Events in the Sahel, and Mali especially, are taking an uncertain and worrying turn. Mali witnessed two coups d’état in less than a year, while the West African Sahel went through its most violent year yet and there are no signs that the violence is slowing down. In the midst of this unprecedented instability, recent developments involving Mali’s transitional government and the international community, France in particular, provide no assurances that things are likely to improve anytime soon, like reported by mei.edu.

Mali’s government is considering hiring the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company (PMC) better known for its human rights violations than anything else. If Bamako moves ahead with the plan, it could disrupt the country’s weak counterterrorism and stabilization efforts. The international community has pushed back, warning against such a move. While France, Mali’s key partner, has promised it will not abandon the country, it has already started vacating key bases in the north. Germany, an important contributor to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), has also warned against hiring the Russian PMC.

Tensions at the diplomatic level are running high as the security situation in Mali and the Sahel region continues to worsen. However, at least for now, there are no apparent changes on the ground other than what was already planned prior to the emergence of the Wagner rumors. France announced its plans to vacate bases in Mali in June 2020 while Germany has invested and continues to invest in stabilization efforts through MINUSMA and its development agency. The United States has maintained its cooperation with the Malian authorities, including recent security collaboration and support for the education and health sectors, although the U.S. ambassador to the U.N, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, has expressed “serious concern” about a possible deployment in Mali of the controversial Russian private security group. Growing diplomatic tensions between France and Mali are alarming though, as they could severely undermine anti-terrorism efforts at a time when regional dynamics are in flux.

Deteriorating Security Situation in the Sahel and West Africa

The security situation in Mali and the Sahel remains deeply concerning almost a decade after the 2012 crisis, when a new rebellion launched in the north and the retreat of Malian forces allowed a coalition of jihadist groups to occupy the region. The French intervention in January 2013 liberated key towns from jihadist occupation; however, the crisis persisted and expanded. The conflict gave rise to several security and stabilization efforts, although violence increased every year and continued to expand to new areas. While jihadist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and later the Islamic State first emerged in Mali, they are now operating in several West African states. After starting in northern Mali, violent extremist organizations gradually expanded to central and southern Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and more recently to northern Côte d’Ivoire and northern Benin. This is a result of a combination of factors, including jihadist groups’ ability to build ties with actors that have an interest in destabilization, such as criminal networks, and states’ inability to react quickly and effectively to the apparent rise of militancy in parts of their territory.

In addition to extremist groups, the region also witnessed an increase in violence between communities based on ethnic affiliation. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso all saw extrajudicial killings of ethnic groups perceived and/or suspected of supporting jihadist groups, mainly Fulani communities. For instance, since at least 2017 ethnic-based militias have emerged in central Mali that are responsible for multiple mass killings of civilians. To make matters worse, local security forces and even international forces, facing pressure to show results on the ground, have been accused of abuses and extrajudicial killings under the pretext of counterterrorism efforts. The number of civilians killed by extremist groups and security forces in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso reached record highs in 2020 and 2021. In Mali, where MINUSMA is present, data showed that state forces killed more civilians than extremist groups. In Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso together 2,400 civilians were killed in 2020, making it the deadliest year yet. This year may be on track to surpass it, however; as of April 2021, more than 1,000 people had been killed in the Sahel, including soldiers, militants, and at least 450 civilians.

Jihadist groups have proven adaptable, demonstrating patience and flexibility as the limitations of counterterrorism and stabilization efforts have become clear. In terms of stabilization, MINUSMA struggles to provide effective protection to civilians in northern and central Mali, where several massacres of civilians have occurred. Given the lack of adequate protection of civilians, communities have formed their own ethnic-based militias under the pretext of protecting their communities and economic interests. This has subsequently led to a cycle of unprecedented violence motivated by vengeance and reprisals. Some communities are targeted by jihadists because they are accused of collaborating with security forces, while others are targeted because they are accused of collaborating and/or supporting jihadist groups. Simultaneously, MINUSMA faces pressure from the Malian government and France to expand its mandate beyond civilian protection to engage in counterterrorism operations currently carried out mainly by local and regional forces, France, and a few European partners with U.S. logistical and intelligence support. While this seems unlikely, MINUSMA will not only continue to face security threats from extremist groups but also challenges from these groups in areas they control and govern in central and northern Mali. Jihadist groups’ activities make achieving the mission’s stabilization goals very difficult, time consuming, and resource-intensive. To counter this continuing rise of extremist groups and to improve its image among certain communities, the mission must do more to protect civilians, including against armed banditry and ethnic violence, and to invest in longer-term development projects as part of its stabilization efforts rather than just quick impact ones.

