A new jihadist alliance claimed responsibility for an attack that killed three members of Mali’s security forces on March 29, according to a statement released by jihadist monitoring group SITE

Three Malian jihadist groups with previous Al-Qaeda links recently joined forces to create the “Group to Support Islam and Muslims” (GSIM), led by Iyad Ag Ghaly of Islamist organisation Ansar Dine.

The group, also known as Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen in Arabic, mounted an attack that killed three gendarmes, they said, though Malian security sources told AFP the day of the attack that it was two soldiers and a civilian who were killed.

“This past Wednesday, a brigade of mujahideen was able to attack a Malian gendarmerie post in Boulikessi, which is part of the Douentza area, near the Burkinabe border,” the statement released by SITE said.

“The attack resulted in killing three gendarmes and seizing some weapons and ammunition as spoils,” it added.

It is believed to be the jihadist alliance’s second operation after their merger, following the killing of 11 soldiers in the same area on March 5.

Ansar Dine was involved in an onslaught that saw northern Mali fall out of government control for nearly a year from spring 2012.

The extremists were later expelled from the region by a French-led international military intervention.

Nonetheless large swathes of northern Mali continue to come under attack from jihadist groups.

The area is also seen by governments battling the jihadist threat as a launchpad for attacks against other countries in the region.

Nigeria’s Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram has released a new video mocking Cameroonian special forces, like reported by saharareporters.com.

https://youtu.be/m0heSVgMF5Y

The 7-minue long video also captures scenes of intense shooting by the deadly sect in a forested area presumably in Nigeria. The Nigerian military insist that the sect has been defeated in Nigeria.

Military will be allowed to launch ‘precision airstrikes’ against al-Shabaab

US President Donald Trump has approved a plan to increase counter-terrorism strikes in Somalia, the Pentagon said on Thursday (30 March), like reported by ibtimes.co.uk.

The president gave the chief of African Command the authority to launch a campaign against al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda affiliate terror group.

According to The New York Times, the new war-zone targeting rules will apply for at least 180 days.

“The additional support provided by this authority will help deny al-Shabaab safe haven from which it could attack US citizens or US interests in the region,” Pentagon spokesman Navy Captain Jeff Davis said in a statement.

The US military will now be allowed to conduct “precision airstrikes” to support the African Union Mission in Somalia and the Somalia National Army as they fight against the terrorist organisation. A US official told CNN that US advisers already working to train and advise local forces in Somalia will also be able to help coordinate the strikes.

The official said that the new authority will be legally based on the 2001 authorisation for use of military force due to the terror group’s affiliation to al-Qaeda.

Areas of active hostilities

Some regions of Somalia will now be designated as “areas of active hostilities,” which will remove strikes from restrictions imposed on counter-terrorism attacks outside of those areas. The official told CNN the designated areas will not include the capital of Mogadishu or the area of Puntland.

Africa Command Commander General Thomas Waldhauser told reporters on 24 March that approval would allow US forces to have a “little more flexibility, a little bit more timeliness, in terms of decision-making process”.

Waldhauser added: “It allows [us] to prosecute targets in a more rapid fashion. So that obviously is something that we advocate for.”

Prior to the new rules, the military was required to follow standards established by President Barack Obama in 2013 on counter-terrorism strikes away from conventional war zones.

According to the Times, the presidential policy guidance rules required high-level, inter-agency vetting of proposed strikes. The rules also required the target to pose a threat to Americans, and a near-certainty that no civilian bystanders would die.

Under the new authority, Waldhauser will have the power to call for missions comparable to those called by the commander of Central Command against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). However, the prevention of civilian casualties will remain a priority.

“Obviously, the cardinal rule in these types of engagements is to not make more enemies than you already have,” Waldhauser said. “And I think we go to great pains to do that.”

he state of emergency in force almost non-stop for 16 months in Mali was extended by 10 days from Friday, the government said according to timeslive.co.za

The fresh extension would allow the government to “further strengthen prevention and counter-terrorism measures, and increase the operational capabilities and processes of the armed forces and security,” the statement released late Thursday said.

There remained “the threat of terrorism in Mali and in the region, as well as risks to people and goods,” it added.

The new state of emergency will be extended again if such a measure is justified, the government said.

