Ten years after Muammar Gaddafi’s death, Libya is in the midst of a fragile peace process aimed at ending a decade of chaos and bloodshed. The enduring turmoil has fostered a form of nostalgia for the Gaddafi era, with some Libyans even considering the prospect of seeing his son Saif al-Islam in power one day, like reported by france24.com.

Gaddafi, whose quixotic and brutal rule stretched over 42 years, was captured by insurgents on October 20, 2011, and then pronounced dead in his home town in circumstances that remain unclear.

Three of his sons – Mutassim, Khamis and Saif al-Arab – were also killed during the 2011 conflict.

However, the best known of Gaddafi’s offspring, Saif al-Islam, implicitly endorsed by his father to succeed him one day and once viewed in the West as a reformer able to democratise and liberalise Libya, is still alive.

Captured in November 2011 by an armed group in Zintan, southwest of Tripoli, Saif al-Islam was sentenced to death in absentia in Tripoli in 2015 after an expeditious trial. Wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of crimes against humanity, he kept a low profile for a long time, even after his release from a prison in Zintan in 2017.

Nostalgia for the Gaddafi years?

However, in July 2021, the 49-year-old broke his silence and gave an interview to the New York Times magazine.

With Libya set to hold a high-stakes presidential election on December 24, Saif al-Islam profited from this media exposure to announce his return to the political arena.

It is not the first time his comeback has been heralded. Back in March 2018, as if to test opinion, the Libyan Popular Front, a party that does not hide its pro-Gaddafi leanings, announced from Tunis that the son of “Africa’s king of kings” would be running for president.

In the NYT interview, Saif al-Islam, sporting a greying beard and dressed in a black qamis (traditional shirt) embroidered with golden motifs and a black turban, did not say if he would run in the December election. He did however say he was convinced that his movement could restore “the country’s lost unity”.

Since the interview, his political ambitions have been taken very seriously.

“It is not impossible to see a Gaddafi coming to power in Libya in the distant future. It is not completely unthinkable,” Emadeddin Badi, a Libya specialist and a researcher at the US thinktank, the Atlantic Council, told FRANCE 24.

“On the other hand, it is still too early today,” Badi cautioned. “So there is very little chance that, if he is a candidate, Saif al-Islam will win the presidential election in December.”

Nonetheless, the Gaddafi clan, and Saif al-Islam in particular, are still popular among nostalgics and officials of the former regime, and among the clans that remained loyal to the former dictator’s family. Pro-Gaddafi sentiment also lingers among a section of the population, disappointed by the chronic instability and violence that has roiled the country over the past decade.

It is this wave of disenchantment, which the returning Gaddafi intends to surf.

“There is no money, no security. There is no more life here. Go to the gas station: there is no gas. We export oil and gas to Italy. We light half of Italy and we have power outages here. This is more than a failure. It’s a fiasco,” he told the NYT.

“In recent years, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi’s standing has only increased in certain communities, especially for economic, security or political reasons, which arouse much more nostalgia for the Gaddafi years than in the early years after the fall of the regime, when no one was talking about a return of this clan,” Badi says.

Ironically, he adds, “this phenomenon is even perceptible at the level of the younger generations, who were not yet mature during Gaddafi’s lifetime, and who have not really experienced the true nature of his regime.”

Saif al-Islam, an option for the Russians?

The mere fact that Saif al-Islam’s return to power is contemplated as a plausible scenario says a lot, not only about the current state of the Libyan political class, but also about the geopolitical strategies of foreign powers, Badi adds.

“We must not forget that his first media appearance was reserved for the New York Times. However, the Libyan public is not used to reading this American newspaper. The message was addressed to a foreign audience and particularly to countries most likely to accept a return to business for his clan.”

Indeed Saif al-Islam remains a political option that may still interest some foreign actors in the Libyan conflict, including Russia. Especially, if they don’t find Marshal Khalifa Haftar, a protégé of Moscow, useful anymore.

“While it will be very difficult for Saif al-Islam to enjoy internal legitimacy, he can however count on external support,” Badi says.

“Russia, which has always maintained political, military and even economic relations with the Gaddafi clan, may seek to promote, or even impose, a return to a clan-based form of governance, for example, by relying on him,” he adds.

However, apart from the complications that may arise from his conviction by a Libyan court and the ICC arrest warrant, the prospect of seeing a Gaddafi back in business is far from decided. The Gaddafis have many enemies who will do everything to prevent him from returning to politics.

“Even the Gaddafi camp itself is much more fragmented than some imagine,” says Badi. “This is due to divisions linked to the very image of Saif al-Islam, perceived by some as responsible for the fall of his father because of his positions, which were considered too moderate before the events of 2011.”

“Even if he were to come to power, it would be very difficult for him to establish his authority throughout Libya, given how fragmented the country is,” Badi concludes.

“Saif al-Islam Gaddafi must surely know that Libya is much more complicated than it was in 2011, at the time of his father’s death.”

The lead investigator in the Beirut port explosion probe, Tarek Bitar, has been the target of a cabal on social media after the judge attempted to question a number of senior Lebanese officials, who seem to be determined to engage in all kinds of ploys in a bid to evade justice and sabotage the investigation, like reported by lorientlejour.com.

Numerous Arabic hashtags have made the rounds on social media attacking Bitar, accusing him of “politicizing the investigation,” with some online users criticizing what they called “the fitna [meaning an attempt to sow discord] of Bitar’s nitrate.” More recently, the hashtag “Bitar has blood on his hands” has been trending, following the deadly gunfire that erupted in Beirut’s Tayyouneh area on Thursday, killing several Hezbollah and Amal supporters who were demonstrating and calling for Bitar’s dismissal.

These are some of the many hashtags and slogans that can be found on Twitter, Facebook and Instagram targeting the lead investigator, who, since February, has been leading the probe into the 2020 Beirut port explosion that left at least 218 dead and devastated entire neighborhoods of the Lebanese capital.

The smear campaign against Bitar has been mainly carried out by the “electronic army” of Hezbollah and its ally, Amal.

L’Orient-Le Jour has chosen to mainly focus on Twitter to examine the trending comments and hashtags that have emerged since the judge was removed for the first time on Sept. 27, following a complaint filed before the Beirut Court of Appeals by MP Nouhad Machnouk, one of the top-ranking officials who Bitar has implicated in the investigation.

“Bitar is out of here,” “Bitar must be replaced” or simply “Tarek Bitar” are among the hashtags that have been trending, often accompanied by a defamatory message or photo of the judge.

While Machnouk clearly does not belong to either Hezbollah or Amal, the majority of the Twitter profiles spreading defamatory slogans and hate speech appear to be strongly affiliated with the “Party of God.”

This can be clearly seen through their profile pictures, which are often that of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah or Iranian Revolution leader Imam Khomeini, or through propaganda messages in favor of the Shiite party that they often share on their pages.

