The most significant feature of our modern world is the large-scale popularization and application of the Internet, which has transformed our society and formed a substantial information society, like reported by moderndiplomacy.eu.

Initially, the information society was only a theoretical projection, but it has now become a reality. When the world transforms into an information society, the great impact of such a transformation will be felt. The governance structures of the world have not prepared for such changes, and thus are unable to deal with these transformations effectively, resulting in massive risks and social disorder.

In the field of information and anti-terrorism, a major concern is the impact of the Internet. The Internet has accelerated the flow of information, and the boundary of truth and falsehood are at times, indistinguishable. At the same time, social conditions can be exaggerated online. Combined with the psychological activities and circumstances of the masses, it is extremely easy to create a larger scale of dissatisfaction which will, to a certain extent, lead to the collapse of the original social ideological and belief systems. The United States and Western countries ignoring the social and stage of countries and regions in the Mediterranean region, Africa, and the Middle East and Central Asian countries, blindly export their ideology, and driven by the amplification effect of the Internet, this process of collapse has been accelerated.

A terrorist organization such as ISIS has harnessed the great potentials offered by the Internet, and as such, it laid the foundation for the large-scale development of ISIS’s information warfare. First of all, the Islamic State has established a professional public relations organization, responsible for producing and disseminating content. ISIS has its homepage and accounts on major social networking sites, and even has multi-layered sub-accounts, thereby evading censorship. They launched DABIQ, an attractively designed online magazine with extremely provocative content, and developed a smartphone app called Dawn of Glad Tidings, focusing on the Western “high-end customer base” as their target group to inform them of the latest “news of jihad in real-time”. In addition, the Islamic State has also launched the online game, which creates scenarios for players to attack the U.S. military, police, and civilians, and rewards criminal acts and even terrorist attacks in the game.

Today, ISIS can be seen almost on all social media platforms and is accessible in Western countries. It has thousands of accounts on Twitter alone, including both organized public accounts and terrorist personal accounts. ISIS is proficient in the so-called “viral marketing” model in information warfare. Through the user’s network, the information spreads like a virus and spreads to thousands of audiences using rapid replication. The organizer clearly achieves the word-of-mouth “relationship marketing” by providing a certain product or service, allowing others to become “marketing and communication levers” inadvertently.

ISIS is often far more professional and sensitive than the government departments of various countries that hold the power of national governance. It has long been keenly aware of the evolution of political discourse from propaganda to information dissemination in contemporary society, and this trend is one of the keys that is enabling it to lead public opinion. Traditional propaganda methods such as sermons and speeches, obviously, lack interaction with the target audience. Therefore, ISIS encourages followers to use various websites as platforms to establish various forms of “self-media”. ISIS also cultivate Internet influencers to encourage netizens to create audio messages, videos and even websites. As ISIS cleverly hides its ambitions behind high-level productions and attractive propaganda, more and more people in the West, especially young people, have been successfully brainwashed, are actively participating in the dissemination of ISIS-related information, even going to the Middle East to become jihadists on the battlefield and gain the satisfaction of realizing their supposed self-worth.

This kind of information warfare was so successful that in 2016, the official website of Tsinghua University in China was hacked by ISIS hackers where ISIS recruitment advertisements were posted. In the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has found cases where teenagers as young as 15 years old were recruited by ISIS, and in some cases in the United States, parents even encouraged their children to participate in terrorist organizations. In fact, the information warfare of ISIS is very active and successful not only in Western countries but also in Turkey and Syria. As a result, ISIS has obtained the human resources of thousands of sacrificial young people.

The information society and the Internet have created a huge imbalance for the future world, making this world an unbalanced world and a world in transition. The formation of various transnational virtual organizations is now possible using simple network tools. This also means that terrorist organizations like ISIS cannot theoretically be eliminated at all. They can easily evolve into virtualized organizations that exist everywhere and can be found by search engines at any time due to the ubiquity of the information society and the Internet.

They will continue to grow, gain popularity, and evolve into a new type of network-based anti-government organization. Terrorist organizations of various types have shifted their focus from the real world to the virtual world, and then back again. This is the enormous governance challenge that the information society will undoubtedly face in the future.

Final analysis conclusion:

Although ISIS faces restrictions as it is a terrorist organization, it has used the information society and the Internet to launch successful information warfare and has achieved remarkable results worldwide. In an age of information asymmetry, simple and easy network tools have made it possible to establish a variety of transnational virtual organizations. This will pose a huge governance challenge to the future information society.

Reports on Sunday of a drone attack on the home of Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi represent a major escalation in the region, like reported by jopost.com.

It represents the increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles, primarily by Iranian-backed groups, to spread terror throughout the Middle East. It also represents the increased use of drones as a strategic weapon, in this case, with the goal of intimidating the Iraqi prime minister just days after security forces clashed with pro-Iranian protesters.

It’s likely that the attack was carried out by pro-Iranian militias as there are probably no other culprits in Iraq who have drones that could or would attack the Iraqi prime minister.

While ISIS has used drones in the past, it’s not clear why they would suddenly emerge now to target the Iraqi leader and that leaves Iran-backed groups firmly in the frame.

While official reports have not yet specified what group was behind the attack and no one has yet taken responsibility for it, the trend of such attacks in the region points to Iranian-linked groups.

A drone was used to attack a US garrison at Tanf in Syria in October. In July, a drone was used to attack a commercial tanker in the Gulf of Oman, killing two crew members. In both instances, the US and other countries have pointed the finger at Iran.

In May, a drone was launched from Iraq, or possibly from Syria, targeting Israel during the 11-day war with Hamas. It is believed that Iran was also behind this attack.

For years, Iran has been building more sophisticated drones for surveillance and kamikaze-style attacks. The drones have become better at navigation and pre-programmed flight paths, or even real-time intelligence gathering. The fact they have targeted a moving ship is a clear indication of this.

An attack on the residence of Kadhimi is also a likely message by pro-Iran groups in Iraq that the prime minister is not immune.

Iraqi armed forces announced the start of investigations to discover the location of the launch of the booby-trapped drone that targeted Kadhimi, according to reports. Images showed the damage to the home, but it is unclear if drone fragments had been found that would link the design to any single country or entity.
One of the reasons pro-Iran groups — including Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis in Yemen — use drones, is that it is difficult to trace their launch site and to know who is behind them once they are launched.

Israel has, in the past, accused Iran of creating a drone training center. Drones from Iran and technology from Iran have been key to aiding Houthi efforts to attack Saudi Arabia.

Since January, the pro-Iran militias in Iraq have increasingly used drones to target US forces. This has occurred even in Erbil where the pro-Iran militias used a drone in the spring of 2021 to target what US media called, at the time, a CIA hangar at Erbil airport. Pro-Iran groups have done parades with drones.

But, the kind of drone used to attack the Iraqi premier may be smaller than some of the kamikaze drones, which tend to be larger than a human.
Locating parts of the equipment will be important, but Iraq’s security services may be reticent to conclude that Iran or any of its proxy groups were behind the attack.

Why? Because in previous incidents where Iraq’s prime minister has acted against pro-Iranian groups engaged in illegal attacks, they succeeded in freeing their jailed members as a result.

Now, the groups, most linked to the Fatah party in parliament and the paramilitary Hashd al-Shaabi, have been conducting a sit-in to demand the overturn of recent election results. This kind of election protest is designed to raise tensions and pressure the prime minister.

The problem that Iraq’s government is facing is that the militias are often tied to official paramilitary forces because former Iraqi prime minister, Haider Abadi, pushed to give the militias a legitimate role.

The militias were given increased power in 2014, based on some existing pro-Iran units, to fight ISIS but after the war on ISIS ended, the militias refused to go home and Abadi, who was backed by the US, empowered the militias.

They soon began taking over the border area of Albukamal in Syria, next to Iraq’s Al-Qaim, and funneling weapons from Iran to Hezbollah. They have been targeted by airstrikes, several of which were carried out by the US in retaliation for their attacks.

In Syria, after the decade-long and still unfinished war, the energy shortage resulting from the loss of control over the main oil fields in the East was replenished mainly by Iran and through smuggling from the Lebanon and Iraq. Nevertheless, due to a collapse in oil prices, increased sanctions and military pressure on Iran, the delivery programme was interrupted, like reported by israeldefense.co.il.

Another blow to the Syrian economy came from the financial crisis in the Lebanon: about a quarter of the deposits in Lebanese banks belong to Syrian companies, including those associated with the government. The introduction of currency restrictions in the Lebanon slowed down transactions for the import of essential goods, including the purchase of wheat, disrupted the supply chain for spare parts and components and led to a sharp increase in prices.

Under these conditions, the Syrian government can only print money, rely on Iranian loans and force Syrian businessmen to help the State directly. Earlier this year, a banknote of 5,000 Syrian Pounds (about 3.98 US dollars) was put into circulation, while the previous maximum denomination was 2,000 Syrian Pounds.

In 2011, Syria ranked 33rd in terms of oil production, after South Sudan and ahead of Vietnam. While in 2011 its production share was 0.4% of the world volume, in 2012 that figure dropped to 0.25% (BP Statistical Review of World Energy calculations).

In the Middle East, the Syrian share before the outbreak of armed clashes was also very small: 1.2% of all production in the region in 2011 and 0.75% in 2012 (BP Statistical Review of World Energy calculations).

The level of oil production in Syria in 2010 was 386,000 barrels per day. With the onset of the crisis in 2011, production fell to 333,300 barrels, and in 2012 it was already almost half the volume of 2011, i.e. 182,000 barrels. In the autumn of 2015, Russia intervened with military means in the Syrian conflict: upon Bashar al-Assad’s initiative, Russian military advisers were deployed in the West of the country.

This changed the entire course of the conflict: it enabled Assad to remain in power and made Russia a major political player in the region. At that time, Russia’s relations with Western countries were in deep crisis due to the return of Crimea to its traditional borders and the outbreak of war in the Donbass.

The intervention in the Syrian conflict changed the dynamics of Russia’s contacts with the international community: In particular, cooperation between the Russian military and the United States of America intensified and relations with Israel reached a new level (the Jewish country has recently opened a new consulate in Yekaterinburg).