The decree hands extra powers to security forces and restricts public gatherings.

Mali’s north fell under the control of jihadist groups linked to Al-Qaeda in 2012 who hijacked the rebel uprising, though the Islamists were largely ousted by a French-led military operation in January 2013.

But jihadists continue to roam the country’s north and centre, mounting attacks on civilians and the army, as well as French and UN forces still stationed in the country.

The U.N. mission in Mali is Turtle Bay’s most controversial. But will its counterterrorism remit be just what saves it from the chopping block, like reported by foreignpolicy.com?

A few minutes before 9 a.m. on Jan. 18, a white Toyota Land Cruiser carrying 50-gallon drums crammed with metal and explosives turned up a wide sandy track toward a military compound guarded by U.N. peacekeepers. Inside the compound, behind a thin concrete wall topped with razor wire, was the ultimate symbol of the country’s troubled peace process: a special unit of Malian forces and former rebels who were due to patrol together in a show of solidarity.

Emblazoned with the insignia of the special unit, known by its French acronym MOC, the Land Cruiser passed the U.N. peacekeepers and the first security perimeter without incident. When a security guard at the main gate asked the driver for identification, he rammed the vehicle through a metal barrier and made a hard left toward a group of soldiers who were assembled to drill. Then he detonated his payload.

“There was a blue light, a big noise, and smoke,” said Lt. Col. Samballa Sidibé, the MOC’s logistics chief. “When it cleared, there was a spectacular scene of desolation.”

The bodies of at least 77 dead and more than 100 wounded lay twisted in the sand, arrayed about a giant, smoking crater. The attack, which was later claimed by an affiliate of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, incapacitated roughly one-third of the MOC’s 600 U.N.-trained troops. It was the deadliest terrorist attack in Malian history.

Since U.N. peacekeepers deployed to Mali in 2013, they have become enmeshed in an increasingly deadly campaign by jihadis who, with the help of Tuareg separatists, had briefly seized the northern half of the country in 2012. Mandated to stabilize the country and support implementation of a 2015 peace agreement, the peacekeepers have instead become piñatas for disgruntled jihadi groups that were excluded from the accord. At least 118 blue helmets have been killed in the past four years, more than in any other active U.N. mission, prompting the Security Council to strengthen their mandate to take “proactive” steps against “asymmetric” terrorist threats.

The mission’s counterterrorism focus has made it the U.N.’s most controversial. Many believe the world body should preserve its impartial status rather than become a party to conflicts. But as the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations stares down potentially debilitating budget cuts proposed by U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration, what made the Mali mission a lightning rod for criticism could be what ends up saving it — at least for now.

The White House has instructed State Department officials to find at least $1 billion in cuts to U.S. funding for the U.N.’s 16 peacekeeping missions, but U.S. planners have so far left Mali off the chopping block. U.N.-based officials say it’s too early to know whether the new administration will embrace the U.N. peacekeeping role in Mali or whether it just hasn’t begun internal deliberations on the mission’s fate. But an official familiar with U.S. thinking said the Trump administration is “most forward-leaning” on the U.N.’s “role in counterterrorism environments.”

“Mali is not in their sights right now,” added a senior U.N.-based official.

The United Nations commands the second-largest expeditionary force in the world, with nearly 100,000 uniformed troops and police officers deployed in 16 missions at a cost of about $8 billion a year. The United States is obliged to pay more than 28 percent of the cost, or some $2 billion each year.

Both the administrations of former Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama viewed that outlay as a bargain, relieving the U.S. military and its allies of the pressure to send American soldiers into harm’s way to monitor cease-fires or halt genocide and other mass atrocities.

But the Trump administration is skeptical about the wisdom of pouring billions of dollars into costly missions that never seem to end and sees a ripe target for securing savings.

On April 6, Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, will host a special session of the U.N. Security Council to try to prod other key powers into cutting costs in U.N. peacekeeping missions including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan and to shutter other troubled missions that show little hope of achieving their goals.

“A significant number of [peacekeeping operations] have mandates conceived years — in some cases decades — ago that are no longer supported by a political environment conducive to achieving the Council’s aims,” Haley’s staff wrote in a confidential “concept paper” distributed last week to prepare the council’s 14 other members.

