A campaign of revenge by Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government against Sunni Arabs in regions once controlled by the Islamic State is aiding Islamists and fueling another rebellion in the country, according to a new report, according to intelnews.org.

In 2014, the meteoric rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria —ISIS, later renamed to Islamic State— was largely aided by the strong belief among Iraqi Sunnis that they were second-class citizens in a Shiite-dominated Iraq. In addition to its Sunni credentials, the Islamic State was also able to appeal to Iraqi Sunnis by portraying itself as pious, efficient and trustworthy. This image was in a sharp contrast to the widespread provincial view of politicians in Baghdad as corrupt, indifferent and ineffectual. Popular support for the Islamic State among Iraq’s Sunni Arab minority took the Iraqi government by surprise and almost enabled the militant group to conquer Baghdad in 2015.

Today, after the destruction of the Islamic State’s self-declared caliphate, Iraq’s Shiite-dominated security and intelligence services have returned to Sunni-majority regions that were once ruled by ISIS. But their systematic campaign of human-rights violations against Sunnis, whom they see as ISIS collaborators, is playing into Islamist propaganda and fueling a new wave of rebellion against Baghdad, according to a new report by the Washington-based Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting. The report, authored by The New Yorker staff writer Ben Taub, warns that the Iraqi government has no strategy on how to reach out to Iraq’s disaffected Sunni Arabs. Even worse, a state-sanctioned campaign of revenge and intimidation is taking place throughout western Iraq, in which “hundreds of thousands of civilians are suffering at the hands of their liberators”, says Taub.

In areas that until a few months ago were ruled by ISIS, anyone —regardless of age or sex— perceived as having previously supported ISIS is outright killed or sent to concentration camps. For Iraqi security forces, says Taub, civilians who did not flee ISIS are seen as inherently suspicious. Bearded men are often viewed as displaying evidence of ISIS support, even though the militant group had a policy of punishing any man who did not grow a beard in accordance with Quranic directives. Most of these people, says Taub, are fired from their jobs, sent to prison, or worse are executed by the dozens and even hundreds. A handful are tried in a court of law each month, but these are usually show trials with a conviction rate of 98 percent, he adds. Family members of the accused rarely show up in court, fearing immediate arrest and imprisonment, which appears to be a regular occurrence. It is “not uncommon for relatives [of accused ISIS supporters] to be rounded up by the security forces and sent to remote desert camps, where they are denied food, medical services, and access to documents”, reports Taub.

These arbitrary arrests are happening alongside an untold number of battlefield executions —many captured on video by jubilant Shiite soldiers and militia members— and killings of prisoners in detention centers. Taub quotes an anonymous senior official in the Iraqi intelligence services who says that “this is not just revenge on ISIS. It is revenge on Sunnis”. The widespread criminality and brutality of the Iraqi security and intelligence forces “plays directly into the jihadis’ narrative”, says Taub, by convincing Sunni Arabs that they “cannot live safely under a government dominated by Shiites”. Ultimately, what is at stake is “whether the Iraqi government can win over the segment of the population for whom ISIS seemed a viable alternative”, concludes Taub, and warns of the possibility of another armed rebellion against Baghdad by what is left of Iraq’s Sunni minority.

Discord among rival camps in Libya and their external backers continues to hamper the stabilisation process, making the creation of a unified military an unlikely goal in the short term, like reported by iiss.org.

The aim of re-establishing a unified military in Libya, which has been convulsed by violent factionalism since the overthrow of the former leader, Muammar Gaddafi, in 2011, may be a laudable one, endorsed at a recent international conference in Italy involving rival Libyan armed groups and international partners. The delivery of such a goal, however, is unlikely in the short term. Continuing violence and divergent ambitions among key leaders in the country and the clashing agendas of the international players involved risk undermining the effort.

The international gathering in Palermo on 12–13 November involved several Libyan factions, 31 countries and European Union and African Union representatives. Conference attendees supported the long-standing Egyptian-led initiative to reconstitute a unified professional military. This would be accountable to Libyan civilian authorities. Pulling together the rival armed groups which are made up of former regular military, tribal militias and armed civilians, however, is an extremely ambitious task.

Rival factions

The disparate paramilitaries have massed under two main banners: Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in the eastern part of the country, and Fayez al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA) in the west.

Reportedly the LNA totals up to 25,000 personnel, with at its heart a number of brigade-size units, including former Gaddafi-era Libyan military. Additional personnel are drawn from the Saiqa, a special forces unit that also counts former Gaddafi-regime soldiers amongst its number. Further manpower is provided by Madkhali Salafist militia units, Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries as well as armed tribal groups and petroleum facility guards.

The GNA can count on a larger support base of militias, although some are prone to infighting. This lack of unity was reflected in last August’s clashes between GNA-affiliated forces and the Tarhuna 7thBrigade, which was supposedly part of the same faction.

Within this loose grouping supporting the GNA, there are also those whose allegiance is driven only by opportunism. The largest armed groups in the west include the Misrata militias and the Zintani forces, with the latter split in their support between the GNA and LNA. In the capital, Tripoli, the GNA’s backers include the Rada Special Force, a police force comprising around 1,500 personnel and the 700-strong Nawasi brigade, led by Islamists. These militias are the best trained and equipped in the capital.

External actors

While there has been no official recognition that the LNA has been the beneficiary of training or a technical advisory programme, there are significant claims of external support and supply of equipment. The United Nations Panel of Experts says that the United Arab Emirates is the source of Panthera T6 and Tygra armoured vehicles delivered in April 2016 to the LNA. It is also noteworthy that the UAE has already built an airbase in Al Khadim, south of the city of Marj in eastern Libya. In 2017, the UN panel also claimed that Egypt might have conducted some air strikes to support the LNA’s attempt to recapture oil terminals along the eastern coast of the Gulf of Sirte. Egypt denied the UN suggestions that it had provided air support.

In western Libya, the ongoing infighting amongst the rival factions has made it difficult for the GNA to deal with human trafficking. Trafficking is a primary concern for the EU. To this end, since June 2016, the EU has provided training and assistance to the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy under the EUNAVFOR operation Sophia. According to the EU’s estimates, by the end of its mandate in December 2018, over 300 personnel will have been trained to perform maritime security and search and rescue operations.

Similarly, in January 2018, Italy announced its Bilateral Mission of Assistance and Support in Libya. This extended and expanded its Libyan Coast Guard Mission and operation Ippocrate to provide limited medical support on a limited basis. Military training under the bilateral accord includes amphibious assault training, and the repair and return to service of a number of Libyan patrol craft and transport aircraft. In addition,12 second-hand Class 500 and two Corrubia-classpatrol boats are also to be provided. These were formerly operated by the Italian Coast Guard and the Guardia di Finanza.

While EU reports suggest that EUNAVFOR Sofia’s mandate might be extended until 2020, it is still unclear whether Italy will renew its bilateral mission.

As 2018 draws to its end, the LNA and GNA-supporting militias have remained fragmented, and on occasion fractious, hampering the stabilisation process. There is also the enduring challenge from ISIS, and the efforts to counter it. Both the LNA and the forces loyal to the GNA also still rely on military aid from external actors, in turn pursuing their own agendas. In such a complex environment, unifying even the bulk of the factions to create a functioning central armed force is unlikely any time soon.

Some Western countries mistakenly think that the al Qaida-linked Salafi-jihadi groups from Central Asia and Chinese Xinjiang are fragmented, weak and less dynamic; therefore they do not pose a big threat compared to the Islamic state, like reported by eurasiareview.com. However, in-depth study of their activities and ideological doctrine shows that the Central Asian al Qaida ally groups today are actively engaged in the ideological education of children and youth, which in the future will become faithful fighters of the global jihad.

The following comparison covers the methods of ideological education of Central Asia’s children and youth, and their use by ISIS and al Qaeda to achieve their goals.

 It is known that during the bloody reign of the Caliphate, more than 10 thousand citizens from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and the Uyghurs from northwest China fought on the side of ISIS. Many of them made a Hijrah (the migration of Muslims for Jihad) to Iraq and Syria to “protect the values of true Islam” and brought their families with small children there.Subsequently, some of these children entered the battalion ‘Cubs of the Caliphate’ and became protagonists in the Islamic State’s Propaganda.

