The Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 had important implications throughout the Islamic world, and Turkey has been no exception. The two countries’ long-standing rivalry dates back to the sixteenth century, and Iran and Turkey have long had a profound impact on one another, not only geopolitically but ideologically. The historical consolidation of a Sunni identity in Turkey and a Shi’a identity in Iran had very much to do with their rivalry. And it played out between two Turkic dynasties, the Ottomans and the Safavids, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

In the early twentieth century, the Pahlavi dynasty was heavily inspired by the modernization and westernization process in Turkey launched by Kemal Atatürk. The 1979 Islamic Revolution, however, turned the tables. Influence began to flow in the opposite direction, as Iranian Islamists became pacesetters and examples for Turkish Islamists.

Closer than Appearances Suggest

The sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shi’as is very real. But it has tended to avert attention from the commonalities between political Islamists in the Sunni world and in Iran, and the mutual inspiration they have drawn from each other. The theological differences between the Shi’a and Sunni are deep. These have been accentuated at times when political or religious authorities have sought to promote or apply particular interpretations of Islamic law. This has inevitably been sectarian in nature, and has led to social friction and conflict.

For example, when Pakistan’s Sunni-dominated government implemented Sharia law during its “Islamization” reforms of the 1980s, the country’s minority Shi’a population was increasingly marginalized, which led to large-scale unrest. The inverse has been the case in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where Sunni minorities like Kurds and Baloch have been marginalized, along with ethnic minorities that are Shi’a, like the Azerbaijanis.

That being said, Sunni-Shia theological disputes have not prevented many of the Islamist political movements that emerged within modern Sunni and Shia Islam from striving to cooperate. Among other things, these movements have tried to reduce religious differences by emphasizing pan-Islamic political unity. They have also opportunistically defined outsiders—mainly Western nations—as the enemy of all Muslims. In doing so, they have sought to build a united world of Islam as a geopolitical counterweight to the “infidel” West.

The ideological ties between the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood movement and Iranian Shiite Islamism has been stronger than is often acknowledged. In fact, the Brotherhood and its leading thinkers like Sayyid Qutb had a significant impact on the Iranian radicals who shaped the revolutionary project led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei. So, also, did South Asian Islamist Abu Ala Mawdudi. As Mehdi Khalaji has noted, the Brotherhood played an important role in “directly stimulating the emergence of a unique form of Shiite Islamism in Iran in the 1950s.” The founder of Iran’s extremist Fada’iyan e Islam movement, Navvab Safavi, played a key role in this as he traveled to Egypt to meet Qutb in 1954. Safavi is credited with introducing Qutb’s seminal ideas about Islamic government to Khomeini. Subsequently, Ali Khamene’i, Iran’s current Supreme Leader and Khomeini’s successor, translated several of Qutb’s works into Persian.

Similarly, the Brotherhood-inspired Jamaat-e-Islami in South Asia, led by Mawdudi, was in close touch with the Iranian revolutionaries. Mawdudi met Khomeini in 1963, and the Jamaat’s overt criticism of the Shah landed it in trouble in Pakistan. Mawdudi backed the Iranian revolutionary movement early, in 1978, and sent a delegation to Tehran to congratulate Ayatollah Khomeini after the revolution. Khomeini likewise expressed his admiration for Mawdudi, whom he termed a religious leader “not just for Pakistan but for the world.”

Thus the Brotherhood’s ideology played a significant role in in the development of the Shi’a clerical rule’s unorthodox political doctrine (velayat al-faqih), which Khomeini famously outlined in his treatise on Islamic government. Both the Brotherhood and the Khomeinist movement emphasized political matters, and specifically the institution of an Islamic state. This helped to suppress the theological-legal differences between them that lay under the surface. Similarly, the Brotherhood’s strongly anti-Western and anti-Semitic program deeply influenced the revolutionary Islamist movement in Iran. Traditionally, most Iranians had not not been particularly hostile to or even interested in Israel; they considered the Jewish State and the Israel-Palestinian conflict as an “Arab” matter. But this changed demonstrably after the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979.

The Islamic Revolution in Iran had, in turn, a far-reaching impact on Sunni Islamism and its subsequent development. Whereas Sunni Islamist movements in the Arabic-speaking world had tended to see the Shi’a and Iranians as inferior, and in many ways schismatic, the success of the Khomeinist Revolution transformed these perceptions. In fact, many Sunni Islamists were inspired by and in awe of what Khomeini had achieved. This did not mean they sought to replicate either the Iranian revolution or the form of clerical government that the Khomeinists created. But the revolution did inspire many Sunni Islamists to believe that they, too, could seize power and establish an Islamic state of their own.

Of course, the revolution did not end the differences between the Brotherhood and Iran. They had many disagreements, including in Syria. This was already the case in 1982, when Tehran supported the Damascus regime’s brutal crackdown on the Brotherhood-led revolt in Hama. In fact, Turkish Islamists strongly counseled the Brotherhood against the revolt. This would also be the case after 2003, as Brotherhood networks throughout the Middle East came to support their Sunni brethren in Iraq; likewise in Syria against Iranian-backed regimes and militias.

Still, it is noteworthy that the Sunni-Shi’a division is not the only factor shaping ideological and geopolitical relations in the Middle East. In fact, there is today a triangular rivalry involving three main contenders. The first is Iran and its aligned Shi’a militias and regimes. The second is a Sunni conservative group led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE including, with various levels of enthusiasm, countries like Kuwait, Egypt, and Jordan. The third is a Sunni Islamist group, which comprises the ruling regimes of Turkey and Qatar as well as Muslim Brotherhood networks, including those in Europe. (This group is, in turn, in the process of developing closer ties with politically ascendant Sunni Islamists in Malaysia and Pakistan.)

While the animosity between Iran and Saudi Arabia is well-known, the Sunni Islamist grouping now helmed by Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party is far more ambivalent toward Iran. Instead, it sees the conservative Sunni bloc led by Saudi Arabia as its chief enemy and rival. In other words, the intra-Sunni divide between conservative or “status quo” powers and political Islamists is, at times, far more consequential than the Sunni-Shi’a split. This dynamic is key to understanding today’s Middle East, including the relations between Turkish Islamism and revolutionary Iran.

Turkish Islamists and Iran

The impact of the 1979 Iranian revolution on Turkish political Islam must be seen in this broader context. Indeed, there continue to be close ideological connections between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Milli Görüș movement. This is the dominant force in Turkish Islamism, which fundamentally shapes the worldview of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), its ambivalence to revolutionary Iran and its pan-Islamic agenda.

The roots of pan-Islamic thinking in Turkey goes back to the Ottoman era. At the time, pan-Islamic identity was seen as a tool to keep the Muslim parts of the empire together following the independence of its European and mainly Christian possessions. However, the politicization of Islam took place with the spread of the Naqshbandi-Khalidi Sufi Order. Its Istanbul-based Iskender Pașa lodge engineered the creation of the country’s first Islamist political party in the late 1960s.

At the time, Turkish Islamism was largely focused on adherence to traditional Sunni Islamic customs, along with opposition to modernity and emphasis on spiritual and moral issues. In the course of the Cold War, Turkish Islamists were increasingly influenced by the Islamist revivalist ideology of the Brotherhood, while they remained ambivalent toward the idea of a revolution. Turkish Islamists, furthermore, were closely connected to state institutions in the Ottoman era and, contrary to general belief, also in the republican era. Although Mustafa Kemal Atatürk closed the Dervish orders and lodges, as well as madrasas, a significant portion of the clergy found a home in the newly established Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet. There they became employees of the central government and provincial muftis or imams in mosques.

As a result, there was a powerful incentive for the Islamist movement to work inside the system rather than outside, as a revolutionary force. This state of affairs particularly crystallized after 1946, when the Soviet threat led the Turkish state—even under the leadership of Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party—to liberalize its regulations on religion. From 1950 onward, center-right parties dominated political life, and they presided over a gradual resurgence of religion, both in state and society. This culminated in the so-called Turkish-Islamic synthesis ushered in by the military junta ruling from 1980-83, which elevated Sunni Islam to a key position in Turkish national identity.

In the eyes of Turkish Islamists, the revolution in Iran strengthened the idea that the creation of a new “Islamic” order in Turkey was possible. Aside from some small sectarian Sunni groups, this notion was met with enthusiasm by Turkish Islamists who followed Iran’s post-1979 political evolution closely. Prominent Turkish supporters of the Iranian revolution—including Ali Bulaç, Ercüment Özkan, Kenan Çamurcu, Nurettin Şirin, and Atasoy Müftüoğlu—expressed and debated their views in various publishing outlets. These ideologists contributed to the spread of Khomeini’s ideas and to interpreting the Iranian regime’s policies for a Turkish audience. But, contrary to popular opinion, most were not agents of the Iranian regime, but rather organic Turkish sympathizers who embraced the view that an Islamic revolution could take place in Turkey as well.

During Khomeini’s lifetime in particular, Tehran’s efforts to export the revolution had a wide-ranging impact on Turkish Islamism. Although traditional Turkish Islamic milieus typically viewed the Iranian Shi’a as deviant and schismatic, Islamist thinkers countered this. They emphasized and repeated the Khomeini regime’s pan-Islamist rhetoric. Khomeini preached the political importance of __Ummah__¬—¬the worldwide community of Muslims irrespective of sect—and __Tawhid__—the doctrine of the sovereignty of God as the sole source of authority. This contrasted with modern notions of popular sovereignty and the primacy of man-made law. Both beliefs demand unity among Muslims in order to impose divine will on the world. Khomeini’s message was consistent with the ideas of Said Qutb, Mawdudi, and other Sunni revivalist thinkers of the time. And given the Brotherhood’s aforementioned connections with the Milli Görüș, in Turkey it found fertile ground in which to grow.

After Khomeini’s death in 1989, the pro-Iranian movement within Turkish Islamism lost its ideological unity, but it had already begun to raise a new generation of Islamist youth. As a result, when Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party grew to prominence in the 1990s, a large number of its cadres had been profoundly influenced by the ideological defenders of the Iranian revolution. By 2001, when the AKP was formed as the successor to the Welfare Party, pro-Islamic Revolution leaders were of an age that allowed them to exercise greater political and ideological influence over Turkish Islamist and Islamic thought as a whole.

Hostility to the United States

One major effect of the Iranian revolution on Turkish Islamism was to accelerate a shift in Turkish perceptions of the United States. Traditionally, Turkish political Islamists had been motivated primarily by anti-communism, which led them—along with Turkish nationalists—to support Turkey’s alliance with the U.S. In fact, Islamists and nationalists were united in the National Turkish Student Association, which came out on the streets in 1969 to oppose leftist demonstrations against the U.S. Sixth Fleet’s visit to Istanbul. But Khomeini indicated that world politics were not binary: opposition to Soviet communism did not have to mean a pro-American stance.

