Back in June 2014, at the al-Nuri Mosque in Mosul, Iraq; Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of an Islamic State (ISIS) and named himself its caliph. Over the subsequent years, the Islamic State quickly managed to control wide swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria, until it became so dangerous it took an international coalition of eighty states and unions to cripple it, like reported by atlanticcouncil.org.

Ultimately, ISIS lost the areas it controlled, and its defeat was in sight. Yet five years later, ISIS is anything but defeated. On April 28, 2019, al-Baghdadi reappeared in a video in an unknown location seeking revenge for his lost territory. The Islamic State was crippled this past year in several fierce battles with the international coalition, but is regrouping and the international community needs to recognize this and redevelop its strategy.

The Battle of al-Baghuz

The Islamic State was able, by virtue of the military and administrative experience of local and foreign fighters, to organize its ranks quickly to prepare for any major confrontation with the United States and international coalition forces. However, it was not enough to face the major battle from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and international coalition, and soon the borders of al-Baghdadi’s state were less than ten towns in the far east of Syria.

Throughout October and November of 2018, ISIS put up a fierce resistance in Hajin and al-Susa, part of Deir Ezzor province in the east, despite the fact that it is an area that lacks easily defensible terrain. It seems ISIS choose Hajin as part of larger strategy in order to draw in SDF fighters into a battle in its favor. And ISIS chose al-Baghuz, a small eastern town along the Iraqi border and Euphrates River that has the only high ground—known as Shafta al-Baghuz—in the area.

ISIS prepared well for this battle. It dug trenches, tunnels, and planted mines around the entire area. It captured tens of thousands of Syrians and families of foreign migrants, using some as human shields to buy time it needed by claiming that it had to guarantee safe passage for the civilians forcing the fighting to stop. ISIS also depended on foreign fighters whose countries’ of origin had refused to allow them to return. They assumed these fighters would never surrender because they had two grim choices: prison in Iraq, or the SDF handing them over to the regime should the United States withdrew.

ISIS selected al-Baghuz because it contains a lot of natural caves, most of them in the highland of Shafta al-Baghuz. It also dug a covered trench toward the Iraqi border seven hundred meters away, and prepared a number of munition storages and a workshop to produce explosive-laden vehicles.

This plan was not to protect a piece of land for the Caliphate, nor to reclaim land for it, as the extremist organization had done at the beginning of its rise. Rather, it was to achieve a victory that it would later fashion through motivational publications for the coming generation of its members. It could say that the elite of its fighters stood firm throughout eight months of continuous battles against eighty states with their aircraft, armored vehicles, and 45,000 fighters. It is something that ISIS could use in future recruitment operations.

ISIS’s leaders who planned all of this did not imagine that such hard circumstances and limited options would split their fighters’ ranks between those accepting their decisions and those rejecting them. Hundreds of fighters preferred to surrender themselves to the SDF or to flee from al-Baghuz. Some of those who rejected ISIS’s plan for al-Baghuz were able to get to Idlib by hiding in oil tanker trucks and paying large sums to SDF leaders.

The leaders of the first battle of al-Baghuz fled toward Iraq to the vicinity of al-Qa’im, near the ISIS pockets in the Anbar desert. Iraq was the only choice, because Iranian militias were spread along the western bank of the Euphrates, having taken into account that ISIS fighters might flee from al-Baghuz to al-Bukamal’s surrounding desert.

In his most recent video, al-Baghdadi announced the end of the Battle of al-Baghuz and the killing of a number of ISIS loyalists in the battle. He then promised to avenge these ISIS fighters who were killed and that ISIS would continue fighting against its enemies.

ISIS Takes on a New Form

It seems that ISIS bought time during the battles in Hajin and al-Baghuz as part of a larger plan; to grant its fighters the chance to regroup. These fighters supposedly number in the thousands and are spread out in the Syrian desert in a triangle between al-Sukhna in Homs province, al-Mayadin in Deir Ezzor province, and Ma’dan in Raqqa province.

Starting from these pockets, ISIS fighters have access to the eastern al-Suwayda’ desert, western al-Bukamal desert, al-Mayadin desert, and al-Salamiya desert to the northeast of Hama. From there, they can launch surprise attacks on Iranian militia patrols and convoys; which are spread out across the western bank of the Euphrates from al-Bukamal desert to al-Mayadin city.

ISIS chose the triangle of al-Sukhna, al-Mayadin, and Ma’dan because it borders the regime’s forces, and they have, thus far, been an easier enemy than Iranian Shia militias. Nonetheless, ISIS still has small pockets of fighters in the area between al-Sukhna, al-Bukamal, and al-Zakf, which is the area along the western Anbar desert.

Since 2015, ISIS had an interest in the Syrian desert because it connects to most provinces. In 2015 and 2016, its forces reached al-Tanf east of Homs, al-Qalamun north of Damascus, and al-Sa’n north of Hama. ISIS also established good relations with the Bedouins in the area, and some joined its ranks to provide reconnaissance in the desert—an area which no group can fully control given how open and undeveloped it is.

Because of the heavy investment by ISIS in establishing this area as a central base, it is likely a storage site for medium- and heavy-caliber weapons with various munitions. This area could then be a launch point for ISIS’s military operations or a refuge in case it is defeated.

ISIS learned the way it conquered and ruled could not last. So it has adapted for the desert, a harsh landscape difficult for its enemies yet more easily defendable. ISIS forces can now move to surrounding areas and launch quick military operations. However, the extremist cells that are present in SDF controlled areas that launch attacks with explosives and assassinations likely operate separate from ISIS’s central leadership. Coalition aircraft have launched dozens operations to capture these cells, so their chances of survival will be relatively low.

Despite its military defeats and the end of its reign, the main grievances that led to the creation of ISIS are still present: the foreign states’ involvement and the lack of will to bring down the Assad regime early in the conflict and the growth of Iranian and Shia influence at the cost of native Sunnis. The United States is expected to withdraw from the region; leaving behind the consequences of its failed strategy. This strategy is what created ideal circumstances for ISIS in 2014, and the projected US withdrawal—if it does happen—will be a major factor in ISIS’s return. ISIS will take presumably advantage of the gap left by the United States. The weak technical and military capabilities of the states who might fill this gap is likely to create more chaos and uncertainty.

The use of subterranean networks by militant groups and hybrid forces is a growing feature of modern warfare. In no country is the tactical and strategic development of tunnels more evident than in Israel, which is in an underground arms race with Hamas and Hezbollah on its southern and northern borders, respectively, like reported by realclearworld.com. 

The more the Israel Defense Forces has improved its intelligence and precision-strike capabilities in recent decades, the more Hezbollah and Hamas have descended belowground. At first, this move was primarily defensive — meant to hide, fortify, store, and protect military assets – but over time offensive assault tunnels have also proliferated. And despite Israel’s extensive investment in advanced technological means of detection, it appears Hamas and Hezbollah will continue placing great emphasis on underground capabilities. While the two groups clearly learn from each other’s experiences against Israel, they are not the only ones. Indeed, tunnels feature in recent fighting in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and elsewhere.