According to my statistical research, in 2013-2018, more than 55 video, audio, and text materials were released by the Islamic State’s media wings with the participation of Central Asia’s children in Arabic, Uygur, Uzbek, Russian, Kyrgyz, and Tajik.After the fall of the Caliphate, propaganda videos with the participation of Central Asian children almost ceased.But the ideological “virus” ISIS continues its mutation among the youth of the former Soviet republics.

With the diminishing possibilities of the Islamic state’s media resources, the propaganda and ideological activity of the al Qaida-linked Central Asian Salafi-jihadi groups have recently increased in contrast.As is already known, the Uzbek militants of Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ) and Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB), as well as Uyghur jihadists of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP)from the Chinese province of Xinjiang are affiliated with al Qaeda. All three groups regularly publish propaganda videos of children from the Syrian province of Idlib where they are fighting against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Since 2013, al Qaeda has posted about 30 videos, audio and text materials in which Central Asia’s children made up the main plot.

It should be noted that in Syria and Afghanistan about 200 Uyghur and Uzbek children are now being raised, whose parents are associated with al Qaeda. Many of them came to the Middle East with their parents. However, among them, there are those who were born already in Syria.

Common aspects of the ideological school of al Qaeda and ISIS

Based on a comparative analysis of video, audio and text materials regarding the participation of Central Asian children, it is possible to point out the common and specific aspects of the alQaeda and ISIS ideological schools, and what different methodologies they use in raising children and youth.

The main common characteristic of the curriculum in al Qaeda’s and ISIS’ madrasas is learning the Quran by heart, Tawhid (monotheism), Fiqh (jurisprudence), Salat (prayers), Aqidah (creed), Hadith, and Sura (life of Prophet Muhammad).

The second common feature in the education of Central Asian children in al Qaeda and ISIS’ camps is the call to Jihad. The doctrine of Jihad is the main place in the ideology of both Sunni terrorist groups, and accordingly, in the madrasas and training camps, children are brainwashed from early childhood with ideas of holy Jihad. Imams explain to children in detail about all forms of Jihad and the sacred purpose of the Shahid (martyr).As a result, children after training in such religious schools, as a rule, replenish the “reserve fund” of ideologically hardened jihadists.

The difference between al Qaeda and ISIS in the education of children and youth

A sharp ideological confrontation between the two main Sunni groups has escalated into armed conflict, which also affects the education of the younger generation of Islamists. To achieve victory in the struggle for hegemony in the global jihadist movement, the ideologists of al Qaeda use all means, including children’s education in madrasas.

Al Qaeda-sympathized Uzbek and Uyghur imams in madrasas in Syria tell children about the enemies of Islam, which they ranked on a par with the “Kafir regimes” of the USA, Russia and China also the Kharijites (those who defected from the Ummah and rebelled against the Caliph) of the Islamic state and its leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.

KTJ and TIP opened several madrasas to teach their children in Uzbek and Uyghur languages on the territory of the so-called “Liberated land of Sham”, which is controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), former al-Nusra Front.KTJ on the Internet often disseminates information about the activities of two madrasas: the Abdullah ibn Abbas Madrasa and the Umar ibn al-Khattab Madrasa.

Also, the Uyghur Salafists of TIP own several madrasas in in Jisr al-Shugur in northwestern Syria. This was possible thanks to the fact that the Uyghur and Uzbek jihadists live compactly and separately in last major rebel stronghold of Idlib.In accordance with the guiding doctrine of al Qaeda, they have skillfully adapted to local conditions, and have virtually no conflicts with the local Arab population.

As is known, during the ideological confrontation, al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri accused ISIS of excessive cruelty towards other Muslims, an unjustified using of Takfir (accusation of apostasy), ignoring the high goals of the Shari’a, which split the Mujahideen ranks.In 2015, the ideologues of al Qaeda even published a special book entitled “The Islamic State is the succession of tyranny and corruption,” in which they raised the problem of excessiveness in Islam (Ghulu fid-deen) and called al-Baghdadi to moderation.Zawahiri brought to mind him the Hadith, in which Prophet said: “Beware of ghulu (excessiveness) in religion, for indeed, what devastated those before you was ghulu in religion.”

ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al Adnani replied that the Caliphate did not swear al Qaeda because it was not appropriate for the State to swear organizations. As a result, ISIS began to use mass executions and public beheadings with incredible cruelty. Unlike ISIS, al Qaeda advocated a more gentle approach to convince local Muslims to accept its views and not force them to do.Ayman al-Zawahiri noted that it is impossible to unite Muslims, trying to impose their power on them with the help of violence.

Indeed, during the peak of his reign in 2015–16, ISIS released dozens of videos with the participation of Central Asian children, who not only taught the Quran in the madrasas, but also cut off the heads of prisoners, executed “kafirs”, and blew themselves up as martyrs. Central Asia’s children were integrated into the military machine of the Caliphate as cruel executioners and suicide bombers, becoming an ideological tool in the struggle for leadership in the global jihad.

The ideological differences between the Islamic state and al Qaeda manifested themselves with the example of teaching children in madrasas. The Uyghur and Uzbek jihadists of TIP, KTJ and KIB, in organizing the teaching of children in the madrasas, took into account the recommendations of their spiritual leader Zawahiri to show a sense of practicality, pragmatism and not to demonstrate excessive cruelty.

When analyzing video plots, the “peaceful nature” of the educational process stands out and the excessive cruelty of the students of the madrasa does not appear.For example, in the Abdullah ibn Abbas Madrasa, in addition to studying the Quran, children also study mathematics, Arabic and Uzbek languages, military science and sports.Imam says that the madrasa is fully equipped with books and textbooks, and books on the Uzbek language brought from Central Asia.According to him, the goal of training is to bring up a new generation of educated and highly intelligent warriors of Allah so that in the future they can resist the technological know-how of the West and defeat the enemies of Islam.

Another video shows the educational process in the Umar ibn al-Khattab Madrasa, where the Uzbek children study among local Arab children. For Uzbek children, a bus-service has been organized that to take and pick children up from Madrasa.

On October 29, 2018, TIP published a video entitled “Protectors of the Quran”, where Uighur children demonstrate excellent knowledge of the Quran, social science classes, swimming in the pool, exercise and military training.The Imam tells them about the atrocities of the Chinese authorities against the Uyghur Muslims and sets the task that they must liberate the lands of East Turkestan from the yoke of Beijing in the future.An analysis of these videos shows that in madrasas, the learning process is organized according to the concept of al Qaeda and the upbringing of children is conducted according to its ideology.

The USA is the main enemy for al Qaeda-backed Central Asia’s jihadists

The fall of the Caliphate revealed that Ayman al-Zawahiri had strategically calibrated the priorities of al Qaeda and its affiliated groups from Central Asia, and managed to implement an action plan that allowed them to survive in the struggle for leadership of the global jihad.For him, it is important not the seizure of territories or the creation of his own state with Sharia rule, but the process of jihad against the USA and its allies, and the widespread of al Qaeda ideology in the Islamic world.

Al Qaeda’s tactic is that it tries not to draw enemy’s fire, slyly and prudently leads the game on its own survival, fundamentally creates its own ideological infrastructure and persistently teaches the next generation of jihadists.

The activities of TIP, KTJ and KIB showed that over the past five years the influence of al Qaeda among the Salafis of Central Asia has increased significantly. There is not only the rejuvenation of al Qaeda militants, but also the ideology of global jihadism is rejuvenating.

In his manifest address named General Guidelines for Jihad, Ayman al-Zawahiri outlined al-Qaida’s priority task of fighting against the far enemy – the United States and its allies.According to him, the local regimes and other Islamic movements (Rawafidh, Ismailis, Qadianis, and deviant Sufis, etc.) are nearby enemies for Al Qaida. He urged not to attack the “nearby enemies”, but instead focus on fighting the “far enemy.”