“[A]re the current missions still ‘fit for purpose?’” the paper asked. “How do we guard against mission creep?”

The United States has developed a hit list of missions, including a trio of U.N. peacekeeping missions in Haiti, Liberia, and Ivory Coast, that were already being wound down before Trump won the presidency. The closure of those missions could “hand Haley some relatively easy victories,” said Richard Gowan, a U.N. expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, but they won’t get the United States near the White House target of $1 billion in cuts.

To get there, the U.N. would have to close or at least scale back some of the largest and most costly missions, like those in Congo, which is projected to cost U.S. taxpayers $440 million in 2017; South Sudan ($372 million); Darfur ($324 million); the Central African Republic ($285 million); and Mali (nearly $298 million).

For the time being, the State Department has no immediate plans to close or cut back the U.N. mission in the Central African Republic, which was set up to halt mass atrocities, or in Mali, where jihadis threaten U.S. interests in the region. This could reflect the Trump administration’s priorities, or it could reflect the fact that it has yet to hash out a peacekeeping doctrine and these missions won’t come up for renewal for months.

“They are taking them one by one, more or less in chronological order,” one council diplomat said. “For the moment, I see no big picture, no big plans coming from the administration.”

Even if the Trump administration is “forward-leaning” on missions like Mali’s, it seems unlikely to nudge the world body toward a broader embrace of counterterrorism. The U.N. has for years resisted taking over for African Union peacekeepers in Somalia, for instance, mainly because they are engaged in a bloody fight against al Qaeda-linked militants there. It’s difficult to sustain political support for missions that take high numbers of casualties, which is part of the reason the AU doesn’t say how many of its troops have been killed. By contrast, U.N. missions must account for every peacekeeper who comes home in a coffin.

The U.N. did adopt a counterterrorism strategy in 2006, but it is mainly focused on addressing the root causes of terrorism and strengthening national governments to combat it. According to a panel of experts convened by former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2015, blue helmets are “not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism operations” because they “lack the specific equipment, intelligence, logistics, capabilities and specialized military preparation required.”

But France, which has a large financial and security stake in the mission’s success, has defended it as a critical force for stability, and a possible model for future peacekeeping missions elsewhere.

“This is new for the U.N., and it’s really a test for the organization to be able to operate in today’s challenging security environment, which includes threats such as terrorism,” France’s U.N. ambassador, François Delattre, said. The U.N. mission in Mali, he added, is a “dam against the spread of terrorism in Mali and the whole region. To weaken it would risk making Mali and the region a new safe haven for terrorists across the globe.”

But the Mali mission, which is the only one of 69 U.N. missions authorized since 1948 to deploy as part of a counterterrorism operation, has been hamstrung by many of the problems highlighted by the U.N. panel of experts. When the Security Council “clarified” the mission’s mandate last year, authorizing it to take a “more proactive and robust posture” to “anticipate, deter and counter threats,” many expected it to begin dismantling terrorist networks. There was even talk of forming an elite African unit within the mission modeled on the Force Intervention Brigade in Congo, the only U.N. mission to undertake sustained offensive operations.

It never happened. Peacekeepers in the Mali mission, known as MINUSMA, continued to be battered by bombs and improvised explosive devices, but they never took the fight directly to the jihadis.

“Most of the time, we know where they are and we know what they do, because we have all the modern techniques to find them,” Col. Wilco Roepers, the commander of Dutch contingent in Mali, said of terrorist groups. “But we are not allowed to attack them. Like targeting, what we did in Afghanistan, we are not allowed to do here. Because we are here just to keep the peace, not to kill terrorists. That’s not our job.”

To make it their job, however, U.N. officials say they would need more manpower and equipment — precisely the kinds of costly expenditures the Trump administration is trying to rein in.

“This country is twice the size of France, and the number of uniformed people is less than the New York [City] Police Department,” said Koen Davidse, the deputy special representative of the U.N. secretary-general in Mali. “We still have gaps in terms of the armored vehicles that we need, helicopter units, special forces units, reconnaissance units — those are all sorts of things that we need to implement the mandate.”

