A detailed investigation inside Myanmar’s Rakhine state has revealed that a Rohingya armed group brandishing guns and swords is responsible for at least one, and potentially a second, massacre of up to 99 Hindu women, men and children as well as additional unlawful killings and abductions of Hindu villagers in August 2017, like reported by atimes.com.

Undoubtedly, accountability for and individual criminal responsibility for these atrocities are every bit as crucial as for the crimes carried out by Myanmar’s security forces in Rakhine state and elsewhere in Myanmar.

There is little doubt that terrorist and militant groups have taken advantage of the disfranchised Rohingya, including recruiting them as cannon fodder for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. In an interview with the Karachi-based newspaper Ummat on September 28, 2001, Osama bin Laden said: “There are areas in all parts of the world where strong jihadi forces are present, from Indonesia to Algeria, from Kabul to Chechnya, from Bosnia to Sudan, and from Burma to Kashmir.”

In mentioning Burma, he was most probably referring to a small group of Rohingya on the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. Today, it is clear that the militant-terrorist group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the Islamic State (ISIS) franchise in Bangladesh, the Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), and its offshoot the Neo-JMB have all been using the same modus operandi of attacking police stations and posts. ISIS-affiliated individuals and groups have been feverishly attacking police stations as far off as Kenya, Iraq and Libya.

Just as these terrorists slitted the throats of Hindu villagers in Myanmar, the same was done to victims in France, Libya and elsewhere – all in accordance with the creed promulgated by the ISIS terror group’s official Al-Hayat Media Center. It released footage on January 26 calling on jihadis to destroy the kuffar (non-believers) in “Europe, America, Russia, Australia and elsewhere” by slitting their throats and watching them die. The English-language nasheed(religious hymn) in the video promises paradise in the afterlife for those who take up the cause. The series of throat-slitting criminal acts is a fact observed by the United Nations itself.

The forced conversion of captive women into the jihadis’ perverted Islamic ideologies and beliefs can be easily seen from the testimonies of Yazidi and Myanmar Hindu survivors. Bosnian Serbs were less zealous in their systematic rape and sexual violence than these Islamist terrorists.

The striking similarities of the modi operandi of these Islamist terrorists and criminals are not only of probative value in any criminal proceeding but also tend to show the influences of Islamic State’s ideologies and methodologies, and thus reinforces an intelligence report on a joint JMB-ARSA training stint.

In an interview published in an issue of the Islamic State magazine Dabiq, Tamim Chowdhury (using the nom de guerre Abu Ibrahim Hanif), who was the head of the organization’s Bangladesh wing, said efforts to recruit in Bangladesh had gained “great momentum,” with many Muslims joining its ranks, and reiterated that jihad in Bengal was a stepping-stone for jihad in Myanmar. He added that ISIS had succeeded in building a base by attracting Muslims following the organization’s campaign in the Bengali language on social media.

The fact that madrassas in Bangladesh remain hotbeds of Islamist militancy and terrorism remains undeterred. One of the most significant links was unearthed in March 2009 when a madrassa in Bhola, southern Bangladesh, was raided by an anti-terrorist division, turning up 10 firearms, 2,500 rounds of ammunition and radical Islamic literature. Investigations revealed that the madrassa was funded by the British-registered charity Green Crescent, and that the founder, British citizen Dr Faisal Mostafa, had close links to the JMB and its current leader, Saidur Rahman.

This is hardly surprising. In Malaysia, an Islamist politician, who was the founder of a madrassa, created untold havoc in a foreign sovereign independent member-state of the UN with his fellow terrorists associated with the Nusra Front. In northern Rakhine state, the main militant force is mostly led by young Islamic clerics (known as “Mullahs” or “Maulvis”) or scholars (“Hafiz”), and it appears to have been the issuance of fatwas that was decisive in persuading many to support the terrorism and militant approach.

The Bay of Bengal, the largest bay in the world, forms the northeastern part of the Indian Ocean and is bordered mostly by India and Sri Lanka to the west, Bangladesh to the north, and Myanmar to the east. There are also other Southeast Asian nations dependent of the Bay of Bengal for maritime use.

In pursuit of UN Security Council Resolution 2249 (2015), the South Asian regional-security group of nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, in the reaffirmation that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, must pursue the combat by all means this unprecedented threat to international peace and security in full cooperation with the UNSC toward the elimination of this dreadful scourge to mankind that has been formed by the unholy trinity of ISIS, JMB and ARSA and ensure that those responsible for committing or are otherwise responsible for terrorist acts, violations of international humanitarian law or violations or abuses of human rights are held accountable.

The whole of Asia and the world are now truly excited at the prospect of sovereign independent nation-states coordinating their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by these heinous terrorists.

September 17, 2018, marks the 40th anniversary of the Camp David Accords and the historic peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, like reported by warontherocks.com.

In 1977, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat steered Cairo’s policy on Israeli relations in a new direction, abandoning its intent to destroy the young nation. In a surprising move, Sadat flew to Israel to show his willingness to negotiate for peace. Shortly after that visit, U.S. President Jimmy Carter invited Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to Camp David to help facilitate negotiations. The two leaders accepted. Begin wanted American oversight to pressure Egypt into a fair deal and Sadat wanted American aid as a reward for the deal. They both wanted help to end the cycle of war.

In 1978, after a dozen days of negotiating at Camp David, two documents emerged — the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David and the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treatybetween Egypt and Israel. The Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David aimed to materialize U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 and contained three specific sections.

The first section — “West Bank and Gaza”— called for negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem, specifically relating to the West Bank and Gaza territories. A subsequent letter from Begin and Sadat to Carter, reveals that the parties indeed intended for the agreement to apply to both the West Bank and Gaza territories. The framework laid out three stages for the negotiations.

First, transitional arrangements were to be made, whereby an autonomous Palestinian entity would be established in the West Bank and Gaza. The agreement unilaterally volunteered Jordan as a future negotiator of this transitional arrangement. The transition was not to exceed five years, with Israeli troops withdrawing after the inhabitants elected a self-governing authority.

In the next stage, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan would agree on the mode to establish the elected self-governing authority, determining its powers and limits. The agreement stated that Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians in their delegations. The future arrangement would also include a method for maintaining security and public order, including a local police force (which may include Jordanians) and Israeli-Jordanian joint patrols at border points.

The third stage clarified that the transitional five-year period would begin after the establishment of the self-governing authority. Thereafter, negotiations would commence no later than the third year among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and elected representatives of the West Bank and Gaza to decide the status of the territories and to conclude an Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty by the end of the transitional period. Notably, the agreement required that the solution from the negotiations “recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples.”

This first section of the framework also assured that appropriate steps would be taken to protect Israel during the transitional period and thereafter, including the establishment of the local police force by the self-governing authority. The agreement also called for a committee with representatives from Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority to establish an admission process for persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. Additionally, Egypt and Israel agreed to cooperate, along with others, to establish a system to resolve the refugee problem.

However, this section, detailed though it was, did not address the issue of Jerusalem’s status, as well as the Palestinians’ claimed right of return. However, separate letters exchanged on September 17, 1978 between Sadat and begin, and President Carter, have indeed addressed the status of Jerusale,. Sadat wrote: “…Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in the City must be respected and restored… Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty.” Begin wrote “…the Government of Israel decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the Capital of the State of Israel.” Also, for all its verbiage, little attention was paid to specific arrangements and logistical planning outside of a five-year deadline. And it laid out no monitoring mechanism for implementation. Nevertheless, there was a certain effort to implement it.

The Cabinet Committee for the Autonomy Negotiations, headed by Israeli Minister of the Interior and Religious Affairs Yosef Burg, began in 1979 to work with American and Egyptian negotiators to materialize this section. During these negotiations, the United States proposed a resolution in the United Nations to force the participation of Palestinians in these negotiations. Surprisingly, Israel and Egypt jointly opposed the action, raising the question about the motives of the framework in the first place. Even so, Palestinian leaders wanted no part of a deal they had not been a part of creating. After a series of setbacks — including and especially the Israeli-Lebanese war in 1982 — Egypt refused to move forward and the committee dissolved. Due to the lack of logistical details and the absence of indispensable parties, this first section remained largely theoretical. Moreover, the Palestinians had no sense of ownership over an agreement in which they had not had a voice and, thus, had no incentive, authority, or power to implement it.