There is no doubt that TIP, KTJ and KIB will firmly adhere to the strategic line designated by Zawahiri.For them, the main priority remains a blow to the US and its military, diplomatic missions near the conflict zones in the future.But they are not in a position to carry out such an operation now and so far securely hide their true intentions.Therefore, the US should not underestimate the potential threat posed by the al Qaeda-affiliated Central Asian Salafi-jihadi groups.

On Tuesday night a man shot at a crowd in central Strasboug. Three were killed and 12 injured in the attack that took place next to a Christmas market. By Wednesday morning security forces were still hunting the suspect, who is known to counter-terrorism services. He initially fled in a taxi from the city of 270,000 which is located near the German border, like reported by jpost.com.

According to reports the perpetrator appears to have acted alone. This conjurs up memories of the murder of 12 people in the 2016 Christmas market attack in Berlin. The perpetrator in the Germany attack, who was born in Tunisia in 1992 had been in prison in Italy where he was allegedly “radicalized.” German security services had warned of his terrorist connections in the spring of 2016 and he was supposed to be deported.

According to France 24 the suspect in the Strasbourg shooting was also known to police. He is 29 years old and was born in Strasbourg. He was confronted by soldiers who have been deployed in French cities as part of Operation Sentinelle. These soldiers were deployed after the November 2015 attacks in Paris that killed 130. The Interior Minister Christophe Castaner has said the suspect “sowed terror” at three places in the city. The reference to “three places” leaves more questions about what happened. It appears that the reference is to the suspect coming into contact twice with security forces and exchanging fire with them.

As with many attacks in Europe over the last several years the suspect was already known to security and police. He had served a sentence and been convicted of unspecified crimes in both France and Germany, according to reports. In 2016 he was “flagged by anti-terrorist services,” France 24 reported. “He had been reported by the General Directorate for Internal Security.” The intelligence agency had even visited him in prison and taken account of his “religious proselytism.” Yet, even with this long rap sheet and being monitored by security forces, he carried out an armed robbery on Tuesday before the attack. During a search of his apartment grenades were found which leads to questions about how a man who was well known for violent proclivities and apparently religious extremism was able to acquire his arsenal.

The attack took place within one kilometer of the European Parliament, which has taken the attack in stride. Antonio Tajani, the president of the parliament, tweeted the parliament would not be intimidated. “Let us move on,” he wrote. But residents and others may want more answers. One man told the BBC that he had attempted to aid a victim of the attack, waiting for 45 minutes for an ambulance to arrive. “A doctor told us on the phone that it was senseless,” to continue to aid the dead victim. This leads to questions about why medical services took so long to reach the scene.

The attack in Strasbourg is among the most serious incidents this year in Europe, after a spate of ISIS-inspired attacks between 2015 and 2017. However the background of the alleged perpetrator appears to fit a much larger pattern, particularly in France. Mohammed Merah, the perpetrator of the Toulouse and Montaubon attacks, was born in Toulouse. A petty criminal he then went to Afghanistan and Pakistan and was placed under surveillance in 2006 and again in 2009. He went to Egypt and Pakistan and was followed by security service upon his return in 2011. Yet despite all this he was able to acquire weapons and between March 11 and 19 went on a spree of killing, targeting soldiers and then a Jewish school.

One of the suspects in the November 2015 Paris attacks had a similar long rap sheet. Arrested for armed robbery in 2010, convicted for theft twice, breaking and entering once, and convicted of theft again in 2012. Then the suspect went to Syria, engaged in extremism, and returned to Europe. A second member of the cell that planned the 2015 Paris attack was named Abdelhamid Abaaoud. He too was arrested in 2010 for breaking into a garage, spent time in three prisons, and then went to Syria. He was even convicted of abduction and video in Syria showed him next to “bloody corpses” as he bragged he had loaded trucks with the bodies of “infidels.” Nevertheless he was able to return to Europe via Greece and is alleged to have helped plan four attacks in the spring of 2015 before being tracked down after the Paris attacks.

Similarly the 2016 Brussels terror attack was carried out by men who had a long history of criminal and terrorist activity. Ibrahim EL Bakraoui had been involved in a robbery and gun battle with police in 2010. He was released in 2014 and travelled to Turkey before returning to Belgium. Another perpetrator, named Khalid El Bakraoui had been involved in “several” carjackings and had been caught with numerous illegal AK-47s. He was also convicted of “robbery and kidnapping” in 2009. Yet for all these crimes he received only several years in prison.

Almost every major attack in Europe in the last several years has fit this pattern. The 2017 Stockholm truck attack was also carried out by a perpetrator who had connections to jihadist groups and was involved in other criminal activities prior to the attack. He was also known to security services.

French authorities have not released a motive behind the Strasbourg attack although counter-terrorism prosecutors have opened and investigation. They had also not released the suspect’s name or a photo by Wednesday morning, despite there being a major manhunt. The French deputy interior minister was quoted in Reuters saying it was not clear if the suspect was still in France. This will lead to many questions about how the man was able to obtain weapons and why he was able to elude police throughout the day Tuesday before the attack, despite being wanted for another crime.

The problem for security services in many European countries still appears to be the gap between surveillance of members of the criminal-terrorist extremist nexus, and prosecuting perpetrators for crimes such as acquiring illegal firearms. In almost every incident the perpetrators are known and some have been involved in numerous serious crimes. Yet they have received short sentences and usually been able to go on to commit new crimes while acquiring weapons. There also appears to be a continuing issue involving coordinating between countries. If the suspect in Strasbourg was able to get to Germany, despite clashes with security forces, that will lead to questions about how quickly the Germans were alerted. The suspect in the Berlin Christmas market attack also was able to cross numerous borders before being tracked down in Italy. Why police did not release the photo, description or details about the perpetrator more than 12 hours after the incident was also unclear. Eventually these details will be explained, but the incident shows that despite deploying soldiers as part of the wide-ranging Sintinelle operation, there are issues relating to response time and when to interdict suspects during the process of monitoring them.

In his speech of November 6, 2018, King Mohammed VI extended a hand for peace and goodwill to the Algerian government, with the hope to start a new chapter of good relations. Nevertheless, the Algerian government did not respond to this initiative of friendship, so far. And a no answer posture is in many ways equivalent to saying unofficially: no way, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

Sand War (September 25, 1963 – February 20, 1964)

During the long spell of French colonial presence in Algeria that lasted 130 years, France considered this country as a French department: Algérie française. When the independence war started (November 1, 1954 – March 19, 1962,) realizing that it is going to, ultimately, leave Algeria, the French authorities turned to the Moroccans asking them to sit down to negotiate the restitution of territories that they have cut off from Morocco during the long colonial spell. King Mohammed VI, in the name of the pan-Arab brotherhood utopia, of the time, turned down the French initiative saying that undertaking something in this vein and at that time in history is equivalent to stabbing a sister country in the back and that after independence Algeria will, unilaterally, restitute the territories in question. However, after independence in 1963, Algeria flatly refused to do such a thing on the grounds that the territories in question are fully Algerian.

The abrupt refusal escalated the tension between the two countries and a war known as the « Sand War » ensued in September 1963 leading to the defeat of Algeria. Rather than hold on the territory grabbed during the brief war by the Moroccan army to undertake the necessary land swap later on , Hassan II in, an unexpected move, instructed the army to return home to avoid a long term conflict with Algeria, but the harm was done and animosity towards Morocco was born in the Algerian official circles.

Sahara Conflict

During the era of President Houari Boumedienne (1932-1978), in the official narrative, Morocco was seen as the enemy because it tried to cut Algeria in its teens. The official policy among political leadership and army strategists stated clearly, in private, that Morocco is a great danger to the unity and survival of Algeria and, as such, must be challenged in all areas and at all times.

One first such challenge was the Sahara issue. While Boumedienne in 1974 accepted the takeover of the territory by both Morocco and Mauritania, yet he adopted the Polisario Front, in 1975, that was calling for full independence of the Spanish-colonized territory of the Sahara.

The tripartite agreement between Spain, the colonial power, Morocco and Mauritania, known as Madrid Accords of November 15, 1975, ceded the territory to these two latter countries.