Like Qutb, Khomeini had set his sight on the United States as the “Great Devil.” He infused a powerful anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and anti-American rhetoric with clearly identifiable left-wing origins into his revolutionary Islamist program. He also embraced anti-American regimes in the developing world regardless of their religious identity. The 154th article of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s constitution emphasizes that it “supports the struggles of the dispossessed for their rights against the oppressors anywhere in the world.” Thus, in practice, Tehran has pursued close relations with anti-American regimes, including in Venezuela, Cuba and Brazil.

The Islamic Republic’s anti-Americanism, and its affinity for other ruling regimes that resisted “American hegemony,” began to take hold among Turkish Islamist groups in the 1980s, gripping their imagination. Later, the end of the Cold War removed the geopolitical rationale for the Islamist’s tactical embrace of the United States all together. Hostility to America rapidly became mainstream within most of the Islamist movement.

This was clearly visible in 1996-97, during the brief premiership of Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey’s legendary Islamist leader. Erbakan ruled in a coalition government with a secular center-right party, and did not control the foreign ministry. But he did develop his own separate “pro-Islamic”—and anti-Western—foreign policy agenda. Notably, this included making Tehran the destination of his first foreign trip. Along similar lines, Erbakan’s most important international initiative was to launch the Developing Eight (D-8) group of Muslim countries in opposition to the western-dominated G-7. He envisioned the D-8 as the embryo of a future union of Muslim countries in which Turkey would be the natural leader. He also believed that Turkey should pursue this initiative instead of its quest for membership in the European Union. Symptomatic of Turkish Islamists’ approach, Erbakan took Turkish leadership in the D8 for granted, and appeared to assume Iran and other states would enthusiastically support the initiative.

During the Cold War, Turkey’s secular republican establishment had tacitly supported rising Islamist activism and Islamic societal consciousness against the political Left. However, with the ascent of Erbakan, it suddenly came to fear that it would lose control of political Islam and that a revolutionary scenario à la Iran in 1979 was also possible in Turkey. Erbakan’s public embrace of Iran, following his first foreign visit to Tehran, raised these concerns to alarming levels. In fact, Erbakan’s downfall was strongly tied to Iran.

In late December 1996, the Welfare Party-controlled township of Sincan outside Ankara held a commemoration known as “Jerusalem Night,” which included overtly pro-Hezbollah propaganda. The event included an incendiary speech by the Iranian Ambassador to Turkey, Muhammad Reza Bagheri, in which he supported the introduction of Sharia law in Turkey. Iran’s consul general in Istanbul went further, warning that the spread of Islam could not be stopped. While the consul spoke only about “Islam” in generic terms, there is little doubt he meant the growth of political Islam.

This, along with popular counter-demonstrations by secularists, triggered the establishment’s move against Erbakan. Following the military-controlled National Security Council’s imposition of a far-reaching set of reforms on the government in February 1997, Erbakan’s parliamentary majority eroded. He was forced to resign in June 1997. The Welfare Party was subsequently closed down by the Constitutional Court and Erbakan was banned from politics. These developments led to a sharp deterioration of relations between Ankara and Tehran, and the two governments went on to spar over Turkey’s relations with Israel, Iran’s ties to the PKK, and broader geopolitical differences.

The resumption of Turkish-Iranian enmity had three major implications for Turkish Islamism. The first was a distinct shift in the relationship between the Islamist movement and the state. Before 1997, Islamists had sought to work in symbiosis with the state to secure power and advance their agenda. After 1997, they cultivated a sense of having been victimized by the secularist establishment that strengthened their determination to stage, essentially, a hostile takeover of the state.

Second, enmity with Iran deepened the split in the Islamist movement between a traditionalist, pro-Erbakan wing and a reformist wing led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül. This wing no longer opposed EU membership or the market economy. It based its argument for change on a rhetoric of human rights rather than Islamic principles. This division was embodied by Erdoğan and Gül’s creation, in 2001, of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an alternative to the Welfare Party. This enabled the Islamist movement to broaden its constituency and attract wider groups of voters, who were keen on supporting new political forces untainted by corruption and mismanagement, but also fearful of Erbakan’s ideological radicalism.

Third was a change in tactics to go along with the shift in Islamists’ objectives. It led to the formation of a tactical alliance between Erdoğan’s political movement and Fethullah Gülen’s network, which had strong representation within state institutions. That alliance fell apart in 2011. Five years later, the Gülen movement was credibly implicated in the abortive 2016 military coup against Erdoğan’s government.

Amid the newer generation of Turkish Islamists, the sum effect of these shifts in objective, style, and partnership was the rise of a new strategy. Erbakan’s generation was focused on the long-term process of advancing the Islamist cause both at home and abroad. Erdoğan, by contrast, has been much more impatient in pursuit of these goals, and thus far more willing to take risks with large implications. This determination and impetuousness is not symptomatic of the movement as a whole: other leaders like Abdullah Gül, in particular, have been considerably more cautious than Erdoğan, but not necessarily because they disagree with his end goal. Instead, they may see his rashness as unnecessarily generating opposition to the movement.

Islamist writer Ali Bulaç recalled in 2015 how Erbakan, during the 1997 military intervention, kept his cool throughout the process and urged calm among his many followers. Some came to him and said they were “about to explode.” Erbakan told them to “go scream in the forest,” adding that their movement’s setbacks were minor impediments in their historical mission. Bulaç credits Erbakan with having prevented a civil conflict that could have turned Turkey into an Algeria or a Syria. Erdoğan takes a different approach. Based no doubt on Erbakan’s fate—being persecuted by state prosecutors and barred from politics for life— at each instance Erdoğan has fought back hard against the secularist establishment, also known as the “deep state.”

In foreign policy, Erbakan also took a cautious approach. The scholar Behlül Özkan details how Erbakan strongly counseled the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood against an uprising in 1982, warning that they would only cause a massacre to transpire. Bulaç, likewise, recalls Erbakan’s position on tyrannical rulers that oppressed Muslims: “They are surely tyrants, but if we confront them, they will oppress Muslims even more. Whatever we do, we must do with these rulers.” This approach conforms to the traditional Hanafi Sunni doctrine, which prohibits rebellion against Muslim rulers even if they are considered unjust.20

Erdoğan, of course, has taken a different approach, choosing to promote Islamism at a hurried pace against established rulers, even when this entails great risk. This helps to explain Ankara’s adventurist policies since 2011, which have contributed to the exacerbation of the wars in Syria and Libya. Erdoğan has also adopted policies toward anti-American states—Venezuela, Cuba, and Brazil among them—that are eerily similar to Iran’s. While the Iranian revolution was not the sole cause of the differences between Erbakan-era Islamism and the trend that is shaping the Erdoğan regime today, the impact of its radicalism is certainly a contributing factor. Ironically, it is Erdoğan’s embrace of the Iranian revolution’s radical nature, and the impatient policies that have followed, that have pushed Turkish-Iranian relations to a new breaking point.

Turkey and Iran in the Erdoğan Era
During the AKP’s years in power, its leadership has shown considerable deference to Iran, and, at times, has actively worked to court Tehran. Initially, in its first term, the AKP set about to gradually improve ties with Tehran. Then, from 2007 to 2011—after the party consolidated power but before the Arab upheavals—it significantly enlarged these efforts.

Erdoğan’s political ability to move Turkey into closer relations to Iran was unintentionally abetted by America’s war in Iraq. This, in turn, led to a sharp deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations. In 2003, Washington was frustrated when the Turkish parliament failed to approve U.S. use of Turkish territory to open a second, northern front in the war. Meanwhile, Ankara grew alarmed when the U.S. invasion created conditions that permitted the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to resume its operations against Turkey from within Iraq, violating a 1999 ceasefire.

For Turkey, it became clear that halting PKK activities was not on Washington’s list of priorities. Worse, this provided powerful ammunition to conspiracy-minded forces in Turkey that have long-suspected the United States of having ulterior motives, including efforts to divide Turkey along the lines of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which provided for separate Armenian and Kurdish entities.

Such conspiratorial thinking about the U.S.’s motives runs deep in Turkey; it has shaped the worldview of Erdoğan and many of his Islamist allies, as well as left-wing secularists that have long opposed America. Erdoğan has fully capitalized on this paranoia in recent years. He has spoken with increasing frequency against modern-day “Lawrences of Arabia” and “Sykes-Picot Agreements,” while he and AKP officials have obstructed or opposed U.S. interests, arguing that Middle Eastern affairs should be left entirely to Muslim powers, not to foreigners. This rhetoric indicates how the worldview of Turkey’s rulers has become increasingly aligned with Iran’s Islamist rulers.

In any case, Iran has seen this as an opportunity to step forward and ingratiate itself to Turkey by intensifying its intelligence cooperation with Ankara and stepping up its own armed struggle against the PKK’s Iranian affiliate, PJAK. This, in turn, led Turks of all stripes to see Iran as a better partner against Kurdish terrorist threats than the United States. This, despite past Iranian covert support for the PKK against Turkey in the 1990s, and regardless of consistent American support for Turkey in its anti-terror struggle. By the mid-2000s, more than 50 percent of Turks viewed Iran favorably, while percentages of those who held positive views of the U.S. were in the single digits.

These shifts gave Erdoğan a freer hand to take the relationship with Iran to another level, while he gradually dismantled Turkey’s historically close relationship with Israel. Remarkably, in this period Turkey became a defender of Iran’s nuclear program as well as an apologist for the Iran regime’s brutal suppression of the 2009 “Green Revolution.”

In 2008, Ankara first offered to mediate between Iran and the international community on the Iranian nuclear issue. However, Erdoğan and his foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu , soon became increasingly outspoken defenders of Iran’s nuclear program rather than go-betweens. Erdoğan urged world powers possessing nuclear weapons to abolish their own arsenals before meddling with Iran. In October 2009, Erdogan declared, “those who … want these arrogant sanctions, need to first give these [weapons] up. We shared this opinion with our Iranian friends, our brothers.” He thus lent legitimacy to the Iranian regime and its nuclear ambitions.

AKP leaders have frequently castigated Western powers for focusing on Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program while ignoring Israel’s assumed possession of nuclear weapons. Following a 2012 nuclear summit, for example, Erdoğan noted that “nobody asks Israel to account for its nuclear weapons. The West should do this. Otherwise it does not appear honest.” As Gareth Jenkins has observed, “Erdoğan appeared sincerely convinced that Iran was solely interested in acquiring nuclear energy and had no weapons ambitions.”

Another possibility is that Erdoğan saw the Iranian nuclear program as a precedent that would allow Turkey to develop such weapons as well. In mid-2010, Erdoğan and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva appeared in Tehran on the eve of a U.N. Security Council vote on a new round of sanctions. They were photographed holding hands with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad while announcing an alternative diplomatic proposal to forestall sanctions. Ankara had become Tehran’s most valuable international supporter.

