As the Islamic State is driven out of its former strongholds, a U.N. panel is warning that the next big terror threat in the region could come, once again, from Al Qaeda — led by the son of Usama bin Laden, like reported by foxnews.com.

The report by U.N. experts, delivered to the Security Council and released this week, included startling findings about both terror networks. The report found that while ISIS had been defeated militarily in Iraq and most of Syria, it had rallied in early 2018 and still had approximately 20,000-30,000 members in the two countries.

The U.S.-led coalition in the region racked up numerous military wins against the group in 2017 and helped reduce its territory to mere pockets of Syria. At the State of the Union address this year, President Trump declared victory: “I’m proud to report that the coalition to defeat ISIS has liberated very close to 100 percent of the territory just recently held by these killers in Iraq and in Syria.”

The U.N. report found ISIS, though, is in the process of moving from “a proto-State network to a covert network” that continues to threaten other countries, and its leadership is still in tact, under Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.

Yet the report also raised significant concerns about Al Qaeda, which fell into the background amid the international attention on ISIS and its brutal tactics, particularly after the death of Usama bin Laden in 2011.

The report found that Al Qaeda is still a global network showing resilience, and it is stronger than ISIS in places like Somalia, Yemen and South Asia — and its leadership in Iran has grown more prominent.

Further, bin Laden’s son — Hamza bin Laden — has “continued to emerge as a leadership figure in Al Qaeda,” the report said.

“Al Qaeda’s leadership demonstrates strategic patience and its regional affiliates exercise good tactical judgment, embedding themselves in local issues and becoming players,” it said.

Earlier this month, The Guardian reported that the 29-year-old Hamza, who has said he wants to avenge his father, is believed to have married the daughter of Mohammed Atta — the Egyptian national who hijacked and flew the first plane into the World Trade Center on Sept. 11, 2001.

While the U.N. said there is little evidence as yet of a direct global threat from Al Qaeda, “improved leadership and enhanced communication will probably increase the threat over time, as will any rise in the tendency, already visible in some regions, of ISIL supporters to join Al Qaeda.”

The report comes amid growing international concern about the civil war in Yemen between the Saudi-led coalition and the Iran-backed Houthis. Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) has gained a foothold in the south of the wartorn country amid the chaos in the country.

This month, an Associated Press investigation found that the Saudi-led coalition has been cutting secret deals with Al Qaeda fighters, paying some to leave cities and towns, allowing others to retreat with weapons and cash. Others were recruited to join the coalition. Participants in those agreement said the U.S. was aware of the arrangements and held off on drone strikes.

U.N. Special Envoy to Yemen Martin Griffiths has invited both sides of the conflict to meet in Geneva for talks in September.

Iran may suffer from military disadvantages, but that doesn’t stop it from being a major military player in the Middle East, like reported by dw.com

Iran is a major military power in the Middle East, with an estimated 534,000 active personnel in the army, navy, air force and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Global Firepower Index, an online military ranking website, ranks Iran No. 13 in the world out of 136 countries. Their listing is based on more than 50 factors including war-making potential in conventional (non-nuclear) forces, manpower, geography and finance. To compare to other regional powers, Turkey ranks ninth, Egypt 12th, Israel 16th and Saudi Arabia 26th.

Iran’s population of 82 million means that it can draw on a deep well of manpower. This is a key factor in sustaining long wars of attrition such as the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.

However, at $16 billion (€13.4 billion) in 2017, Iran’s defense budget falls short of individual regional rivals and is minuscule in comparison to the combined defense spending of countries it is most likely to come into conflict with: Israel’s $18.5 billion (plus $3.5 billion in military aid from the US); Saudi Arabia’s $76.7 billion; and the United States’ nearly $600 billion.

Asymmetric strategy answer to disadvantages

Shiite Iran is outgunned financially by those it perceives to be its main military threats — the United States, Israel and Sunni Gulf Arab states. It also nearly encircled by United States military bases and lacks the security guarantees its regional Gulf Arab rivals and Israel receive from the United States.

In addition, Iran has been under a four-decade-long US arms embargo and UN arms restrictions since 2006. This has forced Iran to rely largely on the domestic production of weaponry. Meanwhile, Iran’s regional rivals are provided cutting-edge Western military systems.

In order to compensate for its relative weakness, Tehran relies on asymmetric capabilities and cost-raising deterrence measures.

Forward defense

One plank of Iran’s defense strategy is “forward defense,” led by the special operations Quds Force of the IRGC. The strategy involves the use of regional allies and proxies, known as the “axis of resistance,” as leverage to weaken, bog down, deter or fight Iran’s enemies away from its soil.

Such groups include the Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq fighting the “Islamic State”; foreign Shiite militias fighting on behalf of Iran’s ally Syria; the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah; Houthi rebels in Yemen; and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran is also one of several regional countries exerting influence on the Palestinian group Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Although aligned with Iran politically and militarily, these groups have to varying degrees their own agency and local political interests where they operate.

Ballistic missiles

A second plank of Iran’s military strategy is short, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles capable of hitting Israel, Gulf Arab states, US military bases in the region and parts of Europe.

As the International Crisis Group notes, Iran views these ballistic missiles as a deterrent against Israel and, in the event of an attack on Iran, as a means to hit enemies on their own soil or US military bases in the region. While Iran presents ballistic missiles as defensive weapons, its enemies consider them an offensive threat.

Ballistic missile policy can be combined with the forward defense policy, such as with Houthi ballistic missile attacks on Saudi Arabia in response to its war in Yemen and Iran’s arming Hezbollah with an array of missiles in Lebanon. Iran denies providing the Houthis with ballistic missiles or components.

Bringing the world economy to a standstill

A third means of Iranian deterrence is the threat to choke the world economy by shutting down the flow of oil in the event of conflict. Around one-fifth of the world’s traded oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

Iran’s strategy is to block the chokepoint through mines and employ asymmetric and unconventional naval tactics against enemy warships, such as swarming enemy warships with small, low-cost watercraft and speedboats armed with anti-ship missiles and torpedoes.