To mar the Moroccan-Mauritanian takeover, Algeria armed the Polisario which launched attacks on both Morocco and Mauretania, the latter unable to bear the brunt of such military onslaught left the territory and ceded its part to Morocco in 1978. During the 70s, 80s and 90s of the last century Algeria not only armed the Polisario but, also and most importantly, bought external support for it in the Organization of African Unity -OAU- and in the UN, thanks to the petrodollars it got from its oil revenues.

Morocco countered Polisario’s militarily efforts by building a defensive wall (The Moroccan Western Sahara Wall is an approximately 2,700 km (1,700 miles) long structure, mostly a sand wall running through Western Sahara and the southwestern portion of Morocco) that stopped the latter’s encroachments in the territory under Moroccan control. On the other hand, Morocco put forth an autonomy plan for the territory (The Western Sahara Autonomy Proposal,) an initiative, proposed in 2006 as a possible solution to the Western Sahara conflict. This plan has been since receiving a lot of support from many nations of the world and is considered as a viable political solution to the conflict, for the time being.

Closing Borders

Besides the Sahara conflict the official Algerian enmity is expressed through the actual closing of territorial borders and the cessation of all possible economic activity. In 1994, Marrakech and most precisely Hotel Asni witnessed one of the first terrorist attacks in the country. The attack that left two people dead was carried out by three Algerian-French nationals. Morocco back, then, accused the Algerian intelligence services of planning the deadly shooting, a claim that worsened the diplomatic relations between the two neighboring countries.

Morocco, consequently, closed off its borders briefly but Algeria used such a decision as an excuse to impose a permanent closure on the borders to stop Algerians visiting Morocco, in millions, and spending lots of money that would benefit and strengthen Moroccan economy. It is, also, an excuse to prevent the Algerian people from witnessing the tremendous development realized by Morocco in various sectors of the economy in spite of the fact that the country does not have any oil.

The Algerian animosity toward Morocco is exclusively the work of the Algerian military that control the country through docile political parties and an incapacitated president. Other than that, the Algerian people feel close to the Moroccan people because of shared religion, language and culture and they express this closeness every time they are given the opportunity.

What Will Alter This Belligerent Attitude?

The hate of Morocco and what it represents is ingrained in the Algerian military psyche, and only two possible developments can, ultimately, put an end to it.

Development 1:

Algeria goes bankrupt economically and allows in the IMF and the World Bank to clean its financial mess and this will open economic borders and allow Moroccan companies to do businesses in this country.

Development 2:

The future possible cutting of subsidies will bring the population to the streets and a revolution ensues that puts an end to military control and brings democracy to the country.

Barring these two developments Algeria will continue holding a grudge against Morocco and the Maghreb Union will be just a wishful thinking if not a political joke, to say the least.

Money-spinning, no matter how careful and meticulously planned by the launderer, leaves digital trails, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

These trails are the launderer’s unique digital fingerprint, which assists law enforcement agencies to his/her doors. This was precisely one of the main reasons as to why law enforcement agencies aggressively implemented mechanisms to combat terrorism finances, because the digital fingerprints left by September 11 hijackers for the very first time introduced intelligence and security agencies to its vast, dynamic, and complex organizational architecture. Intelligence officers discovered the ability of terror organizations to exploit the international banking/financial system and manipulate it to raise operational funds, launder money, and maintain the supply-demand equilibrium. Measures pertaining to Combatting Terror Financing or CFT were first adopted by US intelligence institutions in their “War on Terror” (WOT) post-9/11, in an effort to combat aforementioned irregularities.

CFT received ample attention from international organizations such as the World Bank and the UN, forcing even the EU to formulate an effective regulatory legislation/policy in an effort to cripple the financial networks used by terror factions, while using financial reconnaissance to identify and apprehend terror actors. However, the mechanisms employed by intelligence and security institutions to CFT were largely developed exclusively to combat money laundering.

Understanding and Dissociating Contexts – Terror Financing & Money Laundering

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) defines money laundering as the “the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin.” Transnational organized crime factions and militant organizations launder money to systematically legitimise their illegal and the ill-gotten proceeds of criminal activity. Their day begins with illegal money and ends with clean cash in their hands.

The Third Money Laundering Directive of the EU defines money laundering as the collection of funds and provisions with respect to it, by participating directly or indirectly, intentionally or with absolute knowledge of its usage, in complete or partial capacity and carrying out acts under the definition of terrorism.

Taking the aforementioned definition into account, the legislation is principally focused on the usage of funds and ignores the systematic procedure for legitimizing illegal money. Moreover, finances received by terror factions & radical religion centric militant organizations is largely sourced by both legitimate and illegitimate activities.

Hence, it is impossible to deny the fact that the financing of terror organizations is a reverse money laundering procedure, which initiates with legitimate money leading to militant factions using the same finances for illicit means. However, undoubtedly the transition from dirty to clean money varies even for militant factions as significant militant groups receive finances using illegal measures, including but not limited to kidnapping, drug trafficking, gun running, extortion, and prostitution.

However, the principle difference between money laundering and CFT is the motivation behind the act being committed. Organized crime syndicates are focused on generating profits, while terror activities are political in nature. Organized crime syndicates operate as multi-national organizations, whose focus remains on expanding business and maximizing profits. On the contrary, terror factions have specific yet limited political motives and need finances to achieve their task.

Taking into account the foundational difference between money laundering and CFT, the author stresses the need to establish separate counter-money laundering and CFT legislations. Established legislation, no matter how effective and efficient it may be for CFT, will prove useless for anti-money laundering initiatives, particularly when the finances received emanate from a legitimate source.

Evaluating EU C-ML and C-FT policies

The policies implemented by the European Union to counter terror finances play a more supportive than dedicated approach. The ratification and implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 and 1267 introduced new legislation within the EU legal system for identifying groups/individuals suspicious of possible financial relationships with terror factions. This legislation receives support from three money laundering directives formulated by the EU, particularly on cash entering and exiting the EU along with the information on the transfer of funds.

Freezing Accounts

After consecutive terror attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted for the adoption of UNSCR 1267/1999. With time, these resolutions were extended and subsequently modified via resolutions 1333/2001 and 1390/2002, formulating a policy of freezing financial assets and other economic resources and listing certain persons of interests with possible ties to Al Qaeda and Taliban. The adoption of resolution 1267/1999 among other supplementary resolutions forced the EU to formulate numerous legislations.

September 11, 2001 triggered the UNSC to strengthen operationally limited yet effective UNSCR 1267/1999 (which focused on apprehending and extraditing Bin Laden and putting a complete stop to Al Qaeda operations), with UNSCR 1373/2001. The UNSCR 1373 gave opportunity to the UN member nations to formulate an autonomous list of terror factions/individuals, only to be carefully examined by the UNSC’s Counter Terrorism Committee.

More importantly, the UNSCR 1373 extended its boundaries beyond the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and their affiliates. This triggered the EU to establish an autonomous list of persons of interests and suspicious organizationshighlighting legalities behind the inclusion of certain individuals and organizations in the list, as well as defining inter-agency and intra-agency jurisdiction and cooperative mechanisms to apprehend them. The EU further added counter terror laws and cooperation policies with third world law enforcement agencies, in an effort to strengthen its fight. This legislation involved the exchange of critical information on terror factions and persons of interests, in accordance to 1373/2001, and the exchange of materials and training mechanisms with partner security institutions.

However, these measures undertaken by the EU demonstrated its efficiency and effectiveness only on paper. The extensive dependency on UNSCR 1373/2001 failed to acknowledge the potent financial transactions that were emanating from within the EU. Moreover, when the author took a closer look, the accounts that were frozen since the resolution came into effect saw a partial increment, which highlighted the resolution’s ineffectiveness. This could have been possible only when the terror and criminal syndicates have figured alternate routes to launder their money.

Counter-Money Laundering Laws

One key effective legislation against C-ML has been formulated by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which was established at the G-7 summit in 1989 with a sole purpose to unify international communities’ response against money laundering. After its immediate establishment, the FATF released a list of 40 recommendations which were a compilation of programs aimed at eliminating money laundering. Furthermore, to eliminate the use of the international financial system by terror factions to launder money, the FATF released a list of 9 special recommendations, suggesting policy recommendations to member nations.