The second major section of the framework — “Egypt-Israel”— committed Israel and Egypt to negotiate a peace treaty between themselves, and the final section — “Associated Principles” — encouraged other states to also conclude peace with Israel. The second section — calling for peace between Israel and Egypt — was probably the main reason Egypt entered negotiations. The first section regarding the West Bank and Gaza was the façade Egypt used to justify such negotiations to its Arab neighbors.

However, the cause of the Palestinians had been the rallying cry of the Arab world. If there were no sovereign Palestinian entity, there would be no deals between Israel and other Arab states, period. Thus, to the Arab world, Sadat’s peace with Israel prior to solidifying Palestinian autonomy was a betrayal of their Palestinian brothers, one which threw Palestinians under the bus while making Egypt look like a hero to the West. Despite this, and the failure of the West Bank/Gaza section to materialize, the Camp David Accords set the political climate, as well as the conceptual framework, for a future deal. If nothing else, Sadat’s move destroyed the notion that Arab and Israeli leaders could never agree on anything.

Nine years later, in late 1987, the first intifada revealed the reality of how split the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was, with central PLO leadership only able to indirectly influence the events while new local leadership began to emerge. To unify Palestinians, the PLO proclaimed its declaration of independence from exile in Algiers the following year. It thereby reinforced the notion of a Palestinian state before one even existed, thus creating a tension of political theory — a people that were a legal, autonomous body without having a legitimately recognized state. While not solving the greater need for a central Palestinian state or government, the declaration set the stage for future negotiations by bringing the Palestinian people under a recognized leadership with which Israel might negotiate. However, Israel still labeled the PLO as a terrorist group with which it would not negotiate, at least until the Madrid Conference.

The Madrid Conference of 1991 was President George H.W. Bush’s effort to capitalize on his Gulf War victory by bringing together multiple Arab states and parties, including Israeli and Palestinian representation (Israel refused to attend if the PLO participated). The immediate, visible results of the conference were slim. However, it succeeded in laying the groundwork for a number of bilateral and multilateral conversations between states aimed at eventually reaching peace in the Middle East. By the end of the conference, Israel finally declassified the PLO as a terrorist group. This opened the door for future talks between the two, culminating in the Oslo Accords in 1993.

Possibly influenced by the Camp David Accords, the Oslo Accords similarly set up a five-year deadline for a complete settlement of the status of the West Bank and Gaza. Learning from the Camp David Accords, the Oslo Accords took an even more incremental approach to reaching a full agreement instead of insisting on an instant change. Correcting mistakes of the Camp David Accords, Palestinians actually participated in Oslo, and the agreement established detailed implementation mechanisms. However, the core issues of Jerusalem, refugees, security arrangements, and territory continued to remain untouched until future negotiations on Permanent Status.

Significantly, the 1995 Interim Agreement as part of the Oslo Accords finally created a self-governing body for the Palestinian people — the Palestinian Authority — to govern the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As with the 1978 Camp David Accords, Israeli troops were to withdraw from those territories, as the Palestinian Authority took control over the territories.

Despite these incremental successes in Oslo, peace remains elusive. Yet, although the success of the Oslo Accords is contested, the framework used in the negotiations, created at Camp David in 1978, was vital to the talks happening at all.

Forty years since Camp David, all central players are still present — except the Palestinians have moved onto the stage from behind curtain, and Jordan has stepped back from representing them. That happened with the signing of the Oslo Accords, providing mutual recognition and a goal, yet to be attained, to separate Israel and the Palestinians into two distinct national entities through negotiations. Such an agreement, if pursued diligently, implemented to the letter, and finalized into Permanent Status, would make Israel the Jewish democracy it set out to be and provide freedom and statehood for the Palestinians, with the two nations co-existing in peace with each other. And it would restore the United States’ influence in the Middle East.

Jordan followed Egypt in signing a peace treaty with Israel, and both agreements still hold — 24 and 40 years later, respectively. Both countries have been involved in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations several times since, and Egypt has been the main facilitator for Fatah-Hamas reconciliation talks and the broker of a number of domestic Palestinian unity arrangements. All of them have failed to date.

The United States has remained the most substantively engaged facilitator for Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations throughout these four decades: the Madrid Conference in 1991 during George H.W. Bush’s administration and the subsequent multilateral talks throughout Bill Clinton’s presidency; including the Oslo process in 1993–95, the Hebron Protocol in 1997, Wye River in 1998, the Sharm el-Sheikh memoranda in 1999, the Camp David summit and the Clinton Parameters in 2000; the Road Map and the Annapolis Conference and talks in 2003, and 2007–08, respectively under George W. Bush; and the 2013–14 peace talks under Barack Obama.

In Israel, since the signing of the Camp David Accords, four Prime Ministers, following Menachem Begin’s footsteps, have understood that division of the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea into two distinct and separate national entities, Israel and a Palestinian one, is imperative. Begin, Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon, and Ehud Olmert all took steps in that direction. All five leaders were ready to take actions to attain such a reality and bear the risks of doing so.

Currently, both sides’ leaderships today lack the will to pursue peace and are averse to taking the risks requited.

Today, getting out of the political deadlock and preserving the conditions for an eventual two-states-for-two-peoples solution requires a proactive approach and a binding, continuous, and gradual process led by the United States. The parties should at least seek to delineate provisional boundaries along, say, the security fence in the West Bank, incorporating the major settlement blocks, thereby reversing the current trend leading towards a disastrous single bi-national state. The United States should simultaneously promote tangible progress on the ground, enabling bottoms-up improvements to sustain any political dialogue.

For this to happen, the parties should differentiate between the main settlement blocks plus the Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and the remote settlements outside the main blocks and east of the security fence. While about 80 percent of the settlers reside in the former and are likely to be incorporated within the final borders of Israel under any arrangement, the remote settlements comprise roughly 100,000 Israeli settlers who are likely to be relocated if a final agreement is ultimately attained.

Forty years on, it is time to change two key negotiation dynamics. One, replace the “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” formula with “Whatever is agreed or mutually coordinated is implemented.” Two, abandon the “bilateral negotiation-exclusive paradigm” and add regional dialogue within the framework of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and constructive independent steps by Israelis and Palestinians.

Finally, after reflecting on the hard work, compassion, and determination Jimmy Carter needed to achieve a framework for peace in Camp David in 1978, I would offer the following advice to President Donald Trump.

Since December 2017, in a tour de force, the U.S. president has hit the Palestinian cause with a series of blows. While some of the measures are justifiable, they lack coherence, substance and context. Moreover, they do not provide alternatives, specifically to cutting funds related to education, welfare, and healthcare in the Palestinian Territories.

What is bad for Palestinians is not automatically good for Israel or the United States, and the collapse of the Palestinian Authority might well backfire on both Israel and the United States. Israel and the Palestinians need the Trump administration’s hands-on assistance, not a blitz of symbolic and financial actions that strangle the Palestinians and evoke rejoicing by short-sighted Israelis. Both parties need the United States to lead a balanced, continuous, and binding process that provides both sides with the long-term goal of two nation-states and the practical means for reaching it.

The Camp David Accord, despite its flaws, left a viable framework, addressing both the West Bank and Gaza, that remains vital today for negotiations towards an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. It must be based on the principle of two-states-for-two-peoples. From an Israeli perspective, that principle is indispensable to the ultimate realization of a secure and democratic nation-state of the Jewish People, consistent with the Zionist vision.

As was the case 40 years ago, making a deal remains subject to the willingness of the respective parties, as well as the resolve and vision of their — and America’s — leaders.

Seventeen years ago, on Sept. 11, 2001, al-Qaida conducted the most destructive terrorist attack in history.

An unprecedented onslaught from the U.S. followed. One-third of al-Qaida’s leadership was killed or captured in the following year. The group lost its safe haven in Afghanistan, including its extensive training infrastructure there. Its surviving members were on the run or in hiding. Though it took nearly 10 years, the U.S. succeeded in killing al-Qaida’s founding leader, Osama bin Laden. Since 2014, al-Qaida has been overshadowed by its former ally al-Qaida in Iraq, now calling itself the Islamic State, like reported by theconversation.com.

In other words, al-Qaida should not have survived the 17 years since 9/11.

But it has. Why?

The ties that bind

Much of the credit goes to al-Qaida’s extraordinary ability to form alliances and sustain them over time and under pressure.