Iran may be developing a similar policy in Yemen, calculating that in the event of a conflict with a regional enemy, the Quds Force and its Houthi partners could shut down shipments in the Red Sea through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, through which 4 percent of the world’s traded oil passes.

Militias sharing power with weak central governments has become a growing phenomenon in the Middle East, causing widespread alarm of state structure collapsing and chaos spreading across borders, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

This new trend has common features on many levels, but most important of all the strong ties between the militias and some regional powers, in particular Iran. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) is the main source of arming and funding to major non-state actors that have strongly established themselves as decision makers in their respective countries: The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and several pro-regime militias in Syria. The PMF, the Houthis and Hezbollah not only have well-armed forces, but also have strong political representation within their respective states in the form of members of parliament or the government.

Militias, by definition are armed groups involved in insurgency warfare against the central government or a foreign force or other militias within a country that might be under occupation or has either become a failed state or on the verge of becoming one. Militia members are often ideologues that form an ultra-nationalist group or a sectarian group in a quest to weaken an occupation force or the central government and force it to adhere to their demands and comply with their ideology. Militias in general do not respect the state’s law or international laws. Some countries undergo internal political power struggle that could lead to a civil war. This is not the case being discussed in this article. It is about extensive efforts by a foreign power to create armed non-state actors in sovereign states to control them. Militias are the favorite tools used by regional or super powers in fighting proxy wars against one another. Such militias thrived during the Cold War era, and in other periods of global conflicts. They have now made a strong comeback at an unprecedented scale in the Middle East region.

The current situation in the Middle East could be regarded by military scientists as Fourth Generation warfare, which is simply defined as the loss of the central government’s monopoly on the use of force due to the rise of an armed non-state actor. In modern states, only security agencies and regular armed forces have the right to use arms and resort to violent means to enforce law and order and defend the country’s borders. However, in a Fourth Generation Warfare environment militias or armed non-state actors are often the tools of foreign powers in a quest to establish control over a state and subsequently enhance regional influence through an indirect and less costly approach. Under this scenario, the hostile powers do not need to send their own troops to defeat the other nation or take it over. They simply arm and fund non-state actors in the targeted countries and get them to do their dirty work. Iran fought an eight-year-long war against Iraq in the eighties costing it hundreds of thousands of lives without a victory. But now it has made a great deal of progress in controlling Iraq via the PMF militias and without sacrificing any of its troops. Also, through Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Syria, Tehran has now virtual control over all the territory from its southwestern borders all the way to the Mediterranean.

Therefore militias are now a major component of the so-called Fourth Generation Warfare. Their presence is often aimed at weakening the central government and spreading chaos to facilitate their hostile takeover of state institutions. The situation becomes more complex when there are multiple militias in one state and each militia is serving a different foreign power, which is what is taking place today in countries like Syria and Libya. Regional and global powers are supporting warring factions in these two countries that have become infested with radical terrorist groups while the process to broker a political settlement to re-establish a strong central government there remains deadlocked.

One phenomenon endangering global stability and international law is that the militias are gaining recognitions by members of the international community and are treated as legitimate entities. The U.S.-led Alliance combating terrorists in Iraq and up until late 2016, coordinated with the PMF and provided them with air support in the war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Russia has been working closely with Hezbollah and pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Syria to drive back rebel forces and save the regime there. The political leadership of Hezbollah is recognized by the European Union and Russia and formal lines of communications exist between the two powers with Hezbollah officials, even though the group’s military branch is integrated with its political leadership. Hezbollah is regarded a terrorist group by the U.S. and some Arab Gulf States.

So the PMF and Hezbollah are treated as acceptable entities co-existing with the state’s security agencies and armed forces. The non-state actors have created parallel institutions to that of the state dealing with welfare, religious affairs, education, communications and media. As a result countries like Lebanon and Iraq are now politically vulnerable at all times and actions of their political leaderships are often questionable by the international community. Normalizing this abnormal situation has only encouraged regional powers to create more militias, and the phenomenon is spreading.

The presence of a militia in a multi-ethnic or multi-sectarian country will increase the possibility of a civil war, because when one non-state actor possesses arms other communities in the country will feel an existential threat and subsequently seek ways to form their own armed militias to protect themselves. This will ultimately lead to a civil war as is the case in Libya and other regional countries. Moreover, ungoverned territories and fragile states have proven very attractive to extremist groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS to establish themselves there and spread terror worldwide. This is evident today in places like Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya.

Even if a country’s population is not made up of multi-ethnic or sectarian communities, a militia cannot permanently coexist peacefully with a state because it will always compete with the central government for the monopoly on the use of force and the drafting of foreign policy and managing state institutions. The conflict between the two sides could be postponed but never avoided. It is a matter of time before the country goes through a gradual meltdown of its institutions leading to a civil war and possible breakup.

Hence, global powers should concentrate on reviving and strengthening central governments in the Middle East and deny militias affiliated with foreign powers any legitimacy. Moreover, the international community must set new tough rules regarding armed non-state actors that are backed and funded by a foreign power to take over an internationally-recognized state that is a member of the United Nations. Such an act amounts to a foreign invasion of a sovereign state and must be treated as such.

A major protest movement was set in motion in early July in Iraq’s southern and central provinces over a lack of services and against corruption. As a result, Baghdad residents held demonstrations in support of the southern protests, while the liberated provinces sought to support the southern provinces in any way possible, like reported by al-monitor.com.

However, civilian activists in Salahuddin and Anbar provinces were deterred from taking to the streets in support of those in south and central Iraq, for several reasons, most notably the security situation and prevailing fears that the Islamic State (IS) could use such protests to re-ingrain itself with the public.

On July 23, instead of taking to the streets, Sunni tribes of Hawija in Kirkuk province merely issued a press statement supporting the demonstrations in the southern provinces of Iraq, which call for establishing reform, eliminating corruption and providing services to citizens.

This support came a day after activists took to social media to call for demonstrations in Sunni provinces that had been under IS’ control. However, all Facebook events and invitations were soon canceled and deleted.

