The announcement by US President Donald Trump on December 19 of his intention to rapidly withdraw US forces from eastern Syria led to expectations of a rapid move by Turkish forces into all or part of the area currently controlled by the US-aligned, Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces, like reported by jpost.com.

The precipitating factor that led to Trump’s announcement, after all, was a phone call between the president and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. For Turkey, control by what Ankara regards as the Syrian franchise of the PKK of a large swath of the 900-km. Syrian-Turkish border has long been seen as entirely unacceptable.

The Kurdish dominated SDF has capable and proven fighters. But without US help, and facing Turkish air power and artillery, they would be able to resist only for a while. This had already been proven in Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch in January 2018, when Ankara invaded and destroyed the Kurdish canton of Afrin in northwest Syria.

For Israel, the prospect of a Turkish invasion was and remains a matter of concern. Pro-Iranian Iraqi Shia militias are deployed close to the border adjoining the Kurdish-controlled area. In the event of a Turkish incursion from the north, SDF fighters would likely leave the southern part of their area of control to try to stop the Turkish forces further north. This could leave the way open for a push by the Shia militias into the oil rich Deir al-Zor province. Alternatively, Syrian regime forces along with Iran-associated militias could push into the same area from west of the Euphrates River. In either case, the result would be a dramatic widening of the Iranian “land corridor,” the area of freedom of activity for Iran and its allies. Israel was hence strongly opposed to the abandonment by the US of its Kurdish allies and their area of control.

Similarly, the US and allied base at Tanf is located in the area adjoining the Baghdad-Damascus highway. Its abandonment would thus leave the way open from the Albu Kamal border crossing between Iraq and Syria to Quneitra province, adjoining the Golan Heights.

FOR A number of reasons, however, the prospect of an early large-scale entry of Turkish forces into northeast Syria now seems less likely than it did a couple of weeks ago.

Firstly and most importantly, the US withdrawal, which alone would make possible a major Turkish incursion, currently looks less immediately imminent. On this matter, a certain confusion appears to reign, with different US officials saying different things.

The tendency to chaos of the current US administration is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can produce sudden apparent bonanzas, of the kind that the president’s announcement of imminent US departure must have seemed to Turkey.

On the other hand, the chaotic approach to policy-making means that presidential statements of this kind can’t necessarily be safely “banked,” in a way that would be assumed to be possible with other administrations.

National Security Adviser John Bolton found himself cold-shouldered by Erdogan in Turkey this week, after he appeared, in a statement made in Israel, to be conditioning the withdrawal on Turkish agreement not to target Kurdish forces who had fought with the Americans.

Trump nevertheless tweeted on Monday that “we will be leaving at a proper pace while at the same time continuing to fight ISIS and doing all else that is prudent and necessary!”

Thus, the US timetable and the precise nature of US intentions remain something of a mystery for friend and foe alike. But for Erdogan, as long as US special forces and air power remain in and over eastern Syria, a Turkish entry would be possible only in coordination with them. And if it proves that the US is indeed not prepared to accept the wholesale crushing of its Kurdish partners in the war against ISIS (as the Turkish leader clearly envisages), this places a question mark over the Turkish planned action.

A second area of concern for the Turkish leader is the Russian stance. Russia has emerged as the key power broker between all countries and elements seeking to act within the Syrian space (with the exception of the US). Moscow chose to allow the Turkish incursion into Afrin in January 2018, probably as part of an attempt to draw Turkey away from its traditional Western alignment.

But statements by Russian officials this week appear to indicate that Russia prefers lands currently administered by the Syrian Kurds to return to the control of the Assad regime. Foreign Ministry representative Maria Zakharova, for example, unambiguously expressed this stance. Moscow evidently wants to be able to present the Syrian war as effectively over as soon as possible. A new standoff between a large Turkish-controlled area of north and east Syria and the Assad regime would not facilitate this. Erdogan said on Wednesday that he will visit Moscow in the near future, presumably with the intention of clarifying this matter.

Sipan Hemo, the senior military figure in the Kurdish YPG, has been leading a delegation taking part in Russian-brokered talks with Assad regime representatives in recent days. Kurdish sources close to the SDF confirmed that if forced to choose, the Syrian Kurds will prefer to allow the Assad regime to resume control of their areas of control, rather than face an onslaught from the Turks.

But, of course, as long as the US position remains ambiguous, and American withdrawal does not look immediately imminent, the Kurds are unlikely to accept the conditions of the regime. As seen in an earlier round of contacts over the summer, the regime will settle for nothing less than the resumption of its full sovereignty east of the Euphrates. That is, the termination of the Kurdish de facto autonomy that has held sway over the last half decade. The Kurds are likely to agree to these terms of surrender if the Americans are about to leave and the Turks are about to enter. But this is not yet quite the situation.

Lastly, it is not clear how effectively Turkey, with its Sunni Arab rebel allies, would be able to police the territories it would conquer from the SDF in the event of a major military operation. Kurdish attacks on Turkish forces in Afrin are a common occurrence. The area that would be taken in the event of a major operation into northeast Syria would constitute a far larger and more complex space.

Thus, in spite of the Turkish saber rattling on the border, and Erdogan’s pledge in his New York Times op-ed this week that Turkey can “get the job done,” significant obstacles remain before a large-scale Turkish incursion into northeast Syria.

The nuclear deal was supposed to chart a new course for Iran. But the Tehran ­regime remains as it ever was, including when it comes to committing acts of terror in Western homelands, like reported by nypost.com. Just don’t expect Europe to reconsider its policy of preserving the nuclear deal at any cost.

This week, the Dutch government confirmed that Iran’s intelligence ministry was behind two assassinations in the Netherlands—of Ahmad Mola Nissi in The Hague in November 2017 and Ali Motamed in Amsterdam two years earlier.