In terms of counterterrorism efforts, in early 2020, France opted to focus on the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in the tri-border area of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, known as the Liptako-Gourma. This shift proved successful since it disrupted ISGS’s operations and multiple key leaders of the group were killed between January 2020 and September 2021. At the same time this focus on ISGS and Liptako-Gourma had at least three major sets of unintended consequences. First, ISGS was motivated to expand its reach to avoid aggressive counterterrorism campaigns. This could help explain its expansion into eastern Burkina Faso, northern Benin, Niger’s Tahoua region, and part of southern Niger on the borders with Benin and Nigeria. Consequently, the vast geographic space where groups operate is now expanding closer to parts of the northern regions of littoral states. Second, multiple massacres of civilian populations in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have been carried out by suspected ISGS militants in retaliation for possible collaboration with French and local security forces. Third, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM), an affiliate of al-Qaeda, has strengthened its presence in central Mali, where its Macina Brigade now controls and governs parts of the Ségou and Mopti regions, while the group remains uncontested in large swaths of northern Mali, especially in the Kidal region. Concerns over further expansion and violence by extremist groups intensified following political instability in the capitals of Mali and Chad.

West Africa and Coups

Recent coups in West Africa, notably in Mali and Chad, have enjoyed impunity as the international community initially condemned them but eventually gave its implicit blessing to self-appointed military leaders. The coups in both countries have fueled fears of further destabilization in an already fragile region and could jeopardize current anti-terrorism operations. In August 2020, Mali first experienced a coup when President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was overthrown by a military junta. This followed persistent public protests over growing insecurity and abuse of power in the capital, and the coup enjoyed popular support. Nine months later, in May 2021, the country’s new interim civilian leaders, President Bah Ndaw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane, were detained by army officials after a government reshuffle that was opposed by the military leaders who had carried out the previous coup — a move described by French President Emmanuel Macron as a “coup within a coup.” This second disruption is especially concerning since there were high expectations of a peaceful transition process, with democratic presidential elections set to be held in February 2022.

In Chad, after President Idriss Deby was killed in a fight with a rebel group, the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), in April 2021, his son Mahamat Idriss Deby seized power and a military junta formed a transitional government. FACT was unhappy with the presidential elections and wanted to get rid of Idriss Deby and see a change in power, prompting it to launch a rebellion. Idriss Deby was killed the day after the provisional election results were announced, in which he won a sixth term. Although major allies such as France avoided calling it a “coup,” the power grab was deemed unconstitutional. Nonetheless, following his father’s death, Mahamet Deby has expressed his commitment to a peaceful democratic transition. Idriss Deby’s death has implications not only for Chad, but for the entire Sahel region, as well as for foreign powers involved there, as under his rule Chad was a reliable ally, particularly for France and the United States, in the fight against terrorism. These partnerships don’t appear to be impacted as the French and U.S. posture toward Chad has not changed and is unlikely to do so. Chad is also a key troop contributor to MINUSMA and the G5 Sahel task force in the fight against the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) branch around the Lake Chad Basin. France was recently able to support the transitional government during Mahamet Deby’s diplomatic visits to France. Nonetheless, the Chadian people are calling for a return to democracy and denouncing the international support for the Transitional Military Council, particularly from France. An interim parliament to prepare the country for civilian rule was announced in early October 2021 after a five-month wait. Only time will tell if Mahamat Deby is truly invested in a return to the democratic process, as well as how this will affect security within the country and the region at large.

This transformation of the conflict from a fight against jihadist groups in northern Mali into one encompassing the wider Sahel region, along with unprecedented violence against civilians, ethnic tensions, and recent political turmoil following multiple coups d’état have forced France and its European and regional partners to adjust their counterterrorism efforts.

