The Arab coalition to restore legitimacy in Yemen reported last month that it had thwarted a Houthi terrorist operation targeting a Greek oil tanker in the vicinity of the Bab Al-Mandab strait. According to the coalition sources, an explosive laden speedboat was used in the attack, like reported by ahram.org.eg.

On Saturday, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) naval authority reported that it was aware of an attack on a vessel off the coast of Yemen. The authority later updated the advisory notice on its website to say, the “incident is now complete. Vessel and crew are safe.” UKMTO gave no further details.

The two attacks mark a dangerous precedent that indicate that Houthi militias, with Iranian support, have begun to escalate hostile activities targeting international commercial navigation in the Red Sea. Previous attacks carried out by the Houthis were restricted to vessels belonging to coalition members or its main allies.

The Saudi-led Coalition also reported that the Houthis planted 164 mines in the Red Sea near Bab Al-Mandab — an additional sign that the Houthis are bent on increasing the risks to international maritime traffic.

The escalation comes at a time of a growing Iranian footprint in Yemen following the arrival of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders under diplomatic cover. In October, Tehran announced that it had appointed Hassan Eyrlou, an IRGC leader, as its plenipotentiary and extraordinary ambassador to Sanaa.

According to coalition reports since 2016, the Houthis have staged numerous terrorist attacks against coalition ships, starting with the UAE auxiliary ship HSV-2 Swift using a Chinese made C-801 missile. In October 2016, the Houthis fired several missiles against the USS Mason, but missed.

In January 2017, three mined dinghies struck a Saudi frigate west of Hodeida port as the ship was patrolling within the coalition’s zone of operations. The attack killed two crew members and injured three others. Two months later, Arab coalition forces intercepted three speedboats converging on several ships near the Yemeni port of Midi. In April of the same year, the Houthis struck a Saudi oil tanker near Hodeida. In July 2018, the Houthis struck two more Saudi tankers but inflicted only minor damage.

As the foregoing tells us, there is an upward trajectory in the Iranian-backed Houthi terrorist threat in the Red Sea. When we compare the recent operations to the abovementioned ones, we notice a number of significant trends. One is the salient qualitative shift towards a lack of discrimination between vessels belonging to coalition members/allies and those belonging to other nationalities. The tanker struck two weeks ago was Greek. It follows that there is a strong possibility that the Houthis and Iran have shifted to a strategy of threatening maritime traffic in the Red Sea in general.

Also significant is the diversity in means: maritime mines, missiles (made in China and modified in Iran), and, with greater frequency, explosive laden boats. The latter means might be favoured because it is easier to use and may cause more damage. The preference may also be influenced, on the one hand, by the lack of precision in striking targets at long range, as was the case with the USS Mason and, on the other hand, by the fact that speedboats can pack a bigger explosive charge than a single mine and also pursue their targets.

Another possible reason behind this development is that Iran wants to shift the thrust of its threat from the Gulf to the Red Sea by way of the Arabian Sea, which is less of a sign of a decision to reduce the level of threat to the Straits of Hormuz as it is a sign of a strategy of augmenting the threat to maritime routes. As for the use of a proxy for this purpose, Iran realises that if it undertook such an attack itself it would invite an American response, which President Donald Trump had said he was ready to deliver.

The types of ships attacked offer further insight into Houthi/Iranian strategy. That most of the attacks target oil tankers is clearly meant to deliver a message that says that imposing sanctions against the Iranian petroleum sector will elicit a response in kind.

The Houthis would be motivated by similar reasons. The coalition has a chokehold on oil supplies through Hodeida Port, which helps explain Houthi attacks against Aramco facilities and the petroleum derivatives facility in Jeddah. Such factors confirm that the Houthis’ strategic aim is to use the terrorism weapon against the movement of oil as a pressure tactic and bartering card.

In light of the foregoing, it appears important to assess the efficacy of maritime safety measures in the coalition’s theatre of operations. According to figures available in Arab coalition reports, 60 per cent of attacks were intercepted and one (the attempted missile attack on the USS Mason) failed due to poor targeting (although the missile targeting the HSV-2 Swift hit its mark). As for the mined speedboat attacks, many were intercepted before reaching their target. In the recent cases when the payload struck the damage was limited. In general, there were no preemptive operations to thwart Houthi attacks.