The use, development, and spread of subterranean networks requires continued investment in the most effective and cutting-edge technologies and tactics to counter this threat. Partner countries confronting similar challenges can work with and benefit from Israel’s deep knowledge and experience in this field. This will be necessary to maintain a technological and operational edge against the continual advancement of adversaries’ underground capabilities in wartime and between wars.

Origins of the Tunnel Phenomenon in the Gaza War

Israel’s first encounters with tunnels dates at least to the end of September 2000, in the Gaza Strip. Some tunnels were used to smuggle weapons and goods, others for offensive purposes, including burrowing and detonating explosives under Israeli targets. From 2001-2004, multiple IDF positions in Gaza or on the Gaza-Egypt border were attacked via tunnels filled with explosives.

Three later developments touched off the major evolution and expansion of subterranean networks in the Gaza Strip: The IDF’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in September 2005; the June 2007 coup in which the terrorist group Hamas took control of Gaza from Fatah; and Israel’s development of the Iron Dome missile-defense system. Taken together, these events enabled and encouraged Hamas to expand its underground attacks against Israel.

The IDF’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip was followed by the erection of a security barrier around the territory. Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza went to work on methods for bypassing the barrier to attack Israel. This gave rise to one of the first offensive subterranean operations. In June 2006, Hamas used tunnels to attack an IDF post, killing two soldiers, wounding two more, and leading to the abduction of Sergeant Gilad Shalit. The sergean was held hostage for more than five years and was eventually released in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners, giving Hamas a greater benefit strategically and politically than it ever expected. This experience, as well as developments that made other means of striking Israel less feasible, led Hamas to embrace the operational and offensive capability of subterranean networks.

Hamas’ seizure of the Gaza Strip in 2007 initially boosted its efforts to circumvent the IDF’s barrier. By assuming control of the territory, Hamas was able to divert procurement and production of goods in Gaza toward attacking Israel. With Iranian and Syrian assistance, it acquired significant indirect fire, missile, and rocket capabilities. However, the advent of Iron Dome in 2011 dramatically mitigated these arsenals, prompting Hamas once again to seek other ways of bypassing Israeli defenses and creating new asymmetries with the IDF’s capabilities. Hamas returned to a simple tactic, but one proven effective by the Shalit operation: tunnels.

Hamas greatly expanded the underground network in Gaza after taking power. The IDF’s withdrawal in 2005 already gave Hamas freedom of action in the Gaza Strip, but now it could direct bigger projects. It accumulated practical tunneling know-how over the same period, simplifying excavation and concealment. In contrast to the previous use of underground tunnels primarily for smuggling, these new passages were designed for various purposes, including concealment, infiltration, abduction and, above all, assault.

Though the IDF had known of the tunneling in Gaza since 2000, and was aware of Hamas’ evolving tactics, it had yet to find satisfactory operational or technological solutions. For example, in October 2013 a tunnel was discovered that led from Gaza to the nearby Israeli community of Ein Hashlosha. In announcing the discovery at a press conference in the field where the tunnel was found, the regional IDF commander, Sami Turjeman, made clear that there were dozens of additional tunnels.

Hamas’ use of tunnels in the 2014 Gaza conflict caught neither the IDF nor Israeli political leaders off guard, but it certainly surprised the Israeli public. These offensive tunnels were more effective than the rockets, unmanned aerial vehicles, or commandos Hamas also used to attack Israel in that conflict. They caused pervasive fear and extensive uncertainty among Israeli communities not only near Gaza, but throughout the country. Residents in the north of Israel started to ask about similar threats along the border with Lebanon and noted they could hear digging sounds.

This debate and criticism within Israeli society over the tunnel threat, as well as the utility of tunnels for attacks and for abducting IDF troops in the 2014 conflict, convinced Hamas leadership that tunnels are a worthwhile investment. But these insights were not limited to Hamas; they also encouraged Hezbollah to develop, expand, and define additional uses for offensive tunnels.

Hezbollah Learns From Hamas

Similar to Hamas, the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah has implemented lessons from its own recent operational history against the IDF, especially those learned during the Second Lebanon War of 2006. Less appreciated, however, is how Hezbollah also appears to have learned from Hamas’ 2014 conflict with Israel in its process of embracing subterranean networks for use in a future conflict with Israel.

Since the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah has significantly rehabilitated, upgraded, and expanded its military infrastructure on both sides of the Litani River in southern Lebanon. It has done so despite a U.N. Security Council resolution that forbids the presence south of the Litani of any armed forces except the Lebanese military and U.N. peacekeepers. According to IDF intelligence, Hezbollah’s illegal infrastructure in this area includes an arsenal of tens of thousands of Iranian- and Syrian-supplied rockets and missiles, as well as anti-tank missiles, improvised explosive devices, and anti-aircraft capabilities. Many of these are embedded within Shiite communities whose residents now serve as Hezbollah’s human shields.

Hezbollah rebuilt this infrastructure with the lessons of 2006 firmly in mind. That conflict made abundantly clear Israel’s unique intelligence-gathering and airstrike capabilities that could target these rockets and missiles. In response, Hezbollah has sought to ensure the survivability of its military infrastructure and materiel not just by placing it among civilians, but also by using subterranean networks to shield it from Israeli detection and destruction. Hezbollah established strategic underground infrastructure for storage, personnel and asset protection, shielding command and control capabilities, and hiding and protecting rockets, missiles and other weapons.

This underground network also has offensive purposes. In August 2012, Hezbollah carried out the extensive “Conquering the Galilee” exercise for an operation to strike a surprise blow at the opening of a war with Israel. To maintain strategic surprise, and to avoid being exposed to Israeli intelligence-gathering and firepower, Hezbollah planned for its elite Radwan units to use tunnel networks to cross under the border and take control of settlements or military outposts inside Israel for a limited time.

According to this plan, Radwan units would receive extensive fire support from Hezbollah’s rocket and missile arsenals — which are far larger and more powerful than those of Hamas — on the Lebanese side of the border. Hezbollah reinforcements would also cross the border fence in an attempt to establish a strong holding presence inside Israel. As these units sought to entrench their positions, other Hezbollah forces including anti-tank and air-defense teams would seek to disrupt IDF reinforcements arriving by land and air. This original plan has been updated and improved to integrate lessons from the 2014 Gaza conflict and to reflect the combat experience Hezbollah fighters have gained in the Syrian civil war.

Having adopted this operational model, Hezbollah built out an extensive subterranean network designed to penetrate, take, and hold Israeli villages and military outposts. This network contained tunnels that violate Israel’s sovereignty and threaten to cross the Blue Line, the international border recognized by the United Nations after the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000.