Counterterrorism Efforts

The crisis in the Sahel has proved to be multidimensional and after eight years of counterterrorism efforts, the progress made looks weak compared to the level of violence. Adjustments have been made to adapt during this period, such as the launch of multiple initiatives. This includes the creation of the regional G5 Sahel Joint Force, aimed at guaranteeing conditions for development and security within its member states: Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mauritania. Four years after its inception, the G5 Sahel has little to show for it and vast territories, especially in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, remain outside of state control. The coalition faces several challenges that have prevented it from achieving results with regard to regional security. Financial issues and limited military capacity remain the main obstacles. Speaking to the author, a Malian official also highlighted the differences in political priorities between member states and the distribution of resources among them. Given a shortage of resources and a maximum of 5,000 troops, the task force’s lack of military capacity limits what it can actually accomplish.

The coalition faced another recent setback in August 2021 when the Chadian transitional government withdrew half its troops from the task force. Chad and France justified this as an attempt to move toward smaller units and faster deployment. This shift was also cited in justifying the creation of the Takuba Task Force in January 2020. This task force is supposed to be made up of a coalition of special forces from European countries, not mandated by an international organization but part of Operation Barkhane and under French command. In addition to training and supporting Malian forces, Takuba is expected to carry operations against specific targets. However, today, more than a year after its implementation, the limitations of this approach are evident since the task force has struggled to move as quickly as it claimed and lacks access to the necessary information and intelligence to keep up with jihadist groups’ movement.

The latest adjustment is France’s announcement in June 2021 that it would end its counterterrorism mission in the Sahel, Operation Barkhane, and gradually reduce its presence. Reiterating his commitment to the region, President Macron expressed the need for a “profound transformation” of counterterrorism efforts with local and international partners, citing certain states’ lack of responsibility, referring to the Malian government. Macron expressed frustration with the second coup in Mali and stated that France would not support a state governed by an illegitimate government. Simultaneously, Macron and France more broadly are accused of having double standards for showing support for Idriss Deby’s son as Chad’s new leader. This did not help France’s image in the region, especially in Mali. The decision to withdraw also came as Operation Barkhane lost popularity both in France and in the Sahel, considered a resource drain on one side, and a return to colonial influence on the other. However, it was not until early September 2021 when France-Mali relations took a major turn, thanks to Russia.

Russian Noise

Russia’s increased involvement in Africa in general and the Sahel in particular is apparent. Africa represents a unique market for Russia to sell military equipment and provide military training in exchange for access to natural resources, other economic incentives, and diplomatic influence. Other than as a market for arms and a possible site of natural resource exploitation, what Russia is after in the Sahel and its relationships with Sahelian states remain murky. For Russia, upgrading its military relationship with Sahel countries — former colonies that still maintain deep links with France — would also represent a notable geopolitical win. Arms deals between Mali and Russia were reported as early as 2013, soon after France intervened in Mali. Additionally, to celebrate the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Mali and Russia in 2020, there are plans to open a Russian cultural center in Bamako, while the majority of the 158 Russian citizens residing in Mali are there to reinforce diplomatic relations. In October 2019 fake Facebook accounts were deleted through which Russia was involved in disinformation campaigns in multiple Africa countries. Mali was not listed among the countries targeted by these accounts; however, between October 2019 and January 2020 Mali witnessed multiple anti-French and anti-MINUSMA demonstrations, during which participants demanded collaboration with Russia. In conflict-sensitive countries like Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso information systems are vulnerable and can be used to spread fake information that could be costly to local and foreign actors involved in the region both diplomatically and militarily, such as France and the U.S. It is unclear if Russia’s disinformation campaign in Africa played a role in the protests in Mali, but the visibility of Moscow’s mal-intended interference in conflict zones on the continent has certainly increased in recent years.