Earlier, in June 2009, Turkey had endorsed Ahmadinejad’s highly suspicious re-election. Both Gül and Erdoğan called to congratulate Ahmadinejad within days of his reelection, making them among the first, and few, world leaders to do so. Turkish leaders maintained their support even after the contested election turned into bloody suppression of peaceful protests against electoral fraud. In an interview with Der Spiegel, Davutoğlu called the Iranian political process “very healthy,” and suggested that an “intervention from the outside” would be unacceptable. According to Erdoğan, any criticism of Iran would imply “interference” in Iran’s internal affairs.

Turkey’s direct endorsement of Ahmadinejad, of course, stands in sharp contrast to its approach to the Arab upheavals two years later. Ankara’s swift calls for Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak to step down, for example, suggest that Turkish Islamists’ concerns about interfering in other countries’ affairs were highly selective. When protesters targeted Islamist rulers, Turkey spoke of non-interference; when they targeted secularist leaders, Turkey egged them on. They did so both out of ideological conviction and out of a desire to advance Turkey’s regional influence.

This approach is best explained by the ideological baggage that leading Turkish Islamists like Erdoğan and Davutoğlu carry. While their foreign policy has often been termed “Neo-Ottoman,” this is a misnomer. It’s true that Turkish Islamists have a modicum of Ottoman nostalgia. But far from harking back to the tolerant and pragmatic ways of the Ottoman Empire, their policy from the 2011 Arab upheavals onward is best understood as pan-Islamist.

Davutoğlu ’s long academic record provides ample evidence of this. His early work is colored by a deep conviction that the “conflicts and contrasts between Western and Islamic political thought originate mainly from their philosophical, methodological and theoretical background rather than from mere institutional and historical differences.” For Davutoğlu, this means Turkey’s long-standing effort to become part of Europe or the “West” is both undesirable and impossible, Indeed, he terms making Turkish society western a “utopian” project. Davutoğlu further concludes that Turkey and other Muslim societies should work instead for Islamic unity: “The core issue for [the] Islamic polity seems to be to reinterpret its political tradition and theory as an alternative world-system rather than merely as a program for the Islamization of nation-states.”

Davutoğlu’s writings matter. He is, as Behlül Özkan puts it, “the first intellectual to devise a rationalistic and pragmatic Islamist foreign policy.” He did so through hundreds of articles in Islamist publications, which Özkan has painstakingly assembled and analyzed. Subsequently, of course, Davutoğlu was highly influential in implementing foreign policy, first as an advisor to Erdoğan and then later as Foreign Minister. And even following his 2016 resignation, Erdoğan’s foreign policy has continued along the same lines, as Turkey’s growing interventions in Syria and Libya suggest.

It is the AKP’s approach to Iran, crucially, that reveals its pan-Islamist rather than Ottomanist character. Rather than perceive Iran as an adversary or rival (as it was during Ottoman times), Erdoğan and Davutoğlu viewed Iran as a partner that should be brought on board with Turkey’s efforts to build Islamic solidarity and reshape the Middle East. Going further, it is difficult not to conclude that Erdoğan and Davutoğlu approached Iran with romantic notions of Islamic solidarity. This must have startled their Iranian counterparts. Indeed, before falling out with Syria’s Assad in 2011, Ankara sought to cultivate the Assad regime and effectively replace Iran’s role as Assad’s chief external supporter. In doing so, they seemed oblivious to the possibility that this would irk Tehran and challenge its geopolitical interests.

The expectation that Turkey could build a partnership with Tehran while usurping its position in Syria makes little sense unless one considers that the Turkish leadership believed much of its own pan-Islamic propaganda. Similarly, when Turkey’s relations with Israel deteriorated in 2009, none other than Bashar al-Assad publicly announced that Turkey needed to have good relations with Israel to serve as an effective mediator. This indicated Arab leaderships’ surprise that Erdoğan’s anti-Israeli rhetoric was genuine and not just for public consumption. Iran’s rulers, in turn, certainly welcomed this Turkish approach and saw it as an opportunity to single-mindedly build its Shi’a crescent reaching from Yemen to the Mediterranean.

Although Davutoğlu is now in opposition to Erdogan, he is not the only influential figure in Turkey to harbor such ideas. For example, retired General Adnan Tanrıverdi founded the Justice Defenders Strategic Studies Center (ASSAM) and is presently the Chairman of the Turkish military contractor SADAT. A close advisor to Erdoğan, Tanrıverdi has hosted several large-scale conferences dedicated to advancing the vision of an Islamic superstate based on Sharia law consisting of over 60 countries, with Istanbul as its capital. Speaking at one such event, Tanrıverdi stated that “the Mahdi will come and we should prepare for this,” indicating a millenarianism rivaling that of the Iranian revolutionaries. Tanrıverdi was forced to resign from his position as presidential adviser following these comments, but he still wields considerable influence; his company continues to be a key instrument for Turkish proxy warfare in Syria and Libya.

Of course, more material considerations have also been at play. Turkish-Iranian commercial relations have roots that stretch deeply into Turkish Islamist movement, including senior figures who are close to Erdoğan. While hard evidence is not generally publicly available, it is well-known in Turkey that senior figures in Erdoğan’s entourage have large investments in Iran. One example is Ihsan and Mücahit Arslan, a father-son pair that have both served as AKP parliamenterians and presidential advisers, and who have significant interests in the Razi Petrokimya fertilizer plant in Iran.

The reach of Iran’s tentacles into Turkey are evident in the major Iran-Turkey oil-for-gold scandal involving Iranian gold trader Reza Zarrab. An indictment in the United States District Court for the Second District of New York alleges that Iranian efforts to circumvent and violate U.S. sanctions, spearheaded by Zarrab, involved multi-million dollar bribes to several key members of Erdoğan’s cabinet and extended to influential officials in Turkish state-owned banks. Given the nature of the Turkish political system, and particularly the president’s personal involvement in all matters of importance, it is inconceivable that this scheme would have been possible without Erdoğan’s knowledge.

Given Erdoğan’s earlier rejection of “arrogant” U.S. sanctions against Tehran, it is not surprising that Turkish Islamists would be comfortable helping Iran evade those sanctions. Where they diverge may be in their view of whether it is appropriate for high Turkish officials to grease their pockets in the process. On one side is a group loyal to Erdoğan. These seem to have accepted and partaken in the clientelist business practices that have come to dominate the Turkish economy. On the other side is a group, to which Davutoğlu and Gül (to their credit) belong, that appear to have found these practices utterly immoral.

Syria, Turkey and Disillusionment with Iran
Despite Erdogan’s outreach to Tehran, the growing sectarian violence in the Middle East from 2011 onwards dealt a significant blow to the Turkish Islamist movement’s view of Iran. The AKP’s pan-Islamic approach to regional politics—built on seeking consensus among Muslims against western influence and “colonialism”—was confronted with Iran’s resolute, uncompromising and Shi’a sectarian approach. An underlying problem is the rivaling leadership ambitions between Ankara and Tehran. Because of Turkey’s Ottoman history and Sunni identity, Turkish leaders appear to take it for granted that the Muslim world, which is overwhelmingly Sunni, will never accept Iranian leadership but will fall in line behind Turkey. Unsurprisingly, Tehran begs to differ.

This tension was already on display during the sectarian conflict in Iraq following the 2003 U.S. invasion. At that time, Iran moved to assert its influence over Iraq through Shi’a militias and political parties. From the Turkish point of view, however, Iran’s ambitions were overshadowed by Ankara’s troubled and increasingly confrontational relations with the United States, alongside the resurgence of a Kurdish uprising.

Turkey’s reckoning with Iran would, instead, unfold in Syria. The Turkish leadership committed a series of serious errors in the Syrian conflict’s early phases, for which it has paid a high price. This relates to confusion over Turkish goals, which initially involved securing influence over the government of Syria. That ambitionn rapidly shifted to the more limited goal of countering Kurdish autonomy on its southern border—a problem Turkish leaders appeared not to have seen coming.

Before 2011, Erdoğan had famously courted Bashir al-Assad, seeking to build a strong partnership with the Syrian regime that he envisioned as Turkey’s gateway to the Middle East. In the initial phases of the uprising, therefore, they sought to impose upon al-Assad the need to institute reforms, and in particular to legalize the Muslim Brotherhood and share political power with it. Because Syria is majority Sunni, Turkish leaders after 2011 saw the Sunni majority’s rise to power (represented by the Brotherhood) as both unavoidable and desirable, and focused on getting al-Assad to accept this development. The problem, of course, was that Iran provided the regime with another option: full-scale repression.

When Assad chose to follow Iranian rather than Turkish advice, Turkey committed its second mistake: breaking with Assad and openly endorsing the Sunni opposition to the regime. To make matters worse, Turkish efforts to sponsor the Brotherhood faction within the Syrian opposition led to serious friction with Hillary Clinton’s State Department, which was working for a more broad-based opposition alternative. More importantly, Assad retaliated by simply withdrawing from large areas of northern Syria, which the regime left to the YPG—the Syrian wing of the PKK. Meanwhile, Iran not only endorsed but participated in the Syrian regime’s brutal repression, leading to the flight of several million Syrians to Turkey. This had profoundly adverse implications for Turkey’s economic and social balances—and, by 2015, for Europe’s security, too.

The Iranian regime and its client militias have since established a corridor linking Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea. Meanwhile, Turkish-supported Brotherhood-led forces proved incompetent on the battlefield, forcing Ankara to rely increasingly on radical militias, including Al Qaeda-aligned groups like Jabhat al-Nusra. And, for a time, Turkey paid little attention to Islamic State fighters’ use of its territory to access their caliphate in Syria and Iraq. The rise of ISIS, in turn, shifted Western perceptions of the conflict, and led most Western powers to grudgingly accept the survival of the Assad regime as a lesser evil.

Turkey was thus effectively isolated. But, beginning in 2018, Ankara doubled down on its involvements in Syria by inserting its own troops into the country’s north. This further deepened its relationship with radical Islamist militias, which now function as Turkish proxies. Since 2019, Turkey has become increasingly involved in fighting against the Assad regime. As a result, the Turkish Islamist government has, in practice, found itself in a proxy war against Iran’s Islamist government.

Still, Erdoğan and the AKP leadership have yet to speak up in a serious manner against Tehran, while their criticism of Moscow’s actions has remained measured. Caught in a confrontation with the West, Turkish Islamists appear unwilling to escalate tensions with neighboring Iran, which they seem to see as a lesser threat than the status-quo Sunni powers. This ignores the fact that Iranian policies have been tremendously detrimental to Turkish security, far more than America’s limited relationship with Syrian Kurds in combating the Islamic State. But Erdoğan and his associates seem to see Iran as a balance against Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt—an alignment that Ankara views as both an extended arm of the United States, and as a direct threat to its own ambitions. Indeed, an overview of Turkish reactions to recent crises in the region is suggestive.