Mahmoud al-Hiti, an activist from Anbar, told Al-Monitor, “Some activists in Fallujah and Ramadi planned to organize demonstrations in support of southern and central provinces, but before long the security forces prevented such action.”

Hiti added, “Civil gatherings in Anbar have a hard time being heard” because of the “loud voices of tribes and political parties.”

Sunni tribal leaders believe IS is waiting for any possible demonstrations in the liberated provinces to exploit them and make its way back. Meanwhile, tribes are concerned about clashing with the Iraqi government forces again, as happened in 2013 when the tribes set up tents and cut off roads.

Marwan al-Jabara, a spokesman for the Salahuddin provincial council, told Al-Monitor, “The Sunni provinces share the same suffering as the southern ones, but the equation will differ if we take up protesting against the poor service and economic situation.”

Jabara added, “If we take to the streets, we will be accused of being affiliated with IS and wanting chaos to prevail. But Sunni provinces have long been plagued by chaos due to the corruption in Iraqi state institutions.”

Security authorities in Iraq are concerned that security breaches in the liberated provinces could smooth the way for IS affiliates to regain a foothold there or to invade new areas under the control of the Iraqi government.

An Iraqi national security source told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity that individuals in Anbar have been coordinating to lead a demonstration in solidarity with the south, saying, “These individuals are supported by the banned Baath party in Iraq.”

The source added, “The national security forces, in cooperation with other security services, were able to put a stop to a plan, by Baath members abroad, to carry out demonstrations.”

Despite the lack of services in areas liberated from IS, in addition to economic problems and other issues related to detainees, Sunni community and political leaders are afraid to call for demonstrations, as their opponents or the Iraqi government could link this to IS and its return.

Atheel Nujaifi, a former governor of Ninevah province, said in a press statement, “We are working on steering clear of demonstrations in Sunni areas liberated from IS, because the situation there is too fragile and IS could take advantage of it.”

Residents of Sunni provinces want to express their opinions and protest their suffering because of a lack of services and the absence of a governmental role in certain issues, but as soon as they remember the experience of the 2013 sit-ins, they back down.

Muaid al-Windawi, a researcher at the Iraqi Center for Strategic Studies, spoke with the press about the possibility of Sunni provinces organizing demonstrations, saying, “Despite all calls, these provinces have concerns, especially after the use of excessive force in the demonstrations taking place in southern and central Iraq.”

Residents of Sunni provinces went through a lot during their protests against the governments of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki between 2006 and 2014. They were arrested and accused of terrorism. This is the main reason why they have been trying to avoid any confrontation with the Iraqi state as much as possible.

Ali al-Baidar, an activist from Salahuddin, told Al-Monitor, “After security officials warned activists and tribal leaders in the province about taking to the streets, no demonstration could be organized, be it in solidarity or in protest. We now immediately consider the possibility that we would be arrested, charged and suppressed again, despite our strong need to protest.”

The residents of liberated Sunni areas are highly motivated to protest against Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government, which recently restored their areas. However, their fear of going back to the years of displacement and lack of trust between residents and the Iraqi government is stronger than the urge to protest.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/07/iraq-protest-sunni-shiite.html#ixzz5MpR6XjnJ

Up until Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s talks with President Vladimir Putin Moscow on Wednesday Nov. 11, Israel made clear in every way possible – diplomatic and military – its resolve to prevent Iran and its proxies from establishing a presence in Syria, like reported by debka.com.

The resolve to remove Iran, Hizballah and the other Shiite militias under Revolutionary Guards command was emphasized for the umpteenth time on Tuesday, before Putin’s special emissaries.  His special envoy Alexander Lavrentiev and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin arrived in Jerusalem for another try to shift Netanyahu from his all-or-nothing stance on Iran.

With them was a large Russian delegation of security and military officials from the Operations Division of the Russian General Staff and intelligence units specializing in Syrian affairs.

The prime minister complained about lack of trust after Putin’s repeated violations of his promises to Israel regarding Syria. But the biggest problem still be confronted is Iran’s intransigent determination to stay in Syria which is equal to Israel’s determination to drive this arch enemy off its Syrian doorstep.
This impasse was amply illustrated on Sunday.

Israel insisted on keeping up its military attacks on Iranian command posts and depots filled with new weapons constantly flown in to Syria, while deterred Hizballah and Iraqi, Afghan and Shiite militias were undeterred from advancing on Israel’s borders, even in Syrian army uniforms. This week they are shortening the distance to their goal day by day.

Putin can’t, or won’t, push the Iranians out of Syria to meet Netanyahu’s demand. Without the Iranian militias, the crumbling Syrian army is no shape for conducting substantial ground operations to recover all the areas still in rebel hands. The Iranian proxy input was pivotal in the battles two months ago around Damascus and now, too, in the ongoing Syrian offensives in the southwest.

And so, while Putin gave US President Donald Trump and the Israeli prime minister solemn promises to keep pro-Iranian forces out of the operations going forward in the south, at the same time, he deployed the Russian air force in their support for bombing rebel positions.

Netanyahu is meeting Putin Wednesday for the third time in six months. At each meeting, he was forced back into concessions to pay for Russia turning a blind eye to Israeli air strikes against Iranian targets in Syria. The prime minister first agreed to Iran and its proxies holding back in positions that were 80km from Israel’s border; he then agreed to 40km and now Israel is clinging to the 1974 Separation of Forces accord signed with Syria at the end of the Yom Kippur War.

This is tantamount to permission for the Syrian army and its (Iranian) allies to move up to 10km from the border and in some places only a few dozen meters from the Israeli Golan and Sea of Galilee (Lake Kinneret) basin.

But even that Israeli concession is being whittled down. Tuesday night, the Russian UN mission led an Iranian and Syrian bid to curtail the authority of UNDOF, the international force monitoring the demilitarized zone marked out in the 1974 treaty. Once again, the Russians are two-timing Israel to protect Iran’s presence in Syria.