In September 2021, Mali and Russia were reported to be close to a deal that would allow Russian mercenaries under the Wagner Group into Mali. While this relationship has dominated the conversation about Mali ever since, a military cooperation agreement was first signed by the two countries’ defense ministers in June 2019 for the sale of helicopters. Coincidently, the helicopters were delivered weeks after the rumors about Russian mercenaries emerged. This comes amid growing public opposition to France’s presence in Mali, which dates back to at least 2019. Some have accused France of following a neo-colonialist approach in its counterinsurgency operations. On several occasions in 2019 and early 2020, thousands of Malians carried out protests, demanding the departure of all foreign troops, especially the French, and questions were raised about Mali’s continued dependence upon France. This growing sentiment coincided with the first Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum, organized in October 2019 in Sochi, which illustrated the burgeoning ties between Russia and the African continent. The forum provided a platform for African leaders to discuss the anti-terrorism fight in the Sahel with their newfound ally. For instance, Burkina Faso has called for Russia to be part of the international coalition against terrorism in the Sahel. The late Chadian President Idriss Deby fully supported Russia’s involvement in the fight against terrorism, and called Russia’s help “vital” for the region’s stability. France, Germany, and the European Union have all voiced opposition to a potential deal between Mali’s government and the Wagner Group given the latter’s record of committing violations that amount to war crimes, notably in the Central African Republic and Libya, where its mercenaries were deployed in a similar manner. While the deployment of Russian mercenaries has yet to be confirmed and there are still plenty of questions about their potential role in Mali, that the Malian government is even entertaining the idea has created a major diplomatic row.

Diplomatic Headaches and Tensions

This follows Mali’s recent denunciation of France’s “unilateral” plan to remove its troops from the Sahel. The transitional prime minister, Choguel Kokalla Maïga, accused France of not considering Mali when deciding to end Operation Barkhane during his address to the U.N. General Assembly at the end of September. Maïga reminded the assembly of the security situation in the country, including the mass killings of civilians, and alluded to the need to consider new strategic partners. In a press release, France’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs dispelled some of Maïga’s claims and reminded the prime minister that the decision to end Operation Barkhane was taken in accordance with regional leaders. Moreover, the ministry clarified that ending the operation did not mean France was leaving Mali, reiterating that its security remained a priority, citing the recent death of a French soldier and the killing of the ISGS leader. Additionally, France’s minister of defense, Florence Parly, also recalled Maïga’s public criticism over France’s presence in northern Mali, pointing out the inconsistencies and reiterating that France was adjusting its forces in the Sahel, not leaving the region.

The reports about Russian mercenaries have only intensified concerns about current counterterrorism efforts. A diplomatic source told Reuters the deal is “incompatible” with Mali and its regional and international partners’ efforts for security and stability in the region. It appears that Mali sought Russia’s help as a result of France’s sudden withdrawal from the country, which prompted Bamako to explore new partnerships to fill this security gap. The European Union has made it clear to Russia that this partnership would be a “red line,” prompting Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to deny any involvement on the part of the Russian government. Despite claims that it is a PMC, the Wagner Group has enabled Russia to carry out controversial operations abroad — in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic, and Mozambique, among other places — while maintaining a level of deniability thanks to the supposed private nature of its business. These operations, including the potential deal with Mali, have been part of a Russian strategy to expand Moscow’s influence abroad. Russia’s interests in Africa are opportunistic in nature, driven not only by the continent’s rich natural resources, but also because it provides an opportunity for President Vladimir Putin to move toward a post-liberal international order. He has called liberalism “obsolete” in the past, and Russia’s increasing support for African elites, through disinformation campaigns, arms deals, and election meddling, is part of a broader elite co-option strategy. The potential partnership between Mali and Russia worries the former’s long-time allies, who fear it could lead to further destabilization in the region.

Looking Ahead

Strategic and political shifts in the Sahel have exacerbated the decade-old security threat presented by violent extremism, political instability, and domestic conflicts in the region. The transformation, according to Macron, of Operation Barkhane makes the future of counterterrorism in the Sahel uncertain. While France has insisted that its support for anti-terrorism efforts will be maintained, recent friction at the U.N. General Assembly between Mali’s prime minister and the French government does not bode well for the crucial regional partnership. It remains to be seen if the current rift is something diplomats can resolve. Were it to move forward, the potential partnership between Mali and Russia’s Wagner Group would be bound to worsen tensions between Mali and its Western allies, notably France and European countries. Germany, which has also voiced its concerns, is a major contributor to MINUSMA and a major donor to the Malian government. For now, the United States has remained tight-lipped regarding Wagner Group’s possible intervention in Mali. Despite the recent announcement by the Biden administration that it would craft a new U.S. strategy for Africa, it is unlikely that the Sahel will be among its top priorities.