In my book “Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances,” I examine why a small number of groups, such as al-Qaida and IS, emerge as desirable partners and succeed at developing alliance networks.

Understanding terrorist alliances is critical because terrorist organizations with allies are more lethal, survive longer and are more apt to seek weapons of mass destruction. Though terrorist partnerships face numerous hurdles and severing al-Qaida’s alliances has been a U.S. objective for over a decade, the fact is that these counterterrorism efforts have failed.

It was allies that enabled al-Qaida to survive the immediate aftermath of 9/11. The Afghan Taliban stood by al-Qaida after the attack, refusing to surrender bin Laden and thereby precipitating the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Fleeing, al-Qaida was able to turn to allies in Pakistan to hide its operatives and punish the Pakistani government for capitulating to U.S. pressure to crackdown on the group.

It was alliances that helped al-Qaida continue to terrorize. In October 2002, for example, al-Qaida’s ally in Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah brutally commemorated the first anniversary of 9/11 by bombing a bar and a nightclub in Bali, killing more than 200 people and injuring an additional 200.

And it was alliances that allowed al-Qaida to project viability. With the “prestige” that came with conducting 9/11, al-Qaida was able to forge affiliate alliances in which partners adopted its name and pledged allegiance to bin Laden.

Al-Qaida’s first and most notorious affiliate alliance, al-Qaida in Iraq, was formed in 2004 with Jordanian jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Using the standing he accrued through his role in the insurgency in Iraq, Zarqawi then helped al-Qaida acquire its second affiliate in 2006, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. Then, in 2009, al-Qaida designated its branch in Yemen and Saudi Arabia as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. Its alliances spanned the Middle East and helped it to project power, despite the U.S. war on terrorism.

A lower profile

While al-Qaida still sought affiliates, by 2010, it changed some aspects of the relationships.

Al-Qaida forged an alliance with al-Shabaab in Somalia, but did not initially publicly announce it or ask al-Shabaab to change its name. Bin Laden justified the shift to a less visible form of alliance as a way to prevent an increase in counterterrorism pressure or a loss of funds from the Arabian Peninsula. He privately expressed concerns that al-Qaida’s name “reduces the feeling of Muslims that we belong to them, and allows the enemies to claim deceptively that they are not at war with Islam.” Bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, saw the move as bin Laden capitulating to members of al-Qaida who worried about “inflating the size and the growth of al-Qaida.” After bin Laden’s death, Zawahiri publicly announced al-Qaida’s alliance with al-Shabaab, though al-Shabaab still did not adopt al-Qaida’s name.

The “staying power” of Al-Qaida’s allies has helped it remain a threat despite the loss of its founding leader in 2011 and the ascent of a far less capable leader. Zawahiri’s rise to the helm of the group was itself the consequence of an alliance between his original Egyptian group, al-Jihad, and al-Qaida. The alliance culminated in a merger in 2001, with Zawahiri becoming bin Laden’s deputy and successor.

Zawahiri lacks bin Laden’s cachet or diplomatic savvy, and his shortfalls are evident in al-Qaida’s alliances. His poor handling of the strife between jihadist group al-Nusra in Syria and its parent organization, the Islamic State in Iraq – previously al-Qaida in Iraq and now known as the Islamic State – led to the alliance rupture between al-Qaida and its affiliate in Iraq.

Zawahiri has also struggled to manage the relationship with al-Qaida’s ally in Syria, the very group that spurred the conflict between IS and al-Qaida. Al-Nusra changed its name, an effort to gain more legitimacy within the conflict in Syria by publicly distancing itself from al-Qaida, which left a smaller faction still allied with al-Qaida.

Al-Qaida organized a new branch, al-Qaida in the Indian subcontinent, in 2014. The branch in South Asia reflected al-Qaida’s success at expanding beyond its predominantly Arab base, particularly in Pakistan, and has allowed the group to expand its activities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.

Most of al-Qaida’s alliances have proven resilient over time. This is true despite ample reasons for its partners to abandon ties, such as the heightened counterterrorism pressure that comes with affiliation to al-Qaida; the death of its charismatic leader; and the Islamic State’s efforts to court al-Qaida allies. Even the Afghan Taliban has not severed ties, even though doing so would eliminate one of the major reasons that the United States will not withdraw from the “forever war” in Afghanistan.

There is still a window for the U.S. to damage al-Qaida’s alliances: It has a weak leader and major rival. But that window may be closing as the Islamic State adapts to its losses and al-Qaida appears poised for a resurgence with bin Laden’s son as its future, more inspiring leader.

Shia Islam, like many religious sects, continues to be polarised by political opinion. This has in history led to further sub-divisions of Shia Islam. Notwithstanding, there is still an insistence to present Shia Islam as a bloc. This insistence has consequently invited a blanket of disdain for Shia Islam in general particularly in the Gulf, like reported by middleeastmonitor.com.

Saudi Arabia has been the main instigator in this regard. It has also in some instances managed to exploit the rifts between Shias for its own political ambitions. It has, for an example, extended invitations to Muqtada Al-Sadr, whose “electoral bloc came first in the May 2018 elections”. He has been very vocal on his views against Iran’s political involvement inside Iraq.

According to the state news agency SPA, “Sadr, who last visited Saudi Arabia in 2006, attended ‘discussions of common interest’ during his trip to the Red Sea port city of Jeddah”.  The meeting was an attempt to polarise Iraqi Shia support of Iran and its politics.

Saudi’s anti-Shia rhetoric has influenced a large part of international public opinion. It has subsequently turned Iran, the international sponsor of Shia Islam, into a bogeyman that should be confronted by all Sunni Muslims. It insists on the dangers Iran presents to Sunni hegemony.  However, Saudi Arabia is less interested in the preservation of Sunni Islam but more concerned about safeguarding its national interests. Its political legitimacy is by and large dependent on its continued perception as the upholder of Sunni interests and protector of Islam in general.

The Saudi anti-Iran/Shia campaign has not been without glitches. It has made serious political misjudgments including leading what has become one of the greatest man-made catastrophes in Yemen and blockading the state of Qatar after accusing the Houthis in Yemen and the Qataris respectively of cosying up to Iran.

Furthermore, it established a close relationship with the state of Israel against Iran, a decision that backfired against the country in terms of public opinion. The relationship between the two has consequently shifted focus from Israel, the “main culprit that continues to create political instability in the region”.

Over the past week the youth of Basra, Iraq have been engaged in protests demanding political reforms in the country. Like many such protests in the recent past, there is a sense that people wish their actions would spread into other parts of the region who are experiencing similar grievances against their governments. The Iraqi protests are not only directed at their government, they are also directed at Iran. The protesters have accused Iran of over involvement in their political affairs and indirectly “supporting their incapable government”.

Reuters reports that “after five days of deadly demonstrations in Basra in which government buildings have been ransacked and set alight, protesters broke in and damaged the consulate’s offices, shouting condemnation of what many perceive as Iran’s sway over Iraq’s political affairs”. Ayatollah Al-Sistani, the ultimate authority for devout members of Iraq’s Shia majority and Muqtada Al-Sadr have made pronouncements in support of some of the protesters’ demands.

Notwithstanding the insistence by Saudi Arabia to present Shia Islam as a bloc, as alluded to in the first paragraph of this article, the protests in Basra indicate the contrary. Moreover, they also highlight an important factor seldom discussed in the media, i.e. the schism between Arab and Iranian/Persian Shias. This has repeatedly impacted the interactions between the two from time immemorial. Understanding this is important because it debunks the myth peddled mainly by Saudi Arabia that there is a collective Shia modus operandi against the Arabs and Sunnis. It also highlights another important factor, that there is a sizeable Arab Shia community, something often overlooked at least by the outside world.

The dominant view outside the Muslim world is to equate Shiism with Iran, never with Arabs. The schism between Arab and Iranian/Persian Shia Muslims permeates deep into culture and tradition as well. Dr. Liqaa Maki, an Iraqi scholar at Al Jazeera Centre for Studies in Doha, argues that this could be further explained by simply observing marriages. Arab Shia families hardly allow their daughters to marry into Persian Shia families, that is the ultimate form of mistrust. There are also other historic factors that have added to the mistrust including occasional elements of xenophobia and racism between the Persians/Iranians and Arabs. Cultural differences and languages also further compound this mistrust.