Until now, the IDF did not step in to arrest the serious slide in Israel’s strategic position vis a vis Iran’s menacing proximity to its northern border. It also silenced operations in the run-up to the prime minister’s meeting with Putin. But the price for Russia’s blind eye to Israel air strikes against Iranian targets has become excessive. Time has run out for deliberating whether this price was worthwhile or an inquiry into the failure of Israel’s often lethal air operations to break Iran’s resolve.

Hizballah and other Iranian cohorts are too close for Israel to indulge in soul-searching. Netanyahu’s critical conversation with Putin on Wednesday is the last one before Jerusalem decides whether to go to war in Syria against Iran, Hizballah and the militias.

Putin is not keen  on another war front developing in Syria, but neither is he willing to throw the Iranians out. President Trump too is deeply reluctant to engage in any further military combat in Syria. So it is now up to Israel alone to make and carry through this fateful decision.

It is no secret that Daesh is regrouping in Iraq and Syria. It is also growing and spreading in Libya, Nigeria, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and elsewhere in Africa, like reported by arabnews.com.

In Yemen, as security forces make gains against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Daesh is trying to fill the gap. The presence of Daesh is felt in the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh and elsewhere. The group’s manifestations may go by different names and they may not be organically linked to the mother group, but these third generation offshoots are still lethal and have the potential to wreak greater havoc if the world lets its guard down.

The resurgence of Daesh should be of concern to all countries that have suffered at its hands — its recruitment of young men and women from all over the world, its unspeakable atrocities, in addition to imposing its ruthless and draconian rule over large populations.

The Global Coalition against Daesh was formed in September 2014 with the aim of degrading and ultimately defeating the terror group. The coalition’s 77 members have committed themselves to tackling Daesh on all fronts, to dismantling its networks and countering its global ambitions. Beyond the military campaign in Iraq and Syria, the coalition is working to disrupt its financing and economic tools, such as the exploitation of oil and other natural resources. It is working on stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters across borders. The coalition has publicly committed to stabilizing areas liberated from Daesh occupation and restoring essential public services. The coalition is also countering the group’s propaganda.

The Global Coalition has made great advances against Daesh in all of those areas. Militarily, it has dislodged the group from most of the territory it had occupied. Economically, it has starved it of many of its resources. It has slowed down and sometimes reversed the flow of foreign fighters to its various fronts. However, though greatly weakened, Daesh is surviving and is now regrouping and spreading. It is hard for many to believe that Daesh still has some appeal, given its many failures and the unspeakable crimes it has committed, but the group is a fact of life in many places.

What are the reasons for Daesh’s inexplicable survival? More importantly, what more needs to be done to speed up its demise and prevent a resurgence?

Conditions in Iraq and Syria, the places where Daesh was born and where it flourished, still provide a suitable environment for the group to survive. In Iraq, the post-election uncertainty has delayed the stabilization and development of areas liberated from Daesh. More than $30 billion was promised in February at the international reconstruction conference, but only a limited amount has been delivered due to that uncertainty.

Activities by pro-Iranian sectarian militias in and around the liberated areas have posed a threat to communities once under Daesh, making it easier for the terrorist group’s fighters to hide among the civilian population. Further, those militias are helping Iran ferry fighters and material from Iran, through Iraq and on to Syria. The fact that the coalition has not been able to stop those activities has provided Daesh with a useful propaganda tool as it positions itself against those militias.

In Syria, the military solution favored by the Syrian regime and its allies plays into the hands of Daesh and helps it survive. Assad and his allies have gone after moderate opposition groups, which were Daesh’s natural enemies. The relentless attacks against those forces, while sparing Daesh, will make it more difficult to defeat Daesh in Syria, despite the fall of Raqqa, its former seat of power. Some runaway militants from the defeated groups may even be tempted to join Daesh and affiliate themselves with it to survive.

Some countries have made no effort to bring their citizens-turned-militants back from the front lines in Syria and Iraq. Some have made it nearly impossible for them to go home, forcing them either to continue the fight or go somewhere else to join Daesh affiliates. The largest numbers of foreigners fighting with Daesh in Syria and Iraq come from Russia, mainly from its Muslim minorities. Russia has yet to develop programs to return them. Saudi Arabia and other countries have, for a while now, developed extensive programs to bring those fighters home to face justice and rehabilitation. There is no amnesty, but fighters are encouraged to surrender, come home and take advantage of those rehabilitation programs.

There is a need to provide a way out for foreign fighters, to encourage them to surrender and provide them with personal safety while awaiting trial. Their families, especially young children, should be extricated and taken home to protect them from abuse and exploitation, lest they become the next generation of terrorist fighters.

In most areas it is feasible and certainly necessary to expedite stabilization and development programs to create jobs and provide livelihoods for young people to prevent them from falling prey to recruitment by Daesh.

Finally, US threats of withdrawal from the fight can only play into Daesh’s hands. It may decide to wait out the Americans and reappear, stronger, after their departure.
In sum, the Global Coalition has to take another sober look at its Daesh policies. Its military victories may turn pyrrhic if Daesh ultimately wins after the campaign is over.

A frightening event in U.S.-Russia relations unfolded in February near Deir al-Zour in eastern Syria, as both sides battled the remnants of the Islamic State. In violation of a 2015 deconfliction agreement that divided the area into zones of Russian and U.S. military control, around 500 pro-Syrian fighters – most of whom spoke Russian, but whose citizenship remains unverified – crossed the Euphrates River to the U.S. side from the Russian-controlled zone, like reported by warontherocks.com.

On Feb. 7 these fighters used Russian tanks, artillery, and mortars to attack a U.S.-supported Kurdish opposition outpost located next to a Conoco natural gas plant. Local U.S. forces first fired back at the attackers using anti-tank missiles and machine guns, and then called in massive air strikes as the fighters continued their attack. The resulting four-hour battle killed 200 to 300 of the attacking forces, according to documents released by the Pentagon. The casualties included a large number of fighters from the Wagner mercenary group of Russian and pro-Russian veterans who had earlier fought on Moscow’s side in eastern Ukraine. (No U.S. or Kurdish casualties were reported.)

In other words, at a time of high geopolitical tension, the military forces of one nuclear superpower directly engaged hundreds of heavily armed and hostile citizens of another nuclear superpower, who may or may not have been acting at the behest of that superpower.