Mali is scheduled to hold elections in February 2022. The Malian transitional government has already hinted at the need to postpone the presidential elections, citing security conditions, but whether they are held on the original date or months later will not make any real difference. While the security situation in northern and central Mali does not allow the government to hold elections, it is unlikely to change in the months to come, especially with the withdrawal of French forces. In parts of central Mali, jihadist groups are strengthening their presence, while in most of the north the Malian government is almost non-existent. As of mid-October, France has significantly reduced its troop presence in the Kidal region. MINUSMA is expected to take over the abandoned sites, but this will only increase the security risks for the peacekeeping mission, and civilians consequently.

Russia’s growing role on the African continent, aimed at expanding its influence and undermining democratic governance, is a threat to anti-terror efforts and democracy at large. Regional and international partners of Sahelian countries must consider Russia’s strategy in their anti-jihadist initiatives and stabilization efforts. As the Taliban’s seizure of power in Afghanistan echoes in the Sahel, these strategic changes and challenges raise questions about the future of the region’s security. Sahelian states’ close collaboration with the French and U.S. militaries would make it difficult to maintain a closer partnership with Russia, but the prospect shouldn’t be overlooked. Russia has challenged the French presence elsewhere on the continent, including in the Central African Republic since 2017, when it launched many security and non-security activities such as training the local army, rebuilding state institutions, and establishing media outlets while isolating state officials perceived to be close to France. In many respects though, this is more of a continuation of the past rather than a new development. Moscow has maintained diplomatic, economic, cultural, and security ties in Africa since Soviet times, so it’s misleading to make a direct connection to Wagner Group every time Russia demonstrates an interest in an African country.

Congo’s military says that members of the M23 rebellion group have attacked a base in eastern Congo’s Rutshuru area and fighting is underway, like reported by africanews.com.

“The M23 insurrection movement attacked the FARDC positions in Rutshuru with the intention of destabilizing the province. At present, the fighting is underway and the loyalist forces are determined to put an end to this armed group once and for all,” said General Sylvain Ekenge, deputy spokesman for the Congolese military, also know as FARDC.

The rebels attacked in remote villages of Runyonyi and Chanzu, on the strategic hills between Rwanda and Uganda in the North Kivu province, he said. The rebels had taken over lands near there in 2012 and were pushed from the area into Uganda and Rwanda by Congolese and United Nations forces in 2013.

The fighting has forced a heavy influx of people fleeing to Uganda, according to the Uganda Red Cross.

The group said Monday it deployed a team to assess needs among people fleeing the fighting overnight between unknown armed groups. Spokeswoman Irene Nakasiita said hundreds were camping at the border post of Bunagana, seeking shelter in Uganda.

Ugandan authorities didn’t immediately comment. The East African country is home to 1.3 million refugees who fled violence in neighboring countries such as South Sudan.

Eastern Congo is prone to insecurity with fighting between rival armed groups, including rebels opposed to the government in the capital, Kinshasa.

In recent years an armed group with roots in Uganda has been blamed for a series of attacks on civilians in the region.

In a security alert Sunday, the U.S. Embassy in Congo noted “reports of a potential attack in Goma,” the capital of North Kivu province. “There is increased security presence throughout the city,” the advisory said, adding that U.S. government personnel in the area were advised to shelter in place.

Troops of the Nigerian Army are currently in a gunfight with militants from the Islamic State-backed faction of Boko Haram, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), formerly known as Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihād in Tamsukawu village, Kaga Local Government Area of Borno state, like reported by saharareporters.com.

The town is about 7 kilometres from Ngamdu, where the Super Camp of the Armed Forces is located.

The criminals, reportedly dressed in military uniforms, set up a checkpoint along Maiduguri-Damaturu highway around 10:30 am and stopped vehicles at a spot near Tamsukawu village.

Special task force units were said to have been deployed in the area.

“ISWAP terrorists led by Abou Aseyia are currently attacking Tamsukawu village, located about 7 kilometers from Ngamdu, a military super camp. Heavy battle currently ongiong,” a source said.

“Air support and ground Troops from Super Camp, Ngamdu and Rapid Response Team have been promptly deployed to the scene and are currently engaging the terrorists,” the source said.

ISWAP, which split from the mainstream Boko Haram in 2016, has become a dominant group, focusing on military targets and high-profile attacks, including against aid workers.