Suffice to say the ongoing protests and political positions embraced by both Sistani and Al-Sadr in this regard demonstrate a measured shift in Shia politics in Iraq. It shows an element of policy independence of Iraq from what has been viewed as “Iran backed foreign policy,” particularly after the demise of Saddam Hussein. Finally, these uprising expose the cracks in the so-called Iranian “expansionists project” in the Gulf and they put to the test the perceptions about Iran as the ultimate authority on everything Shia in the region.

Over the last year, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has removed or reassigned five senior military commanders, including making key changes within the country’s air force — a sign that he might be taking military threats against Iran seriously, like reported by iranwire.com.

The latest move from the Supreme Leader came on August 19, when he replaced General Hassan Shahsafi with Brigadier General Aziz Nasirzadeh, a former F-14 Tomcat pilot and veteran of the 1980s Iran-Iraq war, as the new commander of the air force.

But of particular importance was the May 29 appointment of Brigadier General Alireza Sabahifard as the commander of Khatam al-Anbia Air Defense Base, which controls Iran’s land-based air defense system. He replaced Brigadier General Farzad Esmaili.

Earlier, in November 2017, Khamenei had appointed Brigadier General Mohammad Hossein Dadras as the second-in-command of the Iranian army, Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari as deputy army commander in charge of coordination, and Rear Admiral Hossein Khanzadi as the new commander of the Iranian navy.

But the most important changes relate to the air force. In less than three months, it witnessed the dismissal of two senior commanders. And on August 21, following the last change in command, Iran’s Aviation Industries Organization and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics unveiled Kosar, the first Iranian-made fighter jet. The unveiling coincided with the National Day of the Defense Industry and was meant to prove to the world that claims made by the Islamic Republic in the last few years about advances in its air force technology were true.

Khatam al-Anbia Air Defense Base is the command and control center for identifying, tracking and countering aerial threats. In early 2009, Khamenei ordered the base, which had been part of the Iranian air force, to become an independent command in charge of all air defense installations and armaments, from radar and information-gathering systems to surface-to-air missiles.

But the gap between the Western offensive armament, especially that of the US, and Iran’s defensive air system is still very wide. In 2017, 48 senior military experts published a study in the quarterly journal Strategic Defense Studies, published by the Supreme National Defense University, which is run by the General Staff of the Islamic Republic Armed Forces. Their research identified 15 serious threats to the Iranian air defense system in case of a first strike from an enemy [Persian PDF].

The study ranks the threats and vulnerabilities in the order of severity as follows:

1. Intercontinental Missiles

Khatam al-Anbia Base was identified as being extremely vulnerable to intercontinental or “strategic” missiles. It is very difficult for land-based defense systems to defend against such missiles because their warheads are released when the missiles reenter the atmosphere.

2. Cruise Missiles

A cruise missile is a guided missile that, unlike ballistic intercontinental missiles, does not leave the atmosphere and flies at a constant speed during most of its flight. A cruise missile is basically a small, pilotless and self-navigating airplane that can travel at high subsonic or supersonic speed; it can deliver a large high-explosive bomb to a precise location, often within a meter of the target.

A cruise missile can be launched from land, air, surface ship or submarine at ground targets or at ships, and they can reach their targets via an indirect path.

The study found cruise missiles to be the second most dangerous threat to Khatam al-Anbia Base and evaluated the ability of the base to destroy such missiles as “low.”

3. Enemy’s Command and Control System

A command and control system is comprised of an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.

One of the most important components of such a system is “situational awareness,” which includes the ability to maintain exact and real-time information about the position of all military assets around the globe, whether a country or force’s own, or those that are under the control of the enemy.

The United States has invested heavily in its sophisticated Global Command and Control System (GCCS) so that it can provide timely information to its commanders and forces engaged in military operations all over the world. “Misleading” such a system is not an easy undertaking.

4. “Smart” Guided Bombs

Laser-guided bombs and precision-guided munitions do not have propulsion systems of their own, but they do have forward velocity when they are dropped from a plane. They are guided by their built-in optical, laser and GPS guidance systems and can destroy the intended targets with a very high accuracy.

5. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, are guided by a ground-based controller. They fly at sub-sonic speed and can fly over a designated area for more than 21 hours, usually using stealth technology to hide from radar. Ground controllers determine the right moment to instruct drones to drop munitions or shoot rockets attached to them.

6. Tactical Ballistic Missiles

Military personnel launch tactical ballistic missiles from mobile platforms that can be easily moved around, making it difficult to pinpoint their location and to take preemptive action against them. These missiles can carry weapons of mass destruction.

7. High-Caliber Rockets and Rocket Artillery

High-caliber rockets and rocket artilleries are cheap and effective systems against radar and air defense sites, troop concentrations and other targets, and can deliver a high volume of fire in a very short amount of time.

8. Electromagnetic Bombs

This weapon uses an intense electromagnetic field with a wavelength of more than 10 gigahertz to create a brief pulse of energy that affects electronic circuitry without directly harming humans or buildings. These bombs are used to disable any machine that relies on electrical circuits to function, including computers, radars and guidance systems. They are used against targets both on the ground and at sea.

9. Air-to-Surface Missiles

Air-to-surface missiles are tactical weapons launched from military aircraft at targets on land or at sea. They are usually equipped with various kinds of guidance systems and can be either short- or long-range. The missiles can be launched from a distance without coming within range of the target’s air defenses, delivering a high volume of explosive power.

10. “Mother of All Bombs”

The American GBU-43/B, known as the “Mother of All Bombs” (MOAB), was first tested in 2003. It is reputed to be the most destructive non-nuclear bomb in the world and can penetrate bunkers 37 meters underground. The bombs employ a satellite guidance system.

11. Global Surveillance, Identification and Targeting System

The Global Surveillance, Identification and Targeting System uses satellites that give it the ability to gather massive amounts of information using various kinds of sensors. Data gathered via this system is used to create a virtual duplicate of the area under surveillance which, in turn, can be used in planning, simulating and controlling military action.

12. Graphite Bombs

A graphite bomb is a “soft” or non-lethal weapon that is used to disable electrical power system by short-circuiting electrical supply through dispersion of chemically-treated carbon filaments. The graphite bomb was first used by the United States against Iraq in the 1990–1991 Gulf War, knocking out 85 percent of its electrical supply.

13. Reconnaissance Drones

Unmanned aerial vehicles or drones are widely used for reconnaissance of every kind, either independently or in combination with other reconnaissance systems on the ground, in the air or in space. They can be equipped with various types of sensors, from optical and infrared to radar and laser. They fly at sub-sonic speed and can hover over the target for many hours and escape detection using stealth technology.

14. Electronic Warfare

Electronic warfare is any action that uses electromagnetic spectrum — signals such as radio, infrared or radar— to attack an enemy or disrupt an enemy’s attack. Electronic warfare can be conducted from air, sea, land or space by manned and unmanned systems against civilians, the military, electronic communication and radars.

15. Smart Missiles and Bombs and Bunker Busters

Smart missiles are a broad range of projectiles that rely on sensors to track, lock on, and hit their targets. A bunker buster is any munition that is designed to penetrate hardened targets or targets buried deep underground.

ISIS has been forced to reorganise and change strategy to survive after a string of devastating defeats four years after announcing its cross-border ‘caliphate’ in Iraq and Syria, like reported by dailymail.co.uk.

The jihadist group has been pinned down to its last desert holdouts in Syria having lost all urban centres previously under its control in neighbouring Iraq.

It has now changed its administrative structure and shifted its focus away from operating the state-like apparatus it once ran.

An Iraqi security official said that after losing ground in Iraq and Syria, ‘ISIS leadership is now focused on a global vision’ modelled on Al-Qaeda.

Its cross-border state now destroyed, ISIS is instead likely to focus on spreading shock and terror around the world through dramatic attacks, the official added.

ISIS will have to find ‘a new way of doing things, especially to recruit after heavy losses’, said the official, who asked to remain anonymous, told AFP.

At its peak, the self-proclaimed caliphate included 35 ‘wilaya’ (provinces) mostly set within a swathe of territory spanning either side of the border between Syria and Iraq.

But following major military defeats – including the jihadists’ loss of their de facto capitals of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq – ISIS propaganda outlets now only mention six ‘wilaya’.

Former ISIS provinces like Mosul, Raqqa and Kirkuk – an oil-rich province in Iraq – no longer exist.