In the context of C-ML legislative mechanisms within the EU, the Union formulated and ratified the First Money Laundering Directive (MLD) as early as 1991 and Second MLD in 2001, which was applied to financial and credit centric institutions, and by 2001, it was imposed on Designated Non-Financial Professional Bodies (DNFPBs), which included (not limited to) lawyers, accountants, and casino holders. The legislation tasked them to verify customer identification, keep transactional records and report any suspicious transactions. The Directive also tasked member countries to establish a Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) as a federal financial centric enforcement institution with a task to receive, analyze and assess suspicious financial information provided by partnered law enforcement and security institutions. The EU then established the Third MLD in 2005, whose boundaries were extended to cover all financial transactions initiated by criminal factions.

Furthermore, some of the IX FATF special recommendations have been covered under Regulation 2005/1889/EC11, particularly the ninth recommendation on carrying cash by individuals, especially those leaving the country, putting a legislative cap on transactions not exceeding 10,000 euros. However, it is important to note that, the Regulation 2005/1889/EC11 is not fail-proof as it is not applicable on precious articles.

Furthermore, as stated above, the legislative mechanisms adopted by the EU continue to operate with full capacity because of existent and growing discrepancies in submission of financial transcripts by DNFPB members, particularly lawyers with their non-cooperative stance towards the FIUs.

Inter and Intra-agency Cooperation

The key to effective and efficient CFT mechanisms lies in inter & intra agency cooperation and co-ordination. This would comprise effective and timely intelligence sharing, reinforced by timely coordination with tactical and special operation units. As stated, and discussed in the above arguments, to successfully counter CFT, security establishments must strengthen inter & intra-agency intelligence sharing mechanisms.

Although, the call to strengthen intelligence sharing mechanisms seems to be de-valued by security institutions within the EU. Member nations continue to remain hesitant on sharing intelligence, which points toward the essence of insecurity member countries have towards each other, especially when the context of national security lies within the prerogative of member countries themselves. It would not be incorrect to state that the counter terrorism policy within the EU continues to focus on basic technicalities and fails to highlight the role of member nations in their unified fight against terrorism.

Inadequate trust within security and intelligence institutions could be another factor, which is reinforced by the fear of an intel leak, particularly in the light of the participation of various intelligence agencies.

Although in light of an inter-agency cooperation legislation, Council Decision 2000/642/JHA, which highlights cooperation within the FIUs, indicates a lethargic notion of CFT. The sheer absence of member nations motivation to contribute towards Europol analysis on terror financing doesn’t only highlight the casual attitude toward CFT, but also points towards an absence of cooperation between Europol and FIUs.

However, EU’s Situation Centre (SitCen) seems to be the only agency working towards gathering intel on terror financing. It gathers intelligence provided by the member nations, partner EU security institutions, and outside partnered agencies.

The SitCen hosts a Civilian Intelligence Cell and a dedicated Counter Terrorism Cell which hosts intel experts with enormous expertise and experience. It is worth noting the fact that, not every member nation of the EU has delegated its officers to this cluster, which remains functional in spite of being short-staffed.

At the institutional level, the EU can achieve wonders with efficient and effective cooperation mechanisms in C-ML and CFT operations, which today lack the political will, hindering overall operational capability. Reinforcing the Lisbon Treaty and adding an additional clause on CFT could potentially strengthen EU architecture, opening doors for a dedicated CFT & C-ML legislature.

Conclusion

Today, smart tactics employed by terror factions and organized crime syndicates to launder money cannot be countered simply through traditional account freezing mechanisms. Militant groups are rapidly adapting new innovative mechanisms to evade law enforcement surveillance. The solution lies in the sheer political will and decisive actions of political leadership infused with motivation and a clear vision.

This week, for the first time, Israel made public its discovery of the tunnel constructed by Hezbollah and reaching into Israel’s sovereign territory. This brought to an end a long period during which a large number of Israelis living in communities adjacent to the Lebanese border reported hearing sounds of digging as well as feeling tremors in the walls of their homes, like reported by inn.com.

Attack tunnels are intended to allow for significant numbers of armed infantry bearing weapons, artillery and supplies, to traverse them within a minimal time span, avoiding Israeli lookouts and thereby gaining the element of surprise. An underground passage grants attackers protection from Israeli bombs, while it also means that the war begins on the Israeli side of the border, in the midst of areas populated by civilians. That fact allows for sudden forays and kidnapping.

However, the discovery and neutralization of the tunnel that Hezbollah dug into Israel’s sovereign territory is a technological, operational and intelligence network accomplishment, for additional reasons:

1. Hezbollah based its plans for future wars on these tunnels. Nasrallah has not made a secret of his plans to take over the Galilee in the next war, but because Hezbollah has no means of air transport, it cannot land sufficient numbers of armed forces in Israeli territory, and the tunnels were intended as the substitute for an airlift.  By discovering the first tunnel, Israel has eliminated the immediate use of this strategic method, but the IDF believes there are additional tunnels.

2. The discovery of the tunnel has proven to the entire world that Hezbollah is acting in flagrant violation of the Security Council Resolution 1701 which brought the 2006 Second Lebanon War to an end. This resolution forbids Hezbollah any presence in southern Lebanon, but now it has become clear that not only is the terrorist organization in that region, it is also violating Israeli sovereignty. It is obvious once again that UNIFIL has neither the ability nor the interest to carry out the mission it was given by the Security Council and Israel has no reason to assume that the international community will act to ensure its security. This violation of a Security Council decision provides Israel with justification, vis a vis the Israeli public and the world, to attack Hezbollah.

3, Israel has the technological ability to discover tunnels dug as deep as 25 meters (27 yards) down into bedrock, a depth equal to the height of an 8 storey building. And Israeli know-how does not end with the discovery of the tunnel: despite the fact that the tunnel reaches only 40 meters (43 yards) into Israel, Israel managed not only to discover it but to position both a camera and explosive charge inside it without Hezbollah lookouts becoming aware of any activity in the tunnel.

4. Hezbollah suspects that Israel succeeded in finding the tunnel by means of intelligence activity, meaning that there is a “mole” within its ranks, someone with access to its most secret information – the location of its tunnels – who is on such a high level of collaboration with Israel that he can provide it with the relevant information without being exposed.  IDF CoS Gadi Eizenkot said on Tuesday that Israel is in possession of Hezbollah’s tunnel plans.

In my opinion, from the minute the tunnel’s discovery was made public, internal Hezbollah security forces are working feverishly to discover who the collaborator is. People are being interrogated, an insulting experience in itself that does not make for a pleasant atmosphere. Tension is at a high between members of the organization who had information about the tunnel, as each and every one of them automatically is suspected of working with Israel. Fearing that anyone can be the “mole”, people are refraining from sharing information with one another.

This situation is affecting the organization’s functioning and opens up the possibility that the innocent will find themselves accused. Those falsely accused will not continue as if nothing untoward has happened after they have been suspected of disloyalty, an unforgivable insult to their dedication. No organization can function in a situation of this kind, especially in a case where the organization’s entire strategy has to be altered due to fears that Israel has found other tunnels and booby-trapped them as it did the first.

5. Up until Wednesday morning, the time these lines were written, there has been no reaction from Hezbollah. In my opinion, the organization is in a state of utter disarray, with Hassan Nasrallah expected to explain how this debacle occurred. The Iranians are furious because of Nasrallah’s failure to adequately develop the tunnel strategy and because of the suspicion that there is a Hezbollah member passing on information to Israel.

6. Hezbollahs’ “Radwan” commando unit is the attack force which was to traverse the tunnels, enter the Galilee and conquer Israeli settlements there. Now that the tunnel has been found and booby-trapped by the IDF, both officers and fighters in the “Radwan” unit are afraid that every tunnel they enter is a death trap – not exactly adding to their motivation.

7. The discovery of the tunnel will cause Hezbollah to concentrate on developing its rocket arsenal and especially on honing its ability to pinpoint targets in Israel.

8. The tunnel project cost Hezbollah many millions of dollars, and now all that investment has gone to waste. Hassan Nasrallah is going to have to explain the financial aspect of this failure as well.