In July 2013, Turkey went into alarm mode after the ouster of Muhammad Morsi in Egypt. Erdoğan and his advisors linked this event to the Gezi Park protests two months earlier, and saw both as part and parcel of an American or Jewish plan to unseat his government. Turkish officials have similarly pointed fingers at America for the failed 2016 coup against Erdoğan, and pulled out all stops to support its ally Qatar when a Saudi-led coalition (which Ankara saw as boosted by Washington) sought to bring the small Emirate to heel in 2017. Turkish Islamists also viewed Saudi Arabia’s announcement of social reforms and “return to moderate Islam” with great alarm—a mouthpiece for the Turkish government interpreted these reforms as an American plan to “defeat the Muslim world” by “targeting Mecca and Medina.”

Erdoğan then went so far as to state that the 2019 coup in Sudan was “against Turkey.” Senior advisors were happy to explain to reporters that Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, under Israeli and American direction, had triggered the coup because of growing military cooperation between Turkey and Sudan. In sum, Erdoğan and his entourage appear to see their greatest geopolitical threat in a perceived alignment between Sunni Arab powers, Israel, and the United States.

In this worldview, Iran becomes a partner and potential ally rather than an adversary. Thus, Turkey’s political leadership is silent even where Iran is countering Turkish interests in Syria. Still, there is little doubt that the rank and file of the Turkish Islamist movement has experienced serious disillusionment with Iran. Open supporters of the Iranian regime, who proliferated just a few years ago, have gone almost completely silent in Turkey.

Conclusion
Iran’s 1979 revolution had an profound impact on Turkey’s Islamists, which continues to affect Turkish politics today. The revolution generated a seemingly bottomless pit of goodwill on their part, representing an entire generation that viewed Iran as an example to emulate. This allowed Tehran’s pan-Islamic pronouncements to outweigh the clear evidence of Iran’s pursuit of narrow sectarian interests, often at Turkey’s expense.

Now, Turkish Islamists are realizing that their appreciation of the Islamic Republic might be unrequited. The confrontation over Syria, and Tehran’s uncompromising embrace of the Assad regime, appears to have seriously dented Iran’s positive image among the broader rank and file of the Turkish Islamist movement. It is unclear how long this might last. A similar Turkish disillusionment occurred in 1982, when Damascus bloodily suppressed a Muslim Brotherhood revolt. The question today is whether Turkish Islamists will allow their ideological blinders to once again block their sight to evidence of Iran’s actions in Syria, or whether a deeper reapparaisal of Iran’s role will take place. However, because Turkish Islamists see themselves as part of an epic battle between the Muslim world and a Western or “Zionist-American” alliance, it is plausible that Turkish concerns over revolutionary Iran and its ambitions will continue to be relegated to the background.

The Turkish regime, meanwhile, is preoccupied elsewhere. It is busy fueling its confrontation with the West and with conservative Sunni regimes from Riyadh to Cairo. It is picking battles that it is unlikely to win. And all the while it is ignoring the fact that its own decisions have allowed Tehran’s regional influence to grow precipitously at Turkey’s own expense.

As a safety precaution, the Islamic State (IS) warned its fighters against traveling to Europe during the COVID-19 pandemic and specifically disclosed in the group’s al-Naba newsletter that fighters should “stay away from the land of the epidemic for the time being.” Africa, though, has not been spared, like reported by thedefensepost.com.

While life in much of the Western world seems to have stood still, IS’ affiliates have continued to conduct deadly attacks throughout Africa. In March alone, the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) attacked a Nigerian army convoy in Gorbe, Yobe State, killing 47 military personnel. In Mozambique, another IS’ affiliate stormed the seaport and claimed it as part of its caliphate.

The terrorist group appears to have rebounded from its defeat in the Levant and are utilizing security and economic gaps caused by the pandemic to launch a resurgence in Africa.

Islamic State’s Resurgence in Africa
Since its defeat in the Middle East, IS has refocused its attention to Africa intending to establish provinces, Islamic States, and eventually, an Islamic Caliphate to mirror its lost caliphate in the Levant.

The terrorist group’s affiliates in Africa have established bases in regions with prolonged security instabilities, poor governance, and massive socio-economic problems.

Predictably, the economic crises from the COVID-19 pandemic could jolt IS as a legitimate governing alternative due to the group’s ability to raise massive capital. In 2014, for instance, IS generated $1 billion from sales of illegal oil and artifacts.

With its command of the black-market and dark web, along with the plethora of natural resources in Africa, IS can establish a caliphate in the continent that is far deadlier and more sophisticated than the one it controlled in the Levant.

To avoid such a disastrous scenario, international financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund must guarantee developing countries debt relief so African countries can brace for the pending economic crises and adequately address security and socio-economic needs.

If debt relief is not provided, African countries battling violent extremism will have no option but to cut funding for their security forces to focus on the pandemic’s socio-economic disruptions.

The World Bank argues that the crisis will push some 40 to 60 million people into extreme poverty. From a health perspective, Sub-Saharan Africa has been plagued less by the virus but will be hit the hardest in terms of increased extreme poverty that could affect 23 million people.

Preventing Violent Extremism
Economic hardships in Western countries supporting counterterrorism missions in Africa will look to cut costs by reducing military spending, redirecting the funds to pay for trillion-dollar financial bailouts meant to revamp their respective economies. These changes will undeniably hamper anti-terrorism efforts, which IS will exploit to foster violent extremism similar to when President Barack Obama ended US military operations in Iraq in 2008.

Research on the prevention of violent extremism shows that the lack of economic prosperity is one of the main catalysts that perpetuates radical terrorism.

Looking at a data set on foreign recruits of IS, the World Bank concluded that the factors most strongly associated with foreign individuals’ joining IS had to do with a lack of economic and social inclusion in their home of origin.

IS’ affiliates have already exploited economic disparities and weak governance throughout Africa and are currently operating in 20 African states with little to no disruption.

Combatting Terrorism in Africa
In early 2013, before France’s intervention in the Sahel and the UN peacekeeping mission that followed, Islamist Jihadists affiliated with IS and al-Qaeda ruled northern Mali along with a significant portion of the Sahel.

Had the Jihadist groups not attacked Malian capital Bamako and threatened French interests, the former French President François Hollande would have never authorized the French military into Mali, and the Jihadist groups would have continued to govern northern Mali and expand further into the Sahel.

Even before COVID-19, global responses to combatting terrorism in Africa seemed to diminish. The US government planned the withdrawal of critical support assets to French military operations to refocus the resources to respectively counter Russia and China activities in Europe and the Far East, which clearly exhibited the US no longer considered Africa as a strategic interest.

In early February, to alleviate concerns of the French government and African partners, US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said the US military would not conduct a full troop withdrawal from Africa, and an ongoing review could result only in troop reductions.

However, the French President Emmanuel Macron asked the US government to reconsider the withdrawal or reduction of American troops due to the dire situation that will ensue if the US military leaves or curtails its support to the mission.

To date, Operation Barkhane and the UN peacekeeping mission in the Sahel have not been up to the task. Although French forces have progressively managed to eliminate Jihadist leaders operating in the Sahel, Islamic Jihadist groups continue to grow exponentially as the economic situation in the region worsens.

The UN mission in Mali is now considered the deadliest UN mission in history, with 204 peacekeepers killed. Thus far, the Sahel lacks any opportunity for economic growth to act as an alternative to radicalization. Consequently, the economic crisis from the pandemic will add to the cascading situations in the region, which could lead to the displacement of 2.5 million people and escalate the violence.

IS’ Caliphate in Africa
In northern Nigeria, a high poverty rate (87 percent) and regional climate change issues along with ineffective policies and corruption in certain parts of Cameroon and Chad have enabled ISWAP to gain a foothold in the region as it continues to terrorize the local populace.

In spite of the pandemic, IS’ affiliates are striving in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Somalia, and Northern Uganda, and its DRC-based fighters and their Mozambican counterparts have taken advantage of weak governance and security instabilities to establish safe havens for their operations that have led to dozens of attacks and raids on security forces and local communities.

With the Africa continent currently embattling a 60 percent youth unemployment rate and high number of Africans facing poverty, the conditions are adequate for non-state actors such as IS to galvanize disenfranchised youth to their cause and push the Africa continent further into despair.

Unlike Iraq and Syria, an IS caliphate in Africa will be difficult to eradicate due to the complex demographics, vast uninhabitable and ungoverned regions, and the lack of formidable fighting force similar to the Kurds in Iraq and Syria that can defeat IS without Western forces committing more troops.

Regardless of post-COVID-19’s economic outlook, an IS’ caliphate in Africa will be catastrophic for African and Western countries alike.

Al Shabaab, as an insurgent terrorist outfit, has primarily been operating from Somalia in the Horn of Africa. The merger of Al Shabaab with Al Qaeda, a multinational terrorist organisation, in 2012 has enhanced its strength. After completing twenty years of its existence in April 2020, it is showing no signs of waning. Al Shabaab’s endeavours to consolidate its hold over the parts of southern and central Somalia and extract taxes from people is weakening the hold of Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), established in 2012, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

Moreover, on 28th December, 2019 Al Shabaab bombed checkpoint near Mogadishu leaving 85 people dead which included Somalian forces as well as Turkish engineers. Likewise, on January 6, 2020 Somalia based terrorist outfit assaulted Kenyan military base near Lamu where one American serviceman died in Kenya. Their target was Manda Bay on the coastline of Kenya which is a forward reconnaissance base of the USA. It is also a home to parts of USA’s 475th Air Expeditionary Air Base squadron which is used for drone warfare against Al Shabaab. The base also has helped in training, assisting and enabling strategies of the USA’s African allies to combat terror. Al Shabaab viewed the Manda Bay attack as a retaliatory measure against the American attempt to designate Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. The attack, it was claimed, was carried out under the guidance and leadership Al Qaeda. In spite of such attacks, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had shown concern in February 2020 about Somalia’s prospective milestone elections in later 2020. Evidently, such attacks need to be placed in perspective in light of strategic location of the region that has involved major powers and the possibilities of stable political regime in Somalia in the midst of the growing menace of Al Shabaab’s terrorist activities.