MINUSMA was already the U.N.’s fourth-most expensive mission at $933 million in 2016, and it has more highly trained European troops than any other mission in Africa. It also has a sophisticated intelligence arm, the first for a U.N. mission, that puts intel gathered on long-range patrols, by helicopters and C-130 transport planes, and by a fleet of Heron 1 surveillance drones at the fingertips of the force commander.

But U.N. missions are awkward coalitions of the willing, and even good intelligence can be difficult to act upon when troop contingents struggle to work effectively together.

Among MINUSMA’s 13,000 military personnel are Dutch air assault troops that patrol in open-top Mercedes jeeps. But there are also Bangladeshi peacekeepers who lack armored vehicles. Some contingents have experience in NATO missions like Afghanistan; others are deploying overseas for the first time.

“There are still troops coming in with no guns and no tents. Some people are not trained. So we have partners in this mission who are not ready to go,” Col. Roepers said. “In the last few months of 2016, we did some integrated action with five or more countries, and sometimes it didn’t go well because we were not able to work together.”

Peacekeeping in counterterrorism theaters also means the U.N. get less bang for its buck. Blue helmets must focus first and foremost on protecting themselves, which means that more time and energy is spent on things like securing bases and protecting convoys than in traditional peacekeeping operations.

“Of course, we’re here to secure the population, but we can only do that if we take care of our own security, so it’s a constant point of tension,” Davidse said.

Meanwhile, the terrorist threat is spreading. While MINUSMA was focused on preventing al Qaeda and like-minded groups from re-establishing the caliphate they declared in the north of the country in 2012, Mali’s volatile middle belt was quickly imploding. New groups have taken up arms against the government in recent months, and a staggering number of local authorities have been assassinated.

Marc Spurling, the acting head of MINUSMA in Gao, an ancient caravan city on the banks of the Niger River, says the mission’s primary focus on stabilization complements more aggressive counterterrorism efforts being headed up by French “Barkhane” forces operating throughout the wider Sahel region. The U.N. shares intelligence with the French if it thinks lives can be saved as a result.

But others within the mission see its junior partner relationship to Barkhane as a dangerous half-measure. It marks MINUSMA as a clear party to the conflict but means the mission does not act to neutralize threats before it’s too late. And because the French are better equipped and have a lighter footprint, MINUSMA is often the easiest target for the terrorists to hit.

And hit it they have. The MOC explosion may not even have been the biggest to wrack Gao in the last six months. In November, a truck bomb obliterated a bloc of U.N. offices next to the airport and nearly collapsed the terminal. A second truck that failed to detonate was carrying more than 1,000 pounds of explosives.

“MINUSMA is getting hit, the national armed forces are getting hit, Barkhane is getting hit, and civilians are getting hit,” Spurling said. “And what we all have in common is that we’re getting hit by those who are quite clearly enemies of the peace.”

James Ouma, a robbery with violence suspect, has two stark choices, standardmedia.co.ke

Mr Ouma (not his real name) can take an offer from Al Shabaab for bail and leave prison as the newest recruit of the militant group or turn it down and continue languishing in the dark, filthy and lice-infested cells of Industrial Area Remand Prison, with the chilling possibility of having a date with the hangman.

The suspect is the next on the hit-list of the Al Shabaab terror gang that has turned to Kenyan jails to recruit dangerous and hard-core criminals to support its terrorist activities in the region. Investigations by The Standard show that some terror suspects have transformed themselves into agents for the terror gang to continue with their activities even behind bars.

Serious crimes

The agents target vulnerable inmates, especially those facing serious crimes that could get them capital punishment and have nothing to lose. Also on their hit list are suspects who are too poor to afford a decent lawyer or raise hefty cash bails. Ouma was arrested for robbery with violence in January. If found guilty, he could face the death penalty.

After he was charged, he was taken to Industrial Area Prison, where he came face to face with an Al Shabaab agent he identifies as Moha. “Once someone is converted to Islam, they can take a Muslim name. The agent is known as Moha around here,” Ouma says. Having been slapped with a cash bail of Sh500,000 by the court, Ouma says he was extremely tempted to take the offer given that his family was too poor to raise the amount.

“They take time to study you. If they notice that no one has visited you for a month or so, they offer friendship. At this time you are very vulnerable. At first they give you toilet paper or offer you a better meal (than regular prison food),” Ouma says.