With the death of Abubakar Shekau and the realignment of various factions, an interim committee was appointed to lead the ISIS Islamic Caliphate of Africa (Wilaya of Africa), covering parts of Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon.

The Nigerian army has repeatedly claimed that insurgency had been largely defeated and frequently underplays any losses.

The terror group has caused over 50,000 deaths and displaced millions of individuals mainly in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states.

Ethiopia Thursday marks the one-year anniversary of brutal fighting between government forces and regional Amhara militiamen aligned with Eritrean forces against rebels in the northern Tigray region. Now, Tigrayan forces say they are advancing on the capital, Addis Ababa, and that it could fall within months or even weeks.

In recent weeks, the Tigrayan forces and the Oromo regional forces have joined in the fight against the central government and claimed to make significant advances.

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed vowed that his government would prevail.

“Ethiopia will not collapse. Ethiopia will prosper,” Abiy said speaking in Addis Ababa on Wednesday. “Ethiopia will forever exist with her honor by defeating all who test her through the blood and bones of her children.”

The Ethiopian government declared a six-month state of emergency Wednesday and called on residents to defend their neighborhoods if rebels arrive in the capital. “Our country is facing a grave danger to its existence, sovereignty and unity. And we can’t dispel this danger through the usual law enforcement systems and procedures,” said Justice Minister Gedion Timothewos during a state media briefing.

Debretsion Gebremichael, the president of the Tigray region blamed the Ethiopian government and its allies for causing the suffering in the past year. “The warmongers decided to continue with the war, and we entered into this war because the only option we had is to destroy our enemies by force.”

State Department spokesperson Ned Price called on all the warring parties to end the fighting and protect the lives and rights of citizens. He said the State Department has now updated the travel advisory for Ethiopia to Level 4.

“What that means is we are advising U.S. citizens, do not to travel to Ethiopia,” Price said. “We are recommending that U.S. citizens in Ethiopia consider departing now using commercial options that remain available.”

Michelle Bachelet, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights said the yearlong conflict was marked by “extreme brutality.”

“We have reasonable grounds to believe that during this period, all parties to the Tigray conflict have committed violations of international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law,” The U.N. human rights chief said during a press briefing on Wednesday. “Some of this may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Civilians in Tigray have been subjected to brutal violence and suffering.”

A joint report by the U.N. human rights office and the government-created Ethiopian Human Rights Commission found that sexual violence has been rampant in the conflict, detailing reports of gang rapes by various parties against women and girls, but also against men and boys.

The yearlong conflict has plunged about 400,000 people in the Tigray region into famine, killed thousands of civilians and forced more than 2.5 million people in the north to flee their homes, according to the U.N.

At least 69 people, including a mayor, have been killed in an attack by gunmen in southwestern Niger, the country’s government has confirmed according to allafrica.com.

Al Jazeera reports that the assault was the latest in Niger’s “tri-border” zone with Burkina Faso and Mali, a volatile area that has been the epicentre of conflict between state forces and armed groups linked to Islamic State and al-Qaeda.

AFP reports that the assault took place on Tuesday at Adab-Dab, a village about 55km from Banibangou in the western region of Tillaberi, a source said.

Al Jazeera says says that Interior Minister Alkache Alhada said on state television that 15 people had survived and a search operation was under way,

UK troops deployed to Mali as part of the UN’s peacekeeping mission have detained three suspected Daesh terrorists and seized weapons during operations to deter and disrupt non-compliant armed groups threatening local communities, like reported by africa-newsroom.com.

During a 17-day operation in September, soldiers from the UK’s Long Range Reconnaissance Group (LRRG) disrupted suspected violent extremists from groups believed to include the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), seizing weapons and securing villages in line with the UN’s mandate to protect civilians.

During one encounter, soldiers from the Queen’s Dragoon Guards came across three suspected ISGS militants who ditched items as they fled the scene. One of the three men was detained after driving his motorbike into a body of water in a bid to escape. During a search of the area, the soldiers seized two motorcycles, a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launcher with rockets, radios and combat clothing.

Days later, soldiers from the same regiment happened across two armed males, detaining them after they attempted to flee when they were approached. The soldiers seized two AK47 rifles, ammunition, radios and other military equipment.