Northeast African states including Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti and Kenya broadly constitute geo strategic region of the Horn of Africa. In fact, the Bab el Mandeb strait between Arabia and Africa connects the Red sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Since the area links the Suez Canal via the red sea to Mediterranean Ocean as well as the Indian Ocean, it has been a major international waterway. Some of the most significant world powers such as Britain, prior to its withdrawal from the east of Suez in 1967, the USA, former Soviet Union and France have enjoyed naval presence in the region. Besides, in the pursuit of enhancing its presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) China has opened up its military base in Djibouti since 2017. The Chinese embassy is functional in Somalia from 2014. Furthermore, tensions erupting within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) inevitably have found their expression in strife torn Somalia, a country with the longest coastline in the region. Consequently, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is trying to befriend Somaliland and semi-autonomous area of Putland while Qatar, along with Turkey, is backing Somalian FGS. In Somaliland and Putland the Al Shabaab has tried to unsettle the control of the FGS, albeit unsuccessfully. In essence, all the external powers have to constantly negotiate with various intra-regional conflicts to nurture local allies and ensure their durable presence. The conflicts in the region have stemmed primarily from the lack of acceptance of the territorial boundaries drawn by the colonial powers. Some of the trends in the region such as aspiration to constitute ‘Greater Somalia’, by integrating its British, French and Italian parts, Somalia-Ethiopia war over the Ogaden region during 1977-78, the independence Eritrea (1993) and South Sudan (2011) from Ethiopia and Sudan, respectively, after prolonged civil wars could be viewed in this light. Similarly building viable polities has often been a challenge in the region.

Somalia has been grappling to establish a politically stable regime since the fall of Said Barre regime in 1991. Neither the USA led multinational intervention in the 1990s under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) nor roughly twenty conferences that were organised by the African Union (AU), the UN and the European Union (EU) to establish peace in Somalia, after the withdrawal of the UN in 1995, have led to any concrete results on ground. However, Somalia had internationally funded Transitional Federal Government (TFG) since 2004. There was a tussle to capture power between the USA backed TFG, local militia, on one hand and Islamic Courts Union (ICU), on the other. Eventually, the ICU that united several groups of Islamic persuasions including Al Shabaab, was saddled in power in 2006 for a short while.

The ICU’s challenge to TFG was short lived because the agenda of bringing political stability in Somalia has often been hijacked by the external powers. Ethiopia, a predominantly Christian country, backed by the USA could oust the ICU from power in December 2006. The ICU regime was ousted because of its alleged connections with the USA designated terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. Subsequently, Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and Djibouti contributed to the AU force under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in January 2007 that has been assisting Federal Government in countering the well spread out activities of the terrorist outfits. Evidently, the governance in Somalia has had to crisscross through awkward moments as the Federal Government backed by Ethiopia, AU and the USA had to struggle to establish its legitimacy from Somalian capital Mogadishu to peripheral regions. In fact, Ethiopian invasion had proved to be a rallying point for Al Shabaab which essentially means youth. The Al Shabaab also is principally opposed to western backed government and has been committed to the law of Sharia. In the pursuit of building an Islamic state, it has persistently attacked the Federal Government and its allies.

Apart from the earlier mentioned attacks of December 2019 and January 2020, some of the other prominent attacks of Al Shabaab could be stated thus. Al Shabaab’s attack in Kampala (Uganda) in 2010 left 74 dead. In 2013 its attack on shopping Mall in Nairobi (Kenya) killed 67 people. After the infamous bombing of the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 by Al Qaeda, it was Al Shabaab that launched a major attack in the city of Garissa in Kenya in 2015 causing 147 causalities. Further, Al Shabaab was increasingly deploying sophisticated and improvised technical devices in its operations. On 15 October, 2017 in one of its most deadly attacks through double truck bombing Al Shabaab killed about 320 people. Evidently, through fear psychosis it has held Federal Government to ransom.

However, while responding to destabilising pressures the FGS, in its turn, has earned some legitimacy through peaceful transition of power in 2017 elections and by announcing National Development Plan (NDP) towards building political stability and ensuring economic recovery amidst several stiff challenges. For instance, in 2015 and 2016 the economy registered growth of 5 and 7 percent respectively but by 2019 it was less than 3 percent. The rate of poverty according to 2019 surveys is as high as 69 percent with substantial number youth still unemployed. The aid from developed world coupled with the funds from Somalian diaspora have proved inadequate to improve conditions of debt ridden, impoverished and drought prone economy. Somalia has the sixth highest displaced population in the world out of which more than two and half million live in Kenya which is a frequent target of Al Shabaab’s assaults. While handling developmental problems, the FGS has to deal with over 150 active armed groups of clan militias along with dispersed terrorist outfits like Al Shabaab that are relying on all the possible means to run their operations.

In fact, apart from getting support through Al Qaeda and its affiliates, Al Shabaab has traded contraband sugar across Kenya. It has also earned hefty amounts from illicitly traded charcoal since 2012, in spite of the UN ban on the charcoal exports. In addition, funds have come from piracy, kidnapping, extortion, local business and farmers. However, terrorism need not be conflated with piracy because the latter is a self-propelling business in itself and a separate area of investigation.

After 9/11, as the USA declared Global War on Terror (GoWT), Al Shabaab began to arrest the international attention. During 2001-05 the USA worked with local militias to capture suspected Al Qaeda members in Mogadishu. Without declaring war on Somalia formally, the USA has militarily engaged in Somalia and expanded its operations under Trump administration. From 2007-14 it conducted in between 15 to 21 drone strikes but in 2018 alone the figure of these drone strikes rose to 46 killing 326 people, including some civilians. Since the USA also endorses the notion of African solutions to African problems, it has trained roughly 22000 Somali forces that are a part of AMISOM. It has contracted private security firms that pay for soldiers from France, South Africa and Scandinavia. In December 2017, the Trump administration suspended much of the arms aid to Somalia over corruption involving inability of Somalia to account for items such as food, fuels and weapons. As for India, Somalia is a distant maritime neighbour and good deal of its trade passes through the Gulf of Aden. Indian cargo ships need protection from pirates as well as terrorist organisations. Since 2008, Indian navy has been engaged in countering piracy on the Somalian coast. As a major power in the IOR and the Indo-Pacific region India has to be watchful of the activities of important powers that are operating in the region.

In substance, Al Shabaab’s insurgency and Somalian imbroglio have prompted the African states within the AMISOM and major external powers such as the USA, France, China, Turkey, the U.A.E. and Qatar to defend their stakes in the Horn of Africa. Although the FGS has earned a measure of success in its quest to stabilise the situation, owing to persistent attacks from Al Shabaab the prospects of peace and stability still appear fragile.

It is hard to exaggerate the significance of the damage done to the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in Iran—how it will affect Iran’s nuclear program and the broader implications pertaining to a possible Iranian retaliation against Israel, like reported by jns.org.

The reports emanating from Iran over the past two days are contradictory. Initially, reports said a blast damaged a factory where advanced centrifuges were being tested, and then it was claimed that a cyberattack triggered the blaze. Perhaps we should rely on the sources quoted by The New York Times, who said the incident was the result of an explosive device planted at the site.

Assuming the blast was indeed intentional, it would be a tremendous success for the attacker, in terms of the intelligence compiled on the classified facility, knowledge of the activities taking place there and ability to infiltrate the premises undetected and place a bomb precisely where it would cause maximal damage. The bewildered and hesitant responses of the Iranian authorities not only indicate their astonishment that their secret installation was exposed and damaged, but also their uncertainty regarding the attacker’s identity and methods.

Even before all the details surrounding the alleged sabotage emerge, it appears safe to conclude this was the worst setback to Iran’s nuclear program since its centrifuges were incapacitated in 2010 at the same site at Natanz. It was eventually revealed that those centrifuges were hit in a particularly sophisticated cyberattack via the Stuxnet computer worm. According to foreign reports at the time, the Stuxnet virus was jointly developed by the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate’s Unit 8200 and the U.S. National Security Agency. The worm targeted the supervisory control and data acquisition systems for the centrifuges and caused their collapse. The Stuxnet worm was reportedly active for close to a year before it was discovered.

In the most recent attack, centrifuges—ones far more advanced than those ravaged by Stuxnet a decade ago—were again targeted. The Iranians were testing them in preparation for installation in an underground facility at the site. They were also supposed to shorten Iran’s nuclear breakout window.

The latest blow doesn’t just disrupt Iran’s plan to put these advanced centrifuges to work. It also reveals to the world—yet again—the scope of Iran’s investment in its nuclear program as its economy buckles under U.S. sanctions and the coronavirus pandemic, and as its policies on these fronts are met with increasing domestic criticism.

Naturally, Tehran pointed its finger at Israel as the party responsible for the attack. Similar accusations were made the previous week as well, following the explosion at the Parchin military site east of Tehran, although based on the information available that incident does appear to have been caused by a technical malfunction. The Natanz blast, on the other hand, appears to have been an intentional attack, and as such, Iran could seek revenge.

The quickest way for Iran to harm Israel is through its proxies in Syria. Although these militias have been degraded recently through a string of airstrikes attributed to Israel, which according to foreign news reports destroyed various weapons systems, it remains likely that similar weapons are still in Syria or can be shipped there in relatively short order.

Over the past two years, Iran and its proxies have targeted Israel on several occasions via rocket or drone attack on the Golan Heights. In each case, Israel’s air force was able to intercept the threat before it could cause damage, but there’s always a first time for everything. The latest event—and Iran’s public accusations of Israel—necessitate, at the very least, raising the alert level in the north as an act of prudence.

Iran has other options for a response; via Hezbollah from Lebanon (unlikely) or by hitting Israeli targets abroad. We can assume that along with seeking revenge and trying to find those physically responsible for carrying out the Natanz attack, the Iranians will also try fixing the breaches in their nuclear defenses. History tells us they will only be partially successful in this regard because time and again their machinations are discovered—and disrupted.

Turkish forces are at the present time bolstering newly constructed outposts in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Turks have established five positions on mountainous terrain near the villages of Sharanish and Banka, in the Zakho area adjoining the border with Turkey, since commencing an operation in the area in mid-June. Troops have been transported in by helicopter to man the new positions, like reported by jpost.com.

This is the latest phase in an operation that has brought the Turkish Armed Forces 30 km. inside Iraqi Kurdish territory. Operation Claw Tiger was launched on June 17, following Turkish air attacks on targets Ankara had identified as associated with the PKK at a number of sites in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)-controlled area. The areas destroyed in the airstrikes included a number of Yazidi villages in the Mount Sinjar area. A refugee camp at Makhmur was also targeted.

Elements of the 1st and 5th Commando Brigades, both elite Turkish airborne formations, are taking part in the operation on the ground. Iranian artillery shelled the Choman area of the Qandil Mountains on June 16, in a move widely interpreted as supportive of the Turkish offensive.
Despite the considerable dimensions of the current offensive, Kurdish sources do not consider that it represents the beginning of a long-awaited general Turkish attempt to destroy the PKK in Qandil.

Rather, they see it as continuing an established pattern of ongoing Turkish operations in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, conducted without inquiry as to the wishes of the local Kurdish authorities, and intended to establish a widening Turkish military infrastructure/buffer zone in the area adjoining the border.