A plate of beef costs Sh1,000 behind bars. So it is rare for a total stranger to slide a plateful of the delicacy inside your cube, especially in remand where everyone is struggling to survive. But first, Ouma says, one must agree to convert to Islam before any deal can be tabled. “I was offered a deal that was too good to resist given my circumstances.

They offered to pay my bail if I changed my religion to Islam. They would then ensure they took care of everything from there. Mine was just to say yes, do what they want,” he says. Ouma is not alone. The Standard team met three other former inmates who had a run in with the recruitment ring last year. The Government has been aware of this radicalisation from within for over a year now. Last year, President Uhuru Kenyatta said the Government would set up a special new prison for violent extremist offenders.

Active cells

Some of the men running the recruitment ring are facing charges of funding terrorist activities.

Several sources said Industrial Area, Kamiti and Shimo La Tewa prisons have active cells for recruiting criminals. “Moha was not allowed bond or cash bail. He has a brother in Somalia who is at the heart of the recruitment business. He is the one that sends money to the ones in need,” Ouma adds. He speaks from the confines of prison, in handcuffs, behind a wall, through small window openings for visitors. A Government report said Al Shabaab operatives and the Amniyat – the intelligence wing of Al Shabaab – are looking for fertile grounds to recruit, radicalise and possibly attack targets in the country.

A prison warder at Kamiti Maximum Prison said one of their toughest jobs was dealing with the Al Shabaab suspects in custody. “We started hearing the stories of recruitment as far back as when Aboud Rogo was here. But it is not easy to crack the cells. They are too secretive and if it is still going on, then several men have fallen victim,” the warder said. Rogo was at Kamiti for two years before he was released and later killed. The Government was very uncomfortable with his radical teachings and his stance on the Al Shabaab war. The prison warder however maintained Al Shabaab suspects are held in isolation and have little interaction with other inmates.

Members of the local vigilante in Borno State, popularly called civilian joint task force, yesterday stepped on an improvised explosive device, IED, suspected to have been planted by Boko Haram militants, along Dikwa, Maiduguri road, like reported by dailypost.ng .

A member of the group, Ahmadu Kachallah, who disclosed this said they went out on manhunt for fleeing members of the dread Islamic sect, who were expected to be hibernating among communities in Dikes.

According to him, “while coming back from our victorious trip, one of our vehicles stepped on IED. The vehicle belonging to members of CJTF Dikwa local government was badly damaged and we lost two of our members, while three others who sustained injury are currently receiving treatment at the state specialist hospital, Maiduguri.

“As you can see, we are just coming back from condolence to the families of those we lost in the incident,” he said.

The members of the CJTF also appreciated the role played by the International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC, who were on hand at the time of the incident and responded by ensuring that those wounded were immediately evacuated for medical attention.

Meanwhile, the state Attorney General and Commissioner of Justice Borno State, who is also the coordinator of the CJTF, Barrister Kaka Shehu Lawan has consoled the families of the CJTF, on behalf of Government and people of the State.

He urged members of the CJTF not to deter in their determination to rid the state of bad elements fleeing military onslaught and taking refuge in various communities.

He said the government under the leadership of Kashim Shettima will always take good care of them, particularly those who sacrificed their lives to defend their people.

He said government would take care of all those injured and also assist the family of the deceased.

At the end of 2016, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), announced that the group had “expanded and shifted some of our command, media, and wealth to Africa, like reported by isnblog.ethz.ch.”

ISIS’s Dabiq magazine referred to the regions of Africa that were part of its “caliphate”: “the region that includes Sudan, Chad, and Egypt has been named the caliphate province of Alkinaana; the region that includes Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda as the province of Habasha; the North African region encompassing Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Nigeria, Niger, and Mauritania as Maghreb, the province of the caliphate.” Leaving aside the mismatched ethno-linguistic groupings included in each of these “provinces,” ISIS’s interest in establishing a presence in Africa has long been a part of its vision for a global caliphate.