Instead, the term ‘wilaya’ is now used to refer to large chunks of territory like Iraq and Syria, along with Somalia, East Asia, Tajikistan and the Egyptian Sinai.

The administrative reshuffle marks a clear switch from 2014, when ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi boasted of having erased the ‘imperialist’ design that divided the Middle East.

The proclamation was made with great fanfare as jihadists drove bulldozers across the Syrian-Iraqi border, symbolically destroying one of the frontiers drawn up by colonial powers as they carved out the modern Middle East from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire after World War I.

After years battling ISIS, Iraqi troops are now redeployed along most of the border with Syria, across which jihadists and weapons have long flowed unimpeded.

On the Syrian side, separate offensives by forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and a US-backed coalition have pushed ISIS jihadists out of most of the territory they once controlled.

‘The change proves Daesh’s weakness and the loss of much of its leadership,’ the security official told AFP, using an Arabic acronym for ISIS.

ISIS’s restructure ‘shows its central command lacks confidence in its wilaya commanders in Iraq and that it is reducing their powers to one (central) leadership’, the official said.

Iraqi authorities regularly announce the arrest or death of ISIS leaders and relatives of Baghdadi, such as his son, who was killed in Syria in July by Russian missiles.

Baghdadi himself was thought to have been killed several times, and the US has offered up a $25 million (21.5 million euro) reward for information leading to his capture or death.

In a purported new audio message released on Wednesday to mark the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha, Baghdadi called on his followers to ‘not give up the jihad against their enemy’.

‘Baghdadi’s speech was one of consolation and condolence,’ said Hisham al-Hashemi, an expert on radical Islamist groups.

It was an ‘acknowledgement of defeat… but (Baghdadi) urged those remaining to persevere’, he said.

In a first, Baghdadi used his 55-minute recording to call for attacks in the West, saying an operation there would be ‘worth a thousand’ at home.

Much of the address was reminiscent of approaches long used by Al-Qaeda, according to Hashemi.

In it, the ISIS leader scorns the US, blasts Shiite Iran, and calls on Sunni Muslims in Iraq to denounce the Shiite-dominated paramilitary units of the Hashed al-Shaabi.

Tore Hamming, a jihadist specialist at the European University Institute, said Baghdadi’s speech falls into the same category as his last three – ‘crisis management’.

A year ago, a Spain-based cell of Islamic State organized, planned, and executed the vehicle attacks that killed 16 and injured 130 people in and near Barcelona. The motivation behind those heinous acts, like others committed around the world, is the Salafist-jihadist ideology, like reported by theglobepost.com. Reports claim that Islamic State has been militarily defeated, but this ideology remains viable and intact in affiliated groups and true believers scattered around the world. Attacks carried out by individuals with this worldview could help IS survive during lean times.

The Islamic State, the self-declared caliphate that began its rise in 2014, has been militarily defeated. Or has it? The military campaign of the U.S. led coalition has been most effective. A 2017 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) report estimated that 70,000 IS fighters had been killed during Operation Inherent Resolve over four years of war. The large regional caliphate, that actually possessed many of the characteristics inherent to a nation-state, is no more.

But the good news espoused by DOD last year was somewhat dampened by a DOD Inspector General report issued this month, claiming that 28,000 to 30,000 jihadists remain scattered in small enclaves throughout Syria and Iraq. Although some analysts believe these numbers include noncombatants and family members, it is nonetheless a remarkable achievement for a “defeated” organization. As with any war, ground truth is elusive.

Guerrilla Warfare
The report states that an important factor that enabled IS to maintain some fighting strength is an influx of foreign volunteers to the war zone. This is also an indication of the continuing lure of the jihad message to some elements within Islam. But surviving IS elements, still being pressed hard by the coalition forces, have no real conventional combat ability left. It is hard to believe there can be much of a working chain of command.

Recently, surviving fighters have been found in two- or four-man elements only. Although the combat capability of such groups is limited, desperate and dedicated men do have the ability to dig in and make rooting them out a militarily expensive proposition. While IS finances, although reduced, are still significant, I would say the ability of IS to conduct conventional military operations in Iraq and or Syria is nonexistent.

This means that guerrilla warfare, with terror tactics at the forefront, are the movement’s only option at this time. Such tactics are where IS made their original mark in the world and what they are good at. The coalition will continue to fight an asynchronous war against a weaker, but motivated jihadist enemy.

Salafist-Jihadist Ideology

 

While the caliphate has been disassembled and IS conventional military abilities defeated, the Salafist-jihadist ideology, the driving force that motivates this international movement, remains viable and intact in affiliated groups and true believers scattered around the world. So, the principal danger from IS now lies with the several affiliated groups in other nations, including those in West Africa, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Somalia, Tunisia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. While these groups are not large, relatively speaking, they are made up of dedicated operatives, loyal to the cause. And these elements have access to financial and logistical support.

As the coalition vise tightened in 2016-17, IS forces were squeezed into smaller and smaller areas in the conflict region. Many took advantage of the fog of war and confused situation to join the refugee flow. The inability of authorities to vet true refugees from escaping fighters has been a real problem for receiving nations. Of particular note is the E.U. open border policy that has aided the exfiltration of IS fighters from the conflict region. The coordinated 2015 attacks in Paris and Brussels are examples of attacks launched by former IS fighters. It is very concerning that IS warriors have been able to relocate and operate in Europe.

 

IS has claimed responsibility for recent attacks in Afghanistan, Chechnya, France, and London. While these attacks are limited in nature, they often prove deadly to the victims in the kill zones. There are few signs or indications from perpetrators prior to such small-scale attacks.

Motivated by Belief System

The technique of individuals or very small cells working without outside help is akin to the concept of “leaderless resistance” practiced by some in the American radical right in the early 1990s. Such individuals are motivated by a central, commonly held belief system. Then it is up to the individual resistor to prepare and then carry the fight to the enemy in his or her locality. Thus, the cause is advanced through a common worldview, but operations are individually executed and uncoordinated, making detection very difficult. Such operations allow the movement to survive during lean times until the movement can gain strength.

The common worldview that holds the IS fighters, al-Qaeda operatives, and other wide-spread individuals together is the Salafist-jihadist ideology. There are selected mosques around the world that adhere to this view of Islam. The cause is continually propagated through social media and jihadi websites on the surface, deep, and dark webs. Such sites are where interested individuals can tune into sermons, theological lectures, tradecraft how-to instructions, best practice lists, and other aids that taken together and internalized by someone motivated to radicalize, can aid in determining their own path to join the jihad.

The military defeat of IS in Iraq and Syria is undoubtedly a major setback for the cause. But, the Salafist-jihadists are deadly serious in their goal of establishing a worldwide caliphate. They are in it for the long haul. Whether an IS jihadi uses a gun, an explosive, a knife or a vehicle, it is the ideology that motivates and inspires the terrorist to act. And it is the Salafist-jihadist ideology that must be defeated.

The recent attacks in Fuheis and Salt completely change the anti-terrorism battleground. The approach to anti-terrorism must be reevaluated given that we are dealing with terrorists who have managed to hide their radicalism by listening to music, smoking in coffee shops and even having non-veiled wives, like reported by jordantimes.com.

This appears to be a new approach in Jordan, with Jordanians planning and operating within our borders, suggesting that the risks are growing and thus counterterrorism operations must also change to be compatible with new challenges that could exist for some time as the conflict in Syria begins to wane.

These recent attacks appear to set a new battleground. Traditionally, the current phase has seen terrorists targeting military targets, which they consider illegitimate tyrant forces, but the festival in Fuheis was all civilian. It is also the first time to see a building being blown up and a suicide bomber ambushing security forces. The new battleground is a result of Jordanians returning from abroad with new terrorist skills and experience.

The incident in Salt demonstrated the highly effective nature of the anti-terrorism squad within the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate, as it had analysed the Fuheis attack and identified the key people at a great pace. The response must be lauded and greater efforts must be given in similar fashion in the future. However, the high number of casualties amongst the security task force that responded to the terrorists suggests that Jordanian authorities should consider and review their security plans, training and tactics.

Any review at the intelligence and operational level should also consider the entire deradicalisation process. It is clear that all the conferences, seminars and money spent on strategies and plans to combat extremism and terrorism, including the establishment of the anti-extremism unit, have been in vain and had no real value. Those in charge should reconsider all the training programmes and anti-terrorism strategies.

