The central Malian town of Boni was under jihadist control on Friday after administrative buildings were attacked and the army was driven from the area, an elected official and a security source told AFP

“At the moment jihadists are in control of the town of Boni. They infiltrated the town and today fired on several buildings,” said the official, who requested anonymity, adding “the army is no longer there.”

Boni is home to several thousand people and at nightfall remained under the control of the unidentified armed group who fired on administrative buildings and burnt down the mayor’s office.

“We asked our forces present in Boni to withdraw to the locality of Douentza, which has been done,” a military source told AFP, also asking not to be named as the Malian army has refused to comment on the incident.

Douentza is around 90 kilometres (56 miles) from Boni.

Ongoing international military intervention since January 2013 has driven Islamist fighters away from major urban centres, but large tracts of Mali are still not controlled by domestic or foreign troops.

Jihadist groups early last year began to carry out attacks in central Mali as well as the long-troubled north.

france24.com

A middle-aged Somali-born cleric with a bright orange beard was this week put on a US terror list, accused of heading the Islamic State group in East Africa.

The US State Department on Wednesday said Abdulqadir (also Abdiqadir) Mumin is “the head of a group of ISIL-linked individuals in East Africa,” using another term for IS, and branding him a “global terrorist”.

Here’s what we know about the man, and the threat he poses.

– British links –

Mumin was born in the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland and lived in Sweden before moving to the UK in the 2000s, where he was granted British citizenship.

In London and Leicester, he developed a reputation as a firebrand preacher at extremist mosques and in videos posted online.

Monitored by MI5, Britain’s domestic intelligence agency, Mumin is thought to have known Mohamed Emwazi, the IS executioner nicknamed ‘Jihadi John’, and Michael Adebolajo, one of two people convicted over the 2013 murder of British soldier Lee Rigby in London.

In 2010, Mumin travelled to Somalia to join the Shabaab, the Al-Qaeda-aligned militant group — which both Emwazi and Adebolajo had tried to do, but were unsuccessful.

On arrival, he reportedly burned his British passport then served as a Shabaab propagandist and imam — “an ideologue not a commander,” according to Matt Bryden, director of Sahan Research, a Kenya-based think tank.

– Defection to IS –

The Nigerian Air Force said that the Boko Haram leadership in Borno State suffered heavy casualties when their fighter aircraft launched precision attacks earlier this week on the fleeing leaders. The Nigerian army also confirmed on the same day that the Islamist terror group’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, has been killed.

Claims from the army about Shekau being severely wounded or killed have been made in the past. However, Major General Lucky Irabor, commander of the operation against Boko Haram that is dubbed Lafiya Dole, insisted on Thursday they can now confirm the man who identified himself as the leader is dead. He added that the army does not issue baseless statements.

“I can confirm to you that the original Shekau was killed, the second Shekau was killed, and the man presenting himself as Shekau, I can also confirm to you that few days ago, he was wounded. We are yet to confirm whether he is dead or not,” Irabor was quoted by Vanguard as saying.

The commander added that their fight against the Islamic State (Isis)-backed militant group will continue until the last one of them has been killed. He also insisted that videos released by the group to prove that they are still active in the region are “just façades”.

Meanwhile, sharing details of the latest air strike on the Boko Haram leadership in Borno, Group Captain Ayodele Famuyiwa, director of Air Force Public Relations, reportedly said: “The Nigerian Air Force, in a series of well-coordinated air operations conducted on August 29, 2016, successfully attacked a Boko Haram terrorist camp at Tumbun Rego in northern Borno State where some wounded commanders of the notorious sect were believed to be receiving treatment.

“Intelligence report has it that some Boko Haram commanders, who survived the air assault on the night of August 20, 2016 leading to the death of over 300 insurgents, had sustained serious injuries and were said to have relocated subsequently to the camp at Tumbun Rego for medical treatment.

“The latest strike followed the trail of this piece of intelligence to neutralize these suspected leaders of the sect who are high value targets,” the officer said, adding that the air force “is yet to ascertain the casualty figure”.