Who is this electronic army?

Hezbollah is far from having missed out on the digital revolution. On the contrary, the powerful militia has managed to create its own propaganda on social media by dodging surveillance and restrictions on posts that go against Facebook and Twitter’s community standards.

Like all other political parties, Hezbollah is well aware that social networking sites, along with the control of media outlets and of visuals, have become an essential tool of power — a tool that the party also uses to intimidate opponents and critics and to undercut any project that does not work to its advantage.

Hezbollah’s electronic army has been working at full throttle to disseminate disinformation online, with a clear attempt at manipulating and mobilizing its partisans.

“This army is made up of fake Twitter accounts, trolls, ordinary supporters and influential public figures who would mobilize to undermine any issue that does not serve Hezbollah’s interest, as is the case with the port investigation,” Jad Shahrour, communication manager of the Samir Kassir Foundation, explains.

L’Orient-Le Jour took a closer look at the profiles or accounts sharing content attacking Bitar and found that most fall into one of the electronic army’s typical categories.

Some pages have fake profile pictures with a name written in code and few interactions with other users but prolific activity online in relaying propaganda messages. (Here is one example: https://twitter.com/hussein141148?s=20).

Other profiles are difficult to identify. These have a large number of followers but are not well-known figures.

This user, for instance, seems to be dictating the trending hashtags for other internet users. In the picture below, the user, portrayed as a woman in their profile, is asking followers to use the hashtag “Bitar is playing with fire.”

There are also the pages of public figures, like journalists from the Hezbollah-affiliated al-Mayadeen and al-Manar television channels, who have tens of thousands of followers and whose messages usually have a resounding impact, given the high numbers of retweets or shared messages.

For instance, al-Mayadeen journalist Ali Mortada garnered nearly 900 “likes” on a post deriding Bitar following Nasrallah’s Oct. 11 speech in which he castigated the lead investigator.

The hashtags echo Nasrallah’s messages

This online lynching is usually preceded by fiery political speeches that set the tone for social media reactions.

It is important to recall the series of events that led up to the online harassment of the judge, who is in charge of the largest case in the country’s history and who has so far been benefiting from fairly broad support in Lebanese civil society.

On Sept. 21, Bitar allegedly received a threatening message from Hezbollah security chief Wafic Safa, who reportedly said, “We’ve had enough of you. We will go to the end of the legal path, and if that does not work, we will get rid of you.”

The statement was not met by support campaigns online, as the Shiite party’s supporters initially questioned the veracity of these remarks, while Hezbollah remained silent on the matter.

The real turning point was when Bitar was temporarily removed from the case. The defamation campaign began to pick up steam as officials close to Amal and Hezbollah began to publicly criticize the lead investigator.

On Oct. 10, Amal MP Ali Hassan Khalil said the investigation was “highly politicized” and “selective,” calling for Bitar’s removal.

On the same day, Hassan Ezzedine, a Hezbollah MP, said that the United States had been manipulating the case led by Bitar.

The judge soon became the target of a campaign accusing him of “politicizing the case” — a hashtag that made the rounds on social media, especially on Amal supporters’ pages and accounts.

Then Hassan Nasrallah harshly lashed out at the magistrate in a discourse on the evening of Oct. 11. Hezbollah’s number one in command accused Bitar of “political targeting,” as he had not sought to question President Michel Aoun, his predecessor Michel Sleiman, or the former prime ministers who were in office before Hassan Diab. “You will never get the truth with this magistrate,” Nasrallah told the victims’ families, in an obvious attempt to discredit the 4-year-old judge.

The cabal mushroomed on Twitter. “The same chronological order is followed every time. As the party seeks to dismiss a case like this, its officials will adopt a discourse against Bitar. Then, the media close to the party will repeat the same language of criticism against the judge. Finally, the digital army will take the file to social media. Hate messages were clearly seen pouring in a heartbeat after Nasrallah’s speech that evening,” says Shahrour.

The core of Nasrallah’s criticisms is echoed in the slogans, along with images often crafted by “al-Haya al-Tansikeya,” a coordinating committee (as it presents itself on its site) which has chosen to disseminate the values of the “resistance” on social media. On Twitter, Tansikeya was diligent in setting the tone for the anti-Bitar campaign, posting almost every day since Sept. 27 various slogans and images defaming him and accusing him, in particular, of acting under the Americans’ cover.

The hashtags took a more aggressive twist after bloody clashes broke out in Tayyouneh, in southern Beirut, between Hezbollah and Amal fighters on the one hand, and gunmen positioned in Christian neighborhoods on the other, on Oct. 14, the day of the protest that the two Shiite parties had called for against the judge outside the Beirut Justice Palace; the street battles resulted in the deaths of seven people. The hashtag “their blood is on Bitar’s hand,” along with the victims’ photos was retweeted by a horde of users, thus laying the blame for the violence on the magistrate.

“Character assassination”

Magistrate Tarek Bitar, whose colleagues have always applauded his integrity, is clearly the victim of a skillfully calculated “character assassination” to tarnish his reputation. But he is not the only victim of online harassment as part of a campaign led by the supporters of Hezbollah and its allies. A number of Lebanese journalists, especially women, have been subjected to this type of harassment, to the alarm of some organizations, such as Reporter Without Borders.

Dima Sadek, Luna Safwan, Mahassen Moursel and, more recently, Yumna Fawaz have all been the victims of aggressive smear campaigns targeting their private lives.

“One does not need to be very critical; it is enough to mention the name of Nasrallah and they will come down on you,” says Yumna Fawaz, a former war reporter for al-Jadeed TV, who says that she has been harassed by Hezbollah since the beginning of the revolution in Syria in 2011.

“I am exposed to constant hate speech; it besets my whole life, and the ultimate goal of all this is to silence me, to make me stop my journalism work,” says the reporter, who insists that she has never yielded to these intimidations.

The Samir Kassir Foundation, via the academic and anthropologist Nasri Messarra, recently studied the network of hate speech surrounding the assassination of Lokman Slim, an intellectual and documentary filmmaker, and a fervent Hezbollah critic who was killed on Feb. 4, six months after the Beirut port explosion.

An analysis of nearly 190,000 tweets made in the month preceding and following his murder establishes the existence of networks run by supporters of Hezbollah that intentionally promoted a negative image of Slim, celebrated his death and/or accused him of collaborating with Israel.

As with Judge Bitar, influential people on the internet, who sometimes hold high-up positions in the media sector, such as journalist Hosein Mortada, have helped to make the defamatory messages (which range from the subtle to the aggressive) go “viral” by posting them on their pages.

Online assassination = offline assassination?