All three detentions happened in an area where ISGS fighters are known to operate, although part of the peacekeepers’ role in Mali involves approaching members of legal militias who have signed up to the Algiers Peace Agreement to make sure they are complying with its terms.

Minister for the Armed Forces James Heappey said:

“These operations are yet another example of how UK peacekeepers are making a real difference to the UN mission to protect civilians in Mali.”

“Disrupting armed groups and taking valuable weapons and ammunition out of the hands of terrorists makes communities safer, while our presence in the region helps the UN mission to understand and counter threats to the local population.”

Both encounters happened under Operation Makara 2, a UN operation to stabilise population areas around Ansongo and deter or disrupt terrorist groups in order to protect and reassure the local population. The operation was ordered after dozens of villagers were massacred by suspected extremists in the area in August in attacks which the LRRG helped a UN Human Rights team to investigate.

Earlier this year, UK Armed Forces conducting a ‘cordon and search’ operation seized AK47s, ammunition, fuel and radios.

Lt Col Will Meddings, Commanding Officer of the UK Task Group, said:

“The LRRG are not only a force that finds, but a force that acts. These detentions, along with the seizure of these suspected ISGS weapons and equipment, show that a robust approach to peacekeeping helps protect the Malian people.”

“Key to successes like this are putting out patrols for long periods that persist in place. By returning to the sites of August’s cowardly attacks we built up a picture of how jihadist groups operate that has allowed us to take action like this against them.”

The UK Task Group provides the UN with a specialised long-range reconnaissance capability, conducting patrols in remote areas. British soldiers gather intelligence and engage with the local population to help the UN mission understand and respond to threats and fulfil its mandate to protect civilians.

During Operation MAKARA 2, the Task Group also provided assistance to the UN’s civil pillar, enabling them to visit projects and identify future opportunities for engagement.

The Sahel is one of Africa’s poorest and most fragile regions, with more than 15 million people requiring humanitarian assistance and increasing insecurity, including terrorist violence and conflict.

The UK is providing targeted assistance through defence, diplomatic and development expertise, including supporting the UN with critical capabilities like the reconnaissance force.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as Daesh (Arabic) has released a video showing a 12-year-old member of ISWAP (Islamic State’s West Africa Province), the breakaway Boko Haram faction executing two Nigerian soldiers, like reported by abna24.com.

In the 17-minute long video, the soldiers were shot dead by the insurgent with his AK-47.

The video which was called “Makers of Epic Battles” also covered other attacks from ISWAP’s spring campaign in Borno and Yobe states in 2021.

Analysing the footage, Tomasz Rolbiecki, a researcher on ISIS’s attacks worldwide described the execution as “awful.”

“There are no words to describe how awful it is,” Rolbiecki posted on Twitter.

He continued, “In general, the video is mainly covering the attacks from ISWAP’s spring campaign in northern Borno and Yobe, although there are also clips from southeastern and southwestern parts of Borno state.

“Most of the footage had been published in photo reports long before this video was released. Daesh has been doing it for years. However, there is also some new material.

“ISWAP confirms the militants are using an APC (seems like a Mowag Piranha variant) for the first time in a long time, if not ever. News of them using APCs and MRAPs have been circulating for a while now, but we have not seen a confirmation until now.

“The attack on Gajiram is next. It is difficult to say which one is it since there were several in the last year, and the footage was not released previously in any form.

“Then ISWAP shows an IED attack which must have happened in Mallam Fatori (I do not have the exact date). A video shot by one of the soldiers attacked by that IED is used by the militants to show the aftermath. That is a technique sometimes used by Daesh.

“After that, a clip from Geidam, in Yobe State, is shown. This was the attack from 23 April, in which ISWAP briefly established control over the town. We have seen most of that footage previously as well.”

Defence Headquarters (DHQ) has said 1,199 Boko Haram terrorists with families surrendered to troops in Borno State following intensified operations in the North East zone, like reported by leadership.ng.

The acting director Defence Media Operations, Brig Gen Benard Onyeuko, stated this during the bi-weekly update on Armed Forces of Nigeria Operations covering 14-28 October,2021.