However, he added that “post-strike Battle Damage Assessment mission shows that the degree of damage achieved [from the air strikes] was devastating as the buildings were engulfed by large fire as can be seen from the declassified video of the air operation.”

ibtimes.co.uk

Militants from the Al-Shabab militant group killed ten people in a car bomb and shooting attack on a beachfront restaurant in the Somali capital Mogadishu late Thursday, according to authorities.

Police raised the death toll in the attack from seven to ten Friday. “Nine people including two Shabab gunmen were killed in the attack,” Mogadishu city spokesman Abdifatah Halane had earlier told AFP news agency. Twenty people managed to escape the scene of the attack.

The gunmen targeted the Banadir Beach Restaurant near to Mogadishu’s Lido Beach, a popular location for the city’s wealthier clientele. They detonated a car bomb before engaging in a gunfight with security forces.

It was the second attack on the beach area after gunmen conducted another bomb and shooting attack on a seafood restaurant in January, leaving 20 people dead.

The perpetrators “have been gunned down and the restaurant is now under the full command of the Somali government soldiers,” regional police commander Colonel Abshir Bishaar told the Somali National News Agency.

“The terrorist attack killed nine persons, five of them were civilians, two security forces and the other two were the militants who carried out the attack,” he added.

The radical Islamist group, a rival to the Islamic State militant group (ISIS), continues to wage attacks in the Somali capital. In June, the group’s fighters stormed a hotel in Mogadishu, detonating a car bomb and a suicide bomb before gunmen stormed the complex, killing 15 people.

But it is also waging war on neighboring Kenya because of the Kenyan military’s troop presence in Somalia as part of a regional military force.

Its deadliest attacks in the region in recent years have been the Garissa University College attack in April 2015 in which gunmen killed 148 people, as well as the Westgate Mall attack in September 2013 when the group’s militants stormed the shopping center and killed 67 people.

newsweek.com

When the Nigerian jihadist group popularly known as Boko Haram publicly pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State in March 2015, this new alliance made perfect sense to both groups. For the Islamic State, Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance (bayat) was a powerful symbol that it was winning the intra-jihadist competition with its mother organization al-Qaeda, with one observer describing the Nigerian group’s shifting allegiance as “a huge defeat for al-Qaeda and a huge coup for” the Islamic State. The potential upside for Boko Haram could also be discerned easily. One analyst observed that the Islamic State has “the ability to export know-how,” and that doing so in Nigeria could mean that “the already quite substantial problems of containing Boko Haram become that much harder.” But this relationship did not work out as planned.

During the course of a strategic communication project we both worked on in Nigeria earlier this year, we discovered that key leaders in Boko Haram almost certainly regretted joining the Islamic State. Had it remained a part of al-Qaeda, which has a far stronger African network, Boko Haram would almost certainly be a more potent organization today. After completing our work in Nigeria, we co-authored an article for Foreign Policy arguing that Boko Haram was experiencing “buyer’s remorse” over its pledge to the Islamic State, and that al-Qaeda would likely try to exploit this sentiment within the group by attempting to peel Boko Haram away from the Islamic State (though it would not necessarily want the organization to openly align with al-Qaeda). Shortly after our article was published, Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, the nominee to lead the U.S. Africa Command, said at his nomination hearing that Boko Haram has fractured, with about half of the group breaking off “because they were not happy with the amount of buy-in, if you will, from Boko Haram into the ISIL brand.” The Islamic State subsequently announced that Boko Haram’s erratic and enigmatic leader Abubakar Shekau, whose faction was seen as too independent, had been replaced by Abu Musab al-Barnawi.

We have many reasons to question the long-term sustainability of the relationship between the new leadership that the Islamic State appointed in Boko Haram — which has taken on the new name of the Islamic State’s West African Province — and the Islamic State itself. Al-Qaeda will likely patiently wait for that relationship to fail just as the relationship with Shekau failed, and then try to pick up the pieces.

Shekau vs. Barnawi: A War of Words

On August 3, the Islamic State announced in an interview of Barnawi published in its Arabic-language magazine Al-Naba that Barnawi is the new wali, or governor, of the Nigeria-based militant organization. Barnawi is the son of the late Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf, for whom Shekau had served as a deputy.