From a tactical viewpoint, Russia can be considered one of the beneficiaries of the conflict. The successful, relatively low-budget military operation quickly turned Russia into a key external player in the Syrian arena. As far as can be judged, however, in six years of direct involvement in the Syrian conflict, Russia has not developed an exit strategy. The extent of Russia’s influence on the Syrian regime also remains an open issue.

The active phase of the Russian military operation in Syria lasted 804 days, from September 30, 2015 to December 11, 2017. As a result of the Russian air force attacks, over 133,000 terrorist facilities were destroyed, including illegal oil refineries; 865 gang leaders were eliminated and over 133,000 followers were neutralised (4,500 came from Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States).

In December 2017, during a visit to the Khmeimim air base, President Vladimir Putin ordered the withdrawal of most Russian troops from the country.

According to the Defence and Security Committee of the Council of the Russian Federation, as of September 2018 Russian casualties in Syria since the start of the operation have amounted to 112 people – almost half in the crash of the An-26 transport plane (39 people) and of the Il-20 one shot down by anti-government Syrian forces’ anti-aircraft (20 people).

Furthermore, Bloomberg and Reuters reported that hundreds of Russian mercenaries were killed in Syria. The Russian Defence Ministry, however, did not confirm those figures.

At the same time, Russia has two points of presence in the Syrian Arab Republic. The aforementioned Khmeimim air base, where an air group is deployed, which, in 2018, included 28 combat aircraft of the Russian air force, and ten transport and special aircraft and nine helicopters.

Moreover, the naval logistics centre is located in the port of Tartus. In December 2019, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, who oversaw the defence industry, said that over the following four years it was planned to invest 500 dollars million in the modernisation of Tartus, the management of which had been entrusted to the Russian Prime Minister.

The precise number of Russian military and civilian personnel in these two sites is unknown. According to the Central Electoral Commission, in 2020 in Syria, 6,424 Russians took part in the vote on amendments to the Russian Constitution.

The combat experience gained by the Russian officer and non-commissioned officer corps is also relevant. During the period of counter-terrorist operations in the North Caucasus, the control, planning, financing and supply centres were located outside Russia – hence the operation in Syria was necessary from a political-military viewpoint.

If the ISIS pseudo-State with all the resources of that country had emerged on the Syrian territory, it would have posed a deadly threat to neighbouring States, starting with the Western European ones, by financing and swelling the ranks of terrorists. We can thank Russia and certainly not the United States, which has begun to destabilise Syria as the final stop on the Chinese Silk Road.

In fact, neither the European Union nor the United States of America have imposed full sanctions against Russia due to the conflict in Syria, but only some partial ones. The US personal restrictions apply to twelve individuals and seven Russian companies: Tempbank, AKB RFA Bank, Rosoboronexport, Russian Financial Corporation, Global Concept Groups, Promsyryeimport, Maritime Assistance.

Russian companies do not yet carry out large-scale activities in Syria. Earlier, the Financial Times wrote that Stroytransgaz’s subsidiary, Stroytransgaz Logistics, associated with the family of billionaire Gennady Timchenko, obtained permission from the Syrian authorities to extract phosphates, as well as a contract to manage the port of Tartus for deliveries abroad.

Timchenko, however, is already subject to US sanctions and the EU does not ban the supply of phosphates. The media also wrote about businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin’s interests in Syria. It was claimed that in 2019 the Syrian Parliament approved the conclusion of contracts for oil exploration, development and production with two Russian companies – Vilada and Mercury Limited.

Novaya Gazeta wrote that both companies were connected to Prigozhin’s facilities, to which the media had previously related the activities of Wagner’s Private Military Company (PMC). The businessman himself denied the existence of such a connection. Prigozhin, however, is already subject to sanctions by both the EU and the USA.

Nevertheless, the sanctions are hampering Russian companies’ wider participation in the Syrian economy. During Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Abu Dhabi, UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan complained that the law “on the protection of Syria’s civilian population” – the

“Caesar Act”, adopted in the United States of America and in force since June 2020, which strengthens the existing restrictions on Syria’s allies and expands them – complicates the country’s relations with Syria and interferes with the establishment of a dialogue. The Russian Foreign Ministry called this a serious interference with the provision of even humanitarian aid to the country.

What is the prospect of a political solution in the country? Turkey, the United States and their other sponsors maintain their interests in the region, which means they cannot be taken for granted. Syria has lost its sovereignty and decisions are often taken without it by Russia, Turkey and Iran.

We can therefore say that Assad won the war, but did not achieve peace, and the opposition lost the war, but did not lose peace. Moreover, many Syrians do not live in the territories controlled by the regime.

Assad’s regime will continue to give proof of miracles of survival against the backdrop of growing economic problems, new sanctions and the ongoing power struggle in Damascus itself. In the near future, the country surely expects neither the full restoration of territorial integrity, nor the return of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons, nor a large-scale plan for post-conflict reconstruction. Neither European nor Gulf countries have the financial resources to do this.

At the same time, the Chinese government is strongly opposing the use of force to resolve the Syrian issue and has advocated a political solution to the internal issue. In the process of rebuilding Syria, China has put forward the idea of developing the Silk Road Initiative and post-conflict reconstruction, and it has received a positive and proactive response from the Syrian government.

The connection between the Silk Road and post-conflict reconstruction is a historic opportunity for the two countries to achieve interconnectedness. The current internal situation in Syria, however, is still subject to many uncertainties and the current security risks need to be carefully examined, as noted above.

The friendship between China and Syria has a long-standing tradition and the ancient Silk Road is a symbol of this mutual feeling. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Syria was one of the first Arab countries to recognise and establish diplomatic relations with China.

In the aftermath of the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the Chinese government took the UN Charter and the basic rules of international relations as the principles and fundamental steps to deal with the Syrian crisis and firmly opposed the military solution, which was aimed precisely at breaking the Silk Road.

In 2018, the focus of Sino-Syrian relations began to shift from the Syrian civil war to the country’s post-conflict reconstruction. With the gradual improvement of the internal situation in Syria and the stabilisation of security, the Chinese government readily suggested to Syria it wished to participate in the post-war reconstruction process, thus resuming to restore and strengthen the Silk Road, which hetero-directed terrorism from the West had tried to disrupt.

The Chinese government not only adheres to a policy of impartial political resolution of the Syrian issue and actively participates in the UN-led multilateral peace process negotiations on the Syrian issue, but also provides a large amount of free humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people for free.

The Silk Road in Syria is of great importance geopolitically and strategically. Infrastructure construction, energy and industrial cooperation, as well as seaport construction projects are key areas of China’s participation in Syria’s reconstruction. At the same time, China should also address the uncertain risks of Syria’s internal security situation and the influence of political games between the major powers.

Here lies Syria’s tragic recent past, and a desirable future of peace and prosperity.

The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan is transforming the regional landscape and unnerving neighbouring countries. Central Asian countries face migration flows, humanitarian challenges and political uncertainty. The post-American Afghanistan also provides Moscow and Beijing, as well several other regional powers like Tehran and Islamabad, with opportunities to enhance regional engagement as the world moves towards multipolarity, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

China and Russia, and regional powers, are eager to increase their influence in Central Asia, though with divergent goals. No single power is capable of taking on the security role the United States played.

The Taliban’s success should not have taken regional actors by surprise. Popular grievances across Afghanistan towards inept and corrupt governance delegitimised the government of now deposed president Ashraf Ghani and facilitated the Taliban’s takeover. Most worrying to Central Asian leaders is that they are facing similar grievances at home, a trend pushing governments to curtail public dissent, opposition sentiment and overt displays of religion.

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which border Afghanistan, have fortified their frontier zones and are eager to avoid large-scale refugee flows and militant movements across their borders. These countries experience high poverty rates and growing human insecurity, which has been made worse by COVID-19. With electricity shortages of their own, Central Asian capitals now face the question of cutting off electricity exports to Afghanistan, which can no longer pay for them, likely exacerbating the humanitarian situation in urban areas.

Uzbekistan is the most willing to engage with the Taliban. As one of the world’s two double landlocked countries, it has invested heavily in regional transportation infrastructure to reach global markets via South Asia and wants to protect those ambitions.

Tajikistan’s government has long been wary of the Taliban and serves as a refuge of anti-Taliban Afghan dissent. Given the large Tajik minority in Afghanistan, Tajikistan has also made clear that any recognition of the Taliban would be contingent on creating an ethnically inclusive government.

The Taliban’s victory provides Moscow with a potential opening to reassert its influence in Central Asia. Russia seeks to exploit the US withdrawal and growing perception that the United States is not committed to its allies or regional partners. It has presented itself as a key hard power security provider for Central Asia — a region that Russia views as part of its ‘sphere of influence’ and where it has two overseas bases.

In August 2021, Uzbekistan participated in a virtual summit of the Cooperative Security Treaty Organisation, a military alliance of former Soviet states that it has exited twice over disagreements with Moscow. There is speculation that Uzbek membership may be back on the table. Russian forces have held joint training exercises with their Uzbek counterparts along the Afghan–Uzbek border and joint drills with Tajikistan.

But expanding its security footprint deeper into Central Asia poses risks. Russia is stretched thin between deployments to Armenia–Azerbaijan, Syria and Ukraine. Moscow also has a poor track record of living up to its security commitments to its allies. It stood on the sidelines when ethnic violence rocked Kyrgyzstan in 2010, despite government requests for help, and in April 2021, when intercommunal violence occurred along the Kyrgyz–Tajik border.

Washington sees Central Asia, particularly the bordering countries of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as partners in its efforts to stabilise the region after the withdrawal. The Biden administration has sought permission to conduct limited military operations — likely drone operations — from both countries and to secure safe-harbour for Afghan migrants seeking refuge. Biden even deployed Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman to Tashkent for discussions — an indication the US sees Uzbekistan in particular as strategic regional interlocutor.

But gaining permission for any renewed US military presence in the region has been an uphill battle. Moscow and Beijing are using their economic influence, political clout and disinformation to tarnish Washington’s image among its partners and actively discouraging them from allowing any US security presence on their territory.

Beijing views Central Asia as a buffer zone between the instability in Afghanistan and Xinjiang. China is gradually expanding its security footprint in Central and South Asia to protect its financial investments and prevent the region from becoming a haven for ethnic Uyghurs. Beijing has enhanced counterterrorism cooperation, established a small military facility on the Afghan–Tajik border, is constructing additional security infrastructure in the country, and pressured local governments to repatriate ethnically Uyghur Chinese citizens.