The coalition has also been successful at mine clearing operations along Yemen’s western coast. However, it should be stressed here that the Houthis’ ability to strike in the vicinities of Bab Al-Mandab to the south and Muhra governorate to the southwest means they have a reach that extends well beyond their areas of control and influence. This is too large of an area for the coalition to safeguard on its own given the limited size and capacities of the Yemeni coast guard.

In addition, the two recent incidents (i.e., the strike against the Greek tanker and the one reported by UKMTO) reflect a lack of international support for the coalition’s operations in this region at a time when Iran and its Houthi proxy are increasing threat tactics in the region and when there is a greater need for intelligence and technical cooperation to deal with qualitatively different types of risks and the new directions they are taking.

Coalition leaders clearly expected more, as in the aftermath of the attacks against Al-Fujairah and Aramco last year, the US and other world powers said that they would work to safeguard maritime traffic in this region.

The Russian military has been very active in Syria over the last few weeks. It has been conducting air and ballistic-missile strikes against Turkish-backed militant groups around Idlib. This activity can be seen as more fall-out from the recent conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, an area claimed and occupied by Armenia since 1994 but, under international law, part of Azerbaijan, like reported by defenceindepth.co.

This conflict began on 27 September and ended with a Russian-brokered ceasefire on 10 November after Azerbaijan had made significant territorial gains. And although Moscow might itself be seen to have made net gains from the conflict (see below) the interference in it – if not its actual instigation – by Turkey has caused deep Russian concern. Moscow regards the South Caucasus as its ‘back yard’ (part of its ‘near abroad’) and foreign interlopers such as Turkey are not welcome. As such, Ankara’s involvement was bound to bring some sort of Russian reprisal action against Turkish interests beyond the South Caucasus. This has been referred to as a need for ‘revenge’ (mest’) in some Russian sources.

This revenge has been evident in Syria and may yet also come in Libya (where Moscow and Ankara also have competing interests). This does not bode well for geo-political stability in the Caucasus, the Black Sea region and, indeed, the eastern Mediterranean. For while Moscow and Ankara do have many reasons to maintain cordial relations (notably economic) the various points of tension between them may ultimately lead to serious clashes. This brief article, using predominantly Russian sources and seeking to gain a Russian perspective, examines the current state-of-play now in the South Caucasus, in Syria and in regard to the overall relationship between Russia and Turkey.

In Russian eyes, Azerbaijan’s success in the conflict can be put down purely to the military assistance Turkey supplied to its close neighbour and ally; both countries having ethnic, linguistic and cultural links and, as has been pointed out in Russia, a ‘common enemy‘ – Armenia. This assistance has been long-standing, but it has increased in degree in recent years and Azerbaijan’s military has come to be considerably revamped through Turkish help. During the conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh, Azeri advances – designed to regain land lost to Armenia in the war between them ending in 1994 – were aided in large part by, according to Russian sources, the command-and-control capabilities provided by the Turkish military and the use of various Turkish weapons systems. Notable here were strikes by Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs, which destroyed numerous Armenian armoured vehicles. Particularly effective also were the Israeli-made and highly sophisticated Harpy and Harop loitering munitions.

But perhaps the true game-changer in the conflict might be seen to be the introduction by Turkey into the fray of at least 2,000 Islamist militants from Turkish-controlled Syria. These came, according to Russian sources, from the Sultan Murad Division, the Hamza Brigade and the Faylaq al-Sham group. The head of Russia’s foreign intelligence service (the SVR), Sergei Naryshkin, even said that Jabhat al-Nusra (formerly al Qaeda) also had a presence in the region and he voiced concern that the ‘South Caucasus may turn into a stronghold of international terrorists’ that could threaten Russia itself. Some of these Syrian fighters that Turkey had transferred to Nagorno-Karabakh had actually come from Libya. They had been there acting in support of Ankara’s ally, the UN-recognised government based in Tripoli and against the Russian-backed rebel administration based in Benghazi. It is important to note that many of these Syrian Islamists had been sent to Nagorno-Karabakh just days before the conflict began. Their movement was part of general Turkish preparation for the conflict.