Turkish media reports largely concur. According to a recent article in the Hurriyet newspaper, 12 permanent observation posts had already been established in the KRG-controlled area since 2016. Hurriyet quoted Turkish security officials who depicted the PKK as seeking to establish a corridor for its forces on the Iranian border in Sulaimaniya province, via Sinjar, to the Kurdish-controlled area in northeast Syria.

Ankara considers the YPG (People’s Protection Units), which is the main force in northeast Syria, to be a franchise of the PKK. The Turkish operation, according to Hurriyet, is intended to break this corridor. It should be noted that the current deployment of Turkish forces is not sufficiently deep to cut any such notional line.

The Turkish newspaper likened the current effort to previous Turkish operations in northern Syria in 2016 and 2019 which resulted in Turkish occupation of two noncontiguous blocs of territory along the Syrian-Turkish border.

Kurdish sources, meanwhile, suggest an additional, domestic political motivation for the current operation. They note the dire state of the Turkish economy, and the consequent loss of public support, indicated in a number of recent polls, for the ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party and its main ally, the far-right Nationalist Action Party. According to this perspective, the Turkish operation is intended to rally the government’s political base and to distract from socioeconomic failure.

This element notwithstanding, Operation Claw Tiger fits into an arc of Turkish military assertiveness currently extending from northern Iraq, across northern Syria, going down via the Mediterranean and via Israel, and reaching Libya. Turkey also has a military presence to the south and east of this area, in Qatar, and in Somalia.

In the Mediterranean, Turkey is challenging Greece, Cyprus, France and Israel for the gas riches beneath the water.

Via its SADAT military company, Ankara is deeply engaged in support of Hamas against Israel. SADAT, sometimes referred to as Erdogan’s Revolutionary Guards, is involved in other, similarly murky ends of Turkey’s regional assertion. The company, founded by the Turkish president’s military adviser Gen. Adnan Tanriverdi, took responsibility for the training of Syrian rebels under Turkey’s flag. These forces were subsequently deployed against the Syrian Kurds in 2019-20.

They are now engaged in Libya, fighting against the Libyan National Army of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. SADAT, incidentally, is currently also involved in training Sunni Islamist forces loyal to the Government of National Accord in Libya. The Africa Intelligence website and Asharq al-Awsat newspaper reported this week that the Turkish company has signed an agreement to this end with Security Side, a Libyan security company headed by one Fawzi Abu Kattaf, a Palestinian Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood supporter with close ties to Qatar.

WHAT DOES this flurry of overt and semi-covert Turkish regional military assertion amount to? Can a common theme be established?

In Syria and Iraq, obviously, Ankara is, on the face of it, challenging its old PKK enemy. But there are additional layers. Erdogan was first to support the Syrian Sunni Arab insurgency. He has proved its last and most faithful ally. Western states, discouraged by the insurgency’s Islamist and jihadi nature, peeled away from it years ago. Turkey, untroubled by these loyalties because it shares them, has remained.

The enclaves in northern Syria do serve to bisect the area of Kurdish control, and in Afrin a large-scale ethnic cleansing of Kurds has taken place. But Turkey is now pouring money and forces into northwest Syria, in an effort to shore up this enclave and ensure its semi-permanence. This is not only about opposing Kurdish aspirations. It is about establishing a part of Syria intended to be forever Turkish (and Sunni Islamist).

In Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, Erdogan wants to lay claim to the cause of recovering al-Aqsa from non-Muslim custodianship. Covert military support to Hamas runs alongside active soft power efforts. These are managed by the government aid agency TIKA. Tens of millions of dollars are spent each year, via projects such as the Turkish Culture Center on Hashalshelet Street in Jerusalem’s Old City.

In the Mediterranean, the interests, of course, are related to Turkey’s need for gas supplies. But the bald assertiveness of laying claim, together with the client government in Tripoli, to a massive swath of the Eastern Mediterranean and thus stymieing plans by Israel, Greece and Cyprus to pipe gas to Europe has the additional advantage for Turkey of depicting itself as the regional dominant force.

In Libya, finally, again geostrategic and ideological aspects coincide: the government of Fayez al-Sarraj is kept in place by Muslim Brotherhood-associated forces. He represents a last remnant of the hoped-for alliance which Erdogan had thought to lead, before the military coup in Egypt of 2013, the departure of the Ennahda Party from power in Tunisia and the revival of Bashar Assad’s fortunes in Syria.

So, all the way from Zakho province in northwest Iraq to Tripoli on Libya’s African coast, Turkey is flexing its muscles.

It is an independent, ambitious foreign policy, with not the slightest nod to the “pro-Western” and “pro-NATO” orientation that Turkey’s Western apologists like to recall. It has its origin in a combination of nationalist assertiveness, tinged with Ottoman-era nostalgia, and the ambitions of Muslim Brotherhood-style Sunni political Islam.

This is a potent mix, which is not required to place itself before the judgment of the Turkish voter until 2023. As of now, its main impact is an arc of destabilization, stretching across land and sea from Iraq to Libya.

The Saudi-Iranian dispute might dominate headlines, but a similar rivalry between Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is wreaking just as much havoc in the Middle East and North Africa. While Saudi Arabia may have a leg up on Iran in some ways, Turkey and the UAE are at a virtual draw, like reported by algemeiner.com.

In Libya, forces of the Turkish-backed, Tripoli-based internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) are pushing UAE-backed rebels led by renegade Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar out of western Libya. In addition to the UAE, Haftar has support from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, with whom Turkey is also at odds.

In contrast to Libya, Turkey is discovering that in Syria the odds are stacked against it, even if its objectives in the country are more limited. In Libya, Turkish support for the GNA amounts to an effort to shape who controls the country as well as its energy-rich waters in the Eastern Mediterranean. In Syria, Turkey is determined to a) prevent Syrian Kurdish nationalist forces from establishing a permanent and meaningful presence on its borders and b) control jihadist forces in Idlib, the last major Syrian rebel stronghold.

The US abandonment of its alliance with the Kurds in the fight against the Islamic State pushed the Kurds toward cooperation with the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Kurds expect this cooperation to shield them from Turkish efforts to push them further out of border areas.

At the same time, Turkey — already home to 3.6 million Syrian refugees (the largest single concentration of Syrians fleeing their war-torn and dilapidated homeland) — wants to stymie a potential new influx of many more refugees if and when Idlib falls to Russian-backed Syrian government forces.

The UAE-Turkish rivalry, which is rooted in a battle for dominance of global Muslim religious soft power; geopolitical competition across the Muslim world, including the Middle East and the Horn of Africa; and fundamentally opposed attitudes toward political Islam, has escalated military confrontations and severely complicated efforts to resolve the conflicts in Libya and Syria.

The UAE-Turkey scorecard is 1:1, and so far, Turkey has a winning hand in Libya. In Syria, however, few doubt that Turkey will struggle to secure its interests with a firmly reinstated Assad, who is backed not only by Russia and Iran but also the UAE.

UAE Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayed reportedly promised Assad $3 billion in April, of which $250 million was paid up front. This was intended to break the ceasefire in Idlib imposed on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan by his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.

Russia appears to have successfully thwarted Prince Muhammad’s move.

The Emirati crown prince had hoped to tie Turkey up in fighting in Syria, which would complicate Turkish military support for the GNA in Libya. Assad’s failure to take up the offer likely contributed to Turkey’s recent ability to successfully focus on Libya. The UAE does have one strategic advantage. Turkey’s reputation in Washington, DC, much like that of Saudi Arabia, is severely tarnished. The UAE has skillfully evaded a similar fate so far, enjoying not only close ties with the US but also with Russia.

Turkish-US relations are strained over multiple issues, including Turkey’s acquisition of Russia’s acclaimed S-400 anti-missile defense system, its close cooperation with Russia and Iran, and the continued presence in the US of Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish preacher whom Erdogan accuses of staging the failed 2016 military attempt to remove him from office.

The Trump administration has nevertheless offered Turkey ammunition to be used in military operations in northeastern Syria as well as humanitarian assistance in a hopeless bid to persuade Ankara to push back Iranian forces in the country.

In a surprise move, Erdogan recently demoted and then accepted the resignation of Rear Admiral Cihat Yayci, the popular architect of Turkey’s intervention in Libya and its aggressive stance in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yayci is believed to be an anti-Western Eurasianist who advocates closer Turkish relations with Russia and China.

Turkey’s ties to Russia are equally complex. While Turkey and Russia support opposing sides in Libya, they have for the most part been able to balance their interests in Syria — so far. Those interests sometimes coincide and sometimes diverge, leading earlier this year to clashes between Turkish and Syrian forces.

In Libya, Turkish drones allegedly destroyed a Russian-made Pantsir air defense system even as hundreds of Russian mercenaries working for the Wagner Group, which has close ties to the Kremlin, reportedly supported Haftar’s forces. If Russia’s support for Haftar is its attempt to capitalize on an opportunity to stoke a fire, the UAE’s backing reflects Prince Muhammad’s determination to confront political Islam across the Middle East and North Africa.

“Turkey and the UAE [are] engaged in a regional power struggle. They see it as a zero-sum game in which there is no way for both sides to win. If one wins, the other one loses,” said Sinan Ulgen, a former Turkish diplomat and chairman of the Istanbul-based Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM).

This zero-sum game is being played on proxy battlefields, and it bodes ill for those unwillingly sucked into it.

In its annual report on terrorism, the US State Department accused Iran of providing a safe haven for senior members of al-Qaeda, like reported by al-monitor.com.

“When you see Iranian fingerprints on so many different terrorist groups around the world, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that Iran would also have connections to al-Qaeda,” said Ambassador Nathan Sales, who leads the State Department’s Counterterrorism Bureau.

Sales told reporters Wednesday that Iran has allowed al-Qaeda operatives to move freely within the country to facilitate the movement of fighters and money into neighboring countries.

“If Iran wants to rejoin the community of responsible nations, here is a start: Crack down on the terrorists that caused 9/11. Crack down on the terrorist proxies that foment violence around the world,” he added.

This isn’t the first time the Donald Trump administration has claimed the Shiite-led country acts as a sanctuary for the Sunni terrorist group. Last October, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “there is no doubt” that there is a connection between Iran and al-Qaeda.

Pompeo’s testimony raised questions over whether the administration was building a case to attack Iran by invoking the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. The AUMF is directed at the perpetrators of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks — al-Qaeda and its associates.

But to justify the January drone strike in Baghdad that killed Iran’s most powerful military commander, Qasem Soleimani, the administration instead cited the 2002 law that authorized the Iraq war.

The terrorism report, provided annually to Congress, describes Iran’s authorities as “unwilling to bring to justice” senior members of al-Qaeda residing in the country or identify those it is holding in its custody.