Russia’s actions in the wake of this event have been perplexing. The United States used the special deconfliction phone line for Syria with its Russian counterparts “before, during, and after the strike,” according to the Pentagon, presumably making Moscow aware that an American strike was likely. “We were assured by the Russians that there were no Russians involved,” the Pentagon noted. U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis testified that “the Russian high command in Syria assured us it was not their people.” But the Russian foreign ministry later admitted that five Russian citizens were killed, and still later said that while “Russian service members” did not participate, several dozen Russian (and pro-Russian Ukrainian) citizens were wounded and flown back to Russia for treatment. However, nearly all experts agree that Russia is understating these figures: Unofficial estimates by Russian doctors and family members indicate that at least 80 Russians died, with some reports claiming an even higher toll.

Why did Moscow initially deny any Russians’ involvement, and then downplay the casualty numbers? And why didn’t the Russian Defense Ministry stop the attackers from crossing into the American zone, or warn them about the likelihood of a U.S. counterstrike? Western media have offered two contending explanations: that Wagner acted without the Kremlin’s authorization, or that this was a Kremlin-approved attack that sought to test Washington while maintaining plausible deniability. But neither explanation fully answers all of the puzzles raised by the publicly available evidence, even though both help us understand more generally the opaque relationship between the Russian state and these forces. A different, or perhaps additional, rationale takes into account the ruthless infighting between Russian security forces that goes on regularly, while Russian President Vladimir Putin looks the other way. Russian Defense Ministry motives in Deir al-Zour may actually have centered on domestic politics inside Russia — and been directed against Putin ally and Wagner backer Yevgeny Prigozhin.

The ambiguity of the relationship between Wagner and the Kremlin made U.S. crisis decision-making much more difficult and dangerous — and the situation could well repeat itself. Putin is increasingly turning to Wagner (and other groups like it) in his efforts to expand Moscow’s global reach. Wagner forces, which were used to support pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine, are now believed to be operating under contract to Omar al-Bashir’s government in Sudan. A different Russian private military firm, the RSB group, has claimed to be operating in Libya on behalf of Russian ally Khalifa Haftar, a regional warlord who has often acted outside the command of the U.N.-recognized Libyan government. Thus, some version of the Deir al-Zour events could soon crop up elsewhere, as U.S. and Russian interests around the world remain at odds and the two countries continue to use military means to pursue those interests. Understanding Russia’s relationship with militias like Wagner offers insight not just into the Syrian conflict, but also into other fragile security situations where Russia’s involvement is ambiguous, as well as into the political tensions inside Russia’s national security bureaucracy.

Out of Control

A predecessor group to Wagner called the Slavonic Corps first went into Syria in 2013, primarily to guard energy facilities and free up Syrian forces for fighting. That time around, two commanders were arrested and imprisoned in Russia as illegal mercenaries when they returned home, although the rest of the Slavonic Corps personnel were not prosecuted. In 2016, Wagner, using many of the same fighters as Slavonic Corps, is believed to have given crucial assistance to Syria in recapturing Palmyra from the Islamic State. The Russian online investigative newspaper fontanka.ru provided photographic evidence that Wagner commanders received state medals for their work and had even been welcomed personally at the Kremlin by Putin.

While a March investigative report by the German newspaper Der Spiegel had previously cast doubt on the exact chain of events in Deir al-Zour in February, experts in both the United States and Europe now consider a May New York Times report, based on newly released Pentagon documents and interviews, to be the definitive open-source version of the story. This allows Russian military decisions to be analyzed with a higher degree of confidence, and to give each of the contending explanations their due.

The first explanation, suggested by Neil Hauer in Foreign Affairs, is that the Wagner group acted without Moscow’s knowledge or approval. This explanation is also preferred by the Kremlin. Scholars like Deborah Avant who study private military companies term this a “principal/agent problem:” The interests of the principal contracting state may not align with those of the agents it hires to do military tasks, and states cannot sufficiently monitor what agents actually do on the ground.

The Wagner group certainly has distinct interests in Syria, since its service contracts there are ultimately paid by the Syrian state, not Russia, through a complex financial chain. Wagner is believed to be funded by Prigozhin, a prominent Russian military contractor and close Putin ally. Prigozhin is under U.S. sanctions and was recently indicted by the U.S. Attorney General for funding the Internet Research Agency, the St. Petersburg firm responsible for social media interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. He owns another opaque St. Petersburg firm called Evro Polis. In late 2016, Evro Polis (with Kremlin approval) reached a memorandum of understanding with the Syrian energy ministry, giving the firm a 25 percent share of oil and gas produced over the next five years in any Syrian fields, processing plants, and infrastructure that the firm helps to “liberate,” protect, and develop. The final contract was signed in January with the support of the Russian Ministry of Energy. Notably, Deir al-Zour is known as Syria’s oil capital. (Prigozhin also has an interest in Sudan’s gold deposits, suggesting that natural resources contracts may play a role in Wagner’s actions elsewhere, too.)

Perhaps, then, Prigozhin and his Wagner colleagues got greedy, trying to seize the area without adequate planning or Russian defense ministry knowledge and support. But leaked U.S. intelligence documents throw this explanation into doubt because they indicate that Prigozhin kept in close contact with Kremlin officials immediately before and after the attack. In late January, Prigozhin even told Syrian authorities that he had permission from an unnamed Russian minister to make a “fast and strong” move that would be a “good surprise” for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, in the date range where the attack occurred. Furthermore, the Pentagon watched Wagner on the ground for a week before the attack, as the group entered the American zone of control and moved toward the Conoco site. As noted earlier, the United States communicated with the Russian command in Syria throughout. Especially since Wagner trains next door to the Russian Military Intelligence (GRU) 10th brigade in Krasnodar, it stretches credulity to imagine that Russian military intelligence was not also watching the group, and did not suspect either the Wagner group’s involvement or its target.