Given that the conflict was (on one level) between, essentially, Christian Armenia and Muslim Azerbaijan, the motivation of these Syrian Islamists to fight and to bolster Azeri advances seems clear. These Syrians, moreover, appear have been very much at the sharp end of the fighting and, according to Russian reports, had quite a high casualty rate. Some 143 were dead by as early as mid-October. It was the approach of these militants to Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh’s ‘capital’, in early November that seems to have motivated Moscow to step in diplomatically and to broker the ceasefire of 10 November.

From Russia’s point of view this whole clash over Nagorno-Karabakh was most unwelcome and put Moscow in a quandary. Moscow wanted to help a long-term regional ‘ally’, Armenia, but without offending a regional ‘partner’, Azerbaijan (to whom Moscow has made significant sales of arms recently). Historically, Moscow has tried not to take sides between these two protagonists (who both became independent after the end of the Soviet Union in 1991). It has also suited Russian interests, since the 1993-94 war between them over Nagorno-Karabakh, to keep the conflict between them ‘frozen’. Such ‘frozen conflicts’ on Russia’s peripheries (in the likes also of Ukraine, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria) suit Moscow’s purposes. The disputes over territories between the competing factions tend to leave all of them looking to Moscow as the arbiter of final outcomes, thus providing it with a considerable degree of regional leverage as a power broker. More fundamentally, perhaps, maintaining frozen conflicts means that neither side involved in them can join NATO – the Alliance only accepting new members who have no territorial disputes. This naturally serves Russian interests given that NATO expansion into states on Russia’s periphery is a major Kremlin concern. As one Russian source put it in regard to the current dispute in Nagorno-Karabakh (or Artsakh in Armenian), and explaining the fundamental issue for Moscow: ‘If Artsakh remains Armenian, it will prevent Azerbaijan from joining the North Atlantic Alliance’. Hence, any resolution today by Azeri force of the frozen conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh is certainly not welcome in Kremlin corridors. Russia thus had to step in by early November given the danger then of the Azeri occupation of Stepanakert and the total collapse of the enclave.

On this point, it is also important to remember that, from the Russian perspective, Turkey has not been acting on its own in the South Caucasus. That is, as a member of NATO it is seen (however improbably) as doing NATO’s bidding in the region. The Russian media likes to make the point that Turkey is a NATO member and that Turkish influence in Azerbaijan equates to NATO influence there as well. As one Russian news outlet graphically expressed it, ‘it is important for Russia to preserve Nagorno-Karabakh, otherwise NATO will easily get access to the Caspian Sea.’

Linked to this concern about NATO interference is Moscow’s stance towards Armenia. Russia has always been a strong ally of the Armenians (notably, of course, because they are fellow Orthodox Christians). There are several thousand Russian troops based in Armenia proper (but never any in Nagorno-Karabakh itself because it was legally Azeri territory). In recent years, however, Moscow has become concerned that, under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia has adopted an ‘overly pro-Western course’. Given Pashinyan’s stance, it seems that Moscow was quite content for Armenia to face some sort of ‘defeat’ in the recent conflict so that Pashinyan, who would naturally be blamed by the Armenian people for such defeats, would be faced by domestic unrest. This he duly came to face. With his position thus undermined, he is now having to look to Moscow – and not to the West – for help in keeping him in power. So, from Moscow’s point of view, the outcome of the war is desirable – the borders of Armenia proper remain secure but Yerevan has lost territory around Nagorno-Karabakh but without, crucially, losing the whole of the region. Moreover, if the whole of the enclave had been lost to Azeri control then Putin would himself have had to face the ire of his own Russian people for allowing co-religionists to suffer a major defeat imposed, not just by a Muslim state entity, but also by one who had employed Islamist ‘terrorists’.

Hence, Russian military deployments to the south Caucasus during the conflict were only of air-defence units sent to bolster those of Armenia proper and to protect the thousands of Russian troops based there. To maintain neutrality, Russian forces did nothing to assist Armenian troops around Nagorno-Karabakh.