Yet China has a mixed reputation in the region. Local governments want Chinese investment, but the publics are wary of China’s mistreatment of its Muslim citizens — including ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. Chinese businesses in Central Asia are facing popular backlashes due to the lack of transparency in their operations and employment practices.

The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan enhances the prospects for cooperation between the Russian, Chinese and Central Asian governments, but does not guarantee it. Both Beijing and Moscow enjoy far greater economic clout in Central Asia than any Western state does, due in part to geographic proximity. Yet, regional states remain wary of Beijing and Moscow, and will seek ways to keep the West, especially the United States, engaged in the region.

Central Asian states are also reaching out to smaller regional powers, including India, Iran, Japan, Pakistan and South Korea, indicating that regional elites hope to continue their long-standing foreign policy balancing acts. Yet these powers have divergent interests and Central Asian capitals have often seen Iranian and Pakistani ambitions as destabilising in the region.

This emerging landscape in Central and South Asia is a clear example of the shift towards a messier multi-polar world, where great and rising powers and local actors increasingly collide.

Africa was supposed to be the Islamic State’s success story. Observers saw the group’s rising attacks there as proof that the continent had become the new center of global jihad. In August 2021, the United Nations even declared that “the most alarming development in recent months is [the Islamic State’s] relentless spread across the African continent”, like reported by warontherocks.com.

In reality, the Islamic State faces many problems in Africa, largely of its own making. Chief among them is factionalism. Three prominent African jihadists died over the last few months, two at the hands of other jihadists. Where the Islamic State attempted to exploit local grievances, it has now been sucked into local conflicts. To the disappointment of the Islamic State’s leaders, the group is now party to fights between different Fulani clans, and between nomads and farmers.

The deaths of three legendary jihadists — Abubakar Shekau, Abu Musab al Barnawi, and Adnan Abu Whalid al Sahrawi — reveal the limitations of the Islamic state in the region, as well as the way local conflicts feed into organizational rivalries. Internal disputes are compromising the Islamic State in West Africa, and the Central Islamic State has had little success in addressing the problems.

Factionalization

Just summarizing the evolution of the Islamic State in West Africa conveys how deeply factionalized it is. The organization often referred to as Boko Haram (it called itself Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna lil Da’wa Wal Jihad, meaning “People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad”), swore allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015. Then, in 2016, it split into two. One faction, led by the son of the group’s founder, stayed loyal to the central leadership of the Islamic State and became known as the Islamic State’s West African Province. The other faction, led by Abubakar Shekau kept the name Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna.

In 2019, the Islamic State’s West African Province was granted control over the Islamic State in Greater Sahara, which operated in the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali. After incorporating the Islamic State in Greater Sahara, the Islamic State’s West African Province dramatically increased its activity in the border areas between Niger and Mali and its power seemed to be on the rise.

But even as it expanded and incorporated other groups, the Islamic State’s West African Province could not escape its own past divisions. Its 2016 split with Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna set the stage for two of the three most important jihadist deaths in 2021. After 2016, Shekau, the leader of Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna, had concentrated his forces around the Sambisa Forest in Northeast Nigeria close to the Cameroonian border. But his Islamic State rivals were close on his heels. In May 2021, they were powerful enough to lead an attack deep into the Sambisa that killed Abubakar Shekau.

During the summer of 2021 the Islamic State’s West African Province tried to capitalize on this victory by releasing speeches in the Hausa language accusing Shekau of targeting Muslim civilians, imposing forced marriages, and supporting the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The goal of this propaganda was to convince remaining Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna members to abandon the group, and it seemed to work. During the summer of 2021, a large number of fighters — some sources say 2,000, others as many as 6,000 — surrendered. Some did so because they did not want to join the Islamic States West African Province after it killed their old leader. Others surrendered because they were finally allowed to leave after being forced by Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna to stay in Sambisa against their own will. The rates of surrender suggested that Shekau’s “Boko Haram,” estimated to have between 1,500 and 3,000 men at its peak, was dying.

As a result, many expected Shekau’s death would enable the Islamic State’s West African Province to govern a more unified jihadist movement in Northeast Nigeria. But instead Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna was able to benefit from its own decentralization in fighting back. Since 2016, a smaller Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna group had remained in operation around Lake Chad, recruiting from the local Budumas, an ethnic group that lived largely of fishing and that had a troubled relationship with the Chadian state. Two notable leaders emerged in this group: Bakura Shalaba Modu and Bakura Doro. The Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna sub-group around Lake Chad became known as the Bakura group. Importantly, it was located far away from Sambisa, and thus well positioned to keep up the fight against the Islamic State after Shekau’s death.

In August, it appears the Bakura group struck back by killing the leader of the Islamic State’s West African Province, Abu Musab al Barnawi. When reports of Barnawi’s death started to surface, some local sources suggested that he had been killed by Nigerian forces. However, the Nigerian army, which has often claimed responsibility for killings it did not carry out and even declared jihadist leaders dead who were still alive, did not take credit for the death of Barnawi. Our local sources close to defectors from the organization pointed to an attack by the Bakura group, which had been actively targeting the Islamic State ever since Shekau’s killing in May.

The Bakura group’s success will change the dynamics of Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna as a whole. Bakura Shalaba announced Shekau’s death on behalf of the whole organization, indicating an increased importance for him and the Bakura group. Indeed, several reports suggest that Bakura Shalaba was the new Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna leader. This will give the group a new center of gravity in the Lake Chad region. It will also change the ethnic composition of the Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna leadership by adding several individuals of Nigerian and Chadian background. Local sources also report that several of the former Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna commanders that swore allegiance to the Islamic State have returned to the group after Barnawi’s death. In short, Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna seems to be bouncing back, albeit in a weakened state.

Yet we cannot completely rule out another possible explanation for Barnawi’s death: infighting within the Islamic State’s West African Province. There have seen signs of such splits in the past (e.g., when the group executed its veteran commander, Mamman Nur, in 2018). In 2019, Abu Mus’ab al Barnawi’s had seemingly stepped down or had been removed from his position, to be replaced by Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar al Barnawi. Confusingly, this was only announced by media affiliated with the Islamic State’s West African Province, not by central Islamic State channels. Then, in 2021, Abu Musab al Barnawi announced that he had been reinstated as the group’s head. In short, regardless of which explanation of the Barnawai’s death is correct, factionalism within the West African jihadi movement is clearly taking its toll.

Making matters worse for the Islamic State’s West African Province, the group’s Mali branch was facing a host of other problems. Initially, it had successfully taken advantage of Fulani politics, and Fulani grievances towards the central state in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The group’s deep embeddedness in Fulani disputes strengthened its presence in the tri-border area by facilitating local recruitment and earning the group local allies. But it also came at a cost. To maintain the support of these local allies, the Islamic State also had to fight in their local conflicts.

Consider an example described by scholars Tor A. Benjaminsen and Boubacar Ba. The local al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, more specifically the sub-group Katiba Macina, had joined with several traditional Fulani leaders in reinstating grazing fees for certain types of grass pastures. As a result, many pastoralists from the inner Niger delta in Mali joined with the Islamic State to resist this new financial burden. As conflict over grazing fees escalated, the Fulani sub-groups that sided with the Islamic State lost many clashes. This, combined with resistance to some of the group’s other policies, had already weakened the Islamic State when its leader, Adnan Abou Walid al Sahrawi, was killed by French forces in August 2021.

Conclusion

So where does this leave the West African jihadi movement as whole? The deaths of Shekau, Barnawi, and Sahrawi are a setback for West Africa’s jihadists, but not a long-term defeat.

Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna has re-emerged like a phoenix from the ashes. The rise of the Bakura group cannot fully compensate for the loss of strength following Shekaus’ death, but it will enable Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna to remain powerful away from the Sambisa Forest.

The Islamic State’s West African Province is no longer on the rise. It has been checked by its own factionalism and its involvement in local conflicts, including Fulani fights in the Tri-border area, and ethnic conflicts around Lake Chad. But the Islamic State will almost certainly rebuild, particularly as locals continue to seek sources of protection in the absence of state-provided security.

As the Islamic State’s West African Province re-emerges, clashes with Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna will likely resume, along with internal conflicts. So long as local states fail to address rural security issues for local ethnic groups, these factional battles will remain the most meaningful check on the expansion of jihadism in West Africa.

Iraq’s parliamentary elections rarely produce surprises. But the elections that were held this month constituted a potential make-or-break moment amidst widespread social unrest, systemic violence against civilians, and an existential economic crisis, like reported by brookings.edu.

Muqtada al-Sadr’s victory is an example of strategic acumen within a movement that continues its transition from insurgency to government, propelled by a yearning for respite and leadership, and by rampant destitution within Iraqi society. Almost 32% of Iraq’s population could soon be impoverished. But it is precisely this despair that has resulted in the emergence of a protest movement that considers Sadr and his militia to be part of the problem, and complicit in the bloodshed that has engulfed the country, including violence against protesters. In its electoral debut, the bloc representing the protesters, Imtidad, secured 10 seats out of 329, a remarkable feat for a movement that is subjected to systemic assassinations and contested the elections amid unprecedented voter apathy.

There will consequently be tricky waters for President Joe Biden’s administration to navigate. Now is the moment for the administration to double down on its diplomatic efforts to develop and exercise a political strategy for a shifting political landscape, one that requires managing two prevailing contradictions that represent Iraq’s reality for decades to come: the superiority of militias in Baghdad and a protest movement that yearns for democratic rights and good governance.

IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAN
Some observers will see these elections as an opportune moment to combat Iran’s influence. Iran’s proxies within the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) — the umbrella militia organization established to fight the self-proclaimed Islamic State — saw their seats reduced to 17, down from the 57 they won in 2018. The organization’s defeat contrasts with the success of their foremost rivals, the Sadrists, who won 74 seats (an increase from the 54 they won in 2018). But Sadr should not be complacent. While Sadr will reign politically supreme for the foreseeable future, he still has political rivals that the PMF and its allies, with Iran’s support, can exploit to manage the fallout from their loss.

These rivals include Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq’s former prime minister and leader of the Islamic Dawa Party who was responsible for the collapse of the army in 2014 when ISIS took control of Mosul. He has long been at odds with Muqtada and his State of Law coalition won 34 seats in the elections. Hence, even with Sadr’s impressive victory, the current state of play can hardly be described as insurmountable for the PMF and Iran. Iran and its proxies can find ways to cope.