Battlefield setbacks in ISIS’s strongholds in Iraq and Syria since 2015, however, raise questions of what impact this will have for ISIS’s African aspirations. A useful starting point in considering this question is to recognize that the threat from violent Islamist groups in Africa is not monolithic but is comprised of a variety of distinct entities. For the most part, these groups are geographically concentrated and focused on local territorial or political objectives. Specifically, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies has identified 5 major categories of militant Islamists groups in Africa. In order of lethality on the continent, these include Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, ISIS-linked groups in North Africa, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Sinai-focused groups.

ISIS’s ties and influence with each of these groups varies widely. Consequently, ISIS’s future prospects in Syria and Iraq can likewise be expected to have varied implications across Africa. Let’s walk through these groups more precisely.

Boko Haram

While Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, publicly declared allegiance to ISIS in 2015, tangible ISIS support to Boko Haram since that time has been marginal. There is some evidence of subsequently improved public relations materials generated by Boko Haram, however, there are few signs that ISIS has provided meaningful strategic direction, organizational control, funding, assets, or fighters to support Boko Haram operations. Instead, Boko Haram fighters continue to be largely drawn from northeastern Nigeria with a focus of operations in Nigeria and the border areas of Cameroon and Niger. A continued downgrading of ISIS capabilities in Syria and Iraq, accordingly, is not likely to have a significant impact on Boko Haram’s operational capacity or focus. Similarly, if ISIS were to regain territory and resources in the Middle East, it is not expected that this would translate into significant additional support for Boko Haram in the near future.

ISIS’s main influence on Boko Haram, in contrast, has been reputational. At its height, ISIS represented a dynamic, successful force that animated a vision for a global Islamic caliphate. This image was highly appealing to young militants drawn to jihad. In this way, Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to ISIS in March 2015 was widely seen as an opportunity to associate Boko Haram’s flagging fortunes in northeastern Nigeria with a broader cause. Thus, it is on the ideological front that the future of ISIS in Syria and Iraq will likely have the greatest impact on Boko Haram. If ISIS is defeated, and with it prospects for its leadership of a global caliphate, then this ideological attraction and motivation for Boko Haram fighters and recruits will likely dissipate.

Al Shabaab

Al Shabaab has been resurgent in 2016, taking offensive action against the still fragile government in Somalia and AMISOM forces. Al Shabaab is almost entirely focused on Somalia, having emerged from the fractious political and clan competition in Somalia as the face of violent Islam in the country. The group has had a long affiliation with Al Qaeda and has been actively hostile to ISIS. Efforts by breakaway elements of Al Shabaab to establish ISIS affiliates in Somalia in 2016 were aggressively put down by Al Shabaab.

The fate of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, therefore, is not likely to have a meaningful direct or near term effect on Al Shabaab. Rather, the trajectory of violent Islamist extremism in Somalia will be more significantly shaped by other forces (e.g., legitimacy and effectiveness of the new Somalia government, Somali clan dynamics, Wahhabi ideological influences and funding).

ISIS-Linked Groups in North Africa

ISIS-affiliated groups emerged in Tunisia and Libya in 2014, shortly after ISIS’s rise in Iraq and Syria. However, the roles of these two affiliates have differed significantly. Tunisia has served as a key recruitment pipeline for ISIS into Syria through Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia. Some 6,500 Tunisians—more than any other outside country—are believed to have traveled to Syria and Iraq, the majority of whom are presumed to support the jihad there. The ideological appeal of ISIS’s call for a global caliphate evidently resonated deeply with many of Tunisia’s alienated youth.

ISIS setbacks in Iraq and Syria could result in a significant reverse pipeline of Tunisian fighters returning to Tunisia and fostering instability there. While Ansar al Sharia has been responsible for a number of high-profile attacks in Tunisia (and to a lesser extent Algeria) in recent years, for the most part Ansar al Sharia’s significance has been its facilitation of the flow of fighters to the Middle East. A large influx of returning experienced fighters, however, could change that. These fighters would have the capabilities and cultural familiarity to potentially create a formidable and sustained destabilizing force in Tunisia. Thus, Tunisia appears to be the African country most closely linked to ISIS’s viability in Iraq and Syria.

In Libya, the seizure and defense of Sirte has been the most publicized activity of an ISIS entity in Africa. However, ISIS does not enjoy significant homegrown support in Libya. Instead, ISIS drew aggressive and sustained resistance from Libyan militias intent on dislodging what they saw as a foreign and rival presence—efforts that were eventually successful. Reports suggest that some ISIS fighters subsequently fled south to regions southwest of Misrata.