Shekau, who had led Boko Haram since 2010, immediately followed this announcement with his own audio releaseacknowledging that he was no longer the group’s wali. The audio message mentioned that he had reverted to his previous role as the imam of Jamaatu Ahl al-Sunna lil-Dawa wal-Jihad, or JAS, which is the original name of Boko Haram. Shekau’s choice of language when stating the group’s name is significant, as Shekau is asserting his authority over a construct that exists independent of the Islamic State’s West African Province. Shekau said he still recognized Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the Islamic State’s caliph, but that his rivals in Barnawi’s faction had staged a coup against him by manipulating the Islamic State’s leadership and cutting Shekau off from corresponding with Baghdadi. This claim deliberately parallels Shekau’s position to the Islamic State’s at the time of its split from al-Qaeda: It is exactly what the Islamic State alleged that Abu Khalid al-Suri had done to them with respect to al-Qaeda’s senior leadership from 2013 until the Islamic State’s final expulsion from the al-Qaeda network. Further drawing that parallel, Shekau lamented that Baghdadi had not responded to his messages about Barnawi’s acts of “great polytheism.” Lack of responsiveness was one of the Islamic State’s grievances against al-Qaeda

Barnawi’s faction has a clear position on Shekau. Its perspective is explained in detail in a private audio by Barnawi’s ally Mamman Nur that has since been made public. A Cameroonian who served as a liaison between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and had masterminded the attack on the United Nations’ headquarters in Abuja in 2011, Nur discussed Shekau’s excessive takfirism in the audio recording. Another speaker on the same audio, Abu Fatima, listed members of Barnawi’s faction that Shekau’s faction had killed “without evidence.”

On August 7, Shekau appeared in a video for the first time since February 2015. In the first part of the video, a masked militant led more than 100 fighters in a march before giving a speech directed to Baghdadi. In it, the militant said that the “soldiers of JAS” stand with Shekau, and claimed that Baghdadi did not respond to any of Shekau’s eight messages to Baghdadi. Though the masked militant described news of Barnawi’s appointment as wali as “sudden,” he said JAS would not remove its allegiance to Baghdadi—but they would also not follow Barnawi, who is not “authentically salafist.” Toward the end of the video, a camouflage-clad Shekau fires a gun in the air while two militants stand beside him in what appears to be northeastern Nigeria’s Sambisa Forest. The video also carried the JAS logo, rather than that used by the Islamic State’s West African Province. The logo utilized may be another sign that Shekau is resurrecting an organization that exists outside the Islamic State’s formal structure. (This logo appeared once again on August 14, when Shekau’s trusted spokesman interviewed the captured Chibok schoolgirls in a new JAS video.)

Is Barnawi a Mole?

There is reason to believe that the leadership of Barnawi’s faction retains a latent affinity for al-Qaeda, even though they are now publicly loyal to Baghdadi. This can be seen in the pedigree of Barnawi’s faction, which recalls previous factions that sought to rival Shekau.

Since Shekau assumed leadership of Boko Haram in 2010 after Nigerian security forces killed Mohammed Yusuf (Barnawi’s father), two main rival factions have contested Shekau’s leadership. In 2011, the Yusufiya Islamic Movement distributed flyers in Borno State criticizing Shekau’s killing of innocent Muslim civilians. In 2012, Ansaruannounced its formation in Kano after Shekau ordered an attack in the city that killed more than 200 people, mostly Muslims. Ansaru’s Nigerian leaders had been trained by AQIM, and subscribed to al-Qaeda’s limitations on targeting civilians (relative to the Islamic State).

Yet, like the Yusufiya Islamic Movement before it, Ansaru eventually became largely dormant — due to Shekau killing its members, Nigerian counterterrorism operations against its cells, and the disruption of AQIM’s networks in Mali after the French-led intervention in 2013. As the environment for AQIM became more permissive in Mali in 2014-15, external support for Ansaru resumed, and the group was attempting to reassert itself up until its leader Khalid al-Barnawi was captured in early 2016. Shekau thus retained Boko Haram’s dominant leadership position in the face of these challenges, and even incorporated some Ansaru defectors into its ranks ahead of Boko Haram’s push to join the Islamic State in 2015. This may have been a marriage of convenience for Ansaru members who were on the run — as well as a desire for survival, safe haven, and access to greater resources — rather than a sign of true loyalty to Shekau. Thus, the fact that Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s faction has ascended to Boko Haram’s leadership today at the expense of the deposed Shekau represents the first time a rival faction has overcome Shekau.