But Iraq is entering a new phase in its political history that the PMF and its Iranian sponsors are ill-equipped to manage, one in which coercive power may not be sufficient. Together with Iran, the PMF is learning the hard way that power through the barrel of a gun is not sustainable. Its brutality has alienated supporters and large segments of the society that once thought of them as battle-field heroes in the campaign against ISIS.

While the Sadrist movement is also complicit in human rights abuses, the movement can draw on its decades of support to the destitute and disenfranchised, a legacy that preceded their transition to an insurgency in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion and established the infrastructure that has been so critical to their ascension. The PMF’s key factions, on the other hand, have yet to make that transition from militias that emerged from the ruins of the invasion to credible social movements or political actors that can provide at least some sections of the society with a stake in the future of their country.

THE PMF’S VULNERABILITIES HAVE BEEN EXPOSED
The PMF is vulnerable. After its Iran-aligned militias turned their guns on Iraqi civilians, factions within the organization that were not aligned with Iran — namely, the groups aligned with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani — withdrew last year and now constitute direct rivals. The PMF must also manage the emergence of a protest movement that is becoming a political force committed to shifting the tide of public opinion against the PMF and Iran.

The PMF is contesting the electoral results. Militia heads have issued threats against the officials that oversaw the elections. The factions that comprise the PMF collectively secured more votes than the Sadrists, but they lacked a viable strategy and consequently struggled to secure as many seats. These are desperate times for the PMF: it does not constitute a cohesive political force or social movement, and has been in a state of tumult. Its leading factions are widely disdained because of their atrocities and their defeat in this election is symbolically catastrophic and could set the tone for their future political contestations.

If the PMF views its challenges as existential, the immediate future is dangerous. In practice, that means losing access to the $2.6 billion budget allocated to it as a state-sanctioned auxiliary force, a designation that is detached from reality since the PMF operates outside of the state, and has threatened and attacked the military, U.S. personnel, and Kurdistan.

A reduced budget could be a red line, since it effectively means losing patronage networks and a diminished capacity to mobilize fighters. It imposes extra pressure on Iran’s finances and ability to maintain its militia network in Iraq. Tehran has struggled to prop up this network since the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign and the onset of the pandemic.

NAVIGATING TRICKY WATERS
This is an opportune moment. The reverberations of the PMF’s defeat will intensify the organization’s internal disarray and makes it highly unlikely that the organization will ever reclaim popular support. Since the PMF first emerged in 2014, U.S. policymakers have formulated policies around the idea that the PMF enjoys substantial grassroots support and social legitimacy. U.S. sanctions or airstrikes, for example, have been dismissed as viable policies or undertaken in limited fashion on the basis that such measures could embolden the PMF locally and swell its ranks. But such reasoning is no longer plausible.

The U.S. and its European allies must reconsider how they develop strategic relations with Iraq’s political actors. Beyond the PMF, there are others who fan the flames of ethnic and sectarian tensions. The National State Forces Alliance led by Haidar al-Abadi of the Islamic Dawa Party and Ammar al-Hakim of the Hikma Movement, managed only five seats. Abadi’s political irrelevance notwithstanding, al-Hakim still commands a strong support base and has been a voice of moderation in a toxic environment of demagogues and militants. Abadi, on the other hand, far from attempting to calm tensions, attempted to deflect focus away from his poor performance by celebrating his infamous decision to attack the Peshmerga in the wake of the Kurdish independence referendum in 2017 when he was prime minister, which, ironically, was undertaken to improve his prospects of winning the 2018 elections. He came third.

It is here that Washington can put the pieces of a strategy together, focused in equal measure on the protest movement, moderate actors, and Western interests in Iraq. The U.S. should underpin its Iraq policy with the fact that its allies now command a significant chunk of the political landscape, with the Kurdistan Democratic Party securing 32 seats and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan winning 17 seats (for a combined total of 49 seats). The Taqadum party led by parliament speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi won 37 seats. A coalition of moderates — comprised of Kurdistan, Halbousi, al-Hakim and a selection of independents whose interests and values are aligned with those of the West — is the best hope of transforming the PMF’s decline into an opportunity.

The U.S. must work out what it wants. The political elimination of the PMF is not possible, but containing it is, and there will be no better moment for Biden to signal steadfast U.S. commitment and support by convening the coalition of Iraqi moderates. Such support could improve the Iraqis’ ability to work with each other, and enhance their negotiating position to contain the PMF’s attempts to re-assert itself. At the least, Secretary of State Antony Blinken should undertake a visit to Iraq at the earliest opportunity. Iraq’s political transition may take many months, but the contours of the post-election environment are shaped early on.

Empowering a robust Western-aligned coalition will ease the West’s job of engaging the Sadrists, a bloodstained movement with a total disregard for basic human rights but that nevertheless represents Iraq’s reality for the foreseeable future. A strong coalition would improve U.S.-aligned Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s prospects of securing another term and imposes political costs on the PMF if it opts to coerce its rivals.

Critically, it could insulate the protesters from violence by providing them with political cover, without which the militias will have carte blanche. It could empower the protesters to make the crucial transition into a viable political force. Iraq’s political system might be impervious to major restructuring, but the protest movement can still engage with some of Iraq’s most established political actors as they navigate dangerous waters.

France has begun withdrawing its troops from northern Mali as part of plans to reorganise its anti-insurgent forces deployed in the Sahel region under Operation Barkhane, like reported by theafricareport.com.

French army bases in Kidal, Tessalit and Timbuktu will be closed by the end of the year and handed over to the Malian army. Air support will be maintained. But the current contingent of 5,100 French troops will be reduced to roughly 3,000. Adejuwon Soyinka asked Mady Ibrahim Kanté to explain the significance of the changes.

What has changed since France first intervened in 2013?
France intervened in Mali in 2013, “following the request” from the transitional government of President Dioncounda Traore to help combat terrorism.

At the time, the then French President François Hollande declared that the objective of the intervention was to “fight against terrorism”.

The declared intention was to deploy French troops in Mali alongside the Malian army to stop Islamist forces from going to the south. But it could be argued that the strategic objective of the intervention was the protection of French security and economic interests in the Sahel and West African region.

The initial focus was on the interior of Mali. But the reality is that terrorism is a cross-border phenomenon. In effect France’s intervention was aimed at imposing a reverse domino effect that would allow it to face the terrorist groups in the region – and to impose itself again in the Sahel.

But there are few visible or effective results on the ground after eight years of war in Mali. And opinion has started to turn as Malians, as well as the country’s transitional authority, see the security situation in the country getting worse day by day.

While the France intervention was meant to help Mali combat terrorism, the crisis in the region has metamorphosed into an internal ethnic conflict. In the Mopti region, there is conflict between the Fulani and Dogons, as well as between the Bambara and Fulani. In Timbuktu and Gao there is conflict between the Touaregs and Arabs on the one hand, and between the Touaregs and the Songhais on the other.

The French forces face many challenges, in terms of protecting civilians, this is according to a recent report by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) in Mali.

In addition, France is accused of protecting and supporting armed separatist groups in Kidal, one of the desert regions of northern Mali, by many Malians.

It’s therefore clear that France has lost its support of Mali’s government, which has accused Paris of training terrorists responsible for instigating and exacerbating ethnicism in the country.

Combined with the population expressing their dissatisfaction about the presence of the French forces in Mali, France had no choice but to reduce its military deployment.

Is Mali better off with France leaving?
First, we have to know that Mali has strong historical links with France since it is a former French colony. In the broader Sahel region, France remains the leading Western power. But a majority of Malians have begun to doubt the sincerity of France, with mistrust becoming increasingly prevalent.

The other development has been Russia’s growing interest in the region. If all French troops were to leave tomorrow, Russian forces – under the Wagner group – would be ready to fill the gap. Russia has the capacity to do so. It has demonstrated recently in the Central Africa Republic that it is capable of dealing with one of the most important threats in that country. In addition, Malian public opinion favours the arrival of the Russians.

What does the future hold for Mali?
Abandoned by its former allies, the Malian army is now on the ground without French military drones or American logistical support.

Added to this is the precarious political situation in the country. There was a change of government in late May after a coup d’état. A month later on 20 July, the new President of the transitional Government, Colonel Assimi Goïta, was the target of an assassination attempt at the Great Mosque in Bamako.

There are two possible scenarios:

The first would be that Mali establishes a new cooperation agreement with one of the world powers. For example, Russia and its Wagner group. In the eyes of some Malians and the government they are better placed to manage the situation. As for the second scenario, negotiations with the jihadists will be on the table, a move that’s been rejected outright by France.

However, it’s my view that negotiations with the two Malian terrorists Iyad Ag Ghali and Amadou Koufa will become the option of choice for the Malian government. They could then wage a joint battle against the Islamic State and non-Malian terrorist groups in the country.

But France hasn’t left the region – and by extension Mali. It will retain a presence through the Sahel Alliance which was launched in 2017 by France, Germany and the EU. This works closely with the G5 Sahel which was set up by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger as a joint effort to fight organised crime and terrorism.

Stability may be a long way off, however. A recent report on the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSMA) in Mali shows that it faces serious challenges.

The report notes: “In an increasingly challenging security environment, additional air assets are urgently needed to enable the Mission to deliver on its mandate.The Conversation”

Many jihadists around the world portray the Taliban’s sweep back into power in Afghanistan as a victory for their cause, perhaps second only to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. Al-Qaeda affiliates in particular have lauded the reconstitution of the Taliban’s self-styled “Islamic emirate”, which once harboured Osama bin Laden, the man who ordered the 9/11 hijackings, as a strategic victory, like reported by crisisgroup.org.

Twenty years after the U.S. responded to the 9/11 attacks by invading Afghanistan, launching a “war on terror” that came to encompass not just the Taliban and al-Qaeda but also jihadists elsewhere, these groups see the U.S. military withdrawal and the Taliban’s takeover as signs that jihad is bearing fruit. Militant leaders’ celebratory statements make clear that they are drawing inspiration from this moment. But just how much the Taliban victory will shape conflicts involving jihadists or, for that matter, the counter-insurgency strategies of the states they battle, remains up in the air.