In this case, the mullahs allegedly hired Dutch gangland types to carry out the murders. As the US government has repeatedly emphasized, Hezbollah, Iran’s Shiite terror proxy in Lebanon, has close connections with organized crime worldwide.

The Dutch bombshell followed October’s announcement by the Danish government that it had thwarted an Iranian plan to assassinate a leader of the separatist Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz. Swedish ­authorities arrested a Norwegian citizen of Iranian extraction for his alleged role in the plot; he has been extradited to Denmark.

Tehran was also behind a foiled bombing in France last summer. That attack was supposed to target a gathering of the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, the Marxist-Islamist cult that helped bring the mullahs to power in 1979 but has since turned against them.

Had the Paris plot succeeded, it could have shattered hundreds of innocent lives in the French capital’s urban core. Among the attendees at the MEK gathering: former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani.

The French government concluded “without any doubt” that Iran’s intelligence ministry was behind the attempted attack, which had been operationally led by a Vienna-based Iranian spook posing as an intelligence official, on orders from Saeid Hashemi Moghadam, the Islamic Republic’s director-general of intelligence, who answers directly to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Both France and Germany have recently carried out major raids against Iranian spy-terror networks. The Germans found that Iran was gathering information so it could draw up a list of targets for assassination, should the regime choose to carry them out. The list included many Jews and other supporters of Israel, including a former member of the Bundestag, Reinhold Robbe, head of the German-Israel Society.

Liberals on both sides of the Atlantic smirked when US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo last year accused the Iranians of conducting “covert assassination operations in the heart of Europe.” But recent events have wiped that smirk off the foreign-policy establishment’s face.

None of this is new behavior from the lawless Islamic Republic, which has treated terrorism as a central plank of its statecraft from the beginning.

One of the Islamic Republic’s first acts, shortly after the collapse of the shah’s government 40 years ago this month, was to take over the US Embassy in Tehran.

Other notable entries in Iran’s black book of terror include the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, the deadliest single attack on US Marines since World War II; the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people, and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia that killed 20, most of them Americans.

The targeting of dissidents abroad is also par for the course for the regime. Such operations began with Shahriar Shafiq, the Shah’s nephew and a high-ranking officer in the former regime’s navy, struck down by Iranian agents in Paris in December 1979.

Foreign assassinations continued unabated throughout much of the 1980s and ’90s. Operations targeting domestic dissidents inside the country were carried out in tandem but with even greater efficiency—and impunity.

You’d think this latest wave of Iranian terror on the continent would prompt a European rethink on Iran policy. But you’d think wrong.

As US sanctions come back into force, the European Union is seeking ways to help Tehran continue to access the global financial system. Brussels mandarins are determined to rescue the nuclear deal, even as the evidence mounts that the accord has done nothing to curb Tehran’s nefarious activities.

Put another way: European officials are prepared to indirectly bankroll the very Iranian terrorism they condemn. Can you blame Trump for questioning Europe’s commitment to its own security?

The discovery last month of 3,000 Turkish-made guns and more than four million bullets hidden in shipping containers arriving in the Libyan port of Khoms revealed a new element to Turkey’s neo-Ottoman effort to again become a major player in the Middle East, like reported by ahvalnews.com.

Khoms is a relatively minor port, likely chosen because controls might be less rigorous there, Zvi Mazel, former Israeli ambassador to Egypt, Romania, and Sweden, and senior researcher at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, wrote in the Israeli news outlet on Monday.

“From the nature of the contraband weapons, it is fairly obvious they were not intended for a regular army, but rather for terrorist activities of armed groups, most probably Islamic organisations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood,” said Mazel.

The shipments violate a United Nations’ Security Council weapons embargo on Libya since the start of the civil war in 2011. Today the country is split between the Government of National Accord, led by Fayez al Sarraj in Tripoli and recognised by the UN, and the Tobruk government, led by General Khalifa Haftar, the de facto ruler of eastern Libya and head of the Libyan National Army.

As violence has continued, dozens of Islamic and other armed militias have emerged, and the local branch of Islamic State (ISIS) is still active, though greatly diminished.

The discovery of the containers was condemned by both Libyan governments, Mazel wrote. Sarraj ordered a thorough investigation while asking Turkey for explanations. Haftar demanded the UN Security Council launch an international inquest and accused President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of assisting armed terrorist groups and fomenting chaos.

On Dec. 22, the UN delegation to Libya reiterated the importance of the embargo and said the UN had constituted a panel of experts to examine what happened. That same day, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Turkey’s foreign minister, arrived in Tripoli and met his Libyan counterpart and Sarraj.

Çavuşoğlu sought to minimise the incident and accused unnamed Arab countries of supplying tanks, missiles and drones to Libya. According to a UN report, a dozen countries, Turkey among them, are supplying weapons to both sides in violation of the embargo. Çavuşoğlu denied any involvement in the incident, adding that it was not representative of Turkey’s policy. Both countries agreed to cooperate on an investigation.

Both al Qaeda and ISIS are active between the borders of Libya, Tunisia and Algeria, and there are frequent reports of clashes in the area. Weapons reaching the region, mostly from the Mediterranean, often find their way to jihadist organisations.

“Turkey had sided with Islamic parties led by the Muslim Brotherhood immediately after the fall of Gaddafi,” wrote Mazel. “Those parties won the first parliamentary elections held the following year. Ankara maintained its support when they lost the subsequent elections in 2014.”

The fact that Ankara was helping Islamic organisations involved in the ensuing civil war was already known. In 2013, Greek customs agents found Turkish-made weapons in a Libya-bound ship that had sought shelter from a storm in a Greek port. There have been similar discoveries since, showing a clear pattern of attempts to provide arms to these organisations.

