for the future. So far, Medvedev’s visits have demonstrated that Moscow is not forging a new Russian strategy in North Africa, but rather is naturally seeking to capitalize on its success in Syria and position itself as a main security supplier to the region.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/10/russia-medvedev-visit-algeria-morocco-diplomacy.html#ixzz4w27GN4EJ