Operation Northern Shield

In December 2018, the IDF’s Operation Northern Shield revealed and destroyed significant elements of Hezbollah’s tunnel network, including offensive tunnels crossing into Israel. Israel’s highest-level political and military leadership saw this limited military action as urgent and absolutely necessary to address a major operational threat, demonstrate Israeli capability and resolve, and build international awareness and support to fight the tunnel threat.

The urgency came in part from the risk that these tunnels could imminently become operational. The IDF assessed that Hezbollah could prepare the tunnels for action within a few weeks. During a Cabinet discussion in the run-up to Northern Shield, then-Chief of the General Staff Gadi Eizenkot presented an assessment by the Northern Command commander, Major General Yoel Strick, that immediate action was necessary. Furthermore, the technology and operational conditions for locating the tunnels had only just matured, leading Eizenkot and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to determine the time was right to move ahead.

Operation Northern Shield also reflects a strategic decision about how best to confront the challenges posed by subterranean networks. While the IDF’s experience in Gaza showed the need to completely eliminate the threat posed by any given tunnel, as General Strick put it, the challenge was how to deprive Hezbollah of these tunnels without being dragged into a broader and very costly war.

The IDF’s solution was to avoid entering Lebanese territory and instead surgically target tunnels in Israel. Eschewing more aggressive efforts, Israel focused on intelligence, technology and accuracy to mitigate the risks of miscalculation and Hezbollah retaliation, as the head of the IDF’s Intelligence Directorate Major General Haiman stated in late 2018.

By demonstrating it could find and destroy these tunnels, Israel was able to strengthen its deterrence against Hezbollah and other adversaries. This has lowered the possibility that Hezbollah will assume it has a strategic advantage against Israel and lowered its willingness to escalate a future conflict.

Finally, a key purpose of the operation was to obtain international support, especially from the United States, for future operations against Hezbollah’s subterranean network. Israel sees itself on the front lines facing these threats, and as a leader in responding to them. It wants to share its technology and techniques, but also alert its allies to the seriousness of these shared threats and the need for cooperation against them.

Conclusions: Responding to the Growth of the Subterranean Threat

The IDF has been dealing with underground threats for a long time, but now it is clear the use of subterranean networks for offensive operations in hybrid warfare is a tactical challenge with significant strategic implications. The threat is evolving as experiences and capabilities are shared, as seen in Hezbollah’s incorporation of lessons learned from Hamas’ use of tunnels against Israel. Addressing these threats requires a multidisciplinary, collaborative, and sustained effort, including the continued development and adaptation of intelligence, technology, combat doctrine, and training.

Though at first Hamas and Hezbollah went underground to hide and protect their arsenals, they now also pursue offensive objectives, including penetrating borders and barriers to attack stealthily and unexpectedly. This makes tunnels a “spherical” threat, one that denies the existence of a front line and erases the distinctions between combat and supporting forces, and between combatants and civilians. Tunnels allow terrorists to project their power 360 degrees, including underground and above. As seen in the 2014 Gaza conflict, this is a threat with a deep mental and psychological impact that goes beyond the military. Hezbollah’s plan for invading the Galilee through extensive and massive penetration, including tunnels, is even reminiscent of tactics that could be employed by North Korea in a conflict with the south.

Accordingly, the development and use of tunnels should be understood as a new form of arms race – a learning response by adversaries seeking to negate and overcome the IDF’s technological advantages. The more the IDF improved its intelligence and precision-strike capabilities, the more Hezbollah and Hamas pushed underground.

Hezbollah and Hamas seem to have decided that the value of subterranean capabilities remains high enough to justify continued improvement and expansion. The first terror tunnels, in the Gaza Strip, were dug manually. Today, Hezbollah and Hamas have the technology to make tunneling easier, faster, and quieter. It is even possible for them to control the acoustic signature of digging operations and hide working entrances and construction material from overhead surveillance. The discovery during Operation Northern Shield of a tunnel at an unprecedented depth of 55 meters (180 feet) attests not only to Hezbollah’s advances in underground construction, but also its incentive to tunnel ever deeper.

In short, despite the success of Operation Northern Shield, the threat from subterranean networks is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. The continued use, evolution and proliferation of subterranean networks requires concerted investment in the most effective methods to counter and stay ahead of these threats. For armed forces likely to confront hybrid adversaries, adapting to underground combat should be seen as a strategic and operational imperative on par with with developing suitable weapons for warfare in other domains such as land, air, sea and cyber.

As it has in these other domains, Israel’s knowledge and experience in this field should serve as a font of cooperation with its allies to offset the underground capabilities of terrorist organizations, both in wartime and in between the wars.

Turkey, America’s supposed NATO ally, is arming the United States’ Islamist enemy in Libya in flagrant violation of a United Nations arms embargo and should be punished with sanctions, said an analysis for the news site Human Events, like reported by ahvalnews.com.

A Turkish-crewed ship last month delivered to Tripoli some 20 Turkish-made armoured vehicles, or MRAPs, evidence of Ankara’s violation of the embargo and support for the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Government of National Accord.

If this side wins Libya’s ongoing civil war, it will impose Sharia law, corrupt the press and open a safe haven for terrorists, journalist and author Richard Miniter wrote on Sunday for Human Events.

Washington, meanwhile, has expressed support for General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army, which launched a major assault on Tripoli in April.

“Gen. Haftar promises an Egypt-style government, if he wins. That means basic human rights, rule of law, a semi-free press, and regular elections that are usually won by the ruling party. And a new ally in the war on terror,” said Miniter. “This is an alliance that makes sense. Mainly because all of the realistic alternatives are far worse.”

Gen. Haftar has worked with the CIA and spent nearly two decades living in the United States before returning to Libya a few years ago, while his forces are large, disciplined and well equipped, according to Miniter.

Still, he added, Tripoli may be beyond his grasp, as urban warfare is very different from fast-moving desert campaigns, with civilians getting tangled up in the crossfire.

“Tripoli is a humid Stalingrad,” said Miniter. “In this urban battleground, Turkish-supplied armour makes a big impact. Turkish armor will either lengthen the war and widen the death toll or, worse, prevent the war’s end by enforcing a murderous stalemate.”

Without aircraft or armour of its own, Haftar’s forces cannot do much in response. A stalemate could lead to a failed state on the Mediterranean, which would likely become a migrant transit point, potentially destabilising Europe, according to Miniter.

Thus, Libya is a security issue for Europe, if not also for the United States. Yet in addition to its controversial plan to buy Russia’s S-400 missile system, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government poses a major hurdle to achieving stability there, according to Miniter.

“Long governed by the Islamist AKP, Turkey has broken its longtime alliance with Israel, helped Iran evade U.S. sanctions by trading with it, and now, in Syria and Libya, aids America’s battlefield enemies,” said Miniter, who recommended sanctions rather than expelling Turkey from NATO, as it represents the alliance’s second largest army.