“Turkey is now vigorously pursuing its political and/or military penetration in the most sensitive parts of the region – from Syria and Iraq to Somalia and Sudan in Red Sea, and Qatar in the Persian Gulf,” wrote Mazel, “for the greater glory of its leader and the supremacy of Islam.”

A startling discovery toward the end of the year revealed a new facet of Turkey’s ongoing efforts to once again become a major player in the Middle East and restore some of the glory of the fallen Ottoman Empire. Huge consignments of arms hidden in two containers from Turkey were discovered by customs authorities in the Libyan Port of Khoms on December 17 and 18, like reported by jpost.com.

No less than 3,000 hand guns of Turkish manufacture, a number of hunting guns as well as ammunition were found in the first container, and 4.2 million bullets, also of Turkish manufacture, in the second.

Khoms is a relatively minor port in the western part of the country, a mere 100 kilometers from Tripoli and fairly close to Libya’s border with Tunisia and Algiers. It was undoubtedly chosen on the mistaken belief that controls would be more cursory than in the country’s main port in the capital Tripoli. From the nature of the contraband weapons, it is fairly obvious they were not intended for a regular army, but rather for terrorist activities of armed groups, most probably Islamic organizations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.

The UN Security Council imposed a weapons embargo on Libya – which had plunged into civil war following the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 – and renewed it last June. The civil war has not abated, and the country is divided between two rival governments: the Government of National Accord of Fayez al Sarraj in Tripoli, recognized by the UN; and the Tobruk government, formed by the House of Representatives elected in 2014 and dominated by general Khalifa Haftar, the de facto governor of eastern Libya and commander in chief of the Libyan National Army, the largest military force in the country. There are also dozens of Islamic and other armed militias, some supporting the Sarraj regime and others acting independently. The local branch of Islamic State is still active, though greatly diminished after being driven out of the main cities.

The discovery of the containers led to a public outcry and was roundly condemned by both governments. Sarraj ordered a thorough investigation while asking Turkey for explanations. Gen. Haftar demanded that the UN Security Council condemn Ankara for violation of the embargo, and launch an international inquest while accusing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of assisting armed terrorist groups and fomenting chaos. The UN delegation to Libya, striving for neutrality and attempting to reconcile the two governments, found itself forced to act and on December 22, expressed its concern and reiterated the importance of the embargo, stressing that the UN had constituted a panel of experts to examine what had happened.

Turkey, which had refrained from addressing the incident and the reaction of Haftar and Sarraj, could not ignore the stand taken by the UN delegation. On the same day, Mevlut Cavusoglu, Turkey’s minister for foreign affairs, made an unexpected trip to Tripoli and held talks with his Libyan counterpart, as well as with the head of the parliament, before meeting Sarraj.

CAVUSOGLU TRIED to minimize the incident and accused unnamed “Arab countries” of supplying tanks, missiles and drones to Libya. He probably meant Egypt, which is cooperating with Haftar to control their lengthy border and prevent intrusion by Islamic terrorists. 

However, according to a UN report, a dozen countries are supplying weapons to both sides in violation of the embargo. Turkey was already one of them. According to the statement issued by Sarraj’s office after the meeting, Cavusoglu denied any involvement in the incident, adding that it was not representative of Turkey’s policy. Both countries agreed to launch immediately a common investigation. A response deemed unsatisfactory by a member of parliament who demanded that steps be taken against Turkey and requested an international investigation.

Meanwhile, an unnamed security source in Algiers reacted angrily to the discovery and told Saudi daily al Shark al Awsat that dispatching weapons to western Libya, close to the Algerian border, was intended to destabilize the region. As far as he was concerned, he said, it was a declaration of war; the army of his country was in a state of high alert. Both al-Qaeda and Daesh are active between the borders of Libya, Tunisia and Algiers, and there are frequent reports of clashes in the area. Weapons reaching the region, mostly from the Mediterranean, find their way to terrorist organizations in nations of the African Sahel such as Mali, Niger and Chad.

Turkey had sided with Islamic parties led by the Muslim Brotherhood immediately after the fall of Gaddafi. Those parties won the first parliamentary elections held the following year. It maintained its support when they lost the subsequent elections in 2014. The fact that Ankara was helping Islamic organizations involved in the ensuing civil war transpired accidentally already in 2013, when customs agents in Greece found Turkish-made weapons in a ship that had sought shelter from a storm in a Greek port and was bound for Libya.

There have been a number of similar discoveries since, showing a clear pattern of attempts to provide arms to these organizations. In December 2013, Egypt found four containers of contraband armament on a ship which had sailed from Turkey on its way to Libya. Three similar attempts were discovered in 2014: in August, the Libyan army stopped a vessel bringing weapons from Turkey as it was about to enter the Port of Derna, then the stronghold of the largest Jihadi organization at the time, Ansar al Sharia; in November, the Greeks again found arms on a ship coming from Ukraine and going to Libya; and in December, Libyan authorities arrested a Korean vessel carrying a consignment of weapons to Misrata, then the seat of armed militias.

TURKEY’S HELP was not limited to the supply of armament. In January 2017, Ansar al Sharia announced the death of its leader, wounded in a battle with the Libyan National Army, in a Turkish hospital where he had been sent for treatment. When, in September 2018, Libya’s attorney-general issued warrants for the arrest of 826 Islamic terrorists, it became apparent that most of them had fled to Turkey or Qatar, two staunch supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar had in the past supplied Islamic groups in Libya with weapons.