Thus far, while the Taliban’s takeover might give some jihadists a morale boost, it is unclear how much these events will affect their recruitment and funding. Nor is it clear how the Taliban’s success will alter the balance of forces on the battlefields where other militants fight, as that is primarily driven by local dynamics. The core al-Qaeda and Islamic State (or ISIS) leaderships have been significantly weakened over recent years: neither has a focused agenda or even the organisational capability to capitalise on the Taliban’s win.

In the case of al-Qaeda, the organisation has at times seemed detached from events unfolding in Afghanistan. Rather than seizing the Taliban victory and the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks as a moment to rally al-Qaeda loyalists, top leader Ayman al-Zawahiri used the occasion to publish an 852-page book on corruption in the Muslim world. Even if al-Zawahiri or his close associates had a more concrete vision, it is not clear they have the tools to put one into practice. The role of the central leadership in al-Qaeda affiliates’ activities around the world remains vague. Al-Qaeda central may present local branches with a set of shared ideas and long-term strategic objectives, but al-Zawahiri does not direct their activities. The local branches function largely autonomously based on their own circumstances, resources and priorities. Those considerations – and not core al-Qaeda’s attitude or direct orders – will likely determine whether they step up their own violent campaigns in response to the Taliban’s victory.

ISIS affiliates are in a different situation than al-Qaeda, in part because the ISIS core bitterly opposes the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The branches are thus even less likely to take their operational cues from the Taliban. Indeed, the Afghanistan franchise, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP), has suffered fierce crackdowns at the Taliban’s hands. IS-KP’s horrific bombing of Kabul airport and other attacks suggest it is, for now, the biggest security challenge the Taliban faces. Besides, many ISIS branches are shadows of their former selves – including in Somalia, the Sahel and Yemen – and little suggests the group’s stronger affiliate, in northern Nigeria, is much tracking what is happening in South Asia.

Beyond the issue of violence, the Taliban’s success in Afghanistan also raises the question of whether jihadist groups can use negotiations to achieve their goals and whether states are prepared to engage if they do. After all, the Taliban achieved its primary objective – the departure of foreign forces from Afghanistan – not solely on the battlefield but through a combination of military pressure and negotiations with the U.S. Already, it appears that at least some outside powers will deal with the Taliban, affording the group a measure of international legitimacy. Dynamics in other war zones where jihadists fight are very different from those in Afghanistan; nowhere else would jihadists be negotiating over the exit of U.S. forces, for example. Still, militants have clearly noted the Taliban’s willingness to engage in direct talks with the U.S. – in some cases condemning that decision and in others seemingly evincing interest in replicating it. After the Taliban takeover, some governments, particularly those whose counter-insurgency efforts rely on Western support, might themselves be more willing to entertain the idea of talking to militants, for fear that insurgents could similarly gain ground if foreign forces were to pull out. That said, decisions regarding talks, whether taken by militants or their enemies, are likely to be informed more by local dynamics than by the Afghanistan war.

To help shed light on these questions, Crisis Group experts have shared their assessments of how the Taliban takeover might shape the wars in Syria, Yemen, Somalia, the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin and the Philippines. Their views reflect an online event on the same topic.

Syria
Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the only group in the world to break with both ISIS and al-Qaeda, has been watching the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan carefully from its stronghold in Idlib, a province in north-western Syria. The group’s leaders recognise important similarities and differences between HTS and the Taliban and between the circumstances in which they operate. They are drawing lessons from the Taliban’s victory.

Since leaving al-Qaeda’s ranks in 2016, HTS has been estranged from many jihadist groups inside and outside Syria. It has not shied away from strident criticism of prominent jihadist ideologues and even rebutted al-Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri directly when he said the group remained bound by its oath of loyalty to him. Tensions between HTS and other jihadists in Syria have often blown up into armed confrontations and spates of targeted killings. HTS has also made large-scale arrests of local al-Qaeda leaders and commanders.

Yet HTS, which now presents itself as a local Islamist group with no transnational connections, has maintained a favourable tone toward the Taliban. It has eyed the Taliban’s engagement with the U.S. and regional powers with interest, taking note of the group’s willingness to talk to Western governments to achieve its goals. In 2020, when the Taliban signed their deal with the U.S., HTS issued a statement congratulating the Afghan group on their accomplishment. As the Taliban swept into Kabul, HTS, along with a range of Islamist entities (like the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria and the Syrian Islamic Council), put out statements applauding what they called a victory over a foreign occupying force. In private conversations, HTS leaders say the Taliban’s engagement with the U.S. helped inspire their own efforts at diplomatic outreach to countries in the Middle East and beyond aimed at signalling their willingness to engage politically on Syria’s future.

Still, HTS diverges from the Afghan militants on several issues. Notably, on the question of al-Qaeda, HTS has arguably gone further than the Taliban. Whereas the Taliban pledged to the U.S., as part of the February 2020 Doha Agreement, that Afghanistan will not be a launchpad for foreign attacks, it has not explicitly committed to restrain al-Qaeda unless it has evidence of such plotting. In contrast, HTS has militarily subjugated al-Qaeda’s local affiliate. Moreover, because HTS has focused on maintaining control of and governing territory in Idlib, it has made compromises that hardline militants in Syria criticise. For example, rather than pursuing an insurgent war of attrition, HTS has committed to truces with Syrian regime forces and their allies negotiated by Turkey and Russia. It has also reined in (and often cracked down on) groups who opposed the ceasefire in return for Turkey’s military protection and acquiescence to HTS control of Idlib. Al-Zawahiri publicly disapproves of this strategy and advocates a different one: giving up control of territory and shifting to a guerrilla war aimed at “destroying the enemy’s morale”. Many hardliners in Syria voice similar views and lambast HTS for abandoning jihad, as they see it, in favour of ceasefires. Though conflict dynamics in Afghanistan are very different from those in Syria, these hardliners contrast HTS’s compromises with the Taliban’s determined twenty-year insurgency, during which, for the most part, they rejected ceasefires.

As a result, the Taliban’s victory has made it even harder for HTS leaders to defend their stance on insurgency. Many people in rebel-held parts of Syria want militants to fight the Syrian regime. For many Syrians who are being bombed and shelled by Damascus, and have been forced to evacuate to Idlib, abandoning the war with the regime is unfathomable, even when there is no realistic hope of victory. HTS has been walking a tightrope in both their public-facing rhetoric and their teachings to the rank and file, as they maintain an anti-regime posture while emphasising the pragmatic imperatives of concluding ceasefires and limiting their use of force to resisting ground offensives.

In an attempt to answer critics of the group’s military restraint, the highest-ranking religious figure in HTS, Abdul-Rahim Attoun (also known as Abu Abdullah al-Shami) gave a public talk on “jihad and resistance” in the Muslim world in which he laid out the distinctions between the Syrian rebels’ circumstances and what the Taliban faced in Afghanistan, including demographic and topographical factors. He stressed that efforts to emulate the Taliban’s military approach in Syria would be premature and that pursuing guerrilla warfare would bring a brutal military reaction from Damascus and its backers, costing HTS its control of Idlib. Attoun is not wrong: a concerted HTS offensive would likely provoke a bloody regime takeover, given that the balance of power is strongly tilted toward Damascus. Still, even within HTS ranks, some militants counter that Western governments negotiate only with those who prove to be formidable battlefield foes. Even if HTS loses control of Idlib, they say, it can continue with an underground insurgency.

While Syrian jihadists mull what lessons to take from events in Afghanistan, it is unclear whether Western countries might also consider, after Afghanistan, a new approach to their Syria policies. As Crisis Group has argued in the past, Western countries have shown no interest in proactively engaging even with HTS, notwithstanding its evolution away from transnational militancy. This attitude has had a chilling effect on Western support for essential service provision in Idlib, worsening the already dire humanitarian crisis. It has also precluded discussions with HTS itself about its conduct and the future of the territory it controls.

Yemen
Yemeni groups have responded in three ways to the U.S. withdrawal from and Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. The first reaction, from the Huthi rebels who control Sanaa and Yemen’s populous northern highlands, focuses on the military and strategic lessons they have learned, and believe the U.S. and Saudi Arabia should learn, from foreign misadventure in trying to quell homegrown insurgency. The second, somewhat similar, response comes from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the local franchise of the global movement. While praising local resistance to outside powers, AQAP presented the events in Afghanistan as a clear signal that jihad is a “realistic path” to success. The third take is from anti-Huthi and anti-Islamist activist and political groups, which have sought to use the Taliban takeover as a cautionary tale for regional powers and the West about accommodationist policies toward both the Huthis and Islah, Yemen’s main Sunni Islamist political party.

The Huthis portray themselves both as an Islamist movement against corrupt, unjust rule and an anti-imperialist project in the vein of the Viet Cong. The Yemen war, they argue, is their resistance to “aggression” led by Saudi Arabia as part of a U.S. and “Zionist” (Israeli) quest for control of the Middle East and North Africa. The group’s public and private messaging has sought to frame the Afghanistan events as evidence that this mission is futile and to urge Saudi Arabia, the U.S. and their domestic rivals in Yemen to negotiate an end to the war as quickly as possible.

The Huthis believe the Taliban have demonstrated that a committed, patient domestic armed group with local legitimacy can outlast a vastly more powerful external adversary moving in unfamiliar terrain. Perhaps more importantly, numerous Huthi officials and commentators paint the U.S. withdrawal as part of a regional pattern that is to their benefit. Reflecting their scrutiny of U.S. policy debates, they note that some in Washington advocate that the U.S. halt military relations with Saudi Arabia and pressure the Saudis to exit the Yemen war via a settlement with the Huthis. Using this anti-war sentiment as leverage, the Huthis appear to hope that they can turn the screws on Saudi Arabia to strike a conflict-ending deal and on their Yemeni rivals to negotiate their own agreement.

AQAP’s takeaways are similar to the Huthis’ with respect to external intervention, but the group has not surprisingly framed events in Afghanistan as a triumph for “jihad” in particular rather than resistance in general. “This victory … reveals to us that jihad and fighting represent the Sharia-based, legal and realistic way to restore rights [and] expel the invaders and occupiers. As for the game of democracy…, it is a mirage, a fleeting shadow and a vicious circle that starts at zero and ends at zero”, the group said in an 18 August press release. AQAP, which has been significantly weakened over the past five years, also described the Taliban takeover as the “beginning of a pivotal transformation” in the Muslim world. For the time being, this judgment would appear to reflect wishful thinking on the group’s part. AQAP has been reduced from a high-level threat to U.S. security and founder of two jihadist “emirates” to a bit player in the Yemen war struggling for relevance.