Barnawi’s understanding of theology and strategy resembles that of the Yusufiya Islamic Movement and Ansaru. His allies include AQIM-trained Mamman Nur and the above-mentioned Abu Fatima, who was Ansaru’s commander of suicide operations. Moreover, his first video appearance in January 2015 carried some hallmarks of Ansaru messaging. Thus, the current Boko Haram leadership under Barnawi appears to be neo-Ansaru in ideology, but nonetheless expresses its loyalty to the Islamic State. This apparent paradox can be resolved through one of two explanations. First, a number of AQIM factions and “front groups” in northwest Africa have joined the Islamic State out of a shared vision of an Islamic state, but not due to a truly shared ideology. Barnawi is in accord with the Islamic State in the desire for declaration of sharia-based governance in West Africa. Barnawi’s “switch” from al-Qaeda to the Islamic State is thus consistent with some shifting jihadist loyalties in the region, as well as Barnawi’s short-term objectives. Second, and more sinister from the Islamic State’s perspective, Barnawi’s faction may have joined with Shekau in order to finally depose him. To formalize a relationship with the Islamic State, Barnawi’s faction had to merge with Shekau’s to show the Islamic State that Boko Haram had sufficient unity in its ranks to make the pledge. By merging with Shekau under this “general command” while controlling the connections to the Islamic State, Barnawi’s faction was able to bring in Shekau before the pledge but also cut him off from communicating with the Islamic State afterward. Barnawi’s faction apparently convinced the Islamic State to remove Shekau from his leadership role in favor of Barnawi.

While the idea of Barnawi being motivated to join the Islamic State in order to overthrow Shekau may seem conspiratorial, it is consistent with Boko Haram’s ongoing internal intrigues under Shekau. To a lesser extent, it is also consistent with a trend of al-Qaeda members infiltrating Islamic State provinces to weaken, divide, and sow discord in the movement’s ranks. This has occurred in upstart Islamic State provinces in Yemen and Afghanistan — and even at the highest levels of the group, as evidenced by the presence of the high-level dissident and “whistleblower” known by his Twitter handle @wikibaghdady.

Thus, Barnawi’s faction appears to have killed two birds with one stone. It joined the Islamic State, with whom it shared a vision of announcing an Islamic state in West Africa, and it marginalized Shekau. The Islamic State’s provinces in Libya were supposed to provide new resources and weapons to Boko Haram, but this never panned out: There has been no influx of funds or foreign fighters.

The Path Out of the Islamic State

If the Islamic State can provide Boko Haram with no further resources or support, there may be little incentive for it to remain with the Islamic State in the long term. Barnawi may even switch his allegiance to al-Qaeda — even if he is not open about such association, a model al-Qaeda is clearly moving toward with the Nusra Front’s recent “dissociation.” Al-Qaeda’s affiliates are waging an increasingly powerful insurgency in nearby Mali, and a switch to al-Qaeda would also allow Barnawi to receive resources from al-Qaeda in Mali. An alliance with al-Qaeda also would be more consistent with Barnawi’s vision and ideology.

Barnawi’s appreciation of al-Qaeda was subtly evident in his August 3 interview with the Islamic State, when the group named him Boko Haram’s new wali. In it, Barnawi noted that after Mohammed Yusuf was killed, Boko Haram’s “soldiers were sent to the Greater Sahara to be trained there [by al-Qaeda], and transitioned from the stage of guerrilla warfare to the stage of empowerment and spreading control.” Thus, Barnawi likely still owes a debt to al-Qaeda for helping his father’s followers after Mohammed Yusuf’s death.

To win out over the Islamic State in Nigeria, all al-Qaeda has to do sit on the sidelines and watch Boko Haram fall apart, and patiently wait to capitalize. Boko Haram’s state opponents should watch for signs of such a realignment. Boko Haram’s reintegration into al-Qaeda’s network could give the Nigerian jihadist group an immediate boost by linking it to the growing Malian insurgency. It could also signal that the Islamic State no longer poses as much of a challenge to al-Qaeda’s global network, since Boko Haram has been the most prominent franchise that the Islamic State lured to its network. Losing Boko Haram would thus be a potent signal of the Islamic State’s decline.