Plausible Deniability

Perhaps instead Moscow knew full well what was happening, and intentionally used the Wagner group to test Washington’s willingness to defend its Kurdish allies and maintain a presence in Syria. This explanation has been advanced by the Wall Street Journal and the Institute for the Study of Warfare. Putin himself said publicly in 2012 that private military companies could be “an instrument for the realization of national interests without the direct participation of the government.” In this case, Putin may have thought Washington was so wary of deeper involvement in Syria that Russia could overrun U.S. allies and turn public opinion against the American effort, all while maintaining plausible deniability of the Kremlin’s involvement. This fits a standard claim about Putin: that he follows Vladimir Lenin’s maxim to test opponents with a bayonet, moving forward if he finds mush and stopping if he finds steel. Certainly, a similar logic explains why many state leaders cooperate with armed local power brokers, even when these warlords challenge their ultimate sovereignty. Such cooperation gives leaders plausible deniability for what are really state-approved actions, allowing them to avoid both condemnation and dangerous conflict escalation with other states.

This explanation implies, not implausibly, that Moscow did not care enough about the lives of the hundreds of loyal Russian veterans serving in the Wagner group to call them back when U.S. intentions became clear. Some claim that even the evacuation of the wounded was delayed, pointing to the fact that a different mercenary unit — not regular Russian forces — had to provide helicopters to remove casualties from the battlefield. Indeed, the Der Spiegel report hints that this is why Moscow was slow to acknowledge the number of casualties involved: It wished to avoid blame for providing inadequate resources to Prigozhin’s men while treating them as cannon fodder.

Competing Networks

The Russian Defense Ministry’s lack of concern about those fighting for Wagner suggests another possibility that has not yet been raised publicly. Perhaps the uniformed Russian military leadership, or some segment of its command, chose not to stop the Wagner group even knowing full well that superior U.S. forces would fight fire with fire. The Defense Ministry may resent Prigozhin’s independence – military forces everywhere have tensions with those not under their command who take actions in their area of operations. High-ranking Russian officers may especially resent Wagner’s special oil and gas contract with the Syrian government.

Indeed, the Russian investigative journalist who has studied Wagner most closely, Denis Korotkov, said in an interview in August 2017 that Russian Defense Ministry financial support for Wagner had “suddenly dried up” earlier that year, as weapons deliveries disappeared and the wages of Wagner personnel plummeted. Something appears to have changed after Palmyra in how the Russian armed forces viewed Wagner’s usefulness.

The Russian state has refused repeated proposals by deputies of the state legislature, the Duma, to legalize the status of private military companies like Wagner, suggesting the Kremlin has mixed feelings at best about these groups’ actions. The military press in Russia has aired many debates about private military companies, too, reinforcing the sense of uncertainty about how the state views them. (Given state control over the media, the opinions expressed in these pieces are probably proxies for some form of bureaucratic infighting.) One of the most interesting sources for this debate has been the weekly newspaper Military-Industrial Courier. Some commentators, like retired General Staff officer Konstantin Sivkov, have seen the private companies as a key component of counter-insurgency warfare — including for the carrying out of “dirty deeds” abroad where the government doesn’t want to reveal its hand — and have urged Russia to legalize them and catch up with the rest of the world. But others have been virulently opposed. Tatiana Gracheva, a General Staff Academy instructor, worries that such groups would compete against the armed forces to hire the best people, and might even launch violence at home to topple the government, under contract to foreign agents.

Prigozhin himself is a civilian with no military background, imprisoned for nine years as a young man for organized crime activities. While any attempt to understand how Russian officers think must remain speculative, the generals might believe that using a convicted criminal to commercialize foreign defense actions distorts Russian national security interests, in a region where they have risked much on behalf of the state. Or, given that concerns about military corruption remain high in Russia, perhaps the generals just wanted a bigger cut of Prigozhin’s oil deal for themselves. For any of these reasons, they might have intentionally failed to share information from the U.S. deconfliction line with the Wagner group in order to send Prigozhin and his forces a message.

There is no publicly available evidence that Russian generals thought or acted this way. But brutal infighting would help explain the extraordinary callousness of Russian military officers to the fate of a large group of Russian veterans — even if the Russian state was simultaneously trying to advance against U.S. interests using plausible deniability. As analysts Brian Taylor and Mark Galeotti have noted, Putin’s Russia has been riven with conflicts between competing informal network groups close to the Kremlin, including many conflicts within the siloviki, the various state ministries responsible for providing security. Putin is believed to use these rivalries (ranging from competition over overlapping responsibilities to fighting over illegal kickbacks and smuggling) to his own benefit, since it keeps the force-wielding agencies of Russia from uniting against him.

Putin is approaching his last constitutionally mandated term as president, and may increasingly be seen as a lame duck. As scholar Henry Hale notes, signs of leadership weakness in patronage-based political systems like Russia’s often lead clients to start searching for new patrons, which can create social instability. If a core group of military commanders resents Prigozhin, maybe it is they who are using their bayonets — under the direction of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu— not to test Washington, but instead to test a competing circle of other leading figures around Putin.

We may never have enough evidence to solve definitively the puzzles of Russian behavior at Deir al-Zour. But an understanding of Russian politics and security affairs allows us to better interpret the evidence we do have. Since Moscow’s employment of groups like Wagner appears to be a growing trend, U.S. and allied forces should consider the possibility that in various locations around the world, they might end up inadvertently, and dangerously, ensnared in Russia’s internal power struggles.

“We support the BDS movement.”

Those were the words of Ismail Haniyeh, a former Hamas prime minister and the head of its Politburo. And they revealed that Hamas considers BDS to be a component of its strategy for destroying Israel.

Even as Hamas continues the violence against Israel, it has gone on cheering BDS, like reported by frontpagemag.com.

In a statement last month, Hamas welcomed BDS support for its cause even as it vowed victory. Last year, it tweeted, “We salute and support the influential BDS Movement.”

Hamas officials have praised BDS as a means of destroying Israel and urged greater BDS coordination against Israel. But Hamas support for BDS is a lot more than just words. And the support isn’t one-sided.