Such an online campaign should not be underestimated. It can even have a chilling effect. In Lokman Slim’s case, the campaign helped to justify his elimination by tarnishing his image, turning him into a trivial figure, and even worse, into a man deserving of his fate, according to the study by the Samir Kassir Foundation. ​​

Is it to be feared that harassment orchestrated online leads to crime in real life? Shahrour believes that the correlation has not been confirmed yet. According to him, the online cabal mainly plays on the user’s psychology.

“We can’t say that hate speech leads to a crime. In Lokman Slim’s case, the hate messages [before his death] resulted in a scenario where some argued after his killing, ‘You see, you had been told that he was an enemy or an Israeli spy.’ This campaign has somehow shaped a ‘general opinion’ beforehand, making it possible to trivialize the future assassination,” explains Shahrour.

An American study entitled, “From Hashtag to Hate Crime: Twitter and Anti-Minority Sentiment,” indicates that this correlation is real. The study found that US President Donald Trump’s xenophobic tweets were followed by a rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes in the United States.

“They repeatedly wish you death on social media to the point that they get aggressive and violent when they see you,” says Yumna Fawaz, who recounts that she has been attacked on the ground.

What about Facebook and Twitter? Don’t these platforms have an obligation to protect users exposed to hateful content?

“Twitter has policies and services for protection against violent campaigns and threats, but it fails to apply them when the content is not written in English,” Chloe Colliver, head of Digital Policy and Strategy at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, explained.

“None of these platforms are transparent about how many content moderators they have around the world but researches have shown that in languages like Arabic or Spanish the content moderating is less effective and leaves it to abuse and harassment,” Colliver said.

The anti-Bitar online campaign may not be designed to prepare the public psyche for his death. Yet, it clearly aims to discredit him to the point that a large segment of public opinion might not be outraged by his possible removal. The psychological effects of the cabal led by this digital army are, in fact, very real, to the point that the investigation led by the judge has become distorted in the minds of all of Hezbollah’s supporters.

Many demonstrators on Oct. 14 raised signs associating the magistrate with the current US ambassador in Beirut, hinting that he is Washington’s puppet.

The supporters of the Shiite tandem are convinced that the probe seeks to question members of their camp only. But they have turned a blind eye to the fact that Bitar has also initiated proceedings against figures like State Security Director-General Tony Saliba, and former Lebanese Army commander Jean Kahwaji, and that officials like Customs chief Badri Daher (who is close to President Aoun) and the Beirut Port director-general Hassan Koraytem (who is close to Saad Hariri) have been behind bars for more than a year for their alleged responsibility in this case.

Hezbollah has sought to capitalize on the killing of several people in Beirut last Thursday to try to mobilize anger against a Christian Lebanese leader named Samir Geagea, like reported by jpost.com.

This leads to questions about what Hezbollah’s real plan is. Within a day of the attack, the pro-Hezbollah social media was already labeling Geagea responsible and various graphics appeared comparing him to fascists and reminding Lebanese of the civil war that pitted Christian fighters like Geagea against Muslims.

How did Hezbollah know to latch onto this narrative so quickly? It appears that Hezbollah wants to exploit the chaotic scenes last week to claim that they know who shot at protests.

However, the actual events are more unclear. A video emerged showing Lebanese soldiers shooting at least one civilian. Hezbollah members arrived quickly with arms to begin shooting at random buildings during the protest in Beirut. The protest was a Hezbollah provocation designed to remove a judge investigating an explosion last year in Beirut.

This means that some supporters of Hezbollah may have been looking for an excuse to try to sideline or target Geagea. Why him? Because targeting a Christian leader who opposes Hezbollah is one way to divide the opposition in Lebanon.

While some Christians have sided with Hezbollah, such as Michel Aoun, others back the Lebanese Forces, the group led by Geagea. Many Sunni Muslims also back Saad Hariri and others who oppose Hezbollah. This has created political deadlock for years.

Hezbollah wants to remind Lebanon that it is the group with the most weapons and armed members. That is why it has bragged of having some 100,000 fighters. It also wants to use this incident to create a new narrative about having “martyrs” to pretend that it is the victim.

This is the classic victim-perpetrator model, where the more one is a perpetrator, the more one claims also to be a victim and be “forced” to perpetrate crimes. Hezbollah has entered this cycle because of its strength in Lebanon today.

The question for Hezbollah is whether it will continue down a road of sectarian division and trying to create a kind of a cause that could unite its followers against Geagea and lead to violence, or whether it will tone down the rhetoric and stop the incitement.

In Pakistan’s rugged tribal regions along the Afghan border, a persistent warning is circulating: the “other” Taliban is returning, like reported by inews.co.uk.

Pakistan’s own Taliban movement, known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban, with its own record of violent attacks against the Islamabad government, has been emboldened by the return to power of their namesakes across the border.

Islamabad was warned by many that in backing the Taliban in Afghanistan it was playing with fire.

Officially, the Pakistan government doesn’t support the Taliban in Afghanistan, but merely urges the world to work with it. Few, though, believe that.

Pakistan viewed the rise of anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s as a chance to turn Afghanistan into a satellite state. Once the Soviets were vanquished, Pakistani officials turned their attention, post-9/11, to ousting the Americans.

General Hamid Gul, a former head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), spelled out publicly in 2014 how the agency used US aid after 9/11 to continue funding the Taliban.

“When history is written, it will be stated that the ISI defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan with the help of America. Then… the ISI, with the help of America, defeated America,” he said.

Islamist extremism has already divided Pakistani society along sectarian lines, and experts say the return of Afghan Islamists will embolden radicals in Pakistan-based groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Tehrik-e-Taliban.

Amir Rana, executive director of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, notes that Tehrik-e-Taliban has ramped up deadly attacks in recent months.

He warns that Pakistani society is at risk of turning into one similar to the Taliban-run Afghanistan.

A Gallup Pakistan survey last week found 55 per cent of Pakistanis would support an “Islamic government” like the one now in power in Afghanistan

In Pakistan’s rugged tribal regions along the border with Afghanistan, a quiet and persistent warning is circulating: The Taliban are returning. Pakistan’s own Taliban movement, which had in years past waged a violent campaign against the Islamabad government, has been emboldened by the return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan, like reported by fresnobee.com.

They seem to be preparing to retake control of the tribal regions that they lost nearly seven years ago in a major operation by Pakistan’s military. Pakistani Taliban are already increasing their influence. Local contractors report Taliban-imposed surcharges on every contract and the killing of those who defy them. In early September, for example, a contractor named Noor Islam Dawar built a small canal not far from the town of Mir Ali near the Afghan border. It wasn’t worth more than $5,000. Still, the Taliban came calling, demanding their share of $1,100. Dawar had nothing to give and pleaded for their understanding, according to relatives and local activists.

A week later he was dead, shot by unknown gunmen. His family blames the Taliban. Pakistan’s Taliban, known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban or TTP, is a separate organization from Afghanistan’s Taliban, though they share much of the same hardline ideology and are allied. The TTP arose in the early 2000s and launched a campaign of bombings and other attacks, vowing to bring down the Pakistani government and seizing control in many tribal areas. The military crackdown of the 2010s managed to repress it.