He said the troops of Operation Hadin Kai sustained operations in the air, land and maritime environment leading to the killing of 38 terrorists including the new ISWAP leader, Bako, and rescued five kidnapped civilians.

“Between 15 and 28 October 2021, a total of 1,199 terrorists and their families, comprising 114 adult males, 312 adult females and 773 children, surrendered to own troops at different locations in the North East,” he said

The troops also arrested 11 terrorists including their informants and logistics suppliers in the course of the operation.

The director said the troops recovered 29 assorted weapons, 166 rounds of assorted ammunition, two gun trucks and 622 bags of fertilizer, used for production of IEDs.

He said some of the successes were recorded at Dar, Kumshe, Wulgo, Chabbol and Kijmatari villages in Borno State as well as locations along Ngala – Wulgo and Nguru – Kano roads,Dikwa and Mafa villages as well as Ngama village in Yobe State.

At least three Burkina Faso soldiers were killed and seven others wounded in an attack near the southern border with the Ivory Coast, security sources said on Tuesday according to thedefensepost.com.

Burkina Faso has been hit by deadly jihadist attacks since 2015, mostly in the northern and eastern regions close to Mali and Niger but also in the south.

“Unidentified armed individuals attacked a military unit securing the Mangodara commune area,” a security source told AFP, adding the attack took place at 9 pm (2100 GMT) on Monday.

“The toll is three fallen soldiers and seven wounded, some of them seriously,” the security source said.

Another security source said “a soldier died during the attack” which also left “nine wounded.”

He added: “Unfortunately, two of the wounded have succumbed, bringing the toll to three dead.”

The source said that troops killed six enemy fighters while efforts to secure the area and remove assailants continued.

A week ago, an armed police officer was wounded and an assailant killed in an attack near Tehini, along the Burkina Ivorian border.

On October 11, two soldiers on patrol were killed by a home-made explosive device in Farakorosso.

Attacks, normally blamed on jihadist groups affiliated with the Islamic State or Al-Qaeda, have killed around 2,000 people and forced more than 1.4 million to flee their homes.

At least 120 people died and over 200 were injured in intensified fighting between the Somali National Army and its former ally Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) in the Somali state of Galmudug over the weekend, residents and hospital officials said.

The clashes, in the state’s second-largest district of Guriceel, run the risk of distracting both groups from their fights against Al Shabaab, analysts and residents said.

This round of fighting broke out early Saturday and continued into Sunday, residents told Reuters.

“I am sure over 30 people died because I know 27 of them and they belong to both groups,” elder Farah Abdullahi told Reuters. His estimates were echoed by 10 residents interviewed individually by Reuters.

Both the army and ASWJ were not reachable for comment.

ASWJ is a group of moderate Sufi Muslims which has played a key role in the fight against the al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab insurgency.

But tensions between the armed group and the federal government have been building for years. ASWJ accuses the government of not doing enough to fight Al Shabaab, while the government accuses ASWJ of acting without its permission.

Tensions came to a head earlier this month, when federal forces launched what it called a preemptive attack on ASWJ. ASWJ repelled the attack and captured Guriceel, whose residents welcomed the group. L8N2QX3SH

The dead from the weekend’s fighting include senior SNA officer Abdi Ladiif Fayfle, the commander of the U.S.-trained Danab forces, a relative told Reuters.

Fayo Care Hospital in the town received 30 people injured in fighting, while Istarlin Hospital, also in the town said it received 10, officials at the hospitals told Reuters. Hanano Hospital in a nearby town received 60, an officialt old Reuters.

The SNA also airlifted a plane of injured soldiers to the capital, an airport worker told Reuters.

Galmudug state security minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi resigned earlier this month, citing federal officials’ refusal to heed his pleas not to attack ASWJ.

“Many parts of Galmudug and the entire country is under al Shabaab. The commander of SNA is destroying Guriceel town and massacring ASWJ who are famous for eliminating Al Shaabab,” he told Saturday.

Later on Saturday, Al Shabaab militants hit a Galmudug airport with mortars, airport workers said, compounding fears that the group would take advantage of the chaotic infighting.

“The escalation of the dispute between ASWJ and the government distracts from, if not undermines, other priorities like progressing with elections and the struggle against Al-Shabaab,” said Omar Mahmood, Somalia analyst at the International Crisis Group think-tank.