9. Despite all this, Israel would be wise not to think that the discovery of the tunnels is a knock-out blow to Hezbollah. That terror organization knows how to overcome difficulties and adapt itself and its operations to changing circumstances. While it is true that the discovery of the tunnel is an impressive achievement, technologically and intelligence-wise, it is not enough to defeat Hezbollah and convince the organization that there is no point in continuing to fight Israel. Hezbollah will remain Israel’s implacable and bitter enemy from an ideological standpoint, and more immediately, because it is the long arm of the Iranian Islamic Republic which has sworn to destroy Israel.

On November 28, 2018, at least 10 people were killed and another 29 injured in a suicide attack in Kabul City (District), the national capital.

On November 23, 2018, at least 10 soldiers of the 2nd Regiment of the Afghan National Army (ANA) were killed in a suicide attack that targeted soldiers inside a mosque at their base in the Mandozai District of Khost Province. Another 15 soldiers were injured in the explosion.

On November 20, 2018, at least 55 people were killed and 94 injured in a suicide bombing conducted inside the Uranus Wedding Hall in Kabul City.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 822 people have died in 64 suicide attacks across Afghanistan in the current year (data till November 30, 2018), like reported by eurasiareview.com. There were 613 fatalities in 52 such attacks through 2017; and 503 fatalities in 43 incidents in 2016.

According to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Annual Report 2017 2017 had already recorded the highest number of civilian casualties (both in terms of deaths and injuries separately) caused by suicide attacks in Afghanistan since 2009, when United Nations Assistance Mission’s (UNAMA) started documenting civilian fatalities in Afghanistan. According to the report, there were 2,295 civilian casualties (605 deaths and 1,690 injuries) due to suicide attacks in 2017. The previous highest of number of deaths (488) was recorded in 2011, while previous highest of injuries (1,565) were reported in 2016.

Casualties in suicide attacks have been on the rise since 2009, with the exception of years 2010, 2012, and 2013. According to latest quarterly report by Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict released on October 10, 2018, between January 1, 2018, and September 30, 2018, there have been 2,243 civilian casualties (714 deaths and 1,629 injuries) in suicide attacks.

Significantly, as SAIR noted earlier, despite 30 years of warfare, Afghanistan had never experienced a suicide attack until September 9, 2001, when the Northern Alliance Commander Ahmad Shah Masood was assassinated at Khwaja Bahauddin in Takhar Province by two Arab al Qaeda suicide bombers. With this event, Afghanistan was thrust into a new chapter of armed conflict.

According to partial data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM) from media reports, Afghanistan witnessed 421 incidents of suicide attacks between September 9, 2001, and December 31, 2008, resulting in 1,231 fatalities. Thereafter, between January 1, 2009, and September 30, 2018, UNAMA has recorded more than 654 suicide attacks resulting in 14,248 casualties 3,274 deaths and 10,974 injuries). [No. of suicide attacks for year 2009 and 2018 is not available]

Neighbouring Pakistan, which is primarily responsible for the consistently deteriorating security scenario in Afghanistan, remains the principal source of the continuing menace of suicide attacks. According to a report titled Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007) released by UNAMA on September 1, 2007,

…While suicide attackers elsewhere in the world tend not to be poor and uneducated, Afghanistan’s attackers appear to be young, uneducated and often drawn from madaris across the border in Pakistan… The tribal areas of Pakistan remain an important source of human and material assistance for suicide attacks in Afghanistan…

The report also disclosed,

…Considerable dispute persists over the identity of the attackers, with some analysts contending that they are now overwhelmingly Afghan, even if foreigners such as Arabs and Pakistanis were involved in the early attacks. Others still insist that the attackers are foreigners or Afghans who have spent much of their lives in Pakistan… President Hamid Karzai [the then President], as well as Afghan intelligence and other Afghan authorities, have tended to claim that the attackers originate from Pakistan with the implications that they are Pakistanis…

The evidence of involvement continues to crop up. Referring to a spate of suicide attacks in January 2018 Mohammad Stanekzai, the head of Afghanistan’s spy agency, National Directorate of Security (NDS) on February 1, 2018, categorically stated on February 1, 2018, “We asked Pakistan to hand over the culprits of the attacks in Afghanistan and we shared undeniable evidence that the attacks were planned there”. More recently, on October 23, 2018, President Ashraf Ghani observed, “I want to say that this conspiracy was plotted in Pakistan. So Pakistan should give us the criminals so that we can bring them to justice.” He was referring to the killing of Kandahar Police Commander Gen. Abdul Raziq in Kandahar City (District), the capital of Kandahar Province, on October 18, 2018.

The principal architect of the initial upsurge of suicide attacks was senior Taliban ‘commander’ Mullah Dadullah aka Dadullah Akhund, who targeted Afghan and Western troops in Southern Afghanistan. Though Dadullah was killed in a raid by International Security Assistance Force troops in Kandahar City on May 12, 2007, the trend of suicide bombings continues to terrorise Afghanistan. The Taliban remains the primary player. According to UNAMA’s latest quarterly report released on October 10, 2018,

…From 1 January to 30 September 2018, Anti-Government Elements caused 5,243 civilian casualties (1,743 deaths and 3,500 injured), accounting for 65 per cent of all civilian casualties, approximately the same as in the first nine months of 2017. Of the 65 per cent of civilian casualties attributed to Anti-Government Elements, 35 per cent were attributed to Taliban, 25 per cent to Daesh/ISKP, and five per cent to unidentified Anti Government Elements (including less than one per cent to self-proclaimed Daesh/ISKP)…

There were a total of 2,798 deaths in Afghanistan during this period.

It has long been established that Taliban’s survival primarily depends on Pakistan’s continuing support and provision of safe havens. Indeed, Mullah Rahmatullah Kakazada, a senior diplomat under the Taliban regime, according to a November 29, 2016, report, had categorically stated, “If we left Pakistan we would not survive one week”. He was responding to a report that said Syed Mohammad Tayyab Agha, the former head of the Taliban’s Qatar office, in letter to Mullah Akhundzada had said, “to be able to make independent decisions, you, the members of our leadership council, and heads of our various commissions, should leave Pakistan.” Way back in 2010, one of the Taliban’s southern ‘commanders’ (name not disclosed) in an interview had stated,

If anyone rejects that the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s external intelligence agency] backs or controls the Taliban, he has a mental problem… all our plans and strategy are made in Pakistan and step by step it is brought to us, for military operations or other activities. Pakistan [the ISI] does not have only one representative on the Quetta Shura, they have representatives everywhere… The reality is that the ISI controls the leadership…

No respite from suicide bombings in particular and terror attacks at large inside Afghanistan is likely in the foreseeable future, as there is no evidence on the ground to suggest that Pakistan is going to give up its policy of exporting terror into its neighbourhood. On the contrary, with Imran Khan assuming the office of Prime Minister in August 2018, there is a high probability of the Taliban gaining more support from Islamabad. Khan has strong links with the Afghan Taliban, and a close relationship with the Pakistan Army, and there is likely to be a complete unity of purpose on Islamabad’s strategy of disruption in Afghanistan.

Tensions in Syria are once again on the rise after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan repeated his demand that the United States ends its support for the Kurdish militia group YPG, which is the dominant force in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and since the so-called Astana peace talks between Iran, Syria, Turkey and Russia collapsed, like reported by inn.com.

A series of recent events in the war-torn country, furthermore, indicate that the civil war in Syria is turning into a regional conflict with the potential to become a world war.

After claiming that the Islamic State terror organization has no presence left in Syria, Erdogan told members of his ruling AKP party that the U.S. has an opportunity to strengthen ties with his regime by dropping American support for the Syrian Kurds.

“This is an opportunity for those who say that they are allies, that they are strategic partners, and who want to carry our relations to the future by strengthening our ties politically, economically and militarily,” Erdogan said.

“There is no Daesh (Arab acronym for ISIS) in Syria, there are only a small number of gangs who are kept in reserve, trained and equipped, allowed to mix in this country and the region under the guise of Daesh,” said the Turkish leader several days after Islamic State killed scores of Kurdish SDF fighters in the Syrian city of Hajin on the east bank of the Euphrates River.