Those Yemeni factions opposed to either the Huthis or Islah (or both) compare them to the Taliban in an attempt to portray them as irreconcilable hardliners. The Huthis’ enemies point to the Taliban takeover to warn the U.S. not to exert pressure on Saudi Arabia to negotiate with the Huthis. The Huthis’ 19 September public execution of nine men, including one who was reportedly a minor when he was first detained for his alleged role in the killing of a Huthi leader, has become a rallying cry for many anti-Huthi Yemenis, who want Western media to view the Huthis, the Taliban and indeed al-Qaeda as one and the same. Yemenis opposed to Islah use the Taliban example to caution against continued Saudi support for Islah-affiliated fighters in northern Yemen. Anti-Islah groups, including some members of the Southern Transitional Council, which pursues independence for the south, and the General People’s Congress, the long-time ruling party before 2011, have piggybacked on international criticism of perceived Western acquiescence to the Taliban takeover. They demand that the U.S. and Western powers not allow Islah – which they accuse of ties to AQAP and of seeking to foster a conservative regime similar to the Taliban’s in Afghanistan – to use the conflict to build its military power and territorial reach. Such statements should be seen in the context of Yemen’s messy politics, where rival groups routinely seek to instrumentalise outside powers’ interests to bolster their positions and weaken their rivals.

Somalia
Al-Shabaab, the Somali insurgency affiliated with al-Qaeda, has cheered the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. The group’s messaging indicates that it closely followed the Taliban offensive beginning in April and anecdotal reports suggest that it has been celebrating the Taliban’s victory in areas under its control. But while Al-Shabaab may take pleasure in seeing the outcome in Afghanistan, the ramifications for its own struggle in Somalia are less certain.

On one hand, the Taliban’s victory is certainly a source of inspiration for the group. Al-Shabaab has been fighting in Somalia for nearly fifteen years now. For the Taliban to prevail after twenty years could be taken by many Al-Shabaab insurgents as proof that they are on the right path. Al-Shabaab can further point to the government’s international partners’ waning interest in funding the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as evidence that persistence pays off, as it did for the Taliban with the U.S. War-weary commanders and fighters may feel rejuvenated by the Taliban’s achievement. They may also hope to use Afghanistan events to attract new recruits, though thus far it is unclear how successful that endeavour might be.

On the other hand, the Taliban’s victory is unlikely to have a dramatic impact on Al-Shabaab’s posture or operations in Somalia. The group is already in a strong position due to a combination of local factors – including a federal government so riven by political squabbles that insurgents have been able to establish effective shadow administrations in government-controlled cities, even in parts of the capital Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab can essentially pick and choose the time and place of its attacks, while also generating healthy finances from its informal taxation and other revenue generation systems. The movement remains tied to al-Qaeda, but even if al-Qaeda does resurge in Afghanistan – which is uncertain given the Taliban’s logical incentives to prevent that from happening – its Somali branch would arguably derive little immediate benefit. As a self-sufficient and thoroughly Somali movement (despite having some fighters from elsewhere in the Horn), Al-Shabaab does not need much more than inspiration to persevere in its struggle.

As for the possibility of talks between the government and Al-Shabaab, the Afghanistan precedent cuts both ways. For some Somali authorities, what happened in Afghanistan demonstrates the perils of engaging jihadist groups in any form of dialogue, given that those talks paved the way for the Taliban’s takeover. An alternative view voiced by some civil society representatives, however, holds that the Afghanistan example strengthens the case for a negotiated solution, especially if the Somali federal government continues to be unable to project power and looks unlikely to grow into a sustainable venture. According to this line of thinking, international partners are bound to leave at some point, so the parties should forge a political settlement in advance in order to avoid an outcome where Al-Shabaab seizes power by default and does not need to make compromises.

Al-Shabaab’s take on negotiations is unclear. Despite its close monitoring of the situation in Afghanistan, the group’s public messaging has downplayed the fact that the Taliban engaged in dialogue with the U.S., instead rather predictably framing what happened as a Taliban victory amid a U.S. withdrawal. As one elder associated with Al-Shabaab told Crisis Group, the Taliban made a mistake in agreeing to negotiate with “Christians”, but the end result was good. It remains to be seen if the Taliban’s success will induce Al-Shabaab to try combining diplomacy with military might in order to advance its goals in Somalia.

The Sahel
The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan is unlikely to have an immediate impact on the conflict between jihadists and state authorities in the Sahel. The militant coalition Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, or JNIM), which consolidated in northern Mali in 2017, is an al-Qaeda affiliate (its leaders have pledged allegiance to both al-Zawahiri and the Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada). But at present there is little evidence of a flow of material support to JNIM from the al-Qaeda core or indeed any group based in Afghanistan. In the 1990s and early 2000s, a few combatants from the Sahelo-Saharan area, including the Algerian Mokhtar Belmokhtar, fought in Afghanistan after training in camps there. But today these veterans of Afghanistan’s conflict play no significant role in the Sahel’s insurgencies, because they have either laid down their arms or been killed.

The Taliban’s victory could have an indirect effect. It could raise morale among Sahelian jihadists, who might find inspiration in the group’s seizure of power. Moreover, events in Afghanistan have exposed the limits of counter-insurgency efforts that rely heavily on Western troops, training and funding. Militants in the Sahel appear to see in the Taliban’s victory a case study of how a local jihadist movement can win through patience and determination, eventually overcoming a broad international coalition.

There is already evidence that this lesson is not lost on JNIM, which has issued several statements indicating that it sees a model to emulate in the U.S.-Taliban deal that led the U.S. to remove its troops from Afghanistan. For JNIM, the focus is on dislodging not U.S. but French forces, which have been pursuing a counter-insurgency campaign in Mali since 2013. In a statement released in October 2020, JNIM addressed France, saying: “It is in your interest to depart from our lands now, just as the Americans departed from Afghanistan”. JNIM has even made the point – apparently with Paris as its main audience – that it has never targeted the French homeland for attack (though has not said anything about preventing other groups from using Sahelian soil to threaten the security of Western countries and their allies, along the lines of the Taliban commitment).

Among state actors in the Sahel, the end of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan has triggered fresh debate on the sustainability of France’s military strategy. It has provoked a number of Sahelian authorities to accelerate efforts to seek an alternative to dependence on French military support. The shift in thinking comes as France, fatigued and exasperated by the deteriorating security situation and persistently fraught politics in several countries in the Sahel, announced in June 2021 that it would put an end to Operation Barkhane, its main Sahel campaign, while still keeping troops in the region. Though France is not retreating from the Sahel, JNIM leader Iyad ag Ghaly published a statement claiming France’s decision as a triumph for his group comparable to the Taliban’s achievement in compelling the “historic” U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

As France downsizes its deployment, Malian authorities are nervous that their country may meet a fate similar to Afghanistan’s. They are also aware that former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and his government were sidelined when direct U.S.-Taliban talks opened and that, having secured the U.S. commitment to withdraw, the Taliban had less incentive to bargain in good faith with Ghani later. The Ghani government’s collapse could thus encourage the Malian authorities to move more decisively toward their own dialogue with militants, regardless of external partners’ attitudes.

While these circumstances could nudge JNIM itself toward dialogue, differences between JNIM and the Taliban complicate this scenario. First, for now at least, JNIM lacks a political office, like that the Taliban had in the Qatari capital Doha, able to engage in international negotiations. Secondly, notwithstanding the Taliban’s links to al-Qaeda, the group can clearly take decisions without consulting the al-Qaeda leadership; it is not an al-Qaeda affiliate (indeed, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri himself has pledged allegiance to successive Taliban leaders rather than the other way around). Notwithstanding the operational leeway it clearly enjoys, JNIM – as an al-Qaeda branch whose leaders have sworn loyalty to Zawahiri – may not be able to decide such a weighty matter for itself.

As for the Sahel’s ISIS chapter, which opposes the Taliban in Afghanistan and also battles JNIM in parts of the central Sahel, the impact of the Taliban takeover is even more uncertain. The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) expanded its territorial control in the late 2010s and since then has demonstrated very little appetite for dialogue. Starting in 2020, however, it has suffered a string of military defeats at JNIM’s hands as well as deadly French airstrikes. Those strikes culminated in the death of its leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahraoui in August. In keeping with its usual silence on current events, ISGS said nothing official about the Taliban victory.

A final consideration is that, as France reduces its footprint, Russia may be stepping in. In September, the Malian authorities acknowledged that they have initiated discussions with Moscow to “diversify [the country’s] security partners”, according to Prime Minister Choguel Maïga. Reuters reports that Bamako may have inked a contract with Wagner, a Russian private security company that operates in a handful of other African countries. Malian officials seem to regard the deal as a hedge against a French departure. Some among the Malian elite even appear convinced that Russia will be a more efficient partner than the West in fighting jihadist insurgencies – though little suggests that is the case. Thus, even if it wants to, JNIM may have to wait for a while before it can enter talks in the hope of persuading foreign forces to leave the Sahel.

Lake Chad

Overall, events in South Asia weigh little on the Lake Chad basin and Nigeria, the country in the region hardest hit by Islamist insurgency. Some Nigerian groups had modelled themselves loosely on the Taliban’s first emirate in the 1990s or relied on limited support from al-Qaeda in those years up until 2012. But the main armed group, Boko Haram, largely followed an independent trajectory until its leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and adopted the name Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in 2015. When dissenters split from Shekau in 2016 and secured ISIS support, Shekau did not return to al-Qaeda’s fold but insisted that he remained loyal to Baghdadi while reinstating his movement’s previous name, Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna Lil-Dawati wal-Jihad (JAS). In May 2020, ISWAP fighters penetrated Shekau’s stronghold, prompting the JAS leader to blow himself up. Since then, ISWAP has apparently striven to absorb JAS, although some JAS remnants have fought back, managing to wound ISWAP leader Habib Yusuf, maybe mortally, in August. Tensions exist as well within ISWAP itself. The ISIS factions in the Lake Chad basin have remained silent about the Taliban victory, perhaps not surprisingly, given the harshly adversarial dynamic between the Taliban and IS-KP, the organisation’s Afghanistan branch.