A regrouping of the remnants of ISIS elements in Libya would likely serve as a magnet for other ISIS fighters displaced from Iraq and Syria. However, the viability of any ISIS-linked groups in Libya is more a reflection of the absence of a capable central governance authority, rather than an indication of the local support that would be needed to sustain their presence.

AQIM

While affiliated with Al Qaeda, there are splinter groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIS. This raises the prospect that additional relocations of ISIS fighters from Iraq and Syria could strengthen the capacity of these ISIS-linked groups to strike targets in the northern Sahel. These splinter groups have provoked strong resistance from established AQIM factions, however.

Unlike other violent Islamist groups in Africa, AQIM is not linked to a particular local context or agenda. Nor does it hold territory. Rather, its loose configuration of groups have a regional scope with an aim of mounting periodic attacks on government and Western-affiliated targets across the region. By and large, these attacks seem intended for their sensational, rather than strategic, effect. Some observers have suggested that their use of violence is intended to show their continued relevance in the face of growing global media coverage of ISIS attacks. Any influx of ISIS fighters, accordingly, would likely be seen as a threat, potentially triggering increased AQIM activity.

Sinai-based Groups

There have long been a number of Sinai-based violent Islamist groups that have planned and undertaken attacks against Israel and Egyptian government targets. With its emergence, ISIS was able to negotiate a declaration of allegiance in December 2014 from one of these groups, Ansar Beit al Maqdis (ABM) or State of Sinai, which had suffered significant leadership attrition at the hands of the Egyptian military. After this declaration, ABM adopted propaganda and battlefield tactics more closely resembling ISIS in Iraq and Syria. This included attacking certain international targets such as: the bombing of a Russian airliner taking off from Sharm el Sheikh, the beheading of a Croatian expatriate, and an attack on the Italian consulate in Cairo. However, most ABM actions are hit-and-run tactics aimed at the Egyptian military.

A loss of territory by ISIS in Syria and Iraq would likely result in the return of more Egyptian jihadists to the Sinai where they could strengthen ABM’s insurgent activities. This could pose a greater challenge for the Egyptian military, which has been on the offensive against these groups since 2014. An ISIS revival in Syria and Iraq, meanwhile, would likely result in increased funding, weapons, and technical support for ISIS’s Sinai affiliate.

Upshot

ISIS is, by and large, not well-rooted in the communities where Africa’s most active violent Islamist groups operate. This is particularly so in sub-Saharan Africa. ISIS’s closest ties appear to be in Tunisia and the Sinai, plus a cadre of fighters displaced from Sirte in southern Libya and the Sahel. The key effect of ISIS’s continued loss of territory and operational capacity in Iraq and Syria will be an increase in the number of ISIS fighters returning to regions in Africa already facing a threat from violent Islamists. These fighters may attempt to perpetuate the ISIS brand. Without ISIS funding and technical support, however, these fighters are more likely to simply melt into the complex matrix of violent Islamist groups already active in these regions.

ISIS’s main attraction within Africa, however, has been less about resources and more about its reputational and ideological potency. When it was ascendant, ISIS’s reputation for operational capacity, territorial control of large swaths of Iraq and Syria, sensational violence, and a sense of purpose and vision for a global Islamic caliphate generated palpable enthusiasm and momentum among young African Muslims drawn to jihad. As ISIS’s influence and territorial control in the Arab world have waned and the credibility gap for its utopian governance model grown, so too has its reputational appeal. This will diminish its recruitment and alliance building in Africa.

ISIS-related developments in Africa must be kept in context, however. The most lethal violent Islamist groups in Africa (Boko Haram and Al Shabaab) predate ISIS, are well-grounded in their local communities and grievances, and do not rely on ISIS for resources or operational support. Moreover, the dominant ideological influence for militant Islam in Africa has never been ISIS but the ultra-conservative Arab-infused Wahhabi model of Islam that has been propagated from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States for decades. With deep pockets and increasing reach from satellite communications and social media, this continues to be a powerful influence that is shaping the mindsets of millions of young African Muslims.