The U.S. this week set up several new observation posts along the Turkish border in northern Syria to prevent the Turkish army from carrying out new attacks on the SDF and to hunt down remaining ISIS terrorists and prevent them from crossing into Turkey.

“We are going to track any threat we can spot going up into Turkey,” US Defense Secretary James Mattis told reporters in the Pentagon on Wednesday.

Mattis said that the new observation posts would be manned by Special Forces which are already in Syria and that he disagreed with Erdogan that the YPG is a branch of the outlawed Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey.

The SDF is currently undergoing a transformation after defeating Islamic State forces in Syria and will now be used by the US to stop Iran’s entrenchment in the devastated country.

The London-based Arabic paper Asharq Al-Awsat reported on Sunday that the US military had started to train and equip 30,000 SDF fighters to contain Iran while they would continue to battle ISIS as well.

Iranian media later reported a “new American plot” to reinforce the beleaguered Al-Tanf base on the Syrian Iraqi border which is home to a contingent of US Special Forces who are preventing the Iranians from completing their land corridor from Tehran all the way up to the Israeli border on the Golan Heights.

The Americans are also using local militias in southeast Syria and western Iraq to achieve this goal according to the Arab media outlet Sham Times.

The Turks, meanwhile, are entrenching themselves in northern Syria as well.

The Turkish government is providing training to its local proxy Free Syrian Army which is in fact a Sunni Islamist militia and is carrying out all sorts of civilian projects such the drilling of water wells, the supply of Erdogan approved Islamic textbooks for schools while it allows a large number of Turkish companies to operate in territories under its control.

The Turks also threatened to carry out a new military operation on the east bank of the Euphrates River against the Kurdish-dominated SDF.

The Turkish National Security Council (MGK) announced this week it would exercise its “right” to carry out the new operation and to eliminate “terrorists” in eastern Syria and northern Iraq, a reference to the YPG and the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Shortly after the announcement reports came in that the Turkish military was amassing troops with heavy weaponry along the Syrian border in Aleppo and Raqqa provinces.

To complicate matters the Iraqi army started shelling and bombing ISIS positions in eastern Syria killing scores of terrorists.

The Iraqis bombed a weapons- and ammunition depot of ISIS affiliate Fayalq al-Farouq in al-Souseh region in Southeastern Deir Ezzur and a base in the same area.

At the same time, the Russians threatened to resume their airstrikes on Islamist rebels in the Idlib province in northern Syria after some 15,000 fighters of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham militia refused to withdraw form an area which was designated to become a demilitarized zone under a ceasefire agreement between Turkey and Russia.

Russia and Turkey closed the ceasefire deal in September in order to prevent a new humanitarian disaster and to protect Sunni rebels who had been transferred to Idlib under so-called ‘reconciliation agreements’.

The Turks succeeded to convince Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to remove its heavy weapons from the designated demilitarized zone but the Jihadist umbrella organization of Islamist rebels, among them Jabhat al-Nusra the former Al Qaeda branch in Syria, refuses to withdraw completely.

Syria now demands that all foreign troops, except for Russia and Iran, leave Syria soil and has requested the Security Council of the United Nations intervenes to achieve this goal.

Chances are slim, however, that the Turks and the Americans will comply, since much is at stake in the changing Syrian war which is slowly turning into a global conflict between Iran, Russia, Turkey and the United States and its allies Israel and the Sunni Arab Gulf States.

In this respect, it is important to mention that the Arab Gulf countries have decided to send troops and heavy weapons to the area now under American and SDF control, while the Saudis are funding the training and equipment of the new 30,000 men-strong SDF force which will confront Iran in northern and eastern Syria.

Israel, meanwhile has reportedly resumed its attacks on Iran-related targets in Syria.

Shortly before midnight on Thursday evening the Israeli air force (IAF) reportedly carried out aerial strikes on Iran-supported militias in Al-Kiswah in the vicinity of Damascus, Qanaqar in southwest Syria and Quneitra near the Israeli border.

Al-Kiswah had been targeted earlier by the IAF and is home to the central command of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps in south Syria.

The Syrian regime falsely claimed it had downed an Israeli warplane, while the IDF reported a Syrian missile had been launched in the direction of the Golan Heights in Israel.

In February 1943, like reported by rand.org, U.S. troops suffered a humiliating defeat in their first major battle with German forces during World War II. At Kasserine Pass, Tunisia, their inexperience was evident in the indiscipline and fragile morale of the troops; a dispersed, vulnerable deployment; and a rigid, inflexible approach to command and control. The United States paid for its inexperience with the lives of about 6,500 men.

Two decades later, a clash between inexperienced U.S. troops and another seasoned adversary produced a different outcome. In 1965, during one of the first engagements of the Vietnam War, outnumbered U.S. soldiers at Ia Drang fended off numerous assaults by North Vietnamese conventional forces over several days. Using accurate artillery fire, close air support, and novel doctrines of air mobility, the disciplined, well-led American forces fought skillfully against a resolute and capable adversary that had been at war for decades. Although U.S. forces eventually withdrew from the battlefield, they did so in good order and inflicted at least twice as many casualties as they incurred.

Intuitively, the idea that experience should give a military some advantage seems self-evident. Yet as these two examples illustrate, how much experience matters remains far from clear. In the first case, inexperience correlated with poor decision-making, weak battlefield performance, and high casualties. In the latter case, however, an inexperienced force nevertheless demonstrated competent decision-making and effective battlefield performance, and it sustained fewer casualties than the enemy.

Even the idea of “combat inexperience” carries its own ambiguities. Very few of the American troops entering the two battles had fought before, but the U.S. Army they served in had been shaped by the experience of previous wars. The U.S. Army on the cusp of World War II had fallen into unreadiness after an extensive demobilization from World War I, two decades prior. By contrast, the U.S. Army in 1965 had seen extensive fighting within two decades and maintained a higher level of readiness despite the conclusion of the Korean War and World War II.

Today, China’s military has an increasingly impressive high-tech arsenal, but its ability to use these weapons and equipment remains unclear. There are reasons to be skeptical. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) struggles under the legacy of an obsolete command system, rampant corruption, and training of debatable realism, among other issues. President Xi Jinping, the chairman of the Central Military Commission, has directed major efforts to address each of these defects and improve the military’s ability to fight and win wars. Since 2016, these organizational and other reforms have gained momentum.

Yet the one asset that the PLA conspicuously lacks is combat experience, and Xi can do little about it short of waging war. But there is no consensus—either within Chinese military circles or among foreign analysts—on how much it matters.

Although it engaged in a minor naval skirmish with Vietnam over the Johnson South Reef in 1988, the PLA last fought a major conflict nearly 40 years ago, when a seasoned Vietnamese military demolished a bungled Chinese invasion in 1979. The ghost of that defeat still hovers over the PLA. In China, authorities have largely chosen to ignore an embarrassing conflict that fits awkwardly with Beijing’s narrative of a peaceful rise, but the official silence has left many PLA veterans disillusioned about their participation in the war. The few combat veterans who remain in service will all retire within the next few years, which means the military will soon have no personnel with firsthand combat experience.

Without the test of combat, the PLA’s war-fighting prowess remains unproven. Chinese authorities acknowledged this point earlier this year when the military’s official newspaper, the PLA Daily, criticized what it described as “peace disease.” Decades of peace and prosperity, the newspaper warned, have exacerbated corruption and undermined readiness.

Likewise, Chinese Lt. Gen. He Lei said in June that his biggest regret before retiring is that he never fought a war—a remark that some American and Indian commentators seized on to argue that inexperience remains China’s biggest military weakness. Others have gone further, claiming inexperience and other ills render the PLA a “paper tiger.” A more sober analysis by longtime PLA-watcher Dennis Blasko concluded that “book learning or even [the PLA’s] gradually improving training programs cannot compare to the stress of an extended deployment in a combat zone.”

Dissenting from this view, the PLA Navy’s newspaper dismissed the issue in an essay citing examples in which veteran militaries suffered defeat at the hands of less-experienced adversaries. Some Western commentators have pointed out that neither the U.S. nor Chinese militaries has fought a major war against a peer military since World War II—and last battled each other in Korea—which further raises questions about the significance of inexperience.