Events in Afghanistan are equally unlikely to create a surge of interest in negotiations between militants and Lake Chad basin governments, although there is some history of dialogue on certain topics. The first such discussions took place a couple of years after conflict broke out between Boko Haram and the government in 2009. But past talks have foundered for a number of reasons. First, on a number of occasions, governments were talking to peripheral associates of jihadists or conmen rather than to anyone with authority in the relevant groups. Secondly, for the most part, these groups’ leaders gave little indication that they seriously considered the possibility of resolving politically their conflicts with the Lake Chad states; instead, they appeared to treat talks primarily as opportunities to cut deals exchanging captives or securing ransoms in exchange for hostages. Thirdly, hardline factions have scotched chances at more meaningful dialogue. In 2017, for instance, after ISWAP split from JAS, an influential ISWAP member, Mamman Nur, pushed for a ceasefire with the authorities. He was eventually killed by fellow jihadists who saw him as a sell-out. Other negotiations have stalled since then, notwithstanding some contacts about hostage releases.

Indeed, if anything, ISWAP, now the dominant jihadist faction in northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin, looks somewhat less likely to negotiate than before. Over the last few years, even as it has kept discussing ransoms, the group has cut its links to the few humanitarian agencies that it used to engage with regarding aid delivery to civilians. ISWAP has made significant territorial gains following Shekau’s death, and it will be focused on consolidating and exploiting these advances rather than readying itself for dialogue with the state.

The Nigerian state’s present appetite for a political track also seems low, perhaps because the government does not feel fundamentally threatened by ISWAP, which operates in the country’s north-eastern corner, far from the federal capital Abuja and the country’s economic engines in the south. The authorities are also importing new military equipment, notably a fleet of Tucano aircraft from the United States. It seems unlikely that new gear in itself would turn the tide against militants, but Abuja will likely want to try out these assets before any thought of parley. Both the government and its partners are also conscious of political obstacles to dialogue. There is a long history of intercommunal suspicion between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria. If President Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim, were to authorise negotiations with jihadists, the move would be highly controversial, particularly among non-Muslim citizens. The Nigerian military is the main party grappling with Boko Haram’s offshoots. It is unlikely that other countries, whether the U.S., the UK or France, who provide technical and financial support, or the neighbour states with which Nigeria cooperates in the Multinational Joint Task Force, could change Abuja’s incentives to negotiate – even if they wished to, of which there is no sign.

The Philippines
The Taliban’s triumph in Afghanistan has thus far had only indirect effects on Islamist militancy in the Philippines, where such organisations are tightly focused on achieving local goals.

All eyes are on the Bangsamoro, on the southern island of Mindanao, the only Muslim-majority region in this predominantly Catholic country, where Islamist militants have operated for decades. Several local bands have broken away from the mainstream Moro guerrillas in recent years to affiliate with the Islamic State. These include Abu Sayyaf, which was previously tied to al-Qaeda, and factions of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). The ISIS-inspired militants, but also local fighters more broadly, recruit their members from several different ethno-linguistic groups. They control no territory, sustaining themselves by drawing upon shadow economies and clan networks. But they are holding out, thanks to poor governance, insecurity caused by ubiquitous conflict and a heavy military presence that many residents perceive as an occupation.

Even as these splinter groups grow, peace talks have transformed the conflict’s overall contours. The main former insurgency, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), signed a landmark agreement with Manila in 2014 and is now leading a transitional government in the fledgling Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). The BARMM is popular, for the most part, as is the peace process that created it. But occasional violence still breaks out, as some have doubts about the government’s sincerity in respecting the Bangsamoro’s autonomy. In 2017, for instance, militants took over the city of Marawi. It took five months of intense fighting, which displaced at least 360,000 civilians, for the Philippine military to recover the town. Subsequently, the militant groups have fractured, due both to defections and to intensified military pressure, and thus are less capable of executing such large-scale operations. Still, many groups remain outside the peace process, and continue to stage regular smaller attacks, with some even venturing into suicide bombings of late.

Philippine jihadist groups maintain a primarily local outlook. Most are using jihadist narratives and branding to advance their own, more parochial, aims, as illustrated by their reaction to the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Some BIFF factions pledged allegiance to the self-styled ISIS caliph only to quickly withdraw it later; others distanced themselves from the ISIS core after a few years, to refocus on their main agenda of fighting the Philippine military. At present, at least four militant groups describe themselves as ISIS affiliates, but evidence suggests that these linkages are little more than aspirational. In a similar manner, the Taliban’s victory over the former Afghan government’s forces is unlikely to alter Mindanao militants’ doctrine per se.

The Taliban victory could, however, have an indirect impact. Social media chatter suggests that some Bangsamoro rebels and their civilian sympathisers welcomed the news, and feel emboldened, particularly in the Sulu archipelago and around the battle-scarred city of Marawi, where a small number of young jihadists lurk in the shadows, actively recruiting. Yet it remains unclear to what extent this morale boost will translate into anything more than expressions of general support for the Taliban’s victory. Militant commanders may attempt to use the narrative of the Taliban’s victory to recruit more aggressively and breathe new life into their impaired operations, but reigniting jihadist fervour at a time of stepped-up military campaigns and support for the BARMM will not be easy.

Bangsamoro’s autonomy has seemingly curbed the spread of jihadist ideology in the region. Perhaps the biggest concern, however, is the autonomous region’s fate itself. The Taliban’s victory coincides with a critical juncture in the Bangsamoro peace process, as the interim government’s term is likely to be extended for another three years. An extension would give the ex-rebel administration more time to meet the goals of a transition roadmap that has encountered a series of delays, partly on account of the COVID-19 pandemic. But parts of the Bangsamoro population are growing impatient with the lack of significant peace dividends. Failure to fulfil such expectations in a timely manner could hamper the war-to-peace transition. Militant groups outside the peace process will be eager to exploit any miscues on the BARMM’s part. Those MILF fighters who are disgruntled with the slow pace of the peace process could also break away from the main organisation to set up their own or to join other factions. A new generation of Muslim youth ready to fight could emerge in Mindanao should the BARMM not live up to expectations.

Both the Islamic State terror group’s Afghan affiliate and al-Qaida could be ready to launch strikes against the United States and the West sooner than previously thought following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, ike reported by eurasiareview.com.

The Pentagon’s third-highest ranking official told lawmakers Tuesday that the latest intelligence suggests Islamic State Khorasan, also known as ISIS-K, is on a faster track to regenerate its external strike operations, though al-Qaida’s terror operatives are not far behind.

“Both al-Qaida and ISIS-K have the intent to conduct external operations,” Defense Department Undersecretary for Policy Colin Kahl said, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“We could see ISIS-K generate that capability in somewhere between six and 12 months,” Kahl said. “Al-Qaida would take a year or two to reconstitute that capability.”

Fears that the terror groups could gain strength in Afghanistan following the departure of U.S. and coalition troops are not new. U.S. and Western officials have warned for months that both groups were poised to take advantage of the absence of U.S. boots on the ground.

Officials and analysts cautioned that IS Khorasan in particular had already bolstered its clandestine networks in Afghanistan and surrounding countries in the months leading up to the U.S. pullout.

Attacks sooner rather than later
But the intelligence shared with lawmakers Tuesday suggests both IS Khorasan and al-Qaida may have made additional gains in recent months, allowing them to speed up the time frame, which top Pentagon and intelligence officials previously put at six months to three years.

“I don’t think they are nearly as well-resourced as ISIS in Iraq and Syria were back in the heyday,” Kahl told lawmakers of the threat from IS Khorasan, though he warned the affiliate’s links to the terror group’s global network is troubling.

“They do have a cadre of a few thousand folks, some of which would love to conduct external attacks,” he said. “I think we have to be vigilant that a subset of ISIS-K could develop the resources and the capability to strike outward to the U.S. homeland.”

Kahl’s warning echoes the concerns of other top U.S. officials, who likewise have cautioned IS Khorasan has been steadily building momentum.

During a congressional hearing last month, Washington’s top counterterrorism official, Christine Abizaid, told lawmakers that the group seemed to be taking advantage of the notoriety it got for carrying out the deadly attack on Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul in the waning days of the U.S. withdrawal.

“Will it become more focused on the West? Will it become more focused on the homeland than it was?” Abizaid asked at the time.

U.S. officials have also said IS Khorasan has benefited from the way Taliban forces took over Afghanistan, emptying prisons and releasing thousands of IS supporters and fighters.

“What we see is ISIS newly rejuvenated,” General Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie, the commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East and South Asia, told lawmakers last month about the Taliban’s indiscriminate opening of Afghanistan’s Parwan prison in August.

Other U.S. officials now estimate the IS group has at least 2,000 “hardcore” fighters in cells across Afghanistan, though some foreign intelligence services think the number may be higher.

Growth of groups a concern
And there are concerns IS Khorasan’s numbers, as well as those for al-Qaida, could soon start to swell, with intelligence reports suggesting supporters of both groups have started to head to Afghanistan.

Getting a sense of how much both terror groups could grow, though, will be difficult.

Kahl said the U.S. is conducting daily surveillance flights over Afghanistan while also using technical capabilities to obtain information on each group’s plans.

But U.S. military and intelligence officials have consistently warned that getting vital intelligence on the threat is more difficult without a U.S. presence on the ground.

There are also questions about what role the Taliban will play, if any, in limiting the threat of terror plots emanating from Afghan soil against the U.S. and other Western countries.

“We have seen signs … that the Taliban is wary about Afghanistan being a springboard for al-Qaida external attacks, not because the Taliban are good guys but because they fear international retribution if that were to occur,” Kahl said.

U.S. officials have likewise said there is an expectation the Taliban will crack down on IS Khorasan, which already has launched attacks against Taliban targets across Afghanistan.

Still, there is concern that it won’t be enough.

“The Taliban certainly have a vested interest in quashing any Islamic State elements,” Katherine Zimmerman, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, told VOA.

“[But] the gap between the will of the Taliban to eliminate the Islamic State and the Taliban’s capabilities to do so seems to be large enough that the Islamic State threat will persist from Afghanistan,” she said.