“President Trump’s willingness to use tariffs could play a helpful role. He imposed onerous tariffs on Turkey before, to spring a U.S.-born pastor from Turkish prison. Using that tool again may dissuade the Turks from arming America’s enemies – before such behavior hardens into habit,” he said.

The humanitarian crisis precipitated by Boko Haram in Nigeria’s North-east will be the theme at an international symposium on forced displacement holding in Leicester, the United Kingdom, on June 12, according to premiumtimesng.com.

The symposium is the first public engagement aspect of an international development research project – funded by Leicester-based De Montfort University (DMU) Global Challenges Research Fund – on the role of social and human capital among displaced populations in North-eastern Nigeria.

This project “looks at households displaced in Northeast Nigeria, where Boko Haram insurgency has precipitated humanitarian tragedy on a scale comparable to the Nigerian civil war (1967- 1970) and arguably the worst of any manmade or natural disaster in Nigeria’s history,” stated Jo Richardson, a research and innovation dean at DMU in an email to PREMIUM TIMES.

“This study focuses on how displaced peoples are exercising their agency at the individual (human capital) and communal (social capital) levels to recover and rebuild their lives through entrepreneurship.”

From the research design stage, Ms Richardson said, impact and practical relevance is a priority.

“The active efforts of DMU researchers to engage non-academic stakeholders in research, including industry practitioners, policy makers and NGOs are vital to tackling some of the world’s most complex problems in an impactful, connected way.”

The symposium will bring together collaborators, stakeholders and other interested scholars and practitioners from a whole spectrum of disciplines and backgrounds, including the academia, government, media and development, Seun Kolade, the project lead, said.

“Already, the project team comprises one development/entrepreneurship scholar, one historian, two clinical psychologists, one UN official, one NGO official, and one investigative journalist,” said Mr Kolade, senior lecturer at DMU.

Speakers

Speakers at the symposium holding next Wednesday include Robert Smith, the chief of partnerships coordination at the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; Gaim Kibreab, a UK-based professor of refugee studies; Ene Obi, the director of ActionAid Nigeria; James Saliba, a Nigerian professor of history from the University of Maiduguri; and Kayode Ogundamisi, activist and public affairs commentator.

The event will be moderated by Mr Kolade, the principal investigator of the DMU funded Nigerian North-east-focused project titled: “picking up the pieces: social capital, human capital, and coping strategies of households displaced by Boko Haram insurgency in North-eastern Nigerian.”

Mr Kolade told PREMIUM TIMES that though the project focuses on Nigeria, also anticipated are findings that will have wide-ranging and far-reaching positive impacts on institutional transformation and more effective humanitarian actions across the world.

“Traditional, mainly material approaches to interventions in disaster situations have come under increased scrutiny in recent years because they have failed to deliver desired long-term outcomes and have encountered resource and capacity constraints in the face of continually expanding humanitarian crises.

“The project, therefore, seeks a shift to an approach that combines both material and social solutions. It examines the extent to which the displaced populations are drawing on social and human capital to withstand, cope with, and recover from the adverse experiences and consequences of the insurgency and counterinsurgency,” he said.

Since April, research assistants have been gathering data across households and IDP camps in the North-east. There will also be a workshop, another engagement aspect of the project, in Nigeria in July, featuring relevant government authorities, NGOs and the media.

“This is one event we look forward to,” Adenike Aloba, from the humanitarian and conflict programme, said of the July event. “We are taking media-related perspectives on the Lake Chad region humanitarian crisis to the workshop.”

The Easter Sunday tragedy in Sri Lanka on 21 April 2019 brought with it important domestic and international lessons. There is also a China focus on developments in Sri Lanka, primarily because of Beijing’s geopolitical interest in the Indian Ocean, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

Countries in South Asia are also keeping a close watch as regional neighbours because of the resurgence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and, more importantly, a stronger and more united Sri Lanka bodes well for regional stability in the South Asian region.

For the past decade after the civil war in Sri Lanka, the domestic situation has been so stable that the government believed the country was immune to terrorism. Hence, it was a rude awakening when the country was blitzed by multiple suicide attacks on Easter Sunday on 21 April 2019, resulting in fatalities.

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have reportedly claimed responsibility for the attacks, apparently utilising radical-extremist groups, namely the National Thowheed Jamaath (NTJ) and Jamathei Millathu Ibraheem (JMI) as their local proxies inside Sri Lanka.

One month on since Sri Lanka was terrorised, this tragedy has increasingly become an intermestic – a dynamic interplay of international and domestic – concern. There are not just domestic, but also international lessons that can be drawn and learnt from the Easter Sunday tragedy.

“Glocalised” Terrorism an Existential Threat

Gone are the days when ISIS was a localised group confined to the Middle East. It has grown to become a glocalised threat where it tailors its global agenda to entice local groups – whether in Southeast Asia or now in South Asia, the attacks in Sri Lanka being its opening chess move.

As terrorism is transnational and borderless, it can undermine domestically social harmony of a country with a multicultural society such as Sri Lanka in South Asia or Singapore in Southeast Asia.

As witnessed in Sri Lanka, terrorism can also badly hurt a country’s domestic economy as a result of falling business and consumer confidence. It can also cause a rapid drop in tourist arrivals due to the deliberate targeting of foreigners, as seen by the calculated attacks on hotels in Sri Lanka.

Clearly, ISIS has not been defeated and has the wherewithal to execute a deadly attack despite losing its physical caliphate in Syria. Their overriding motive remains the same – restoration of a caliphate of early Islam through the use of armed violence. Self-radicalisation via social media and use of local proxies to carry out suicide attacks forewarns the world of ISIS modus operandi.

That some of the perpetrators in the Sri Lanka attacks hailed from educated and wealthy families cements the notion that the profile of ISIS-affiliated attackers is no longer confined to being poor or lowly-educated. Self-radicalisation of today transcends social or class stratification.

The Sri Lankan attacks illustrate the resurgence of ISIS in South Asia, putting the region on alert and jolting the South Asian countries to take the ISIS threat seriously rather than remain in a state of denial. In addition to Pakistan where ISIS have claimed responsibility for suicide attacks in the country and announcing a new Pakistan ‘province’, Bangladesh has also been on alert post-Easter Sunday after a pro-ISIS telegram released a poster in the Bangla language, warning that an attack is imminent. The Maldives too is fast becoming an ISIS nerve centre in South Asia.

That there are credible links between ISIS-linked NTJ and localised radical-extremist groups in the southern Indian states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu have implored the Indian authorities to keep a close watch on them. India’s National Investigation Agency actually foiled a plot to execute a suicide attack in Kerala by nabbing an ISIS suspect who was inspired by the bombings in Sri Lanka.