But the TTP was reorganizing in safe havens in Afghanistan even before the Afghan Taliban took over Kabul on Aug. 15. “The Afghan Taliban’s stunning success in defeating the American superpower has emboldened the Pakistani Taliban…They now seem to believe they too can wage a successful jihad against the Pakistani ‘infidel’ state and have returned to insurgency mode,” said Brian Glyn Williams, Islamic history professor at the University of Massachusetts, who has written extensively on jihad movements.

The TTP has ramped up attacks in recent months. More than 300 Pakistanis have been killed in terrorist attacks since January, including 144 military personnel, according to the Islamabad-based Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies. The events in Afghanistan have also energized the scores of radical religious parties in Pakistan, said Amir Rana, executive director of the Islamabad-based Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies. These parties openly revile minority Shiite Muslims as heretics and on occasion bring thousands on to the street to defend their hardline interpretation of Islam. One party, the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan, has a single agenda: to protect a controversial blasphemy law. The law has been used against minorities and opponents and can incite mobs to kill simply over an accusation of insulting Islam.

Already buffeted by a growing religiosity, Pakistani society is at risk of transforming into one similar to Taliban-run Afghanistan, Rana warned. A Gallup Pakistan poll released last week found 55% of Pakistanis would support an “Islamic government” like the one advocated by Afghanistan’s Taliban. Gallup surveyed 2,170 Pakistanis soon after the Taliban takeover in Kabul. Pakistan has shied away from offering unilateral recognition to the all-Taliban government in Afghanistan, but has been pushing for the world to engage with the new rulers. It has urged the United States to release funds to the Afghan government, while urging the Taliban to open their ranks to minorities and non-Taliban.

Pakistan’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban is a constant source of angst in America, where Republican senators have introduced a law that would sanction Islamabad for allegedly working against the U.S. to bring the Taliban to power. The charge has angered Pakistan, whose leaders say it was asked and delivered the Taliban to the negotiation table with the U.S., which eventually led to an agreement paving the way for America’s final withdrawal. Pakistan’s ties to many of the Afghan Taliban go back to the 1980s when Pakistan was the staging arena for a U.S.-backed fight against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In particular, the Haqqani group, possibly Afghanistan’s most powerful Taliban faction, has a long relationship with Pakistan’s intelligence agency, ISI.

Pakistan has turned to Sirajuddin Haqqani, the interior minister in Afghanistan’s new Taliban government, for help in starting talks with the Pakistani Taliban, said Asfandyar Mir, a senior expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Some TTP figures in North Waziristan — a rugged area the group once controlled — are ready to negotiate.

But the most violent factions, led by Noor Wali Mehsud, are not interested in talks. Mehsud’s Taliban want control of South Waziristan, said Mir. It’s not clear whether Haqqani will be able to get Mehsud to the table or whether Afghanistan’s new rulers are ready to break their close ties with Pakistan’s Taliban. In the attempts to put together negotiations with Islamabad, the TTP is demanding control over parts of the tribal regions and rule by its strict interpretation of Islamic Shariah law in those areas, as well as the right to keep their weapons, according to two Pakistani figures familiar with the demands. They spoke to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to speak to the media and because they fear retaliation. Bill Roggio of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a U.S.-based think tank, said Pakistan is opening talks with the Taliban to stop the increasing attacks on its military, but he warned that “the government is opening Pandora’s box.”

“The TTP will not be satisfied with ruling a small portion of Pakistan, it will inevitably want more than what it is given,” Roggio said. “Like the Afghan Taliban wanted to rule Afghanistan, the TTP wants to rule Pakistan.”

 

Gunfire targeted Hezbollah members who were taking part in a protest that was designed to prevent an investigation into the Beirut port disaster last year, like reported by jpost.com. Hezbollah’s goal was to cement its control of Lebanon, where it already has been able to secure allies in the presidency and to create a parallel communications network and infiltrate other state structures.

Hezbollah’s goal, 16 years after it murdered the former prime minister of Lebanon Rafic Hariri in its first bid for control of the country, was to flex its muscles and get judge Tarek Bitar removed. It appears that the gunman had other plans for today.

Hezbollah is now a victim of its own success. What was once a “resistance” movement that was popular among a segment of the historically marginalized Shi’ite population has come to dominate Lebanon. This isn’t because Hezbollah is so large, it has only a few seats in parliament. Hezbollah instead has incredible mafia-like success because it maintains its own para-state militia, its own phone network, financial system, it arranges import of fuel and has sent fighters abroad to wage war and conduct Lebanon’s foreign policy.

Hezbollah is so powerful and global that it is stronger than the state. As such, it occupies Lebanon, using classic Iranian tactics for building up parallel institutions, bankrupting the state and turning the state into an appendage of the Hezbollah militia terrorist movement.

But Hezbollah is also a victim of this “success.” This is because if you are too powerful then you become the target of “resistance.” It is no longer in Hezbollah’s interest to have destabilization and chaos in Lebanon because now it is part of the state structure. This means that while Hezbollah wants to parasite off the state and bankrupt it, it also doesn’t want the kind of factionalism that dominated Lebanon during the civil war period from 1975 to 1989. This is because Hezbollah, now that it is close to power, wants to have a monopoly on that power. That means it doesn’t want other militias in the country.

The gunmen who shot at Hezbollah and its Shi’ite allies among the Amal movement, seem to be resisting Hezbollah’s machinations. This isn’t the first time these kinds of clashes have happened. Back in 2008, Hezbollah defeated opponents in armed street battles and clashes so that Hezbollah could maintain its parallel communications network.

Each time a state structure has tried to challenge Hezbollah’s power and impunity the organization takes advantage of the crises. This time the judge had issued warrants for officials linked to Amal. Hezbollah couldn’t allow that. In the past Hezbollah has made sure that no warrants were issued for its members in the wake of the murder of Hariri. It assassinated writers, commentators, politicians, experts and officials.

Hezbollah members appeared to have brought arms to the protest as well, perhaps prepared in advance for this eventuality. Lebanon also has an army that has been deployed. By late afternoon reports said five or six people had been killed.

This incident appears similar to another incident in August when Hezbollah mourners also came under fire. Several Hezbollah members were killed in the clashes. Those clashes were apparently between Hezbollah and a local Sunni tribe. Here again, Hezbollah was a victim of its own power because instead of it being the lawless group it was being targeted by an armed group.

Although the army deployed in Beirut in the wake of the clashes the reports from the ground showed random shooting and even RPGs being fired at buildings. Both Hezbollah and Amal members were armed. This shows how Lebanon is a powderkeg and many small arms are held by people in the country. Many Hezbollah gunmen appeared to be mobilized in Beirut according to videos. Members of parliament called for the army to be deployed to stop the “militia” violence.