How Combat Experience Matters

The debate over how much combat experience matters for the PLA frequently conflates two related but distinct issues. The first concerns the operational significance of combat experience for China’s military. In other words, how much does inexperience affect the PLA’s potential battlefield performance? The second concerns the strategic significanceof experience. How much does the PLA’s relative inexperience affect the potential outcome of a war involving China?

Even without battlefield experience, training matters. Considerable evidence shows that better educated soldiers are easier to train, more adept at operating and maintaining sophisticated weapons and platforms, and more capable of executing complex tasks. Both the quantity and quality of military training correlate with superior military performance as well. Military units that undergo realistic, demanding training which simulates combat conditions tend to fare better (PDF) in battle than those that have not had similar training. For example, after the U.S. Navy founded the Navy Fighter Weapons School in 1969 to provide more rigorous and realistic training, its pilots experienced a dramatic improvement in its loss exchange ratio against the North Vietnamese, from about 4:1 between 1965 and 1967 to 13:1 after 1970. And as the examples of Kasserine and Ia Drang illustrate, how much a military invests in maintaining the infrastructure to transmit lessons between wars can greatly influence prospects for combat performance in the next conflict.

Social, cultural, and political factors can help win or lose wars, as well. In some cases, ideology and culture can encourage a furious fighting style that can help compensate for material disadvantages, as Japan demonstrated with its “banzai” culture in World War II and many highly motivated insurgencies showed in overthrowing their colonial overlords. Militaries that can operate with minimal interference by political authorities tend to demonstrate greater adaptability on the battlefield than forces whose decisions are made for political, rather than operationally sound, reasons. Units riven by social, ethnic, or sectarian divisions have generally proven less resilient and less lethal than more cohesive units.

The PLA’s disastrous performance in the Sino-Vietnam War owed a great deal to such factors. The Cultural Revolution directed by Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong in the late 1960s decimated the officer class and destroyed much of the professional knowledge that had been accumulated over decades, especially after the fall of Lin Biao, one of the PLA’s most talented generals, and his followers. The deleterious consequences (PDF) are evident in the PLA’s reversion to discredited, but low-skill, tactics like the human-wave assault, as well as in the inability of infantrymen to navigate or read maps, and the inaccuracy of artillerymen due to unfamiliarity with procedures for measuring distances and calculating firing distances.

Competent management is also required to supply, transport, and support troops in war, and to ensure retention, training, and preparation in peacetime. Technologically advanced militaries depend on systems that link weapons and troops to sensors, satellites, and command centers. But it takes technical and management skills and knowledge to assimilate state-of-the-art technologies into a cohesive, lethal whole. All of these factors can affect how efficiently a society can translate resources into military power.

So, what role does combat experience play in all this? Research has confirmed its importance in improving some measures of survivability and performance. One study, for example, found that maneuver battalions under experienced commanders in the Vietnam War suffered one-third fewer (PDF) battle deaths compared to those with inexperienced commanders.

But combat experience does not automatically translate into military advantage. Militaries require institutions, processes, and procedures that can learn the right lessons from battlefield experience and improve their performance. Military academies and research institutes can help systematize insights into superior doctrine or develop more lethal weapons and technologies. Scholars have noted that a major source of the German military’s adaptability and lethality in World War II owed (PDF) in part to its deliberate, thorough analysis of its after-action reviews and willingness to implement changes accordingly.

All these factors (except perhaps motivation) are extremely resource-intensive, and for this reason many of the qualities associated with superior military performance tend to improve as resources become more plentiful. At least some studies suggest that cultural and institutional barriers to military effectiveness could dissipate as states become more economically developed. This suggests China has the potential to make gains in many areas of military effectiveness, even if it does not fight a war.

In sum, experience alone doesn’t ensure superior battlefield performance—a painful lesson the seasoned, but seriously deficient Iraqi military learned in the Gulf War. Experience is but one of many factors that contribute to combat effectiveness. Militaries that have mastered the other variables, as the United States did in the lead-up to the Gulf War, can more than compensate for a lack of experience. Moreover, mastery of the other factors can position a military to profit from its experience more quickly and thoroughly, a key attribute of high-performing militaries.

In China’s case, the PLA has made impressive gains in raising (PDF) education levels, the quality of recruits, the realism of training, and an overall readiness for a broader range of missions. After a disastrous performance in the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, for example, the PLA carried out an overhaul of its approach to such operations. As a result of these changes, military forces have operated more effectively in subsequent major relief operations. The PLA has also eagerly sought opportunities to deepen its experience through non-combat operations. Since 2008, for example, the PLA Navy has deployed a counter-piracy (PDF) task force near the Horn of Africa. The PLA has expanded its participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations around the world as well, and deployed its first full infantry battalion in 2015 to South Sudan. The PLA has also stepped up its involvement in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; in 2011, the Navy competently carried out a major noncombatant evacuation operation in Libya.

The PLA has likely improved its combat readiness from a very low level, but how much remains unclear. The persistence of corruption, concerns about the realism and rigor of its training, challenges in integration, and mismanagement provide grounds for skepticism. Moreover, given the PLA’s history of cover-ups and prevarication, Chinese leaders have sound reasons to doubt the military’s assurances of successful reform.

Combat reveals truths about competence more clearly than any peacetime analysis. Short of going to war, Chinese leaders will likely have little choice but to rely on observations of peacetime performance to assess the PLA’s overall readiness, and these simply do not test the military’s capabilities to the extent war would.

Combat Experience: Strategic Significance

At the strategic level, how much does experience matter in determining the outcome of a war involving China?

History provides ample examples of well-prepared militaries that won wars with a knockout blow. In 1940, a seasoned German Wehrmacht fresh from its victory over Poland overwhelmed the French military and quickly occupied the country. At the Battle of Yalu River in 1894, an outgunned, but better-trained Imperial Japanese Navy decimated the poorly prepared Chinese Beiyang Fleet. The Qing government surrendered months later. In both cases, inexperience on the part of the defeated militaries contributed to longstanding weaknesses in training, leadership, integration, and other factors.

The lure of a quick victory over an inexperienced, unprepared force can be deceptive, however. In 1941, Japan miscalculated that the destruction of the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor would undermine the American will to fight. Instead, the United States summoned all of its resources to build a victorious war machine. In 1950, North Korea surprised an ill-prepared South Korea and nearly prevailed. Once the prospect for quick victory ebbed, however, United Nations and South Korean forces rallied and fought the North to a standstill. These latter examples illustrate how any advantage granted by superior combat experience diminishes over time. As wars drag on and both sides accumulate experience, factors such as training, leadership, access to resources, civil-military relations, and the institutional ability to draw and implement lessons learned are likely to prove more decisive.

Combat experience thus matters for China at the operational and strategic levels, but its significance can be overstated. At the operational level, other factors such as leadership, training, preparation, and motivation are more responsible for determining military effectiveness on the battlefield. Weaknesses in these areas are more likely to impair the PLA’s performance more than inexperience. Inexperience matters mainly in that it obscures the extent of the PLA’s deficiencies, impairing an accurate assessment of all the factors that contribute to combat readiness.

At the strategic level, a war between Chinese and U.S. forces would likely involve high-intensity combat that neither side has experienced. The outcome of an initial clash could go either way. With adequate preparation and planning and under ideal circumstances, it is possible that China could prevail in a first battle.

But since the initial clash probably would not end the war, U.S. forces could be expected to use their formidable advantages to adapt and improve their performance in subsequent engagements, just as they rallied following their initial rout at Kasserine Pass to defeat Germany. (The converse example, in which the United States lost the Vietnam War despite fighting well at Ia Drang, illustrates the reality that military superiority alone rarely determines a war’s outcome.)

Whether China had made sufficient efforts to overcome the sizable gaps in the quality of its command, training rigor, integration, and other factors could prove important if the conflict drags on. But even then, the ultimate outcome of a long war between the two global powers will likely be decided by factors beyond the control of generals and admirals, such as economic strength, political cohesion, and national resolve.