As the continued support of Turkey for Islamic organizations became more and more apparent, hostility grew between that country and Haftar, whose army is the main obstacle to the development of political Islam backed by armed militias in Libya. According to sources in Tobruk and in the army, the Libyan Air Force said it would target Turkish planes entering Libyan airspace while the Tobruk Parliament threatened to halt bilateral trade – estimated at two-to-three billion dollars a year. Turkish investments in the region before the civil war were over 15 billion dollars.

In the course of the last two years there were some new developments.

Turkey is wary of the growing political and military strength of Haftar; the UN is working hard at attempting a reconciliation between Tobruk and Tripoli as well as at holding elections which could bolster further Haftar’s position and hamper Turkish penetration.

This is why a delegation from the Tobruk Parliament was invited in September 2018 to meet President Erdogan in Ankara. Though the meeting was courteous, no agreement was reached, mainly because Haftar is deeply suspicious of Turkish intentions. Last November, Turkey attended the Palermo conference, convened at the initiative of Italy to find a political solution to the Libyan crisis. Haftar objected to the presence of a Turkish delegation. The Turks left in a huff, and a few weeks later a new consignment of Turkish made weapons was discovered in Khoms.

Interestingly, there is very little media interest in what Turkey is doing in Libya, and no condemnation or even reaction. But this is also true about Ankara’s deepening involvement in the Middle East. Turkey, after all, is a major player because of its geostrategic position between Asia and Europe, and the fact that it is a member of NATO and thus part of the defense of the West (though its links with Russia raise doubts on that point).

Then there is the refugee issue. Ankara has agreed to stop the flow of refugees trying to reach Europe from Islamic countries – in exchange for five billion dollars. It is working so far. A weak Europe, helpless to deal with the chaos in the Middle East, is not ready to address Turkish aggressive behavior. And with America departing the scene, the would-be sultan will be even freer to act. 

Turkey is now vigorously pursuing its political and/or military penetration in the most sensitive parts of the region – from Syria and Iraq to Somalia and Sudan in Red Sea, and Qatar in the Persian Gulf, for the greater glory of its leader and the supremacy of Islam.

Al Qaeda-linked militants in Syria are strengthening their grip over rebel-held territory in Aleppo’s western countryside, nearly a year-and-a-half after wresting control of most of the north-western province of Idlib, like reported by thenational.ae.

The Hayat Tahrir Al Sham alliance, Syria’s strongest and largest militant group – often referred to by the acronym HTS – is moving to consolidate its hold over more of the rebel-held north in an attempt to strengthen its hand in any possible talks with key stakeholders in the conflict, including Turkey and Russia, analysts say.

“The more territory HTS seizes in northern Syria, the stronger its hand will be in future negotiations,” Nawar Oliver, a Syria specialist at the Turkey-based Omran Centre, told The National.

“Power comes from control of territory, so they are in need of this territory.”

Turkey is the most involved player in opposition-held areas in northern Syria, where it has established observation posts and backs rebels in commanding areas near its southern frontier.

A surprise campaign by HTS last week caught Turkey and Ankara-backed rebels on the back foot.

While thousands of rebels were stationed on front lines with Kurdish fighters before a planned Turkish assault on the Kurdish-held city of Manbij in the north-east, HTS seized a string of towns and villages from the Ankara-backed National Liberation Front in the western countryside of Aleppo to the south-east.

“Tahrir Al Sham chose the right moment to attack,” Mr Oliver said, suggesting that a concentration of HTS forces near Manbij left rebels in Idlib and Aleppo exposed.

As of Sunday evening, the nearly week-old clashes had killed 119 fighters, including 61 Al Qaeda-linked militants and 58 NLF fighters, according to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Clashes have also resulted in HTS capturing large areas of territory from its rivals.

“In less than one week, Hayat Tahrir Al Sham has managed to exert control over a large geographical zone extending from the outskirts of western Aleppo to the border with Turkey,” head of the war monitor, Rami Abdul Rahman, said on Sunday.

Last week, the group seized all territory previously held by the powerful Noureddine Al Zenki rebel group – a National Liberation Front affiliate – in Aleppo’s countryside, dealing a blow to one of its greatest rivals.

“[Noureddine Al ] Zenki had been a thorn in HTS’s side and one of the most stubborn challenges to its dominance, and now it has been defeated,” Sam Heller, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, told The National.

The observatory said that hundreds of Zenki fighters and other defeated National Liberation Front affiliates have retreated to territory held by Turkey-backed rebels in Afrin, which Tahrir Al Sham has cut-off from other rebel-held territory in Idlib.

Beyond undermining its challengers, HTS is also establishing control over key zones that would be politically and strategically useful in future negotiations, including areas near the M4 and M5 main roads, Mr Heller said.

These highways run east to west and north to south, bisecting the Idlib region to link the government-held city of Aleppo with Damascus and the Mediterranean coast. Both have been cut off in Idlib since 2014.

Before the war, the M5 was a major trade route that connected the commercial hub of Aleppo to Damascus and on to the Jordanian border in the south.

Reopening them would help resume trade from Turkey through to regime-held areas and on to Jordan and the Gulf.

An agreement brokered by Turkey and Russia in Sochi in September last year to establish a demilitarised zone in Idlib also called for the reopening of the two strategic routes to traffic.

“It seems [Hayat Tahrir Al Sham is] positioning itself to negotiate the opening of the M4 and M5 highways,” Mr Heller said.

The Syrian government and its Russian allies have repeatedly used the presence of HTS in northern Syria to justify attacks on the area.

The groups expanded foothold may threaten the more than 2.5 million civilians in Idlib, half of whom have been displaced from other parts of the country.

It remains to be seen whether the group’s expanded territory will upend the Sochi agreement to create a demilitarised zone around Idlib. But air strikes resumed at the weekend in a sign that both Russia and the Syrian government may be more emboldened to carry out attacks following advances by the group.