But it still remained unclear who had started the violence. In the end, although it shows that Hezbollah has enemies that are willing to take potshots at it, the groups overall drive for power in Lebanon is almost complete. It has bankrupted the country. It killed a former prime minister. It has a parallel communications network. It has a huge arsenal of missiles, drones and other weapons. It has killed critics such as Lokman Slim. It likely killed author Samir Kassir as well as Pierre Amine Gemayel, George Hawi, and Wissam Eid, the investigator of the 2005 killing of Hariri. Now Hezbollah sought to remove a judge investigating last year’s Beirut explosion.

The violence on October 14 will be another small turning point in Lebanon’s descent into complete control by Hezbollah.

Similar to several insurgent groups in Africa, Al-Shabaab in Somalia has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, which has implications for people`s safety in the continent, like reported by lse.ac.uk.

Some policymakers, practitioners and scholars assume that a pledge between insurgent groups increases terrorism in the base country or elsewhere.

However, new analysis finds that Al-Shabaab`s bombing attacks did not significantly change in Africa after the group pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, which has implications for international stakeholders who are at risk of reproducing terrorist propaganda efforts.

As the leading actor of the global jihadist movement, al-Qaeda has developed a global alliance network with terrorist organisations around the world that share similar ideologies and goals. Several insurgent groups in Africa and the Middle East have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, declaring a cooperative relationship and support for each other.

Based in Somalia, Al-Shabaab has carried out major terrorist attacks, including in surrounding countries such as Kenya and Uganda. The leaders of Al-Shabaab swore allegiance to al-Qaeda under the leadership of Usama bin Laden, but its pledge was formally accepted by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the successor of bin Laden, in 2012.

Counterterrorism policymakers, practitioners and scholars have different opinions on the influence of pledging on Al-Shabaab’s terrorist activities. Some counterterrorism experts have stated that pledging allegiance was a key strategy for Al-Shabaab to expand its activities and increase its success.

On the other hand, others have stated that pledging allegiance was a symbolic action, which aims to propagate the ideology of the group and motivate its supporters. Still, other experts and scholars suggested that pledging allegiance was counterproductive because it led to organisational issues and attracted global attention from key counterterrorism players.

How does this formal expansion strategy influence a small group`s activities in a specific form of terrorism? In our research, we tested the role of pledging allegiance in terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab in Africa by analysing its bombing activities before and after its pledge to al-Qaeda.

How Al-Shabaab’s pledge affected bombing activities
The vector autoregressive (VAR) model in our study provides a way to examine the impact of Al-Shabaab’s pledge to Al-Qaeda on the occurrence and lethality of bombing or explosive attacks in Africa. To accomplish this, our VAR model accounts for interactions between the two time-series of bombing/explosive attacks and associated fatalities. Simultaneously, the models consider the impact of the pledging of allegiance on these two series.

Furthermore, the incidence (i.e., the number of bombings in a quarter) and lethality of bombing/explosive attacks (i.e., the number of casualties in the bombings) may interact and influence the future behaviours of one another. For instance, less frequent bombings may result in more fatalities, or more bombings may cause more fatalities, and so forth. Therefore, the impact of pledging may evolve over time within this cycle of interactions between the two series.

Nevertheless, the results of our analysis showed that there was no immediate nor long-term impact of Al-Shabaab pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda on the frequency and lethality of the bombing activities.

Even though we see a verbal commitment in the form of pledging allegiance between the two violent groups, it appears that this cooperative relationship did not bring enough logistical/operational support to increase the performance of Al-Shabaab on the ground.

Three factors limiting impact
There may be several explanations for our findings. First, the timing of the pledge was not ideal for al-Qaeda to provide sufficient support to Al-Shabaab due to its declining power, as a result of consistent counterterrorism efforts from the US and its allies, and also fierce competition with other jihadist organisations such as Islamic State (IS) in the global jihadist movement.

When IS invited Al-Shabaab to pledge to IS in 2015, this caused a rift among Al-Shabaab militants and caused the formation of a splinter group, Jahba East Africa, which pledged allegiance to IS and started to compete with Al-Shabaab in the region.

Second, Al-Shabaab had to change its focus from domestic to regional terrorist attacks after pledging to al-Qaeda, but this strategy shift increased pressure against them from international counterterrorism actors, such as the United States and the African Union. For example, when the leader of Al-Shabaab, Godane, was killed in a US airstrike in 2014, this move deepened leadership struggles and intensified internal power struggles among senior members of the group.

Third, the global jihadist agenda and the Wahhabi/Salafist ideology of al-Qaida did not align with the national goals of Al-Shabaab and local concerns of Somalian clans. While Al-Shabaab’s leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, was more aligned with the global jihadist ideology, other senior leaders such as Sheikh Mukhtar Robow and Hasan Dahir Aweys had national/local concerns.

Substantially, we suggest pledging allegiance does not improve the organisational performance (such as more incidents) of terrorist organisations. Hence, the stakeholders (i.e., policymakers, practitioners and scholars) should cautiously evaluate the declaration of pledging allegiance between terrorist organisations and keep in mind the goal of making propaganda for organisational survival and revitalisation of a terrorist group.

Of course, counterterrorism policies should continue to observe all cooperative relationship efforts between terrorist organisations, because any low-end cooperation such as pledging may evolve into high-end cooperation or merging with al-Qaida. But placing too much emphasis on the declaration of pledging allegiance may inadvertently serve the goals of terrorist organisations by providing a basis for their propaganda efforts in Africa, particularly where governance is weak.

The Haqqani network derives its name from Jalaluddin Haqqani, who first fought against the Soviet army in Afghanistan, and later against the United States (US) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces. Following the death of Jalaluddin, the leadership of the group was assumed by his son, Sirajuddin, who is set to head the Interior Ministry, perhaps the most important ministerial position in the newly announced Afghan cabinet. India’s diplomatic presence in Afghan cities, whenever it is restored, will be under the direct watch of the Sirajuddin-led ministry. Obviously, this is far from comfortable for New Delhi, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

A United Nations (UN)-designated global terrorist since 2007 and on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s most-wanted list, Sirajuddin is undoubtedly one of the most influential and powerful insurgent leaders in Afghanistan. The UN listing about him says that he “participated in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Jaish-i-Mohammed.” Sirajuddin’s uncle, Khalil-Ur-Rehman Haqqani, finds a place in the cabinet as the Minister for Refugees, and has also been listed as a terrorist with links to al-Qaeda. Two other members of the group – Najeebullah Haqqani and Sheikh Abdul Baqi Haqqani – will lead the Communications and Higher Education ministries respectively in a cabinet that is all-male and overwhelmingly Pashtun. Sirajuddin is expected to make sure that all shades of resistance to Rawalpindi’s involvement in Afghan affairs are suppressed so that Afghanistan can effectively become a client state of Pakistan.