Thus with the ceasefire now imposed, the situation has worked to Russia’s advantage. Not only has Armenia, in essence, been brought to heel, but Moscow has also more influence over Azerbaijan. As part of the ceasefire agreement, there are now 2,000 Russian peacekeeping troops (from the Ulyanovsk-based 15th Separate Motorised Infantry Bde) on the ground in Nagorno-Karabakh. Their presence has fundamentally increased Moscow’s degree of regional influence and means that it can keep now the conflict frozen with a greater degree of certainty. It also means that Russia now has a military presence in every single frozen conflict in its near abroad. And Russia, moreover, will keep any Turkish peacekeepers out of Nagorno-Karabakh despite Ankara’s wish to see them there. Any Turkish troops that do come to the region will have to remain on the (undisputed) territory of Azerbaijan itself and will have to monitor events actually in Nagorno-Karabakh using drones.

For its post-conflict position to be truly cemented, though, Moscow has to give Ankara a sense that it has crossed a red line with its involvement in the south Caucasus. This brings us back to the ‘revenge’ taken by Russia in Syria. In recent months, and prior to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Russian and Turkish forces based in northern Syria have basically been in a tense stand-off situation. In a nutshell, and with the danger of oversimplification, Turkey supports several Islamist factions in the region while Russia is very much opposed to them. In recent years, Russia has periodically conducted air strikes against Islamist camps and even killed 33 Turkish soldiers in an attack on a convoy in February of this year.

Once the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict started in late September, though, Russian attacks on the various Turkish-backed militant groups in Syria increased in intensity and number. Indeed, these groups themselves could see the writing on the wall and were actually expecting reprisal attacks against them. As one representative of the Islamist factions put it in early October, such Russian attacks would be necessary in order to indicate the ‘Kremlin’s desire to rein in Ankara in the Nagorno-Karabakh region’. A number of high-casualty strikes were registered. In late October, for instance, Russian aircraft killed about 80 militants from the Al Sham Corps. Such attacks have clearly put Turkish forces in Syria on the back foot. On 11 November (the day after the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh) it seems clear that the Russian military had warned Turkish units that they were about to conduct another attack. On this day, a large withdrawal of Turkish forces was noted (hailed as a ‘retreat’ (otstuplenie) by Russian sources) from positions where they could be seen as protecting Islamist groups. And by 13 November it was clear why they might be pulling back as not only Russian airstrikes took place but also the rare use of the Iskander-M ballistic missile. The use of this particular missile would certainly be signalling a sense of Russian ire to Ankara.

With its ‘revenge’ air and missile strikes in Syria, Russia seems certainly to be firing some warning shots across Turkey’s bows. Moscow’s needs to rein in Ankara’s ambitions and to stop it spreading its influence any further in the South Caucasus. The message seems to be that there will be costs attached to any such encroachment. And while Moscow certainly did not welcome the outbreak of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the outcome actually seems generally to be in its favour. But what Russia now has to do is to prevent any further build-up of Turkish forces within Azerbaijan. This might prove quite difficult given Ankara’s obvious wish to become far more of an influence in the South Caucasus.

Airstrikes conducted by the US-led coalition forces in Iraq on Sunday resulted in the killing of five terrorists from the so-called Islamic State group and the destruction of their hideouts in Iraq’s Salahuddin province, Iraq’s military announced like reported by kurdistan24.net.

The airstrikes assisted by “accurate” information provided by Iraq’s National Intelligence Service to the coalition forces, Iraq’s military media department said on Twitter, to conduct the air raid, targeted Tal Thahab area in Salahuddin’s Samara province, located north of capital Baghdad.

The terror group’s hideouts were destroyed as well, the military wrote.

The Iraqi military along with other state security apparatuses regularly conduct military operations in remote areas where they serve as the terror group’s hotbed. The Islamic State’s terrorist activity has been on the rise, particularly as the country grapples with a dire economic crisis caused by a global pandemic.

The desert areas in Iraq are well-known havens for terrorist groups since the fall of Iraq’s former regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The so-called Islamic State’s rise also began in those areas, which were exploited as training and depot grounds.

The Islamic State was territorially defeated in 2017 by the successful campaigns of the Peshmerga forces and Iraqi army, and airstrikes from the coalition forces. However, the terror group periodically initiate hit-and-run attacks on security forces and civilians, sparking fear it can still seriously pose threats to the country.

International allies of both Iraq and the Kurdistan Region have repeatedly asked both governments to coordinate in their respective security sector to better safeguard the areas liberated from the terror group.