Three civilians were killed and nine others injured in Russian air strikes in the northern Syrian province of Aleppo, Turkey’s state-run Anadolu news agency reported on Saturday, saying that most of the casualties were recorded in Darat Izza – a town that HTS captured last week.

There are basic interrelated questions that any student of human history must ask. Why is human history filled with so much evil, and why do good people so often do nothing in the face of evil?

Jamie Glazov’s new book, Jihadist Psychopath: How He Is Charming, Seducing, and Devouring Us,addresses that troubling question, like reported by frontpagemag.com.

The answer that he comes up with in Jihadist Psychopath is a collusion that is not born only of simple radicalism, but of the ways in which Islamic political movements play on our own emotional weaknesses.

Jihadist Psychopath is a journey into the dark heart of the Western world using the metaphor of the interplay between the psychopath and his victims. That metaphor pervades Glazov’s text, structuring his understanding of the growing terror death toll and the accompanying sympathy for the terrorists.

Glazov, who has a BA in Political Science and a PhD in History, had already made a study of Islamic terrorists. To prepare for the writing of Jihadist Psychopath, he also made a study of the most fascinating and deadliest element in the criminal life of societies: the psychopath. Human societies are bound together by empathy. Multiculturalism and diversity stretch and expand our sense of empathy to its limits. The psychopath plays on our sense of empathy despite lacking any empathy of his or her own.

That paradox makes the psychopath extremely curious and deadly. Like a cuckoo bird, the psychopath has evolved to exploit a biological loophole, empathy, meant to bind a species together around shared interests, without the biological commitment to those interests, creating a predator that is facile and adept, as Glazov’s title puts it, at “charming, seducing and devouring us”.

The uses and abuses of empathy by the psychopath and the Islamic terrorist are a major focus of Jihadist Psychopath. Islamic terrorists take advantage of the empathy bonds that multicultural societies use to bind diverse populations together into a single functional entity whose members cooperate and even sacrifice for the benefit of the group, without ever sharing in that sense of mutual responsibility.

Like psychopaths, Glazov argues, Islamic terrorists create the illusion of a mutual relationship while viciously exploiting and eventually destroying their victims by degrees. These victims can be the individuals, the women who marry Islamic terrorists only to be used by them to obtain legal status or to birth new Jihadists, but they are the microcosm of our larger society which is also being charmed, seduced, and destroyed by an ideology that turns our own values and our sense of self against us.

“Once he succeeds in lodging his hooks into his target’s body, he inflicts the key wound, convincing him that he (the victim) is the actual offender and guilty party, and that the psychopath is the actual victim,” Glazov writes.

The exchange of roles between perpetrator and victim is crucial to the predation of weaker societies on stronger societies. As predatory plants mimic the appearance of the prey of their victims, the Jihadist appears to resemble a victim of Western civilization, of colonialism, capitalism, and imperialism, turning guilt and grief into the aphrodisiac of his monstrous appetite, before entrapping his civilizational victim.

Victimhood is the protective coloration of the psychopathic predator, both in his familiar role as the demon haunting a thousand crime stories, thrillers, and action movies, and the less familiar guise of CAIR, ISNA, and countless other Muslim Brotherhood front groups who defend the predation of terrorists by reinventing them as the victims of the very people whom they are killing and destroying.

And yes, the victims are neither truly helpless nor innocent. As the con artist exploits greed, the psychopath’s swollen sense of self-regard feeds upon the narcissism of his victims.

As Glazov notes in Jihadist Psychopath, “It is crucial to emphasize that many victims in the con game possess a tremendous narcissism, since in needing to believe that they are part of the script and can actually change it, they incubate a pathological and self-destructive ego.”

The boundless narcissism of the Left, which convinces its true believers that their beverage choices and their menu options can save or destroy the planet, that even their pettiest actions and emotional states are deeply meaningful signifiers of great and terrible changes in the world, makes it absurdly easy for the Islamist psychopath, who offers the illusion of saving them and himself, to hook them on his line.

The Left hungers for victims to justify its inflated sense of self-importance and its greed for power. Islamists exploit their messianic delusions by playing the victims in need of rescuing. The Islamist psychopath validates the twisted psychology of his radical victims only to destroy his rescuers.

This same psychodrama has played out in Iran, in Egypt, in the United Kingdom, and the United States. When the alliances unravel, as they finally must, the socialist utopia instead becomes the caliphate.

Jihadist Psychopath is an invaluable resource for understanding and coming to grips with the human drama behind the headlines and the radical emotions behind the radical march of political events. It gets at the unacknowledged truth behind the political psychodramas of the Left, the narcissistic notion that even the most destructive behaviors can feel good because they make us feel good about who we are.

“Who we are” was the theme of  a number of Obama speeches. It is no coincidence that the politician who most definitively straddled the cultural divide between Islam and the Left, while uniting them politically in their mutual hatred of the United States of America, could never get enough of telling us who we are.

The core of Jihadist Psychopath lies in the conflict of identities, the slow sonorous clash of civilizations between a West that is losing its sense of self and an East that is regaining it, and between former conquerors losing their religion and renewed conquerors regaining it, between monsters and victims.

“Islamic supremacism crushes all individuality within itself. Its members cannot have their own identity or beliefs, nor can they explore or nurture their own happiness or talents,” Jamie Glazov writes.

And those same Islamic supremacists use their conviction in the inferiority of the individual to destroy the identities of their victims, temporarily adopting their borrowed identities as camouflage, mirroring their victims, gaining their confidence, abusing them, destroying their sense of self, and killing them.

Jihadist Psychopath is a compelling look at the process by which the West is losing its life and its soul.