There are local, regional and global dimensions of the Haqqanis’ rise to prominence. Jalaluddin Haqqani was one of the most infamous students of the Darul-Uloom Haqqania religious seminary located in Akora Khattak in northwest Pakistan (Asim Umar, the former head of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent had also studied here). Jalaluddin went on to become a notorious mujahedeen in the 1970s. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, he emerged as the Central Investigation Agency’s trusted mujahedeen leader. Jalaluddin is believed to be the first Afghan Islamist to have actively recruited Arab militants into his ranks during the Afghan jihad. He soon developed ties with Osama bin Laden before joining hands with the Taliban. When the Taliban came to power in 1996, he was appointed a minister.

Though the Haqqani network has formally functioned under the Taliban’s Supreme Council, it has been able to remain effectively outside Taliban control and maintain a separate identity. The Haqqani network, in the areas of its operation, has hosted and supported many anti-India terrorists, with direct involvement of the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI). The Uighurs, Uzbeks and other militant groups were also sheltered by the Haqqanis in its strongholds during the 1990s.

After the removal of the Taliban regime in late 2001, the Haqqani leaders took refuge in Pakistan’s North Waziristan where they made a lot of money through both legal and illegal activities. The network played a critical role in the revival of the Taliban insurgency during the Hamid Karzai government. In 2016, Sirajuddin was named deputy to Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, the leader of Afghan Taliban, after the news of the death of Mullah Mohammad Omar was leaked by Afghan intelligence.

In its determination to undermine India’s influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s security establishment has often channelised the Haqqani network’s lethal capacity to carry out terrorist violence. The 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul and the subsequent attack on Kabul’s Gurdwara Har Rai Saheb in 2020 are widely believed to be the handiwork of the group. The US too became frustrated with Pakistan as no amount of pressure could persuade the latter to crack down on the Haqqani network, which was termed a “veritable arm of Pakistan’s ISI” by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen, in 2011. The Haqqani network is also credited with introducing suicide bombings as a terrorist tactic that was later adopted by the Taliban as well as other terrorist groups.

It would be erroneous to treat the Haqqanis as a local Afghan non-state actor. It is the Haqqani network’s remarkable ability to remain in the grey zone between nationally-oriented insurgency and globally-oriented jihadism that is dangerous. Having survived for more than four decades in an extremely volatile and conflict-ridden region, the Haqqani network remains at the centre of a nexus of religious medievalism, state sponsorship of terrorism, and global jihad unleashed by the troika of the Taliban, Pakistan’s security establishment and al-Qaida.

It is too early to say whether Sirajuddin and other Haqqani clan ministers will modify their behaviour or continue to find value in their network’s ties with the al-Qaida and Pakistan’s security establishment. If the network leaders continue to insist on maintaining the group’s autonomy from the Taliban while paying obeisance to generals in Rawalpindi, it will not only create governance challenges within the country but will also have a significant bearing on India’s engagement with the Taliban-led Afghanistan.

 

When ISIS claimed responsibility for a series of bomb attacks in Afghanistan which targeted the Taliban this week, the terror act marked the latest in the historical conflict between the two extremist groups, like reported by alarabiya.net.

While the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan was met with celebration by many terror groups, ISIS was the notable exception.

Who are the Taliban and ISIS?
The Taliban and ISIS are both extremist groups seeking to form authoritarian states under their strict interpretation of Sharia law and are prepared to use violence to achieve their aim.

How are ISIS and the Taliban different?
Although both ISIS and the Taliban are extremist militants, they have differed on the minutiae of religion and strategy. That tussle has led to bloody fighting between the two. The most significant difference between ISIS and the Taliban is in their ideological interpretations and enforcement of sharia law.

One aspect that experts, such as journalist Mah-Rukh Ali, point to is the group’s interpretations of how to treat women under Islamic law. In a 2015 paper published by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, Ali highlighted that ISIS sexualizes women as objects in a way the Taliban does not.

Jason Burke, foreign correspondent for The Guardian, noted that groups including the Taliban, who have “shown greater pragmatism in recent years,” stand in stark contrast to those, like ISIS, “who believe in unmitigated violence, extreme commitment to doctrinal purity and apocalyptic predictions.”

Are the Taliban and ISIS enemies?
The two forces are long-time foes who have fought bitterly since 2015 when ISIS formed the arm of the extremist group in Afghanistan’s Khorasan Province (ISKP) at a time when it was first seeking to extend its geographical reach beyond Iraq and Syria.

Days prior to the final US pullout in Afghanistan, ISIS-K, the arm of the extremist group in Afghanistan, carried out a suicide bombing at Kabul airport. The bombing killed 13 US servicemen and over a 100 Afghans, becoming the deadliest day for the US military in Afghanistan since 2011.

Most notably, in the group’s first statements following the Taliban’s seizure of Afghanistan, ISIS has “basically called the Taliban a stooge of the US” and suggested it “was handed Afghanistan on a silver platter” by America, a BBC expert on extremist messaging Mina Al-Lami told NPR.

What is the history of ISIS and Taliban fallout?
ISIS, which was formed in 1999, began recruiting Taliban defectors in 2015, after establishing the ISKP in Afghanistan.

The two forces went to war later that year, after the Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour asked his ISIS counterpart Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to stop recruiting former Taliban fighters. He had called for the two groups to unite under the Taliban’s leadership to achieve a common goal of ruling by sharia law.

ISIS and the Taliban fought each other again in 2017, in the Jowzjan province of Afghanistan. Violence continued until the ISKP was “almost entirely eradicated” by US and Afghan forces in 2019, The Independent explained at the time.

The Taliban signed a peace deal with Donald Trump’s administration in February 2020 which, as well as agreeing to the withdrawal of US troops within 14 months, allowed for some continued violence, though at a reduced level.

ISIS has most recently criticized the Taliban for working with Western governments and organizations, and its latest statement indicates that the group considers that the Taliban is willing to collaborate with the West.

What has been the latest conflict since the Taliban takeover?
Fierce battles have taken place between the Taliban and the local ISIS affiliate in Afghanistan, after the takeover. Days after taking control of Kabul, the Taliban claimed to have removed the former head of ISIS in South Asia, Abu Omar Khorasani, from an Afghan prison before executing him “on the spot,” The Wall Street Journal reported.

On Sunday, ISIS claimed responsibility for a series of bomb attacks in Afghanistan in which 35 Taliban members were killed or wounded, the extremist group’s Amaaq News Agency said on its Telegram channel.

Explosions targeted Taliban vehicles in Jalalabad city, the provincial center of Nangarhar, Bilal Karimi, a deputy of Taliban official Zabihullah Mujahid, confirmed to Afghan news outlet TOLOnews on Sunday.