National Security and Counterterrorism Intelligence

The Easter Sunday attacks revealed multiple gaps in Sri Lanka’s security architecture. The claims made by officials in the Sri Lankan government of being unaware of prior intelligence information intimated a weakened and uncoordinated intelligence information-sharing mechanism in the country. In 2016, then-Minister of Justice Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe cautioned in parliament of the possible existence of ISIS-trained individuals in Sri Lanka, but was given the short shrift.1

The failure of the Sri Lankan authorities to act on intelligence tip-offs – received from both within and outside of the country – was a principal cause of the Easter Sunday attacks. This is perhaps due to domestic political and economic fragility, lack of elite coordination among the government ministries, the intelligence services’ obsession with the revival of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the government’s preoccupation with a soon-to-be presidential election.

Taking national security for granted was a painful lesson for Sri Lanka, as Easter Sunday proved to be a wake-up call for the government to review holistically its entire security infrastructure. Beefing up counterterrorism intelligence-sharing needs to be a top priority. It also behooves the Sri Lankan authorities to pay serious attention to trends in global terrorism and its potential domestic implications so as to stay ahead of the curve in the battle against terrorism.

Militant groups supportive of ISIS or Al-Qaeda are also active in Southeast Asia and have carried out terror attacks, chiefly in Indonesia. The Easter Sunday bombings reinforce the importance of boosting counterterrorism intelligence-sharing, as evidenced by the close collaboration among Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia to thwart terror attacks both on land and surrounding sea.

Dealing with fake news in a social media age has also become a centrepiece of preserving national security. Governments which consider fake news as an existentially perilous problem have been scouring robust and effective ways to counter falsehoods and curtail the spread of fake news.

In the aftermath of Easter Sunday, fake news was so ubiquitous and rampant that it alarmed the Sri Lankan authorities. Despite attempts by the government to impose a social media blackout, the surge in fake news via social media continued, peddling in misinformation and disinformation that further inflamed the domestic situation in post-Easter Sunday Sri Lanka. This illustrates the urgency for the Sri Lankan government to devise a more robust and comprehensive long-term strategy to counter fake news in the hope of ensuring greater stability and security in the country.

Muslims are Critical Assets in the War against Terrorism

Whether in the majority or minority, Muslims are critical assets and effective antidotes towards battling terrorism perpetrated by radical Muslim groups. For years, Sri Lankan Muslims, namely, Tamil-speaking Moors who comprise the majority of the heterogeneous Muslim minority in Sri Lanka, have alerted the government in Colombo to radical-extremists in NTJ and JMI, including the radical preacher Zahran Hashim, the alleged mastermind behind the Easter Sunday attacks.

In the local Sri Lankan Daily Mirror paper, a grouping called ‘Peace Loving Moderate Muslims in Sri Lanka’ issued a public statement in 2014 condemning the NTJ and cautioning that it was “fast becoming a cancer” within the Sri Lankan Muslim community due to its strict implementation of Islamic law and, concomitantly, relegating in importance the legal system of the country.2

Similar to the civil war when Sri Lankan Muslims provided the Sinhalese military with intelligence as they opposed the agenda of the Tamil separatists led by the LTTE, the Muslims also tipped off security officials on the location of radical-extremists post-Easter Sunday averting further terror attacks.

The vast majority of Muslims who are law-abiding citizens of Sri Lanka, including members of the main Islamic theological body, All Ceylon Jamiyyathul Ulama, have also disassociated themselves from NTJ and JMI. They denounced the terror acts as being contrary to Islamic teachings, and a mischaracterisation and de-contextualisation of the Quran, the Islamic religious text.

The Middle East Dimension

The infiltration of Wahhabi-induced Islamisation from the Middle East into Sri Lanka contributed to the Easter Sunday attacks by fermenting or emboldening radical-extremist groups in Sri Lanka.

This linkage can be attributed to Sri Lankans returning home from the Middle East after studying or working in the region, with some arabising themselves and others becoming radical preachers.

The Sri Lankan Sinhalese, Tamil and English press have reported for many years that the Wahhabi ideology has spread across the Eastern province in the country, mostly in Kattankudy which is a densely populated Muslim town.3 The exclusivist Wahhabi ideology which practises an austere form of Islam divided the Muslim community in Sri Lanka which has traditionally been more inclusive – moderate in faith and pluralistic in culture. This consequently led to clashes between the ultraconservative Wahhabi-influenced and the more moderate non-Wahhabi Sufi Muslim groups in Kattankudy as early as 2004. Wahhabi- influenced Muslims also insulated themselves, turning inwards and withdrawing from the larger non-Muslim society altogether.

It is noteworthy that not all Wahhabi-influenced Muslims are terrorists and not all terrorists are Wahhabi-influenced Muslims. However, Wahhabi-influenced Muslims are inclined to embrace radical-extremist views, with some turning to violent acts oft-called terrorism, and others who do not.

The bombings portend the danger of countries soft-pedalling on Wahhabi-induced Islamisation. Those in government such as the Sri Lankan authorities need to keep a close watch on returnees from the Middle East chiefly when they exhibit radical-extremist behaviour, ban hate preachers, and rehabilitate radical individuals to re-integrate them into the mainstream Muslim community.

Battling Islamophobia, Interfaith Dialogue and People-to-People Linkages

To get the Muslims on their side, the Sri Lankan government needs to better protect the country’s Muslims against Islamophobic backlashes which have been on the rise after Easter Sunday. It is also imperative to avoid a repeat of anti-Muslim riots perpetrated by radical Sinhalese Buddhists in 2018, as this grievance may have been exploited by NTJ and JMI to recruit their foot soldiers.

The greater the instances of Islamophobia, the more fertile the ground will be for recruitment by radical-extremist groups which can be emboldened as local proxies to carry out terroristic acts.

Banning face coverings which includes the face veil won by a tiny number of Sri Lankan Muslim women in the guise of public protection can be construed as a knee-jerk reaction by the Sri Lankan government. It misses the forest for the trees when it comes to strengthening national security, as the perpetrators were mostly male and none wore a face veil while carrying out the attacks. While there are Muslims who support the ban, there are others who see this move as scapegoating the Sri Lankan Muslims, feeding, therefore, into the Islamophobic narrative.

Religious leaders in Sri Lanka can be key calming influences and promoters of interfaith dialogue. Leading the way was the Archbishop of Colombo, Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith, who played a crucial role to unite Christians and Muslims in the aftermath of Easter Sunday. He had beseeched the Sri Lankan Christians “not to hurt even a single Muslim person because they are our brothers.”4

Interfaith dialogue has been elevated in importance after the tragic events in both Sri Lanka and New Zealand. It is known to alleviate religious violence and bring the different faiths together in harmony. So it may be worthwhile for Sri Lanka to set up a nationwide interreligious organisation.