Further, though the United States and its allies have found it notoriously difficult to capitalize on fissures within and among jihadist groups, the rivalries and maneuvering within Boko Haram demonstrate the strategic importance of internal dissension and realignment. Boko Haram’s defection to the Islamic State deprived it of al-Qaeda’s resources, which were more potent locally. And at this point disunity within Boko Haram is undeniable. Whether that makes Boko Haram less of a threat, or in the longer term creates greater dangers, remains to be seen. But scholars of sub-state violence should certainly be following developments in Nigeria to extract important lessons about disunity in militant groups.

warontherocks.com/

The Nigerian Christians Elders Forum (NCEF), an affiliate of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), wednesday said Nigeria was fatally sliding into an Islamic State under President Muhammadu Buhari’s government.

The NCEF position came as a response to serial killing of Christians in the northern part of the country in recent times. Last week, Christian students were brutally killed and burnt in Talata Marafa, Zamfara State, over alleged blasphemy.

The NCEF also cited the arrest of Mr. Joe Chinakwe for naming his dog ‘Buhari’ in Ogun State as a clear case of discrimination against Christians in the country.

According to the NCEF Chairman, Chief Solomon Asemota (SAN), “There is a bill now pending before the National Assembly, titled: “NGO Regulatory Bill” intended to silence non-governmental organisations (NGOs) including the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN).

“It is not in dispute that Nigeria is an Islamic State contrary to Section 10 of the constitution. What is in dispute is whether Nigeria is ruled by mainstream Muslims or by Islamist Jihadists. We plead with the Sultan of Sokoto to appreciate that Nigeria is safer and more peaceful when the federal or state government does not adopt any religion as ‘State Religion’.”
The NCEF explained that the overt dominance of the National Security Council by members of the Muslim faith was worriesome and expressed reservations whether Vice President Yemi Osinbajo plays any role in the council.

“It is as a result of the understanding (or lack of it) of civilized jihad that we are apprehensive of those in the ‘Security and Intelligence Committee’ of the federal government by some unexplained reasons who are mainly Muslims.

President Buhari, (Muslim), Chief of Defence Staff (Christian), Chief of Army Staff, Chief of Air Staff, Minister of Defence, Minister of Internal Affairs, Inspector General of Police (IG), National Security Adviser (NSA), Director General of DSS are all Muslims from the North.

“We are not too sure whether the Vice President is a member of this committee following information that he was once excluded from the meeting which the president called. When the vice president summoned the same meeting in the absence of President Buhari who was away in the United Kingdom, there was resistance and the meeting had to end abruptly,” the Christians elders stated.
Asemota maintained that going by the activities of the Fulani herdsmen, it is clear that a jihad is being staged through the back door, adding: “The atrocities committed by Fulani herdsmen such as the number of persons killed, farmland and buildings destroyed with other property during the same period were not included.

“The conclusion which we, Christians, draw is that jihad is being committed against our country especially when the cohesive instrument of state is in the hands of three ethnic nationalities and one religion. This enlists fear in the minds of the populace, especially Christians.”

The group also differed with the Sultan of Sokoto, Sa’ad Abubakar III, on the interpretation of the secular status of Nigeria, stating that: “NCEF begs to disagree with the Sultan that Nigeria is a multi-religious state based on the fact that the constitution which forms the basis upon which our founding fathers agreed to live together as a country, provided under Section 10 that ‘the government of the federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as ‘State Religion’.
“Nigeria has multi-cultural and multi-religious communities, tribes, ethnic nationalities but one nation. It is correctly assumed that in the interest of peace and justice, the constitution in Section 10 prohibits the state from religious participation by way of recognising one and two religions. Multi-religious country does not fit the interpretation of Section 10 rather, it is its opposite.

“The Sultan’s interpretation, we submit, is intended to justify Islam and Christianity as state religions until Islam dominates to become de facto and de jure religion of Nigeria.”

On the arrest of Chinakwe, NCEF said: “If Nigeria is being run as a secular state, Sections 10, 37, and 38 of the constitution guarantees that the right of private and family life, right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion should protect Joe Chinakwe and the complainant would have been arrested but because Nigeria is an ‘Islamic State’, Chinakwe has to face trial, and in the process, promoting the most effective way to get rid of critics which is to instill fear in ordinary Nigerians. One wonders if the dog had been named Gowon or Jonathan would there have been any furore about the matter.”