Additionally, “ISIS considers Shia Muslim heretics,” the BBC’s al-Lami continued. Shia civilians are considered “legitimate targets” by ISIS, whereas they are not by the Taliban. The difference in views is shown in ISIS’s description of the Taliban as “apostates.”

Groups including the Taliban, who have “shown greater pragmatism in recent years”, stand in stark contrast to those, like ISIS, “who believe in unmitigated violence, extreme commitment to doctrinal purity and apocalyptic predictions”, Burke summarized.

ISIS vs The Taliban: A growing concern?
In the first quarter of 2021, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan recorded 77 attacks that were claimed by or attributed to ISKP. Burke has described the faction as “perhaps the ugliest character in the Star Wars bar for extremists that Afghanistan has become” in The Guardian.

On Saturday, US officials said that alternative routes to Kabul airport were being established to protect Afghan civilians and US personnel from the threat posed by ISKP. A US defense official told CNN that “there is a strong possibility” the group could try to carry out an attack on the airport.

Following the fall of the US-backed Afghan government of Ashraf Ghani on August 15, al-Qaeda-linked Uighur, Uzbek and Tajik jihadi groups widely celebrated the Taliban’s “historic victory” over the “enemies of the Muslim Ummah”, like reported by moderndiplomacy.eu.

In honor of the Taliban’s rebuilding of the Islamic Emirate, leading Jihadi groups from Central Asia and China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region issued special congratulatory statements, echoed jihadi nasheeds (chants of jihadi glory), arranged a festive feast for their Muhajeers (who immigrated to spread Islam and wage jihad) and gloatingly booed the US military forces leaving Afghanistan on jihadi media.

Turkestan Islamic Party called on all Muslims to unite around the Taliban as one body

Uighur jihadists of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), formerly known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) from Western China, were one of the first to congratulate the Taliban victory. On August 16, in a statement of the TIP’s Syrian branch, released by its propaganda arm, ‘Muhsinlar’, Uighur militants congratulated the Taliban’s emir Haibatullah Akhunzada and all Afghan fellow believers on the restoration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

Notably, in its statement, TIP ‘discovered’ the root causes of the Taliban’s victory in the Muslim holy book of the Quran, which refers to Surah al-Fatiha “Indeed, we have given you, o Prophet, a clear conquest” (48:1). The TIP further emphasized that “one generation of Muslims have sacrificed themselves for the religion of Allah, for today’s boundless joy and rejoicing.” The Taliban’s victory is “a fruit of long and arduous struggle and God’s big gift to Muslims worldwide”, the statement reads.

The TIP’s Syrian branch has called on all Muslims to make dua’s (invocation of God) for the Afghan Mujahedeen, to cooperate and support their fellows of Taliban. Uighur jihadists emphasized the need for the integrity of the Islamic Ummah, which should be governed only by the rule of the Almighty as one nation and one country. At the end of the statement, TIP noted that “East Turkestan Mujahedeens, as an integral part of the Great Ummah, celebrated the historic victory of the Taliban with boundless joy, and will stand alongside them shoulder to shoulder.”

It is recalled that ETIM was designated as a terrorist organization by the UN Security Council resolutions 1267 and 1390 on September 11, 2002, for its alleged association with al-Qaeda, its leader Osama bin Laden, and the Afghan Taliban. As part of the “global war on terror,” the US Federal Government designated ETIM as a terrorist organization on August 19, 2002. At that time, China skillfully took advantage of the situation emerging after the 9/11 attacks, achieving the recognition of ETIM as a terrorist group by many members of the U.S.-led “war on terror” coalition.

However, on November 5, 2020, the US Department of State removed ETIM from the blacklist, which provoked a fuming reaction from official Beijing. China on the other hand is pursuing a harsh repressive policy against the Muslim minority in its Xinjiang region detaining more than one million ethnic Uighurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz in so-called “re-education camps.” Despite the US decision, the post-Soviet Central Asian countries, Russia and China did not exclude TIP from their banned list of terrorist organizations.

According to the latest 2021 UN Security Council’s report, “several hundred Uighur jihadists of TIP located primarily in Afghan Badakhshan and neighboring provinces, whose strategic goal is to establish an Islamic Uighur state in Xinjiang, China.” The report stated that TIP affiliated with both the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and their ties remain “strong and deep as a consequence of personal bonds of marriage and shared partnership in struggle, now cemented through second generational ties.” Moreover, the notorious leader of TIP, Abdul Haq al-Turkestani, has remained a member of al-Qaeda’s elite Shura Council since 2005. For more two decades, the most wanted key Uighur jihadist has been openly loyal to the Taliban’s top leader Haibatullah Akhunzada and the al-Qaeda’s emir Ayman al-Zawahiri. Today, all three top emirs are successfully continuing their faithful jihadi fellowship, skillfully hiding their close relations, and throwing dust in the eyes of the US and its Western partners, tired of the “longest war”.

Thus, it can be assumed that despite the Taliban’s warm relations with the Chinese government after their return to power in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that they will break ties with the Uighur jihadists of TIP. On the contrary, both are expected to remain loyal to the oath of allegiance (bayat). The long relationship between the Taliban, al-Qaeda and TIP has shown that the bayat has a sacred religious value for them.

Taliban is a source of inspiration for Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad

The Uzbek jihadist group Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ) on its Telegram channel posted a video congratulating the Taliban on the victory over the most powerful evil empire in the world, which it considers the US. The congratulations were unusual, as the three KTJ leaders via video addressed the Taliban comrades in joint jihad in three official languages of Afghanistan – Pashto, Dari and Uzbek. In particular, the KTJ’s top emir Abdul Aziz al Uzbeki, whom the UN identified as ‘Khikmatov,’ spoke in Pashto, the military commander Sayfiddin in Dari, and the main ideologist of Central Asian Salafi Jihadism, the group’s imam Ahluddin Navqotiy in Uzbek.

Abdul Aziz glorified the Taliban’s victory over the foreign invaders and occupiers as a gift from Allah Almighty to the Ummah. He eulogized the vision of Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban’s first emir, who once said, “Allah has promised us victory and America has promised us defeat, so we shall see which of the two promises will be fulfilled.” Top Uzbek jihadist further noted that “today, after a long-suffering patience, tireless struggle and great jihadi perseverance, finally came Nusrat (victory) in Khorasan, promised by Allah.” “Because the Mujahedeen are stronger in spirit and faith in God than the invaders, who, despite their military might and immeasurable wealth, fled the country in shame”, concluded Abdul Aziz.

Then, in an emotional speech, the group’s hard Salafi ideologist, Ahluddin Navqotiy, congratulated the Taliban Mujahedeen on behalf of KTJ Muhajeers waging a jihad in Syria’s Idlib province against Bashar al-Assad regime and pro-Iranian radical militias. He expressed confidence that today’s Nusrat of Allah in Afghanistan will become the driving force behind the establishment of Sharia rule in Central Asia.