There are also lingering questions about the ability of U.S. forces to successfully limit terrorism threat from “over the horizon.”

Despite ongoing discussions, the U.S. has so far failed to acquire any basing options that would allow it to establish drones and other assets in the region, instead relying on flights from its bases in the Persian Gulf, some eight hours away.

“We’ve not secured firm basing arrangements,” Kahl told lawmakers, noting ongoing talks with Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

“They [Pakistani officials] continue to give us access to Pakistani airspace, and we’re in conversations about keeping that airspace open,” he added. “They don’t want Afghanistan to be a safe haven for terrorist attacks, not just against Pakistan but against others.”

Biden critics’ worries
A number of U.S. lawmakers have been highly critical of U.S. President Joe Biden’s decision to move ahead with the Afghanistan withdrawal, charging it has laid the groundwork for a terrorist revival in Afghanistan.

“The consequences of the president’s disastrous decisions are impossible to ignore,” Senator Jim Inhofe, the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said Tuesday.

“The danger is likely to grow across the world in our own backyard,” he said, adding that “instead of putting together a real counterterrorism plan for the future, all we get is buzzwords.”

Lieutenant General James Mingus, the Joint Chiefs director for operations, on Tuesday tried to allay those concerns.

“We are actively setting the conditions to ensure we remain situationally aware and are postured to mitigate and neutralize developing terrorist threats,” Mingus told lawmakers.

He also said intelligence estimates that IS Khorasan or al-Qaida could launch terror attacks in six months to a year were, “based on no U.S. or coalition intervention.”

“Our efforts in the months ahead, and as we continue to improve our over-the-horizon architecture, is to ensure that that external capability never comes to fruition,” Mingus said.

Kahl on Tuesday, also pushed back, while admitting the U.S. needs to “remain vigilant.”

“The intelligence community assesses that the overall risk to the homeland across the world is at its lowest point since 9/11,” he told lawmakers, arguing other hotspots are just as dangerous, if not more so.

“We’re focused on the counterterrorism front on Somalia, the growth of violent extremism in places like the Sahel,” Kahl said. “We continue to have to vigilant in Iraq and in Syria and in Yemen.”

On October 8, a suicide bomber struck a Shiite mosque in Afghanistan’s Kunduz province. The bombing killed more than 70 people and injured over 140 worshippers belonging to the Hazara minority community. Soon after, the Islamic State terror group’s local affiliate in Afghanistan, known Islamic State Khorasan (ISK), claimed responsibility for the heinous attack via an online propaganda statement. ISK identified the bomber as “Muhammad al-Uyghuri,” saying the assault targeted both “rafidites” (a derogatory term used by jihadists to refer to Shiites) and the Taliban government for its purported willingness to deport Uyghurs from Afghanistan in response to requests from China.

ISK’s aggression toward religious and ethnic minority civilian populations is not uncommon. As the Taliban are working to transform themselves from a radical insurgent movement to a legitimate state structure, attacks on such minority communities are meant to foment sectarian strife while casting doubt on the unrecognized new rulers’ ability to deliver appropriate security to the country’s people.

However, the group’s apparent attempt to justify the targeting of the Hazara minority community in Afghanistan through rhetoric about China and Uyghurs is both unusual and perplexing. An analysis of the attack indicates that ISK is potentially considering pivoting its China strategy away from what it was previously assessed to be, moving from a relatively non-provocative posture toward a more hands-on stance. Furthermore, ISK is apparently viewing the Taliban’s stated incentives to deport Uyghur militants as an opportunity to position itself as a new protector of the Uyghurs, with the aim of welcoming disgruntled Uyghur militants into its ranks.

ISK and Its Uyghur Suicide Bomber

ISK emerged in 2015, when the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria announced its expansion to the historic “Khorasan” region, which encompassed parts of modern-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia. Initial members of the group predominantly included former hardline members of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, al-Qaida, and other militant groups. Since its inception, ISK has seen the Taliban as its strategic rival and ideological opponent. It has targeted Taliban positions and attempted to encourage defections from the movement. From 2015 to 2020, amid sustained military pressure by the U.S., Afghan government forces and the Taliban contained the ISK threat.

Since 2020, under a new leader, Shahab al-Muhajir, ISK has ramped up local violence as part of its resurgence campaign against the Afghan government and the Taliban. According to U.N. reporting, ISK had an estimated 500 to 1,500 fighters under its control before the fall of the Afghan government in mid-August, and it was responsible for 77 attacks across Afghanistan in the first quarter of 2021 alone. Since the Taliban takeover, the group has intensified attacks on civilian spaces, including religious institutions. Some of these and earlier attacks saw the involvement of the group’s Afghan, Indian, Tajik, and Pakistani members, among others.

The Kunduz attack is the first time that ISK has publicly confirmed the mobilization of an ethnic Uyghur – while not providing any detail about his country of origin – to carry out an attack in Afghanistan on its behalf. Previously, Uyghur militants had been invisible in both the online propaganda and battlefield activities of the group.

The Uyghurs are a Turkic-speaking, mostly Sunni Muslim ethnic community native to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China. Although the bomber’s nom de guerre (“al-Uyghuri”) implies he was an ethnic Uyghur, it does not necessarily mean that he was from Xinjiang. Uyghur fighters who claim to come from China usually adopt the nom de guerre of “al-Turkistani” to emphasize their separatist cause: the establishment of an independent Islamic state in Xinjiang, which they often refer to as “East Turkistan.” Many foreign countries, including Turkey and Afghanistan, host varying numbers of Uyghur communities, any of which the attacker may have come from.

Regardless of the attacker’s national origin, by highlighting the Uyghur involvement in the attack, ISK is sending important messages to its intended audiences: China, the Taliban, and the former’s Uyghur affiliates.

ISK’s ‘Indirect Enmity’ Approach

By showcasing that the group now has Uyghur members who are motivated and trained to sacrifice their lives for its cause, ISK has exacerbated Beijing’s existing concerns about the Uyghur militant threat deriving from Afghanistan. China first came to the attention of the Islamic State’s central core in July 2014, when the group’s slain leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi listed it among many other countries as a battlefield on which to “wage jihad.” A year later, IS announced the execution of a Chinese hostage, along with a Norwegian citizen in Syria. The group also claimed responsibility for the murder of two Chinese teachers kidnapped in Pakistan in May 2017. Since then, however, Islamic State’s anti-Chinese activities have been largely limited to the spread of sporadic online propaganda threats and calls for action.

While there could be various motivations, two main factors may explain the relative paucity of China- and Uyghur-focused rhetoric in IS propaganda in the past. First, as China had not participated in any anti-IS military campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria, IS possibly viewed Beijing as less threatening. Instead, it has prioritized fighting against the Western coalition force.

Second, both IS and ISK have so far been quite unsuccessful in recruiting Uyghurs compared to groups linked to their al-Qaida rival. More Uyghur members could imply the possible growth of more anti-China and pro-Uyghur propaganda. Given Beijing’s apparent interest in engaging with the Taliban, IS and ISK are now seemingly considering including China on their list as an “immediate enemy.” The framing of the Kunduz attack as retaliation for the Taliban’s willingness to curb Uyghur militants at China’s request is an indication of that.

ISK Hopes for the Taliban’s Abandonment of TIP

The public invisibility of Uyghur fighters in ISK propaganda in the past was largely a reflection of the fact that it was losing Uyghur recruits to the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), which was also known as the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a longstanding battlefield ally of the Taliban. Under the Taliban’s consistent support and protection for nearly 25 years, TIP has managed not only to survive as a single monolithic entity, but also to establish unchallenged hegemony over the recruitment and control of the Uyghur jihadist network in Afghanistan..

Unlike ISK, IS in Syria had been relatively successful in recruiting Uyghur fighters. When the group was at its peak in 2014 and 2015, it had reportedly 114 Uyghur members in Syria. However, even then, this figure was 10 to 20 times less than the number of Uyghurs in TIP’s Syrian division.

Before the Taliban’s capture of Kabul in August, TIP had approximately 400 Uyghur fighters, gathered primarily in the Jurm district of the country’s northeastern Badakhshan province, which shares a small border with Xinjiang via the mountainous Wakhan Corridor. Despite being an independent jihadist faction, TIP has performed all its activities in Afghanistan under the guidance and approval of the Taliban. Since 2019, the group has kept a relatively low profile in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s capture of Kabul was an iconic moment for TIP and many other jihadist groups across the world. A few days after the fall of the Afghan government, TIP issued a statement lauding the Taliban’s “victory” and the “restoration of the Islamic Emirate.” A potential resurgence of TIP, which China blames for many attacks at home, has been Beijing’s overriding security concern.

The Kunduz attack came at a critical moment for Taliban-TIP relations. In response to Beijing’s repeated calls to sever its ties with TIP, the Taliban recently announced that many TIP members had left Afghanistan at the request of the movement. However, it did not clarify how many Uyghur fighters might have moved out or where they went. Reports surfaced in October alleging that the Taliban relocated the Uyghur fighters from Badakhshan to other areas, including in the eastern Nangarhar province, suggesting that they were still residing in Afghanistan.

While neither the Taliban’s claim to have expelled Uyghur militants out of Afghanistan nor the allegation of their resettlement within the country has been verified, ISK’s attempt to justify the Kunduz attack as retaliation for this unconfirmed move is creating an impression that the Taliban have abandoned their longtime jihadist ally. Any potential backlash from TIP militants against the Taliban’s possible expulsion or resettlement initiative would be an ideal opportunity for ISK to recruit disgruntled fighters.

The Outlook

With the Taliban’s recent takeover of Kabul, the ISK-Taliban rivalry has entered a new phase. ISK’s framing of the Kunduz attack through China and Uyghur rhetoric is a manifestation of the group’s growing disappointment with Beijing’s evolving diplomatic and economic engagement with the Taliban. For ISK, a stronger Taliban state means more serious challenges to its ambitions and survival in Afghanistan. Increased Chinese involvement in the post-Taliban Afghanistan will further antagonize IS and ISK.

As retribution, ISK is likely to continue to promote narratives designed to demonize and intimidate China. The group will also try to encourage defections from TIP and recruit them, especially given the Taliban’s ongoing readjustment of relationship with its Uyghur allies. In the worst-case scenario, it even could attempt to attack Chinese personnel and installations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.