Over the last few months, Russian diplomatic and political engagement in Libya has triggered many speculations over Russia’s agenda in this war-torn North African country. Moscow’s alleged increased military presence in eastern Libya sparked international controversy and even led some western observers to conclude that Russia is aiming to repeat the Syrian scenario in Libya, like reported by qantara.de.

For some time now, Russia has been seeking to restore its position in North Africa, increasing co-operation in a variety of fields with almost all the countries in the region. Its once impressive trade and political relations with Libya, for instance, completely collapsed after the uprising in 2011, when all previously signed contracts in the energy, infrastructure and health care sectors were annulled. Moreover, as a result of the UNʹs arms trade embargo, Russia lost $4 billion worth of arms contracts.

The uprising in 2011 plunged Libya into complete disorder with far-reaching consequences. Russia claims that the 2011 intervention by the West and NATO is the main cause of the chaos that has since ravaged the country.

The internal struggle for power has divided Libya between two major rival factions and inspired a new Islamist insurgency involving the Islamic State militant group as well as tribal factions. The Tobruk-based Libyan National Congress, which is supported by the Libyan National Army’s leader Khalifa Haftar, controls much of Eastern Libya. Haftar gained in popularity and reputation after achieving victories over Islamic radicals. The Western states, as well as the UN, however, have endorsed the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) and its leader Fayez Sarraj as the legitimate government. Although Russia has maintained contacts with both parties in the conflict, it has much closer ties with Haftar, who has urged Moscow to help his side financially and militarily.

Russian troops in Libya?

There have recently been many rumours and much speculation about Russia’s plans to play a more decisive role in Libya, including the deployment of troops.

UK tabloid The Sun reported in October that Russia had allegedly set up military bases in Benghazi and Tobruk, “using the cover of controversial Russian private military company the Wagner Group”. The article stated that Russia had deployed special forces (Spetsnaz) and missiles, while also sending weapons to help the head of the Libyan National Army in the east of the country, Field-Marshal Khalifa Haftar, take over the country. 

But is there any truth in this? The Sun, after all, is not a media outlet known for quality in-depth geopolitical analysis. This is why Tim Eaton, a research fellow with Chatham House’s MENA Programme, suggests that one should treat The Sun article with caution. “The depth and style in which it was written suggest that it was placed there and not created by the newspaper itself. I have heard suggestions that intelligence services are responsible for this,” he told Qantara.

Wayne White, a policy expert with Washington’s Middle East Policy Council argues that Libya remains too unsettled for Putin to contemplate setting up a major base there. The location of any major military installation would surely be viewed as a provocation by one of Libya’s two main rival governments.

By sending some limited Russian personnel, currency and munitions to the eastern-based Libyan National Congress (the latter via Egypt), the Russians already risk antagonising the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, although they have been careful to remain in touch with GNA Prime Minster Sarraj in a high profile manner.

The Sun article, not to mention reports from some other outlets, also claims that control of Libya is part of a Russian greater master plan, namely to seize control of the biggest illegal immigration route to Europe with the aim of using it as a bargaining chip in their talks and relations with Europe.

Russian agenda in Libya

Securing control of the Libyan coast and thereby the immigration routes to Europe, notes White, is certainly not Moscow’s goal. The best Russia can – and probably does – hope for is a sympathetic Libyan regime with broad control to do that.

For Eaton, Libya is wary of external intervention, and it is hard to see Prime Minister Sarraj or Field Marshall Haftar acceding to the establishment of a Russian naval base, should the Russians even wish to establish one. On the contrary, it is Haftar who is seeking to market his claim that he can control irregular migration. To do this effectively, any player must be able to address the land routes, not just the crossing of the Mediterranean.

According to White, in addition to seeking to re-establish some lost influence in North Africa, Russian involvement is to a great degree exploratory. However, Moscow is also concerned about suppressing militant Islamic elements and, if it helps Haftar, currying favour with Sisi’s Egypt, Haftar’s main backer (along with the UAE).

Realities on the ground prevent greater influence

But the double-engagement policy in Libya by Russian diplomats and the Russian military raises many questions. Some observers even mention the possibility of inter-agency rivalry between Russian state institutions, each of them with a stake in a different party. But it is more likely that Russia is trying to keep open channels of communication with all parties in the conflict and benefit, regardless of who ultimately emerges as the winner. This reflects the varying Russian interests in Libya and indicates that Russian players, according to Eaton, will adopt a relatively opportunistic approach, seizing chances where they identify the potential for significant gain with minimum investment. It is unlikely that Russia has the will to invest what would be required to become the international mediator for a political settlement in Libya.

And much like other parties who have tried to put down roots in Libya, the Russians could fall victim to the many militant and otherwise violent parties inside Libya, losing personnel and then dialling back any notion they may currently entertain of establishing a significant footprint there.

The global terrorist and extremist threat is likely to persist in 2019 as the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group goes through a phase of re-adaptation and de-centralisation. This threat will remain given the global failure to resolve the underlying causes of extremism and terrorism, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

The self-styled Islamic State (IS) continues to present an enduring threat worldwide despite the territorial losses it has suffered. The group has established clandestine and underground structures to survive in Iraq and Syria. Its ideology is still intact and continues to be propagated in cyber space. In the provinces, groups, networks and cells which have pledged allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, are radicalising Muslims and conducting attacks.

Although the apex of IS leadership and many of the directing figures are on the run and likely to be eliminated in 2019, the penultimate leadership enabling the fight and supporting the infrastructure will continue to operate in the shadows as they become agile and more cunning. The IS and Al Qaeda-centric threats are likely to remain given the lack of an effective global counter terrorism plan and strategy, the continuance of superpower and geopolitical rivalry, and the failure to resolve the underlying causes of extremism and terrorism.