Noteworthy, the KTJ leader, Abdul Aziz, had close ties with al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, in particular with the Haqqani network. As a native of the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan, Abdul Aziz made a hijrah (migration) to Afghanistan fleeing the repressive policies of Uzbek President Islam Karimov in the early 2000s. He waged a jihad in Afghanistan as part of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Then, in 2015, along with dozens of comrade-in-jihad, he split the group and joined the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), a splinter faction of the IMU. At the time, Central Asian jihadists split over the internal conflict between al-Qaeda and ISIS struggling for the leadership of global jihad.

On August 20, 2015, when the IMU officially swore allegiance to the ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the IJU followed in al Qaeda’s footsteps and renewed bayat to the Taliban’s emir Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. In May 2005, a decade before these events, the US government listed the IJU as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization in May 2005.

He belongs to the first generation of foreign fighters from Central Asia, who went through Taliban’s jihadi school in Afghanistan. He gained prestige among the fellow militants as a military strategist, and not as a deep scholar of the Quran or a public orator-ideologist of Salafi jihadism. In 2008-15, Abdul Aziz, along with the IJU’s leadership, was based in the al-Qaeda’s military hub of Mir Ali in North Waziristan. In one of his Jummah Khutbah preaching he admitted that allowing the Pakistani ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) to take refuge in North Waziristan saved the lives of many Uzbek jihadists from the US drone strikes. In 2019, Abdul Aziz made a hijrah to Syrian Idlib province and became the leader of the KTJ group.

Motivations and Strategies of the Central Asian Jihadism

The congratulations from the Central Asian Sunni militant groups to the Taliban were a vivid manifestation of their long-term and tested joint jihadi cooperation, which began in the late 1990s. Thus, Uighur’s TIP and Uzbek’s KTJ complemented a long list of global jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda’s Central Command and its franchises in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Hurras al-Deen (HD), Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Hamas, congratulating the Taliban on their ‘victory’ over the US and NATO forces.

To celebrate the Taliban’s ‘victory’, Uighur, Uzbek and Russia’s Caucasian Jihadists in Syria also hosted grand feasts for foreign and local Sunni Arab militants and heroized the Afghan Mujahedeen during Jummah Khutbah Sermons. The Central Asian jihadi media widely published photos and videos from these parties and against this background tried to recruit new supporters to make hijrah to Afghanistan and Syria to protect the values of Islam and wage the sacred jihad against the infidels. The dramatic picture of Afghan government soldiers fleeing to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan has made the Taliban and al-Qaeda more attractive for recruiting a new generation of Islamists from Central Asia. Calls to make hijrah, or migrate, to the Taliban’s so-called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan are also surfacing on jihadist forums. If the Syrian province of Idlib falls, al-Qaeda-aligned and HTS-backed Uzbek and Tajik jihadists’ migration to Afghanistan will be inevitable. The Taliban can easily melt them into Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz societies in northern Afghanistan and use them as leverage over rebellious ethnic minorities.

So, analysis of the jihadist media indicated that al-Qaeda-linked and Taliban-backed Central Asian extremist groups, operating in both Afghanistan and Syria, were deeply inspired by the Taliban’s victory over the pro-Western government of Ashraf Ghani. As a result, small and fragmented Salafi-Jihadi groups from post-Soviet countries have received the biggest boost to unite around the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Consequently, conducive conditions after the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan are expected to lead to a resurgence of al Qaeda in the Central Asian region. Latent al-Qaeda sympathizers and other radical Islamists in the “Five Stans” view the restoration of the Islamic Emirate on the other side of the border as the beginning of the great jihad’s revival and the approach of Nusrat. With the decline of ISIS and the rise of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, internal divisions, and inter-group feuds between the jihadist jamaats (group) of Central Asia, sometimes accompanied by bloodshed, are expected to diminish, and the volume of clandestine donations to jihad in the region are also expected to increase markedly.

But the main fear for local authoritarian and corrupt pro-Russian governments is that a Taliban victory could provide a historic boost for Uzbek, Tajik and Uighur violent extremist groups encouraging them in their campaigns to overthrow and replace local regimes. And although the Taliban is viewed by the world community as a Pashtun nationalist jihadi movement, and the Afghan jihad has always been more inward and parochial, nevertheless its ideological influence has always been strong among the Central Asian jihadists.

Despite the fact that the Taliban leadership publicly denies the presence of transnational terrorist groups in the country, a recent UN report revealed that there are about 10,000 foreign fighters in Afghanistan, who are members of al-Qaeda, Uighur’s TIP, Uzbek militant groups Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB), KTJ, IJU and Tajik’s Jamaat Ansarullah (JA). Moreover, some of them took an active part in the recent military attacks against the Afghan army on the side of the Taliban, which led to the rapid fall of Mazar-i-Sharif, the strategically important capital of the Northern Alliance. As we predicted earlier, the Taliban exploited the Central Asian jihadists during the fighting in the north of the country as their “hard power” and political leverage on the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. When the Taliban captured a strategically important security checkpoint near Afghan border with Tajikistan in July, they assigned a Tajik jihadi group Jamaat Ansarullah (JA) to raise the Taliban flag on the site. They also put JA in charge of security in five districts of Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province – Kuf Ab, Khwahan, Maimay, Nusay, and Shekay – near the Tajik border.

Although the Taliban has repeatedly promised not to allow Afghanistan to be used as a staging ground for any attacks, they will not sever their ties with Central Asian jihadi groups and will not violate the bayat. Uzbek, Uighur and Tajik jihadist groups are expected to maintain a safe haven in Afghanistan under the tacit and tight control of the Taliban. In the jihadist world, bayat or pledging allegiance is a heavy Islamic commitment reaching under the holy gaze of Allah Almighty, and reneging it is considered a serious offence. Therefore, the Taliban has never disavowed the group’s pledge.

In conclusion, the high fighting spirit and ideological strength of al-Qaeda-affiliated Central Asian jihadist groups in Afghanistan is associated not only with the Taliban’s lightning victory, but also with the humiliating and chaotic US withdrawal from the country. One of the Kyrgyz jihadists in Syria wrote on the KTJ Telegram channel that “the honor and dignity of America today is under the Taliban’s feet in front of the great Ummah.” This indicates that a new generation of Central Asian extremists has emerged on the scene of global jihadism, absorbing in itself the al-Qaeda’s Salafi-Takfiri military ideology, and synthesizing it with the Islamist nationalism of the Taliban, based on the common kindred Hanafi’s al-Maturidi Aqeedah (Sunni Islamic theology school). As the US counterterrorism capacity in Afghanistan weakened in the foreseeable future, the terrorism threat from Central Asian region will grow symmetrically for the US and the West as a whole.