Sri Lanka boasts a rich culture and civilisation as a South Asian country with outward links to Southeast Asia. However, this is not as well-known to the outside world. This can be attributed to Sri Lanka inadequately practising cultural diplomacy in its foreign policy, central to which is people-to-people linkages. Instead of being known as a cultural haven, Sri Lanka has come to be known as a haven for extremists and terrorists after that Easter Sunday. It is, therefore, in the national interest of the Sri Lankan government to alter this erroneous perception as placing emphasis on culture and civilisation can serve as an effective bulwark against both extremism and terrorism.

The China Interest and the Indian Ocean

The weakened security architecture in Sri Lanka captured China’s attention as it could potentially impact the latter’s economic and security interests both within Sri Lanka and the wider South Asian region. Sri Lanka is a key South Asian country for China’s Belt and Road Initiative and an important partner for China to protect its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. China is one of Sri Lanka’s major lenders and investors, and took over controversially the operation of the Hambantota Port.

Security lapses inside Sri Lanka disconcert China as Beijing has been giving military support to Sri Lanka, noting its key strategic position in the Indian Ocean. The Chinese policymakers see Sri Lanka as assisting to preserve China’s interests geopolitically by curtailing maritime terrorism in Sri Lankan waters within the broader Indian Ocean, and securing the sea lines of communication.

The ISIS factor in the Easter Sunday attacks serves as a cautionary tale for China in its chronic repression of Muslims in Xinjiang. Similar to its modus operandi in Sri Lanka, ISIS could capitalise on the grievances of China’s repressed Muslim minority, influencing the Uyghur Muslims to act as their local proxies. The possibility of an ISIS-style attack transpiring in China cannot be ruled out if the persecution of Chinese Muslims by the Beijing government continues to take place.

Conclusion

There are lessons to be learnt from the Easter Sunday tragedy in Sri Lanka. This encompasses the domestic for Sri Lanka and the international for the wider community, which includes specific regional constructs such as South and Southeast Asia.

To its credit, the government of Sri Lanka has begun to take concrete steps to learn some immediate lessons from Easter Sunday by beefing up security intelligence, shoring up the country’s fragile peace and curbing intercommunal violence.

Just as Sri Lanka has shown remarkable resilience to bring about normalcy after the ravages of its civil war, there is sufficient reason to believe that Sri Lanka will be able to bounce back stronger from the carnage of Easter Sunday. Sri Lankan’s regional neighbours would welcome this because a stronger and more united Sri Lanka bodes well for regional stability in South Asia, and also enabling it to garner greater bargaining leverage in managing relations with China.

It would require strong political leadership in Sri Lanka to bring the country’s domestic house in order. While there is cause for optimism, the hard truth is that Sri Lanka still has a long way to go before it can genuinely achieve lasting peace and stability in political and strategic- security terms.

Civilian pro-democracy protesters were gunned down on Monday by Sudanese security forces in Khartoum, the country’s capital. According to various media reports, at least thirteen protesters were killed and approximately 200 injured, like reported by soufangroup.com.

There were also reports that the security forces were blocking ambulances and emergency response personnel from responding to the situation. There were even allegations that the security forces had opened fire near the hospital where protesters were being treated. Security forces were attempting to clear out protesters from a camp that was established when the demonstrations began several months ago.

After longtime Sudanese strongman Omar al-Bashir was ousted from power in April after nearly three decades in power, protesters were hopeful that a democratic transition was in the works. However, progress has stalled, with talks between the protest leaders and the Transitional Military Council, led by Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, breaking down just recently. The protesters are represented by an organization called The Forces for Declaration of Freedom and Change.

Concerned about protests spreading beyond Sudan’s borders, regional countries including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been working behind the scenes to position their own preferred power brokers. While the U.S. condemned the crackdown on protesters and called for a transfer of power to civilian control, the Saudis and Emiratis have been providing support to quasi-military leaders in Sudan, including the notorious commander of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces Lt. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan.

Also known as ‘Hemeti,’ In 2009, Hamdan was indicted by the International Criminal Court for genocide, human rights abuses, and war crimes for his role in directing the notorious Janjaweed militia in Darfur, yet has still managed to receive the backing of Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed of Abu Dhabi. Together, bin Salman and bin Zayed offered Sudan a $3 billion aid package in April, while also providing weapons and equipment to Hemeti and forces under his control.

There are clear parallels to some of the Arab Spring protests that eventually progressed to full-blown insurgencies, including Syria, where indiscriminate shelling of civilians by the military initially galvanized protest movements that helped launch a broader uprising. But there are also important differences between Sudan and other revolutions throughout the region.

Unlike Egypt, which maintains a predominantly secular military, Sudan’s military and institutions have long been linked to Islamists, dating back to the regime of Hassan al-Turabi. Elements of the Sudanese Army are naturally suspicious of Hemeti, particularly given his role in the atrocities in Darfur. This is indicative of broader internal divisions and fissures within competing power structures in Sudan.

There is a real risk that the situation could spiral into full-blown civil war, which would significantly affect the region, with spillover violence impacting the ongoing conflict in Libya. .

Americans and Europeans have become accustomed to hearing in the aftermath of terrorist attacks that the perpetrator was “on the radar” of authorities but somehow slipped through the cracks, like reported by wnd.com.

In Sri Lanka, where Christians suffered a suicide bomb attack that killed 258 on Easter, the country’s president publicly rebuked his intelligence chief on Thursday after he told a parliamentary panel that the attack could have been avoided.

Former Department of Homeland Security Islam subject matter expert Philip Haney pointed out to WND that Indian intelligence officials gave Sri Lankan intelligence specific names and dates prior to the April 21 attack.

The problem apparently was that they didn’t take seriously the group that now is the prime suspect, Tawheed Jamaat.

The group is part of the worldwide Deoband movement, which includes the Taliban and Tablighi Jamaat, the group tied to the San Bernardino terrorists by the FBI.

“Sri Lankan authorities said they didn’t believe Tawheed Jamaat had such a capacity,” noted Haney. “It was a marginal group, they said. No. Tawheed Jamaat has branches all over the world, including in the United States.”

The problem is familiar to Haney. When Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik massacred 14 people in San Bernardino, California, in December 2015, he discovered that a case he developed on the Deoband group Tablighi Jamaat might have prevented the attack if it had not been shut down by his agency and Hillary Clinton’s State Department.

In the immediate aftermath of the Orlando massacre in 2016, Haney found that the Islamic Center of Fort Pierce, Florida, attended by Omar Mateen is part of the Deoband movement.

Three years prior to the San Bernardino attack, Obama administration officials insisted that  Tablighi Jamaat members merely were students of the Quran. As recounted in Haney’s bestselling book, “See Something, Say Nothing,” the DHS Civil Rights and Civil Liberties division complained that Haney’s case and the consequent policy of denying visas to Tablighi Jamaat members was an infringement of their rights.