Three Major Developments

The global threat landscape in 2019 will be dominated by three major developments.

First, the IS is entering a new phase in global expansion. With the depletion of its rank and file in Iraq and Syria from about 60,000 to 5000-6000 combat fighters, the IS territorial control in its main theatre has shrunk to 1%, east of the Euphrates River. In any case, outside of the physical “caliphate”, the groups, networks, cells, and personalities loyal to Baghdadi are growing in their ideological and operational spaces.

These local entities are reinforced by IS virtual caliphate and emboldened by the dozens of IS affiliates and franchises known as wilayats or the external provinces of the caliphate. Driving the globalisation of IS is the media operations and battle-hardened Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) returning home armed with Jihadi ideology, active combat exposure, expertise in explosive-handling and links with underground networks.

Worldwide government counter-terrorism databases today list about 40,000 IS personalities in 102 countries operating in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Europe and North America. Presenting a pre-eminent threat, IS and al Qaeda will continue to mount most attacks in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Similarly, radicalised personalities and cells of diaspora and migrant communities will strike in North America, Europe and Australasia.

Second, Afghanistan is emerging as an alternative theatre for foreign and local fighters in 2019. With the disruption in the flow of fighters to Syria and Iraq, and the dispersal of fighters from the IS core to the periphery, multiple centres of terrorism and extremism are emerging in the Middle East (Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt), Africa (West Africa, East Africa), Western Balkans, Caucasus and Asia.

Afghanistan a New Epicentre?

However, the IS theatre is more pronounced in the Af-Pak region with the Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) threatening the Afghan Taliban, the Afghan government, and Pakistan. In addition to the impact on Central Asia, the threat is moving from tribal Pakistan to mainland Pakistan, Indian-held Kashmir, Xinjiang in western China and Iran.

The intermittent terrorist attacks in Kashmir, Xinjiang and Iran are likely to continue. Given the ongoing geopolitical rivalry, the flow of weapons and finance to, and the training acquired by the Afghan Taliban and ISK, Afghanistan is turning into a new epicentre of regional and global terrorism. Between December 2017 and March 2018, as many as 69 members of IS core, and between 200 to 300 fighters from Iraq and Syria have relocated to Afghanistan and this trend is likely to continue through 2019 as well.

Third, with the rise of ultra-nationalism, ideologies have come to the forefront. Communities based on ethnicity and religion are becoming more polarised, therefore making their peripheries vulnerable to hatred. It is not only the jihadists but political parties, threat groups, and personalities driven by extreme interpretations of their respective religions that threaten their opponents, communities and governments.

The intermittent communal clashes, riots and attacks in India, Myanmar and Sri Lanka demonstrate how Hinduism and Buddhism have been exploited by religious and political leaders and groups. Additionally, Islamophobia continues to rise in the West and even in countries with Muslim majority and minority populations. Similarly, Sunni-Shia relations are further strained especially with the growing anti-Iran and anti-Shia rhetoric in the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world.

While conflict between the Houthis and Saudi-led coalition in Yemen is likely to be mediated in 2019, it is likely that reciprocal intolerance, exclusivism, extremism and terrorism in both physical and virtual spaces will affect global peace and security. It is therefore crucial that world leaders make a concerted effort to unite divided communities.

US Troop Withdrawal and Its Impact

The recently announced withdrawal of 2,000 American troops from Syria and the possible drawdown of 7,000 troops (out of 14,000) from Afghanistan have been compared to past US military withdrawals that were exploited by terrorists. The IS had capitalised on the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 to expand its presence and influence in the Levant.

Likewise, terrorists and insurgents benefitted from the drawdowns of US troops in Afghanistan. Adequate security preparations will therefore be necessary to prevent terrorists from gaining any advantage from troop withdrawals or drawdowns.

Muslim insurgent and terrorist groups will dominate the threat landscape and mount attacks worldwide both in the battlefields and off the battlefields. The geography of the global terrorism map will not change dramatically with Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, India and Libya being the most violent theatres of conflict.

Due to inter-state rivalries, the threat will persist and even grow.  Similarly, the ultra-nationalistic rhetoric by politicians will polarise communities making some vulnerable to greater radicalisation and violence.

The centre of gravity of IS will be its wilayats and the fragmented cyber caliphate, the IS cyber wing is re-emerging regionally. Despite government and technology firms working closely with each other, IS’ virtual presence will endure and grow, compensating for the lack of presence and operations in the physical space. A decentralised IS will present a far greater threat than a centralised IS.

The group’s operatives and supporters will continue to mount attacks and attempt to radicalise Muslim communities worldwide. Counter-terrorism efforts must therefore continue to include not only effective kinetic measures and P/CVE programs, but also a determined political effort to resolve underlying causes of extremism and terrorism.

For crises like accelerating climate change, growing Russian aggression and China’s increasingly assertive military posture in areas like the South China Sea, the fresh start often associated with a new year offers little respite, like reported by soufangroup.com.

These challenges—among others, such as the persistent spread of the ideology of ‘bin Ladenism,’ intractable wars in Syria and Afghanistan and a rising tide of hyper-nationalistic politics—have been building for years, and in some cases decades. This confluence of crises requires a thoughtful, yet urgent, approach that is entirely devoid from the body politic of the U.S. and other Western nations, including the United Kingdom and Australia.

Even though these challenges require a multilateral approach, comprehensive security cooperation and resilient international institutions, the past few years have witnessed a growing trend among nations that signals a desire to jettison the Cold War alliances that reliably served as a foundation for global stability since the end of World War II.Perhaps the most significant issue facing the international community is one that influential policymakers and politicians in the U.S., including some in the White House and other high-ranking positions within government, dismiss out of hand as either a hoax or conspiracy: climate change. The wildfires in California, devastating hurricanes, flooding rain systems overlaying persistent drought and warmer temperatures combined in the last year to inflict significant damage across the U.S.