The US Campaign for Palestinian Rights (USCPR), the umbrella group for BDS in this country, whose work guides Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), has been funneling money to the Palestinian BDS National Committee (BNC) which operates in the terrorist occupied territories of Israel. BNC includes an umbrella group which numbers Hamas, the PFLP and Islamic Jihad, among other terrorist groups, as its members.

The recent expose of these intimate links between terror groups and the BDS movement in a Tablet report by Armin Rosen and Liel Leibovitz demolished the myth that BDS is a non-violent movement or that it seeks a peaceful solution. Rather than a non-violent alternative to terrorism, BDS is an ally of Islamic terrorist groups and seeks to supplement their violence with economic and cultural pressure.

BDS is not an alternative to terrorism. It’s another political arm of the terrorists.

Israel’s Minister of Strategic Affairs and Public Diplomacy, Gilad Erdan, has now made “The Hate Net” map public. The Hate Net map charts the connections between BDS organizations and terrorist groups.

“Here are the 42 leaders of the BDS network,” Minister Erdan said, at his presentation at the Global Coalition 4 Israel Forum (GC4I), as he explored how the connections to the Palestinian BDS National Committee create a direct link between domestic BDS groups and Islamic terrorist groups.

Hate Net maps how BDS groups in the United States and Europe intersect with designated terrorist groups using political organizations in the terrorist occupied territories as their interface. These organizations, like the Palestinian BDS National Committee, Addameer or al-Haq, launder BDS support while plugging into local terrorist organizations such as Hamas or the PFLP. The PFLP’s Dawson Field hijackings of multiple airplanes in order to seize Jewish hostages was Al Qaeda’s inspiration for 9/11.

Minister Erdan pointed out that al-Haq boss Shawan Jabarin had served over a decade in prison for his role in the PFLP. Jabarin’s dual role with the PFLP terrorist organization, al-Haq and Human Rights Watch had already demonstrated the intersection between activist groups and terrorist organizations.

The Israeli High Court had noted at the time that “Some of his time is spent in conducting a human rights organization, and some as an operative in an organization which has no qualms regarding murder and attempted murder, which have no relation whatsoever to rights. Quite the opposite, they reject the most basic right of all, without which there are no other rights, that is, the right to life.”

In 2016, Rep. Hank Johnson, who would slur Jews as “termites”, BDS backer Rep. Mark Pocan, Rep. Luis Gutierrez, Rep. Dan Kildee and Rep. Matt Cartwright had met with Jabarin on a trip funded by MIFTAH, an anti-Israel BDS group, which is in turn funded by the UN, that glorifies anti-Semitic terrorism and has accused Jews of using blood to make matzas. MIFTAH’s chairman sat on the board of the Arab Fund for Arts and Culture which is mostly funded by George Soros.

Some of the 8 terrorist occupied territories area organizations listed in the Hate Net, BNC (Palestinian BDS National Committee), PACBI (Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel), Al-Haq, Addameer, DCI-P (Defense for Children International – Palestine), BADIL, PCHR (Palestinian Center for Human Rights) and Al-Mezan are accused of serving as links between BDS and terror groups.

As NGO Monitor’s past report had noted, Addameer was an official PFLP affiliate and key figures in the organization were PFLP members, including a board member who was a nephew of PFLP terror boss George Habash. DCI-P’s board members have documented PFLP ties and PCHR’s founder had served time in prison for his PFLP role. These groups connect to familiar anti-Israel groups here like Code Pink.

DCI-P’s terror ties didn’t stop Rep. Betty McCollum from thanking it for its role in her anti-Israel bill.

Hate Net’s 9 US BDS groups, 18 European BDS groups, and various other regional anti-Israel groups are effectively part of a network that includes the PFLP the PLO and Hamas. This network allegedly shares propaganda, funding and political goals.

As Minister Erdan noted, “Under the guise of ‘civil activities’, a coordinated and financed network of organizations is led from Ramallah and Gaza, a quarter of which have links to terrorist organizations, including Hamas and the Popular Front.”

The US Campaign for Palestinian Rights (USCPR) sponsors the Palestinian BDS National Committee (BNC) in the terrorist occupied territories. Donations by Americans to the BNC, which when drilled down to its constituent elements includes Hamas and other terror groups, use USCPR’s tax-exempt status.

How can there be tax-exempt donations going to an organization whose constituent elements include terror groups? While Obama’s people abused the IRS to target pro-Israel groups, and media outlets from the New York Times to the JTA, and anti-Israel groups such as T’ruah and If Not Now, have urged financially targeting pro-Israel charities, this extremely disturbing arrangement was allowed to remain intact.

Meanwhile Students for Justice in Palestine, the campus hate group notorious for its harassment of Jewish students and for anti-Israel events funded by student fees, credits the support of USCPR in its BDS handbook. And SJP members have been notorious for their support of the PFLP. At Temple University, SJP celebrated PFLP terror boss George Habash. Columbia’s SJP tweeted PFLP propaganda. SJP Vassar concluded its withdrawal of anti-Semitic material with a Habash quote.

USCPR’s own constituent elements include American Muslims for Palestine (AMP) whose origins lie in the Palestine Committee that was set up by the Muslim Brotherhood to support Hamas. At least one AMP board member has spent time in prison for his work on behalf of Hamas. AMP’s National Campus Coordinator, Taher Herzallah had praised Hamas violence against Israel on social media.

Minister Erdan had noted that, “The relationship between terrorist organizations and the BDS movement has never been closer, ideologically or operationally.”

BDS is a crucial part of that operational relationship.

The Hamas shift to using fake civilian protests as human shields for its attacks on Israeli soldiers and farmers is clearly meant to aid its BDS allies. Rather than abandoning violence, the Islamic terror group is finding new ways to combine terrorism with civilian protests in a way that meets both its military objectives and the political objectives of the BDS movement.

Meanwhile campus BDS propaganda is being shaped by groups interlinked with the PFLP and Hamas. And the leading BDS group in America is helping raise money that trickles into a terror-linked network. The notoriously vague demands of the BDS movement are purposely so because spelling them out would mean echoing the rhetoric of their allied terror groups in calling for a genocide against the Jews.