The move by Prime Minister Omar Razzaz to establish an anti-extremism unit at the Prime Ministry to “expand its mandate and activate its contribution to the fight against radicalism” is highly important, but should take a wider national strategic approach. It is important to make the work of this unit clear and subject to transparency and accountability, while all underlying influencers who place obstacles in front of the work of this unit and the strategy should be sidelined immediately. 

Moreover, those who will run the prime minister’s unit should be aware of the complexity and wide ranging nature of extremism. There needs to be a comprehensive vision that focuses on socioeconomic strategies and not on superficial rhetoric. This unit should coordinate with ministries, such as planning, labour, agriculture, culture, youth and social development in order to establish and implement its society-wide vision.

Jordan is facing a new wave of challenges in addition to its economic and security challenges, so it is time now more than ever before for efficient and effective solutions to the Kingdom’s current problems to be in a position to address future challenges.

At the time when the Uzbek authorities held an international conference on Afghanistan on March 26-27, 2018, and the Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov hosted the Afghan Taliban delegation led by the Movement’s political chief Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai on August 6-10, 2018, Taliban-backed Uzbek Salafi-jihadi groups continued their military operations against the Afghan government forces, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s diplomatic efforts to establish a direct dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban have not yet produced the desired result. Moreover, these two important events in Tashkent city could not diminish the terrorist activity of jihadist groups from the Ferghana Valley, which are under the dual patronage of al Qaeda and the Taliban.

The dispute between the UN and the US about the al Qaeda’s and the Taliban’s strategic ties

Monitoring of the Central Asian Salafi-jihadi groups activities showed that since 2018 al Qaeda-linked Katibat Imam al Bukhari (KIB) has stepped up its participation in the terror attacks against the Afghan Armed Forces. This Uzbek terrorist group has a high level of trust among the leaders al Qaeda and Taliban and has become a link in their strategic ties. The ongoing strategic ties between al Qaeda and the Taliban were also noted in the United Nations’ twenty-second comprehensive report, which was published on July 27, 2018.The UN Security Council emphasized that “Al-Qaida and its affiliates remain stronger than ISIL, while its alliance with the Taliban and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan remains firm despite rivalry from the local ISIL affiliate” (page 3, section “Summary”).

In this regard, it should be noted that the Pentagon and some high-ranking generals maintained that the strategic ties between al Qaeda and the Taliban were terminated. The US Department of Defense in its biannual report “Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan” in June 2018 wrote that “…there is no evidence of strategic ties between the two organizations and the Taliban likely seeks to maintain distance from al-Qa’ida” (page 26, section “Threats from Insurgent and Terrorist Groups”).

However, the UN report and the KIB activities show that the strategic ties between al Qaeda and the Taliban continue to function successfully. KIB is not the only group from Central Asia that is affiliated with al Qaeda and conducts terror operations under the Taliban’s leadership in Afghanistan. The authors of the UN’s report devoted a whole paragraph to jihadist organizations from Central Asia, which play a key role in strategic cooperation between al Qaeda and the Taliban. Citing information provided by its Member States, the UN its report claims: “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan still commands about 500 fighters in Afghanistan, concentrated in Faryab, Sari Pul, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar and Badakhshan provinces. Around another 500 Central Asian fighters are distributed between Khatibat Imam Al-Bukhari, Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad, Islamic Jihad Union… The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement commands 400 fighters in Badakhshan” (page 15-16, section “Central and South Asia”).

As an expert who is researching an ideological doctrine of the Central Asian Salafi-jihadi groups, I want to note that the above facts in the UN report may require some adjustment.First, of all the above-mentioned terrorist groups, only Katibat Imam al-Bukhari and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, more commonly known as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) from northwest China, today jointly conduct attacks against the Afghan government forces.

Secondly, the presence of Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ) militants in Afghanistan raises serious questions for experts on Central Asia. This Salafi-jihadi group, which consists of Islamists from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, is fighting alongside other al Qaeda-linked groups in Syria and has not yet formed its branch in Afghanistan.Although KTJ is a strong mouthpiece of al Qaeda in the Central Asian region. The KTJ’s leader Abu Saloh became an effective mechanism in spreading the ideology of al Qaeda in the Ferghana Valley and the recruitment of new militants.

Thirdly, after the killing of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s (IMU) leader Usman Ghazi and his more than 100 militants by the Taliban for the betrayal to ISIS at a base in Zabul Province, the group was practically extinct.In June 2016, a new faction of the IMUannounced itself, denouncing ISIS and expressing its loyalty to the Taliban and al Qaeda.But after this incident, al Qaeda and the Taliban leaders do not strongly trust the new IMU faction. Therefore, the IMU is unable to become an effective player in strengthening strategic ties between al Qaeda and the Taliban. Among the Central Asian jihadi groups who fight in Afghanistan, only KIB, TIP and Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) have the highest confidence among al Qaeda and the Taliban leaders.

Uzbek jihadists in a double embrace

It is known that KIB has two branches. The group’s main fighting force of more than 500 militants, led by leader Abu Yusuf Muhojir today is based in the Syrian province Idlib. Despite the fact that KIB positions itself as an “independent” faction it is closely connected with Ahrar al Sham who has had al Qaeda operatives embedded in its own ranks. The KIB’s second branch is concentrated in Afghanistan, which positions itself as an integral part of the Taliban.Even the emblem and the name of the KIB branch are closely associated with the Taliban. It is known that the Taliban refers to itself as “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” and has the website under the same name. With the Taliban’s consent KIB leaders gave their branch the name “Katibat Imam al Bukhari of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”.After pledging an oath of allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Omar, KIB became a reinforcing factor of the strategic ties of the Taliban and al Qaeda.It should be noted that the US State Department designated KIB to the list of global terrorist organizations on March 22, 2018.

KIB’s Media Center is located in Idlib, which promotes the activities of both branches in the social media. In his propaganda materials and public speaking during Jumu’ah (congregational prayer on Friday), KIB leader Abu Yusuf Muhojr regularly makes reference to the religious preaching of the founder al Qaeda Osama bin Laden and the group’s current amir  Ayman al-Zawahiri. Radical Salafism and militant Takfirism are the fundamental basis of the jihadi ideology of the KIB.In accordance with the ideological doctrine of KIB, the group considers its goal the construction of an Islamic state in Central Asia, the overthrow of the regime of Bashar al-Assad, and the protection and spread of Salafi-jihadi ideology around the world by force. Also, Abu Yusuf Muhojir describes with admiration the military successes of the Taliban Mujahideen and calls them “the faithful warriors of Allah.”

Since the spring of 2018, Uzbek jihadists, together with the Taliban, have conducted more than ten terror operations called Khandak and Mansuri.After each terrorist attack, the KIB’s Media Center published video and photo materials on the captured military equipment, weapons, and cited the data of the killed soldiers of the Afghan Army on the Telegram channel.For example, on July 18, 2018, the Media Center reported that “in the framework of the joint Operation Khandak, the Mujahideen of Kathibat Imam Bukhori neutralized four military personnel who had undergone military training NATO and destroyed one infantry fighting vehicle and 3 Hummer.”At the end information, the KIB confirmed its loyalty to the Taliban according to the Bay’ah (oath of allegiance in the world of jihadism). This indicates that the KIB continue its historical fealty to the Taliban and alQaeda.

As the recent battles for the city of Ghazni have shown, the Taliban has been able to significantly increase its combat readiness and expand its presence to the borders of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.This means that Uzbek jihadists are closer and closer to their homes, where they intend to create an Islamic Caliphate.The KIB, IJU and TIP continue to attract followers, gain battlefield experience and make international connections.

The Central Asian countries seriously fear that the Taliban’s dominant role in the intra-Afghan war can inspire the jihadists from the Fergana Valley into terrorist attacks in their homeland.But the “Stans” governments do not have military, political and economic levers to pressure the Taliban so that it refuses patronage over Uzbek and Uyghur Salafi-jihadi groups. The Afghan peace conference in Tashkent and the ongoing talks between Uzbekistan and the Taliban do not give much optimism that the terrorist threat KIB, IJU and TIP will decrease in the future.