But like al-Qaida, the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaida in the Indian sub-continent (AQIS), the objective of these international Islamic organizations is not terrorism — that is a tactic, Haney points out — but the establishment of Islamic law over all the earth.

“That is their goal,” he said. “That the deen, or the way, of Allah, the Shariah, will prevail on the earth.”

Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwah declaring war on the United States, the Muslim Brotherhood’s “Explanatory Memo” vowing destruction of Western Civilization from within and the AQIS “Code of Conduct” bear the same message, Haney emphasized.

Haney noted that in bin Laden’s fatwah, the al-Qaida leader identified himself as part of the World Islamic Front. Half of that coalition’s members, Haney said, are Deoband groups.

He added that the attack in Sri Lanka is just one indicator that the “center of gravity” of the global Islamic movement has shifted to the Indian subcontinent.

At least 90 Deoband groups exist in Bangladesh alone, he said, and others are in the Philippines, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

“Now intelligence officers and analysts in Sri Lanka are waking up to the fact that the center of gravity is in their front yard,” said Haney.

The current wars in the Middle East, especially the ongoing conflict in Yemen, are proof that the use of small drones in insurgencies is now a permanent phenomenon of irregular warfare, according to experts.

Drones have been used in warfare in the Middle East for almost 20 years —including by outside powers like the United States. But National Public Radio’s Geoff Brumfiel reports that the wars in Iraq and Syria, and especially the war between the Yemeni government and Houthi rebels, clearly demonstrate that we have entered “a new era of drone warfare”.

The use of off-the-shelf small drones has been increasing since 2010, with the Syrian Civil War having served as a testing ground for military uses of drones by all sides involved in the conflict. Belligerents quickly realized that the use of drones —whether remotely operated from the ground, or guided by GPS coordinates— could provide useful air power “for a fraction of the cost of fighter jets” employed by national militaries, according to Brumfiel.

He quotes numerous drone warfare expects who agree that the ongoing Yemeni Civil War provides the clearest sign yet of the proliferation of drones for military and paramilitary purposes. The Houthi rebels have employed drones to attack government targets and targets such as air fields, oil installations and military bases in neighboring Saudi Arabia. Most of these drones, and the knowledge of how to modify them for military use, are given to the Houthis by Iran, according to RAND Corporation expert Ariane Tabatabai, who is quoted in Brumfiel’s article.

Iran has been developing military drone technology since the 1980s, but did not begin to employ drones outside of its airspace until 2015. The change was prompted by the emergence of the Islamic State emerged as a major Sunni threat to Shiite populations in the region. Iranian drones are now everywhere, from Iraq and Syria to Yemen.

These drones, including drones used by the Houthis, are major sources of concern for conventional armies, because they are difficult to detect and destroy, according to Center for a New American Security researcher Nicholas Heras. He told Brumfiel that small drones are difficult to locate by radar, and their flight paths are far more flexible than those of airplanes. Additionally, those drones controllers can use GPS systems to “navigate through holes” in air defenses, said Heras.

Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the self-declared caliph of the Islamic State (ISIS) appeared recently in a short video to demonstrate he is alive, well and on duty, like reported by nationalinterest.org.

Gone are the days of his declaration of so-called Caliphate and control of territories in Iraq and Syria the size of Britain with a population of almost ten million. His modest attitude in the video was an attempt to revitalize his shattering organization with a message of thankfulness to those who lost their lives in defense of ISIS, his appreciation of the loyalties of Wilayahs (Provinces) and allegiance to their global cause. It is noteworthy that Baghdadi’s appeared right after the U.S.-supported Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces captured the last territory of the ISIS in the Syrian town of Baghouz.

Baghdadi now has two options.

One is to take advantage of the chaotic situation in Syria and Iraq to lead the insurgency. The Western interest in fighting, which was mobilized against the territorial caliphate, has waned and the U.S. forces are packing to come back home. In addition to a pool of thousands of supporters, entrenched Sunni frustration in Iraq promises ongoing recruitment opportunities for ISIS. Moreover, Sunni frustration is mainly provoked by the Iranian-led groups’ sectarianism and the lack of effective governmental authority in Baghdad and Damascus.

However, Baghdadi’s second option is to sideline the idea of a territorial state but to re-organize the Islamic State into the structure of a virtual state with global franchises from Africa to Asia. There is also a high degree of possibility that ISIS can try both but would concentrate on the second option given its lessening competence for territorial control.

For instance, Baghdadi presented the Easter attacks in Sri Lanka as a response to losing the battle in Baghouz. He underlined the commitment from groups in Mali, Burkina Faso, the Western Sahara, Pakistan and Khorasan (Eastern Iran). The brochure in his video refers to West Africa, Somalia, Sinai in Egypt, Libya, Central Africa, the Caucasus and Turkey as the new Wilayahs. Additionally, ISIS later declared another Wilayah in Kashmir in India as the Wilayah of Hind. Even before these moves, ISIS was involved in most of the Jihadist terror in the West either in the form of directly executing such attack or by serving as a model of inspiration. Considering this capability in international terrorism, the following questions require urgent consideration. What would be the structure of non-territorial ISIS? What would be the new strategy of a virtual ISIS? Who will be its targets?

The counterterrorism strategy against virtual terrorism should spend serious thought on the question of “what ISIS can do.” The Islamic State does not hide that it has international support and a network of allegiances that tie lesser terrorist groups to it. This calls for a broader strategy on the emerging threat of the ISIS network. Remember that the failure against Al Qaeda at the outset was the absence of creative thinking about the use of the possible technologies and role of ideology. There is a need for forward-thinking that doesn’t completely depart from conventional and past analyses, but also does not impede new imaginations.

One should accept that there is a religious-ideological component in this struggle. This ideology excludes an overwhelming majority of the Muslims but includes the jihadists who serve its cause. After all, the Islamic State has killed more Muslims than any other faith groups. It is a well-known fact that there is strong opposition to ISIS ideology and practice within Muslim countries and populations. However, this strong opposition fails to put an end to ISIS-type radicalism in its own context.

The Islamic State lost the oil money and taxes imposed on the population under its control but is still capable of financing international terror attacks. As long as money pours to Syria and Iraq, probably in the form of reconstruction in the coming years, ISIS-affiliated groups will get their share through corruption. Furthermore, Islamic State recruits used cryptocurrencies, credit cards by false pretenses and the hawala system for financial transactions.

Another problem is that ISIS propaganda is widespread on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube despite social media outlets’ cooperation with the governments to remove its content in these platforms. It is becoming a more challenging task for the governments in an age of post–truth and private media to produce a counternarrative against the Islamic State. This is especially true in an environment where self-radicalization through online platforms has become a major challenge. There is also the destructive input of third parties on these platforms, such as from Islamophobia. Finally, the use of artificial intelligence and algorithms on both sides further complicates the situation.