The Christian leaders also queried the short change of the Niger-Delta in oil revenue since the discovery of oil in Nigeria, stressing that it has been shown that out of N96.212 trillion crude oil earnings, only N12.3 trillion was paid to the oil producing areas as derivation.
Had 50 per cent derivation as obtained before 1966 applied, the Niger Delta would have earned N48.106 trillion.

“The fears of ‘Christian’ in the Niger Delta is that the region may be abandoned to its fate by an Islamist federal government, after all, ‘all land in Nigeria has been bequeathed to the Islamists by Allah and therefore, reserves’ the right to abandon same as the British,” they observed.

thisdaylive.com

Kenyan authorities say they have enhanced security patrols along the border with Somalia to prevent incursions of Al-Shabaab militants targeting communication infrastructure.

Northeastern Regional Coordinator Mohamud Saleh said on Wednesday that the militants’ bombing of two Safaricom masts in Mandera county early this month was meant to sabotage communication infrastructure and frustrate security operations in the region.

“We have permanent ground security operations on hotspots along the border after we realized that Al-Shabaab were out to sabotage our communication infrastructure,” Saleh told journalists in Garissa.

“They (Al-Shabaab) were also planning to bomb water pipelines in these towns but we managed to secure them,” he said.

Saleh said that the Al-Shabaab Islamist group had been degraded and the few attacks reported for past 14 months, adding that his security team was working closely with the Lower Juba administration in southern Somalia in the fight against Al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab militants have been targeting military and police vehicles either by laying ambushs or planting explosives on the road in Kenya’s northeast region, especially in Mandera and Garissa counties.

Kenyan troops are serving with the Africa Union Mission in Somalia to fight against Al-Shabaab militants in support of the Somali government.

xinhuanet.com

A Burundian human rights group said Wednesday it had identified the locations of 14 mass graves around the country.

The Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons (APRODH) added that hundreds of people have disappeared in the east African country since last year. It did not say how many of them could be buried in the mass graves.

The group reported five mass graves in the region of the capital Bujumbura, eight in the north and one in central Gitega province.

Those buried in the graves could include government opponents killed by security forces and soldiers killed during a failed coup attempt in May 2015, according to APRODH.

They could also include members of the youth wing of the ruling party CNDD-FDD, who dug the mass graves and were killed to eliminate them as witnesses, said Pierre Claver Mbonimpa from APRODH.

“Vehicles of the [Bujumbura] city hall, of the police and of the army move bodies to these mass graves,” Mbonimpa told dpa.

Government spokesman Philippe Nzobonariba declined to comment, saying police were investigating the affair.

Police spokesman Pierre Nkurikiye said he could not comment on the report because APRODH participated in the coup attempt and is a banned organization.

“These facts do not exist, it is a strategy to influence politically,” Nkurikiye said.

Burundi has been rocked by political violence since President Pierre Nkurunziza won a third term in the July 2015 elections, despite a constitutional two-term limit.

Amnesty International had already reported the presence of mass graves in the country, citing witness accounts, video footage and satellite images.

aboutcroatia.net

At least 275 people have died in fighting between government and rebel forces in South Sudan, officials from both sides say.

Jonglei Governor Phillip Aguer says rebels attacked the army barracks in the northeast town of Pajut on August 19. He says at least 242 opposition and 23 government soldiers died and 10 civilians were killed in the crossfire.

But a spokesman for the rebels, James Gatdet, says the army launched the offensive and that more than 300 soldiers and 30 rebels were killed.

The reports emerged after Sudan on Tuesday announced that rebel leader Riek Machar was in that country for “urgent medical attention.”

Machar’s absence after fleeing renewed fighting in South Sudan’s capital last month struck another blow to the country’s peace deal to end a civil war.

ap.org

Three people were killed and 24 others were wounded when a suspected Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyya suicide bomber detonated their explosives at a market in the town of Mora in Cameroon’s Extreme-Nord region.

In March 2015, Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State was accepted, and the group reconstituted itself as the Islamic State’s Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyya.

janes.com