These events generated discussions about how to mitigate the effects of rapid climate change, however, including the rising sea levels that threaten many locations on the Eastern seaboard. Still, a national dialogue is lacking, meaning that the chances of producing a whole-of-government commitment to building a resilient domestic infrastructure in the U.S. while reducing dependence on carbon-emitting energy production are slim. As the polar regions heat up and spin-off systems wreak havoc across the globe, the scale of the crisis will cascade, with dangerous consequences for the international community.The issue of China’s assertive military posture in areas like the South China Sea is one the U.S. will be forced to address multilaterally and with well-developed strategies. China’s increased presence in what it sees as its historical sphere of influence is a fait accompli in some territories and has been consistent, both in its efforts to reshape the geopolitical landscape—literally in some cases—and in its indifference and even anger over the objections of its neighbors. China views its actions, which Beijing has undertaken for decades, as correcting wrongs that occurred throughout several centuries.

The U.S. role as guarantor of naval free passage is running aground on the shoals of China’s determination to flex its muscles throughout Asia and the Indo-Pacific. One serious issue is that a significant percentage of trade and oil flow through these areas. With tensions mounting, escalation between the U.S. and China remains a worrisome possibility.Russia continues to support a low-level insurgency in eastern Ukraine, still occupies the illegally-annexed Crimea region and remains unwavering in the Kremlin’s commitment to wage information warfare by relying on relentless influence operations and propaganda. Moscow enters 2019 as a determined and persistent foe to NATO and western democracies more broadly.

Russia’s reversal into blatant autocracy and kleptocracy has been unfolding over the past 20 years. Vladimir Putin assumed the office of president on the final day in December 1999, and ever since, has accumulated and consolidated uncontested power. The oil-dependent economy and endemic corruption, the killing of journalists and dissidents and the absence of any genuine political alternative to Putin, have struck hard at Russian life. On the international stage, Russia is primarily viewed as a pariah that assassinates its critics and operates social media campaigns (and funds political campaigns) with one goal: exploit existing social and political divisions.

Russia will continue to use this strategy because it has proven effective and, at least to date, has cost Putin and his cronies relatively little.As 2019 commences, the challenges faced by the U.S. and others will linger unabated. The U.S.’ insistence on a unilateral approach to multilateral challenges is worse than counterproductive; it is actively destructive and encourages others to similarly abandon consensus, multilateralism and the cultivation of alliances based on shared values. These crises have taken years—and often far longer—to reach their respective critical stages. The longer they continue unaddressed, the more problematic they become, perpetuating a state of durable disorder with no clear end in sight.

The US has begun withdrawing American troops from Syria, a decision President Donald Trump made in response to the fall of the physical ISIS caliphate, like reported by thisisinsider.com.

“We have won against ISIS,” Trump said in a video message Wednesday. “We’ve beaten them, and we’ve beaten them badly. We’ve taken back the land. And, now it’s time for our troops to come back home.”

Critics argue that withdrawing from Syria at this time risks advancing the interests of America’s adversaries. “The big winners of this decision are ISIS, Iran, Russia and Assad,” South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham told The Washington Post after calling the president’s decision an “Obama-like mistake.”

White House and Pentagon officials have been unable to offer clarity on the situation, with questions about timelines, expectations, and the mission going forward remaining largely unanswered.s

There are serious concerns among lawmakers and foreign policy observers that the president’s decision will basically hand Syria and its future over to the Syrian regime-Russia-Iran axis, leaving our allies vulnerable and the stability of the region in jeopardy.

Here are the groups that stand to benefit from the US’ move:

Russia

Moscow celebrated Wednesday’s surprise news that the US plans to leave Syria “as quickly as possible.” The Russian Foreign Ministry, according to Russian media outlet Tass, said “hope emerges,” arguing that “once Americans were there, there was no such hope.”

The Russian military has been active in Syria since 2015. Without the US military standing in its way, Russia will be able to significantly expand its influence.

Iran

While the primary mission of the US military in Syria has been the “enduring defeat of ISIS,” it has also been to counter troubling Iranian activities in the region.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in October that a US objective was “the removal of all Iranian and Iranian-backed forces from Syria.” One month earlier, White House national security adviser John Bolton said US troops would not “leave as long as Iranian troops are outside Iranian borders and that includes Iranian proxies and militias.”

The US military presence in Iran has disrupted Iranian activities, but withdrawing US troops from Syria will permit Iran to more easily pursue its interests.

Syrian regime

The US has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with Syrian President Bashar Assad, with some observers assessing that he might eventually be removed from power. The US military placed at least limited restraints on the Syrian military.

Pulling US troops out of Syria risks emboldening Assad, as he feels more secure, leaving his enemies — which have fought alongside American forces — more vulnerable. With the threat posed by ISIS degraded, Assad could, with the support of his Russian and Iranian allies, focus his efforts on retaking territory lost in the civil war.

And, as the US will no longer have a military presence in country, the Syrian regime, in coordination with Moscow and Tehran, will be free to dictate the post-war outcome.

ISIS

While President Donald Trump said ISIS is defeated, the latest estimates suggest that there could be as many as 30,000 ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria. Secretary of Defense James Mattis has argued that the US needs to maintain its military presence in Syria to prevent the resurgence of ISIS.

“Getting rid of the caliphate doesn’t mean you then blindly say okay, we got rid of it, march out, and then wonder why the caliphate comes back,” Mattis said in September.