“Iran has allowed AQ [al-Qaeda] facilitators to operate a core facilitation pipeline through Iran since at least 2009, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to South Asia and Syria,” the report said.

Hamza bin Laden, the son of the late al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, is thought to have lived in Iran before he was killed in a US operation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region in September 2019.

Describing Iran as “the world’s worst state sponsor of terrorism,” the report also listed Tehran’s continued support for armed groups throughout the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Iran also backs a number of Shiite militias in Iraq, including Kataib Hezbollah. The United States blames the group for a number of attacks on American interests in Iraq in the past year, including a rocket attack that killed an American civilian contractor at a base near Kirkuk in December and another that left two US service members dead at Camp Taji in March.

The State Department report also said the Iranian regime uses the clandestine foreign wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), known as Quds Force, to “provide support to terrorist organizations, provide cover for associated covert operations, and create instability in the region.” In April 2019, the United States designated the IRGC, including the Quds Force, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

 

Despite his lengthy military background, the Egyptian President Abdul Fattah Al Sissi who rose to the rank of Field Marshall before removing his uniform has proved to be an accomplished diplomat and statesman, like reported by gulfnews.com.

Since he assumed office in June 2014 his prime focus has been on developing the economy, providing jobs, increasing tourism and overhauling his nation’s infrastructure.

He is a leader who has sought good relations with all major powers and works to find peaceful solutions to brewing conflicts.

Put simply, he is no warmonger and neither does he seek to use force in order to acquire territory or steal the natural resources of neighbouring states. Softly spoken, charismatic and known for his patience, it appears when it comes to a looming existential threat to Egypt posed by Libya, his patience is almost exhausted.

On Saturday, for the first time he put his cards on the table clearly delineating his red lines.

While stressing his preference for a ceasefire to be followed by a diplomatic solution to the conflict, he warned that any efforts on the part of foreign militias to capture the port town of Sirte, a gateway for the export of oil, or the Al Jufra airbase, currently home to Khalifa Haftar’s forces, would invite Cairo to launch a military intervention.

“Any military intervention by Egypt will be according to the principles of international law,” he said while pledging never to violate Libya’s sovereignty or threaten the Libyan people.

Mediation efforts
President Al Sissi’s recent thrust to mediate between the unelected Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) involving the dismantling of militias, the removal of foreign mercenaries and the handover of all illegal weapons was praised by the US, the EU, Russia and most Arab states.

Unfortunately, the Islamist-weighted GNA led by Fayez Al Sarraj appears more concerned with holding on to the limited power it currently enjoys than the well being of citizens.

Al Sarraj has thrown a damp squib into the proceedings, vetoing an Arab League meeting to discuss the way forward after shamefully placing his nation under the protection of Turkey that has wormed its way into areas of Iraq, Syria, Somalia and its ideological twin Qatar.

Al Sarraj has placed his people’s fate in the hands of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan who gets oil and gas exploration rights within Libya’s maritime borders for his trouble.

Brotherhood regime
And as an additional bonus his insertion into Libya of 15,000 or more hard line Syrian militias, now free to terrorise the population unchecked, succeeds in rattling his nemesis President Al Sisi who brought down Turkey’s former ally the destructive Brotherhood regime.

Moreover, just in case the GNA was seriously considering the Egyptian proposal, Turkey dispatched a delegation bearing a multimillion trade deal to Tripoli which could be construed as a timely bribe.

On this occasion Erdogan may have underestimated the resolve of the Egyptian leader to protect Egypt’s long and porous western border from terrorist incursions.

Turkish intervention
Turkey’s intervention was a blow to the ambitions of LNA chief General Khalifa Haftar whose forces were beaten back by Turkish drones just as they were closing in on the capital.

Haftar subsequently accepted the need for negotiations but such talks require two to tango and so far the other side insists on dancing to Turkey’s tune.

Cairo has now gained a new ally within Libya besides Haftar. On Saturday, Sheikh Mohamed Al Mesbahi who heads the Supreme Council of Libyan Tribes urged Egypt to expel or “exterminate” militias in the pay of Turkey.

He confirmed that Libya’s tribes would resist the Turkish occupation and he slammed Erdogan for pretending to be a liberator even as he arms and funds terrorist groups.

From a purely moral perspective, Egypt is on the side of right and deserves the backing of the Arab League as well as the international community at large.

The United Nations should withdraw legitimacy from the GNA which has turned its back on conflict cessation leading to free and fair elections and both the United States and Russia should quit sitting on the fence, instead issuing Turkey’s wannabe neo-Sultan with an ultimatum.

The French president is supportive of Egypt’s endeavours but now is the time for him to put his money where his mouth is especially when it was former president Nicolas Sarkozy who persuaded David Cameron and Barack Obama to tip the balance in Libya in the favour of rebels which ultimately sealed its destruction.

At this time when a crippling pandemic is robbing lives and setting back economic growth, no one with the possible exception of the Turkish president wants to be engaged in wars.

Al Sarraj could easily put an end to the heightened tensions by accepting talks in good faith unless he is scared of enraging his puppet master across the Mediterranean.

Alternatively Russian President Vladimir Putin could decide to sever relations with Turkey and throw his backing behind his Egyptian counterpart.

Until now, the world has played footsie with Erdogan. Turkey’s Nato membership, strategic airbase and its containment of millions of refugees ready to hotfoot it to Europe given the chance has allowed him to punch above his weight.

In the event that Al Sissi’s red lines are breached it is my hope that whatever the outcome, Egypt’s allies will grow a backbone and not leave Cairo to fight alone.

Ever since the signing of the U.S.-Taliban agreement in Doha on February 29, there has been much speculation around the question of whether the Taliban will break ties with al-Qaeda to honor the terms of the agreement. The agreement mentions that the Taliban will not allow any individual or group, including al-Qaeda, to threaten the United States and its allies from Afghanistan, like reported by thediplomat.com.

While the agreement states that there are unspecified “enforcement mechanisms” to validate the conditions of the deal, there seem to be no visible changes in the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban as of now. Al-Qaeda’s relationship with the Taliban has not always been steady and while the two groups have had their differences, their relationship has remained intact for more than two decades now. Recent developments in Afghanistan have shown that the Taliban is unlikely to abandon al-Qaeda and may even permit the latter’s activities as long as they benefit the Taliban operationally and are not traceable back to them.

Evolution of the al-Qaeda-Taliban nexus

Al-Qaeda and the Taliban got along due to a similar understanding of a fundamentalist form of Islam known as Wahhabism that they twisted to suit their own beliefs. The Taliban mixed the pre-Islamic Pashtun tribal code, Pashtunwali, with Wahhabism, but lacked credible Islamic scholars who could give credibility to their ultra-strict version of Islam as most Taliban had come from the most backward tribes of eastern Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda, however, mixes Salafi and takfiri concepts with Wahhabism and its members usually came from educated backgrounds and provided the guidance that the Taliban required.

Al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri pledged allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Omar and accepted Omar as Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful) of all Sunni Muslims. Al-Zawahiri would later re-affirm this pledge to Omar’s successors, though they were not accepted publicly. Afterwards al-Qaeda gained considerable freedom to operate in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, and were even allowed use of national resources for their activities. In return, al-Qaeda doled out money to the Taliban.

However, there were some tensions when al-Qaeda was becoming blatant in its attacks and statements, after which Omar shifted bin Laden to Kandahar to keep him under observation. In 1998, Omar even went as far as to promise the chief of the Saudi intelligence agency that the Taliban would not shelter bin Laden after al-Qaeda threatened the Saudi royal family (one of the three governments that recognized the Taliban). Al-Qaeda’s presence was a source of internal tension within the Taliban. Some Taliban elements were particularly frustrated by bin Laden’s declarations of war and al-Qaeda’s acts of terrorism against the United States in the years prior to 2001. However, U.S. missile strikes on al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan after the 1998 East African embassy bombings renewed Taliban support for the group. Bin Laden had lied to Omar in July 2001, when he promised that al-Qaeda would launch no more overseas attacks (while secretly plotting the 9/11 attacks). Regardless, the Taliban did not give up bin Laden and al-Qaeda after 9/11 to the United States, even at the risk of being bombed out of power.

The Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance has since then survived almost 19 years of a U.S.-led Global War on Terror and despite the prospective benefits for the Taliban in breaking ties with al-Qaeda. The Taliban remains solely focused on Afghanistan and has never accepted al-Qaeda’s global jihadist ambitions. Their mutual interest in expelling U.S. forces and retaking Afghanistan has kept them together. Also the emergence of a common rival since 2014 – the Islamic State (IS) – has given them more incentive to cooperate.

Recent Developments in al-Qaeda-Taliban ties

In April 2020, on the seventh anniversary of Omar’s death, the Taliban praised his defense of al-Qaeda and bin Laden after 9/11 in a eulogy. The Taliban had put out a similar statement in October 2019 and in July 2019 the Taliban in a video justified the 9/11 attacks. Even after the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the Taliban have not denounced al-Qaeda and rather have done the opposite.

In the present day al-Qaeda appears to be operating clandestinely both alongside and independent of the Taliban. A United Nations report claimed that al-Qaeda and the Taliban had at least six meetings over the last one year at the top level with regard to operations, training, and sanctuary for al-Qaeda by the Taliban in the event of a U.S. withdrawal. The most interesting of these meetings occurred during spring 2019 in Helmand province, in which top veteran Taliban officials reportedly met with Hamza bin Laden (announced dead in July 2019 by the United States) to reassure him personally that there would be no change to the Taliban-al-Qaeda relationship at any cost. However, according to TIME Magazine, Taliban spokesman Suhail Shaheen categorically denied these reports.

In May 2019, al-Zawahiri gave a video eulogy for the deceased Jalaluddin Haqqani of the Taliban’s Haqqani network. Jalaluddin’s son Sirajuddin became the deputy leader of the Taliban after his death. Al-Zawahiri met with Hafiz and Yahya Haqqani to discuss the Afghan peace process in February 2020. Yahya Haqqani has been the primary Haqqani Network liaison with al-Qaeda since 2009 and the Haqqani Network has been historically close to al-Qaeda.

In September 2019, as negotiations were ongoing between the United States and the Taliban in Qatar, a joint U.S.-Afghan raid on a suspected Taliban-al-Qaeda compound in Helmand killed the leader of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Asim Umar, along with multiple foreign nationals, including the group’s deputy, its “courier” to al-Zawahiri, multiple foreign females, and several Taliban fighters. This is a strong indication of continued patronage of high-level al-Qaeda members by the Taliban. Prior to his death Umar had praised current Taliban Emir Haibatullah Akhundzada’s leadership in an Eid al-Fitr address.