Hate Net’s map of the BDS movement’s ties to terrorism shows the multidirectional operational relationship between bombings and BDS. This relationship is not merely supportive. The Hate Net spectrum shares a common cause. And that cause is the destruction of Israel.

Hamas and the PFLP support BDS. And BDS supports the PFLP and Hamas.

BDS is not just a point of view. It’s not non-violent. Like the Nazi boycott of Jewish stores, it’s another tactic in a violent anti-Semitic campaign by Islamic supremacists to exterminate the Jewish people.

Terrorist attacks in Mali, including a brazen assault on the headquarters of the fledgling Sahel counterterrorism force, cast a spotlight on the Islamist extremists roaming Africa, like reported by dw.com

Mali has experienced a number of deadly extremist attacks in recent days. Three people were killed in a car bomb attack on the G5 Sahel force command post in the town of Sevare on Friday. The al-Qaida-linked Support Group for Islam and Muslims claimed responsibility for the attack.

Four Malian soldiers were killed on Saturday when their vehicle hit a land mine. An attack in northern Mali targeting French forces killed four civilians on Sunday and wounded more than 20 people, including French soldiers.

The latest wave of extremism coincided with a summit of the African Union (AU) in Nouakchott, the capital of neighboring Mauritania, which focused on ways to tackle corruption and extremism.

Macron in Nouakchott for talks

The leaders of the G5 Sahel states — Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad — held talks with French President Emmanuel Macron in Nouakchott on the final day of the AU summit.

The G5 Sahel force was set up with the help of the French last year to crush jihadist insurgents and criminal groups in the vast and unstable region. It aims to deploy 5,000 troops. It will operate alongside France’s 4,000 troops in the troubled border area between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso and the 12,000 UN peacekeepers in Mali.

Macron also met with the AU Peace and Security Council to discuss the fight against Islamist extremism in Africa, as well as ways to better finance peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations.

“Our thoughts are with our Malian friends after tragic and cowardly attacks,” Macron said. “Several French soldiers were injured and are being evacuated. The first victims are Malian civilians.”

Limping into action

Several years after the G5 Sahel force was conceived by African countries, the French leader set the ball rolling on international donor pledges in mid-2017. It is some time since the UN warned the force was behind on its mandate.

The Sahel is experiencing a rising tide of Islamist extremism as the force limps into action. The developments in countries such as Mali are closely watched in other regions of the continent facing a similar pattern.

Morocco’s Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita, in an interview with DW, said Monday that Maghreb states are willing to work with the G5 Sahel group.

In the Niger River valley, in particular,  jihadist and  inter-communal conflicts are contributing to the overall insecurity in the West African nation preparing for elections on July 29. Attacks where jihadists target French troops in Mali are frequent.

“The big strategic question is: Can France help the countries of the G5 Sahel accelerate and strengthen deployment of their new military force? The big challenge at the moment is to strengthen the G5 joint force to help reinforce security,” Paul Melly, an Africa analyst with Chatham House in London, told DW.

Africa’ jihadists intertwined

Across Africa, Islamist extremism is intertwined and seen to be emerging as far afield as Mozambique to the south. Some of the larger outlawed groups include Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabab in Kenya.

Foreign Minister Bourita put the number of Islamist fighters at 10,000 Africa-wide.

“It is clear that al-Qaeda, with more than 6,000 fighters, is active throughout Africa today, I would also say that IS [so-called Islamic State]) has more than 3,000 fighters within its ranks in Africa,” he told DW.

In many instances they were former IS fighters returning from Syria or Iraq. “And that does not include those who have joined al-Shabab or Boko Haram.”

A homegrown problem

Experts increasingly view terrorism in Africa as homegrown and not necessarily driven by an Islamist ideology alone. Mali has seen what one expert describes as an Islamization of criminal structures. The groups are entrenched, and military solutions alone are often seen to be ineffective.

“When on looks at terrorist groups that are active in Africa, they didn’t fall from the sky and were not transplanted from elsewhere. These are groups that are rooted in their respective areas,” said Mark Engelhardt, an author and expert on terrorism in Africa.

“In the Sahel there is this new group, the one that claimed responsibility for the G5 Sahel attack, that is a coalition of well-known personalities. There is Mr Marlboro – known also as Mokhtar Belmokhtar – who started out smuggling cigarettes, and since then, people and weapons or anything of value,” said Engelhardt.

“Or, Iyad Ag Ghaly, who is reputed for switching alliances. Why? because it’s all about money.” The fanatical preachers and their followers in these parts are being welcomed with open arms as “fighters for free, or at least little.”

Jihadists drawn in neglected regions

The reasons terrorism is taking hold in Africa are manifold, according to Morocco’s foreign minister. He listed economic underdevelopment, population grown, a rise in separatist and other resistance movements, as well as criminal activity.

“The jihadists naturally profit from the chaos in Libya. They also profit from the chaos in the Sahel region, where many different terrorists ply their business. The same goes for Somalia and also West Africa, with Boko Haram,” Bourita said.

“Morocco and various neighbors in Africa jointly developed a strategy against terrorism. There are several solutions to the problem of IS: military solutions, also propagandist solutions and we are seeking to rebuild the areas that were destroyed by IS. These initiatives should be extended to other African states,” Bourita said.

“Cooperation with the G5 Sahel group  should be expanded,” he added.

Experts have long warned that areas that are unregulated or neglected by African governments are especially prone to jihadist influence.

“One example is the story of Boko Haram or that of al-Shabab in Somalia. It is an entirely similar story, each of course specific to that country. But the point is that these groups are rooted in what is wrong with these countries,” said Engelhardt.

“People don’t want war or gruesome terror, but they are fighting for their existence and at the moment they only have these terrorists on their side.”

Parallels are being drawn between the instability in northern Mozambique, where jihadist militants have gone on the rampage in recent months, and Nigeria’s experience with Boko Haram. Kenya’s north-east coast — home to a marginalized Somali minority —  is also seen as vulnerable to the influence of al-Shabab.

“What happens is the same dynamic we are seeing in Mali,” said Engelhardt.