Since 2001, there have been many attempts to organize a negotiation process with the “moderate” wing of the Taliban in various formats.International conferences were held under the aegis of the UN, like the Tashkent one.Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri has sworn allegiance to the Taliban’s new amir, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada in June 2016.Therefore, it can be expected that the strategic ties between the Taliban and al Qaeda will continue in the future, and their patronage over the Central Asian Salafi-jihadi terror groups will not interfere.

Causes and consequences of jihadism

In conclusion, it should be noted that the UN statistics on the number of Central Asian jihadists is very conditional. Counting al Qaeda backed Sunni radical group’s membership in Central Asia and the Middle East is a difficult task.In practice, their number is several times higher. In my opinion, the controversy over the continuation or termination of al Qaeda’s and Taliban’s strategic ties in Afghanistan, as well as the allegation of a quarrel between al Qaeda and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria is of secondary importance.Despite internal contradictions and temporary conflicts for leadership in the jihadist world, al Qaeda, the Taliban and ISIS united by the common extremist Salafist-takfiri ideology. The purpose of this ideology is the construction of the Caliphate in the world and the struggle with the crusaders of the West.

The UN in its report was unable to name the exact number of Sunni Muslims who share the Salafi-jihadi ideology. While the ideology of Salafism and Wahhabism is alive, the number of Islamist terrorists in the world can only grow, and jihad cannot be stopped.After analyzing the UN’s and the Pentagon’s reports it can be concluded that world powers are struggling not with causes, but with the consequences of jihadism.But the fight against the ideology of radical Islamism is primarily a responsibility of the Islamic world.

Many analysts have attempted to explain the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s outreach to post-2003 Iraq as a desire for Riyadh to have its say in Baghdad’s politics and to counter Iran’s influence. One overlooked motivation central to Saudi Arabia’s new approach is its own domestic policy: countering potential Iranian infiltration in the Kingdom’s Shi’a-dominated Eastern Province, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

Strengthening ties with Iraq’s national religious authorities (marji’yat) signals a rapprochement with the entire Shi’a sect. However, Saudi Arabia should consider that constructing such a binary is complicated when leveraging Iraqi society as a backdrop to constructing its own. Iraq’s marj-iya follows a different model of theocracy than that of “Wilayat Al Faqih,” the Islamic Republic of Iran’s political model that imposes a rule of jurisprudence on all aspects of Iranian life. Nonetheless, the marji’yya can only serve as a bulwark against Iran’s religious influence to a limited extent.

Until recently, Saudi Arabia has perceived Iraq as a security threat. Iran’s influence in Baghdad looms ahead of a feasible strategy aimed at supporting Iraq as a neighboring Arab state. While the Iraqi public and a significant number of its politicians are increasingly discontent with Iran’s outreach in Iraq, open hostility has not been the answer Baghdad adopted as a solution to Tehran’s strategy. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iran has fully exploited the absence of U.S. planning for the “morning after,” successfully entrenching, and in many cases coercing, its presence in Iraq’s social, economic, religious, and military affairs. Its appeal is decades old among former loyalists who became key members in the Iraqi government. These politicians and officials do not shy away from acknowledging their alignment with Iran, a frustrating reality for Iraq’s Western allies who toppled Saddam and the Sunni neighbors who harbor legitimate concerns regarding Iran’s expansionist ambitions. A neighbor, an ally, and regional power that has frequently displayed contempt at Iraq’s sovereignty, Iran is a force Iraqis must reckon with. Ironically, Saudi Arabia’s relationship with its own Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) neighbors resembles to an extent Iran’s regional foreign policy—one that is aimed at creating satellite states that function under its mandate.

In June 2017, Iraq’s Interior Minister Qassim Al Araji paid a visit to Saudi Arabia to “forge high level cooperation on security and other vital matters for both states.” Al Araji met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and several security officials. The visit followed Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubair’s surprise trip to Baghdad earlier in the year, but Al Araji is an active member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, thus his arrival on Saudi soil for reasons other than the pilgrimage to Mecca reflected a significant change.

Former U.S. State Secretary Rex Tillerson directly sponsored the rapprochement, and Saudi Arabia appeared willing and cooperative. Despite Saudi authorities often referring to the Hashd Al Sha’abi—the confluence of militias gathered under the Dawa Party leadership and an ambiguous religious fatwa—as a scourge and source of instability, and Popular Mobilization Units’s (PMU) leadership had displayed little objection to the new Saudi footprint.

With the departure of Rex Tillerson, the nixing of America’s participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or Iran nuclear deal), and the increasingly aggressive rhetoric from current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo towards Iranian influence in the region, will the Saudis lose the incentive to reach out to Baghdad?

The answer is most likely no.

Since 2016, Saudi Arabia’s reading of its own security and social dilemma has shifted: the growing tensions with the Saudi Shi’a of the Eastern Province cannot be confronted by force. One particular example is enlightening: Saudi Arabia executed Shi’a cleric Nimr Alnimr whom authorities accused of terrorism. While the official Iraqi pleas to pardon the cleric were unsuccessful, the reactions to the execution across the Shi’a world were too loud to ignore. Mobs attacked and burned the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran, but despite the worldwide condemnation of the embassy sacking, Iran had once again presented itself as the sole defender of Shi’a grievances in the Islamic world. Violence soon played out on the streets of Qatif, and with Iran already championing legitimate grievances in Bahrain and indirectly supporting the Houthis in Yemen, the oil-rich Eastern Province was the last place Saudis would tolerate Iranian tampering. A new approach to Shi’a communities in Saudi Arabia became a necessity, and Saudi authorities have not been subtle with their new measures. Clerics have been banned from publicly chastising Shi’a in sermons and televised programming. In 2015, after an ISIS suicide bomber attacked a Shi’a mosque in Al Qatif, Saudi media heavily reported on the “solidarity between all Saudis in the face of terrorism.” Shi’a families visited the homes of fallen law enforcement officers in Al Qasim, the heart of Wahhabism—Saudi Arabia’s strain of strict Salafism and political devotion to the ruling King—while Sunni families visited the victims of the attacks in Qatif.

Within this context, we can look at the new Saudi Arabian engagement as not a means to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, but rather as a message to the Kingdom’s own Shi’a population: we are not at war with your set of beliefs, but against Iranian meddling in our affairs. The recent visible cracks between Iraq’s authentic Shi’a authorities and Iran provided a fresh model for an Arab “Marjiyi’a” that does not answer to Qum. Najaf is not pleased with Iran’s claims to speak on behalf of Shia everywhere, and such nuances help countries with Shi’a populations in the minority keep Iranian dominance afar. Warming up to Iraq’s Shi’a institutions is a positive step that can help counter a reservoir of deeply rooted sectarian disfavor of Shi’a in Saudi Arabia with the aim of creating a cohesive national Shi’a identity that can withstand Iranian infiltration. The new approach can help the social fabric of the Kingdom recover, but rapprochement with mainstream Iraq requires a better comprehension of how Iraqis perceive Saudi Arabia, an understanding of sub-identity management, and an acknowledgement of the complexities that accompany the concept of opposing Iran.

Saudi Arabia’s Perception in Iraq’s Recent Memory

The relationship between Iraq and Saudi Arabia has historically altered between animosity, tensions, grudging acceptance, and regional coexistence. The new phase of this relationship cannot exclude a rich past that holds firm in the Iraqi conscious and popular memory.

Shi’a Iraqis have long viewed the Gulf monarchy with suspicion. In 1802, Mohammed bin Abdulwahab led a fighting force to sack Karbala, butchering thousands of Shi’a inhabitants during the Ottoman era. The sacking of Karbala is still referred to today as a victorious campaign in Saudi Arabia. Until a century ago, the Ikhwan forces of Najd campaigned against southern Iraqi tribes despite warnings from King Abdulaziz and his British allies who were then the Mandatory power in control of Iraq. In recent years, Saudi media green-lighted sectarian anti-Shi’a rhetoric to dominate state-sanctioned television broadcasting. Education too includes forms of discrimination against the Shi’a sect, an ongoing problem in the Kingdom that until recently remained unaddressed.

Outreach to Iraqi Shi’a should not only include politicians, but also approach mainstream Shi’a Iraqis who anticipate the retirement of the derogatory term, “Rawafidh,” historically used to describe followers of Imam Ali bin Taleb, who refused to legitimize the Caliphs who succeeded Prophet Mohammed, from popular Saudi discourse. Other causes of discontent include destroying Meccan sites considered sacred by Shi’a, the war in Yemen, and overwhelming popular endorsement of different “jihad” concepts outside of the Kingdom.