AQIS changed the name of its Urdu language magazine Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad to Nawa-e-Ghazwa-e-Hind (NGH) in March 2020 after the U.S.-Taliban deal. This name change may have been done to give the impression that the Indian subcontinent would be the priority theater for AQIS after its apparently successful jihad against U.S. forces in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban. This could be an attempt to create artificial distance between the Taliban and al-Qaeda after the U.S.-Taliban agreement. In the April issue of NGH, AQIS for the first time mentions its role in the fight against the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) under the command of the Taliban. They helped them specifically in preparing improvised explosive devices and conducting special night-time operations to capture ISKP strongholds in Nangarhar province from August-October 2019.

Conclusion

After al-Zawahiri pledged allegiance to Taliban Emir Akhundzada in 2016 the latter did not publicly acknowledge the pledge, but at the same time there is no indication that it was rejected. Al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates are, in theory, loyal to the Taliban’s emir by virtue of their allegiance to al-Zawahiri. Therefore, al-Qaeda’s members around the globe are now, technically, bound by an oath to Akhundzada as well. Ever since the emergence of IS, al-Qaeda has sought to discredit the IS “Caliph” by promoting the Taliban’s emir as the more theologically correct leader of Muslims. Akhundzada not reciprocating al-Zawahiri’s pledge can be seen as an indication of the Taliban cutting ties with al-Qaeda (as pointed out by Shaheen) but it could also be seen as the relationship becoming more clandestine. To demonstrate that the Taliban is actually breaking ties with al-Qaeda, it has to publicly reject al-Zawahiri’s pledge.

Al-Qaeda today has more to gain from the Taliban by continuing to be relevant by playing a supplementary role in the latter’s jihad as well as gaining a prospective safe haven. At present the Taliban have an available fighting force of 55,000-85,000 fighters and contests 50-60 percent of Afghan territory with 21 districts under full Taliban control, so an additional 400-600 al-Qaeda members will not make a significant difference.

The Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance has survived the deaths of bin Laden and two Taliban emirs, which is indicative of something much deeper than personal relationships at the top level. The relationship is based on more complex conditions of legitimacy and identity. The Taliban cannot abandon al-Qaeda without also abandoning their current identity as an organization based on the Pashtunwali code and fundamentalist Islam. Their legitimacy depends not only on their governance, popular support, or territory, but on their adherence to their version of Islam. Ideological concerns aside, if the Taliban severs its ties with al-Qaeda it could lead to a domino effect where other regional groups in Afghanistan come out from the Taliban’s influence due to them sharing ties with al-Qaeda at the foundational level. Furthermore, those outfits could also align themselves with the Taliban’s rivals such as ISKP and rebel Taliban factions like the Hizb-e-Vilayat-e-Islami and continue fighting.

Last night, Turkish airstrikes wreaked havoc in northern Iraq. Hours before the airstrikes, the US launched a secretive “ninja” missile at a car in northwest Syria, killing an alleged member of an Al-Qaeda-linked group. Then, around the same time Turkey’s airstrikes were being launched, Iraqi investigators found a flatbed truck with rockets aimed at a base housing US soldiers near Baghdad, like reported by jpost.com.

There were also Russian airstrikes reported in Idlib on Sunday, June 14.
The huge number of airstrikes and battles taking place in the Middle East make it the most war-torn region in the world, with the largest number of countries and world powers engaged in conflict. Here is a quick rundown of all the wars happening in the Middle East.

Iranian militias vs. the US

Iranian-backed militias in Iraq have carried out dozens of attacks on bases in Iraq where US forces are present. Four members of the US-led coalition have been killed, including one contractor. The US has launched two rounds of airstrikes, in December 2019 and March 2020 against the Kataib Hezbollah faction. The US also killed IRGC head Qasem Soleimani and Kataib Hezbollah leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in January. In response, Iran fired ballistic missiles at US bases. Washington sent air defense systems. The US also has tensions with Iran in the Persian Gulf, where the Islamic Republic mines tankers and harasses American ships. And there are tensions in Syria where Iran threatens US forces. Russian contractors serving with pro-Assad militias in Syria attacked US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces in February 2018 near Deir Ezzor.

Israel vs. Iran and Hezbollah

Israel has carried out more than 1,000 airstrikes in Syria against Iranian targets, according to retired IDF chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot in The New York Times in 2019. Tensions between Israel and Iran are high regarding Iranian entrenchment in Syria. Tehran may be repositioning forces now. Last August, Israel also detected a Hezbollah “killer drone” team near the Golan. In addition, Hezbollah figures have been killed in Syria and one of their cars destroyed by a drone strike they blamed on Israel. Last fall, on September 1, 2019, Hezbollah launched an anti-tank missile at Israel. Iran launched a drone at Israel from Syria in February 2018. Israel has used its air defense to down missiles and rockets fired from Syria. A salvo was fired at Israel in May 2018. In April 2020, Hezbollah cut holes in the security fence in northern Israel.

Turkish-backed Libyans versus Egyptian-backed Libyans

Turkey intervened in the nine-year Libyan Civil War in November 2019. Now Turkish drones are active and Turkish planes and ships have appeared off the coast. Turkey backs the Government of the National Accord in Tripoli against the Libyan National Army of Khalifa Haftar. Haftar is backed by Egypt, the UAE, France, Russia and others. The LNA tried to capture Tripoli last year but Turkey helped push it back. Now Ankara wants military bases in Libya. Egypt wants a ceasefire. France is angry at Turkey for trying to conduct a grab for energy resources in the Mediterranean and transfer weapons to Libya. Turkey has asked the US to support it in Libya. Russia sent warplanes to Libya to bolster Haftar after he faced setbacks in May.

Russia and Iran in Syria versus Turkey and Syrian rebels in Syria

Iran moved in to Syria around 2012 to help the Assad regime fight Syrian rebels, and Russia intervened in 2015. With their help, Assad retook Aleppo in 2016 and southern Syria in 2018. Then Russia backed the Syrian regime offensives in Idlib, signing a deal with Turkey in September 2018 and another ceasefire in March. Russia and the Syrian regime also grabbed up areas the US withdrew from during a Turkish invasion in October 2019. Turkey has increased its role in Syria since 2016, invading areas around Jarabulus, then Afrin in 2018 and then Tel Abyad in 2019. Now it has sent thousands of tanks and soldiers to Idlib. Russia and Turkey conduct joint patrols on the M4 highway but Russia continues to bomb Syrian rebels.

US vs. Russia and Iran in Syria

The US says it wants to make Syria a Russian “quagmire.” The Trump administration has carried out two rounds of air strikes on the Syrian regime. Meanwhile, Russia and the US have tensions in eastern Syria around Derik and Qamishli where patrols frequently try to run each other off the road. Things are tense. Russia has accused the US of a variety of crimes in Syria, and misinformation seeks to undermine the US role there. Meanwhile, Washington says it wants Iran to leave Syria and has condemned Moscow’s role in the country.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others against Iran in Yemen

In 2015 the Houthi rebels in Yemen looked set to take Aden and control the Bab al-Mandab straits. Saudi Arabia intervened with a Gulf Coalition. Alongside the UAE and contractors and others they pushed the Houthi rebels back. Iran moved drones and ballistic missiles to aid the Houthis and began firing them deep into Saudi Arabia. Eventually Iran even carried out a massive drone and cruise missile attack in September 2019 against Saudi oil facilities. Iran’s Houthi allies also carried out dozens of drone attacks.

Everyone vs ISIS

The whole world has joined the anti-ISIS Coalition led by the US. It has 82 members. These include heavy lifting by the US and some forces from France, the UK and other NATO members. Iran, Russia and Turkey also claim to fight ISIS. Everyone is fighting ISIS but ISIS is still having a small resurgence in Iraq. The US-backed SDF in Syria also holds 10,000 ISIS detainees and fights ISIS sleeper cells. The Coalition trained and mentored more than 200,000 Iraqi soldiers and some 80,000 SDF members. These huge numbers are apparently not quite enough though. ISIS is still fighting.

The US vs. al-Qaeda

The US is still fighting al-Qaeda. In Syria, Libya and Yemen air strikes kill members of the group from time to time. A “ninja sword” bomb used by US drones has sliced up several al-Qaeda members in recent years in Idlib. These extremists operate near the Turkish border. The US operates across borders to hunt down these extremists.

Israel vs. Islamic Jihad and Hamas

Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have seen tensions rise over the last two years. Hamas also embarked on a March of Return in 2018 and carried out protests for a year. In November and December 2019 Israel and Islamic Jihad came to blows. Islamic Jihad leaders have been killed and many of their fighters killed as well. They have launched hundreds of rockets at Israel. Hamas has refrained from joining some of the fighting.

Turkey vs. the PKK

Turkey had a ceasefire with the Kurdistan Workers Party up until 2015. When it broke down Turkey fought a grueling war in Kurdish cities in Turkey. Then Ankara expanded the war, attacking Kurds in northern Iraq and then invading parts of Syria, claiming to be fighting PKK-affiliates. It invaded Afrin in January 2018 and carried out large scale operations in northern Iraq. On June 14 Turkey launched a new operation targeting Yazidi areas of Iraq, claiming there are PKK bases there. Turkey also accuses the US of training PKK-linked groups in Syria.

Egypt vs. ISIS

Egypt has been fighting an ISIS insurgency in Sinai that has led to thousands of casualties. ISIS has carried out numerous atrocities, targeting Christians and mosques. Egypt has used its military to flood Sinai. However, ISIS is not defeated and the war continues.

NO OTHER area in the world has so many complex conflicts. Every day in the Middle East there are airstrikes and threats of war or invasions. The region is an area of competition for global powers, such as Russia and the US. It is also an area where regional powers feel impunity to traffic weapons and send their armies across borders. Nowhere else in the world are there so many states operating across national borders or funding and arming proxies. Drones and new technology are being experimented with and updated in the Middle East. The region has seen ballistic missile strikes at new ranges, drone swarms and the use of air defense such as Iron Dome, Arrow 3 and Patriots to down threats. Jamming and new technology has assisted Turkey in Libya.

In addition, the region’s civil wars in Yemen, Libya and Syria are not ending. They continue. There are also rivalries, such as Qatar versus Saudi Arabia, that feed conflicts elsewhere. Nowhere else in the world are F-35s and MiG-29s and S-400s and other systems all being put into play with the chance that they will all be used. The region is suffering the long-term challenges of the post-Cold War and post-War on Terror era.

This era sees a return to stronger states after the Arab spring, the chaos and the rise of proxy groups and ungoverned spaces. Now this region is seen as up for grabs as the US begins to withdraw from areas like Syria or Afghanistan and other states, such as Iran, Turkey, Russia and China, step in. This feeds conflicts as each country seeks greater hegemony and wants to take over areas in Syria, Libya or Yemen. In addition, terrorist groups and proxy armies and militias are well armed in the Middle East. Although they wreak havoc across the Sahel or Afghanistan, this is the region where they have the most funding and weapons and state support.