The ISIS franchise system requires spreading a common psychology and mindset to affiliates in various geographies. Once Islamic State ideas and perceptions became guidelines to these affiliates, ISIS leadership will reach to a new level of operational capability in its dispersed structure. In due course, the Islamic State will not hesitate to direct or inspire war of attrition, mass casualties, destruction of critical infrastructures, targeted suicides, cyber terror, and other attacks.

The U.S. government and allies have enough resources to deal with the challenges of a non-territorial ISIS. Washington needs to work on the legal and political dimensions of counterterrorism as much as on the military and intelligence sides. There is no magic formula to counter the evolving terrorist threat, but America must see the necessity of a continuous will to fight, coalition-building and the endless search for counterterrorist narratives. The threat of a virtual Islamic State is a global issue. The strategy to counter it should match it at the same level; it should deliver a flexible and inclusive response with the ability to act in the pace of evolving threat.

On May 18, 2019, Pakistan Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa disclosed that Pakistan was strengthening the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border through fencing, construction of new forts and posts and increasing the strength of the Frontier Corps (FC) to effectively manage the troubled north-western boundary, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

He made this statement while addressing troops on forward posts along the Border at Dawatoi in the North Waziristan District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Significantly, three Pakistani soldiers were killed and seven injured on May 1, 2019, when a group of 60 to 70 terrorists from bases in Afghanistan attacked Pakistan Army troops undertaking fencing efforts in the Dawatoi area.

On May 6, 2019, one Pakistani soldier was killed and three seriously injured in a militant attack on SFs patrolling the Pak-Afghan border in the Kher Qamar area of Data Khel tehsil (revenue unit) in the North Waziristan District of KP.

On October 2, 2018, terrorists from across the Afghan border opened fire at a check-post in the North Waziristan District. The Pakistani army retaliated, killing seven terrorists. Military sources stated that, due to the extensive fencing along the border, terrorists cannot physically attack and now resort to ‘fire raids’ — concerted targeting of Pakistani assets from a distance. 

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), since 2007, there have been at least 103 militant attacks from across the border, in which 277 Pakistani SF personnel and 74 civilians were killed while another 285 sustained injuries. Two of these incidents (above) have already been reported in 2019. The whole of 2018 recorded 10 such attacks in which 19 SF personnel and 15 militants were killed. 2017 recorded 16 cross-border attacks, in which 15 SF personnel and 11 civilians were killed.

Further, the Afghan SFs fired from across the border on at least six occasions, since 2007, resulting in the death of 32 Pakistani SF personnel and 16 civilians.

Pakistani SFs have also been continuously shelling across the border. On February 22, 2019, Afghanistan complained to the United Nations (UN) about violations of its territory by Pakistan’s military, including shelling of Afghan territory, violation of its airspace by military aircraft and construction of military posts and barriers on its soil. The complaint was made in a letter sent by Afghanistan’s deputy permanent representative at the UN, Nazifullah Salarzai, to the UN Security Council President Anatolio Ndong Mba. The Afghan letter said, concerns about the violations had been conveyed to the UN several times, including through a report on recorded incidents during 2012-17. This document stated Pakistani forces fired nearly 29,000 artillery shells into Afghanistan during this period, killing 82 people and injuring 187. The letter further mentioned that, since January 2018, Pakistani troops had been involved in 161 violations and fired more than 6,000 mortar and artillery shells into Afghan territory.

The first border fencing-related skirmish was reported in the then South Waziristan Agency of the then Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in April 2007. Pakistani SFs operating in South Waziristan made a three-tier security deployment on April 11, 2007, to stop cross-border infiltration by militants into Afghanistan. Pakistan fenced 12-kilometers of its border stretch with Afghanistan to ‘choke off’ cross-border infiltration, but Afghan troops tore down the fence on April 19, leading to a gun-battle, though there were no casualties.

The conflict over the legitimacy of the Durand Line – the border imposed by Imperial Britain – between Pakistan and Afghanistan is more than a century old. However, it came to attention in September 2005, when Pakistan announced for the first time that it had plans to build a 2,611-kilometres fence (1,230 kilometres in KP and 1,381 kilometres in Balochistan) along its border with Afghanistan, purportedly to check armed militants and drug smugglers moving between the two countries. Afghanistan, expectedly and immediately, raised objections on the grounds that this was an attempt to make the disputed border permanent. On several occasions thereafter, Afghanistan has opposed Pakistani plans to fence the border. Most recently, Kabul’s Ambassador to Islamabad, Omar Zakhilwal, reiterated these objections while speaking to the media on October 10, 2018, 

Not surprisingly,since its first announcement in 2005, Pakistan’s work for mining and fencing the border has been stopped and renewed on at least three occasions. Nevertheless, Pakistan has succeeded in making some progress. Providing details, Major General Asif Ghafoor disclosed, on January 27, 2019, that work on about 900 kilometres of fencing along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border had been completed. He added that work on another roughly 1,200 kilometres, the most sensitive portion of the 2,611 kilometres long border with Afghanistan, had commenced in 2018, and was expected to be completed by the end of 2020.

The construction of 150 of the 443 planned forts under the project, some on mountaintops as high as 12,000 feet, had also been completed. Another 750 forts, with an inter-fort distance of 1.5 to 3 kilometres, are under construction or at a planning stage. Meanwhile, according to a February 10, 2018, report, at least 1,100 border posts had also been established.

Major General Ghafoor claimed that the project, which would cost about PKR 70 billion, including the cost of technical and surveillance equipment to keep strict vigil on the illicit movement from across the border, is expected to help check the movement of terrorists. Islamabad has, for long, blamed terrorists and militant coming in from Afghanistan for creating trouble inside Pakistan. After the April 17, 2019, Ormara attack in which 14 bus passengers were forcibly offloaded from a bus and shot dead, Pakistan asked both Iran and Afghanistan on April 20, to take ‘visible action’ against terrorist groups operating from their soil and also to dismantle logistics and training camps of such elements located across the border.

On the other hand, Kabul has, for long, held Pakistan responsible for violence inside Afghanistan. On February 1, 2019, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani once again accused Pakistan of sheltering Taliban insurgents and blamed Islamabad for a recent wave of urban terrorist attacks. In a televised address, President Ashraf Ghani described Pakistan as the “centre of Taliban terrorism” and demanded that Pakistani officials take swift, concrete steps to drive insurgents from their country. “The Afghan nation is waiting for clear action” from Pakistan, he said.

In a more direct reference, subsequent to emergence of reports stating that militants who participated in Ghazni attack retreated to Pakistan and were receiving medical treatment there, President Ghani stated, on August 27, 2018,

While Pakistan is building fences and fortifying the border on the pretext of stopping cross border infiltration, Afghanistan is opposing the action claiming it as a malicious move to legalise the contentious border. The AfPak border remains volatile, and little is expected to change.