Sunni Iraq, on the other hand, has a divided stance. The wave of Arab nationalism in the 1940s and 1950s created popular hostility towards Saudi Arabia as the latter openly opposed and countered pan-Arabism. The religious crowd viewed the Kingdom with reverence, but ideologically referenced Ottoman Sunnism rather than Saudi’s rigid interpretation of Islam. Nonetheless, the fringe community influenced by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood aligned with Saudi Arabia in its war of ideas against Nassir and the Ba‘th Party. Nevertheless, Saddam Hussein’s monopoly of power would severely weaken this alliance.

The followers of Salafism—the concept of authentic Islam as practiced by the “Salaf” or early Muslims—often set Saudi Arabia as the epitome of Islam’s righteous path. Salafism reflected in social conservatism has found its grounds in Iraq from the time of the ill-advised Faith Campaign of the mid-1990s. However, it was rise of the Islamic State in Iraq that raised many questions about the influence of Wahhabism on the roots of extremist ideology as practiced by the self-proclaimed Caliphate and its followers. On social media, where much of Iraq’s public discourse takes place, Saudi Arabia was ruled guilty as being the source, ideologically and materially, of the Islamic State. The accusation is ostensible at best, but the perceptions stand. While Sunni supremacy existed in the context of left-leaning Arab nationalism, overt hostility over differences in theology is a foreign phenomenon in Iraq’s recent memory. Saudi Arabia’s counter-ISIS narrative—focused on describing the group as a grassroots Iraqi organization and overstating the Ba‘thist and Saddamist role in the group—exonerates radical fatwas and decades of normalizing sectarian rhetoric and glorification of jihad. While the Islamic State’s leadership is indeed Iraqi, there is no questioning the ideological roots of ISIS, which borrowed a more brutal version of Islam from al-Qaeda.

Saudi Excitement and Miscalculations

As Iraq’s Independent Higher Electoral Commission was announcing the initial results of the May 12 general parliamentary elections, the Gulf—in particular Saudi—press gloated at what it perceived to be a resounding defeat to Iran: Iraq’s “nationalist” Muqtada Al Sadr had the lead. Trailing him by a small margin was the openly Iranian-backed “Fatah” bloc, comprised of the Popular Mobilization Units, Al Hashd Al Sha’bi.

The euphoria would last less than one month. On June 12, Muqtada Al Sadr’s “Sairoon” bloc announced its alliance with “Fatah” in a move that surprised many; however, it was not too outlandish for the static module of Iraqi politics that has not seen major shifts since the first elections in 2005. Muqtada Al Sadr, despite his several harsh criticisms of the Kingdom, is also a Gulf media favorite. Even as Riyadh might have given up on Sunni figures, Shi’a critics of Iran from Iraq’s political and social spectrum were welcomed and endorsed.

Despite the initial excitement over the election results, using Iran as a gauge for Iraqi patriotism is a pitfall. The reasons preventing Iraq from taking a stronger line against Iranian interference will not be resolved in the near future, and they come as a direct result of mismanaging Iraq’s affairs in the aftermath of regime change. There are no true anti-Iran camps in Iraq, including its Sunni political establishment. Relationships with Tehran range from acknowledgement to full alignment, with actors that call for ejecting Iranian influence being fringe figures that remain excluded from the political process. The Iraqi public is vocal about the indignation of Iranian overreach, but unanimously rejects the mere idea of an armed confrontation. The grief of the eight-year war is still present in many, if not most, Iraqi households. The belief that Saddam sacrificed the country to protect the Gulf still holds. Iraq’s political system since 2005 has revolved around bargains between the same crop of politicians who share similar merits of inefficiency and mismanagement, even if few of them resort to fiery anti-Iran commentary that sounds appealing to Tehran rivals.

Another reflection of Saudi Arabia’s weak understanding of the delicate Iraqi compact is its overt support to Kurdish independence. King Salman officially stated that Saudi Arabia supported the unity of Iraq and called for the Kurds not to go through with the September 25, 2017 referendum to vote on the independence of the areas under Kurdish Regional Government’s autonomy. However, sympathy towards the Kurds’ right of independence has been steadily increasing, building on the flawed perception, often dispersed by Kurdish lobbyist groups, that an independent Kurdish state would create a bulwark against Iranian expansion while disregarding the actual breaking of Iraq.

Gains and Challenges in the Saudi-Iraqi Relationship

Souring relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq cannot be pinned on Iran. Since 1990, Saudi Arabia has had its embassy in Iraq shut down and borders closed. Until 2003, relations between the two states were openly hostile. Up until two years ago, several Iraqi officials openly accused Saudi Arabia’s “petro-dollars” of stirring violence in the country. Non-state actors, like Wathiq Al Battat, resorted to armed violence against Saudi Arabia, aware that he could go unpunished.

One year ago, Saudi and Iraqi authorities reopened the Arar border crossing in a huge step to re-establish trade and the facilitation of pilgrimage to Mecca. Iraq offers Saudi Arabia a consumer market for its goods as the Kingdom strives for the success of its Vision 2030—the massive economic revamp aimed at reducing Saudi Arabia’s dependency on oil. As the Financial Times reported earlier this year, Saudi Arabia and Iraq exchanged delegations in an excited atmosphere that was soon damaged by the daunting reality of Iraq’s outdated banking system and rampant corruption. Security, too, was another concern.

The infamous Qatari kidnappings last year made headlines globally, highlighting the unparalleled strength of paramilitaries in Iraq. In December 2015, the Iranian-backed militia Kataib Hizbollah kidnapped 26 Qatari royals who were on a hunting trip near Al Muthanna province in Iraq. Though the case itself and the ransom became a PR talking point for Saudi Arabia against Qatar, it would be hard to imagine a reaction different if royals of another GCC state were subjected to a similar ordeal. With a Saudi Embassy now in Baghdad and potential consulates in other cities, the risks run higher for Saudi interests and personnel. Former Ambassador Thamer Al Sabhan claims to have received death threats following several controversial comments on social media. Increasing hostility with the Popular Mobilization Units could subject newfound economic ties and interest to many obstacles. Saudi Arabia has a stake in balancing communication with all groups in Iraq to assure the safety of its own businesses.

Saudi Arabia’s assistance in the reconstruction of Sunni territories liberated from ISIS can be considered another venue that can build positive leverage. With Riyadh struggling to meet the all promises and projects designed for its “Vision 2030” and the rampant corruption in Iraq’s reconstruction sector, local residents are not likely to see tangible outcomes of such assistance unless firm plans are set to execute projects that benefit the public. Nonetheless, if Saudi Arabia can contribute in improving the quality of daily life for average Iraqis, the feedback would be more rewarding than inciting against Iran and Iranian-backed groups. As the United States ramps up economic sanctions against Tehran from abroad, and discontent with Iran’s regional policies simmers on the domestic front, financial support to Iraq is a realm Saudi Arabia can utilize. The Kingdom did not miss the recent opportunity to step in during the electricity crisis in south Iraq that led to a wave of ongoing protests. Iran had cut electricity flow to Iraq from its grids in June after the latter failed to pay its accumulating debts. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait quickly looked to partially fill Iran’s void by sending diesel shipments to help generate electricity in the direst areas.

Saudi Arabia aims to counter Iran whenever possible, but the Kingdom has recently opted to offer an alternative: a better perception of Saudi Arabia to a suspicious Iraqi population. Although Riyadh continues to engage in erroneous strategies such as backing Kurdish independence, there are little expectations to counter Iran via an outreach to Shi’a leaders or the business sector in Baghdad. Riyadh can exploit Iran’s blunders in Baghdad, such as cutting off electricity, overtly boasting about its control of Iraq, and empowering militias at the expense of the conventional security apparatus, if the Kingdom distances its approach from any sectarian rhetoric and interference.

Unlike Iran, Saudi Arabia’s organic support base in Iraq is limited. The Kingdom holds a significant status among Iraqi Muslims as the land of Islam’s holiest sites. Iraqis, who live in a diverse nation with a number sects, beliefs, and political leanings, have seldom found in Saudi Arabia a regional ally or protector. Reaching out to Shi’a politicians, clergy, and activists aims at enhancing Saudi’s image in Iraq which can in turn bring long-term advantages to the Kingdom.