Nine people have been killed in new violence in Benghazi where pro-government forces have launched an offensive against Islamist militias, raising the toll to 75 dead in five days, medics said.

In the latest violence yesterday, a woman was killed in a bomb attack that targeted the vacant house of former general Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the offensive launched Wednesday, a military source said.

The woman was walking past the house with her daughter, who was wounded in the bombing, said the Benghazi Medical Centre, adding that it had also received the bodies of eight other people including two soldiers.

Fierce fighting raged in several parts of Libya’s second city between pro-government forces led by Haftar and Islamist militias, an AFP correspondent and witnesses said.

Air raids carried out by units of the air force loyal to Haftar pounded Islamist positions.

On Saturday the United States joined Britain, France, Germany and Italy in calling for an “immediate” end to long-running violence there between government forces and militias.

Since a 2011 revolution that toppled Libya’s longtime leader Muammar Gaddafi, interim authorities have failed to establish a regular army and had to rely on state-backed militias.

The European powers and the United States said they were “concerned” by the operations carried out by Haftar, although he has the backing of army units while civilians too have taken up arms.

“We consider that Libya’s security challenges and the fight against terrorist organisations can only be sustainably addressed by regular armed forces under the control of a central authority which is accountable to a democratic and inclusive parliament,” a joint statement said.

Source: dnaindia.com

The American military airdropped weapons, ammunition and medical supplies to Kurds fighting the Islamic State group in the flashpoint Syrian city of Kobane, in a move likely to anger ally Turkey.

Kurdish defenders have been under IS assault for more than a month in Kobane, which has become a key prize and is being fought under the gaze of the world media massed just across the border in Turkey.

Three C-130 cargo aircraft carried out what US Central Command (CENTCOM) called “multiple” successful airdrops of supplies in the vicinity of Kobane yesterday, including small-arms weapons, provided by Kurdish authorities in Iraq.

It is the first time the US has made airdrops to Kurdish fighters in Kobane.

The aircraft faced no resistance from the air or the ground, were not accompanied by fighter jets and exited the area safely, a senior Obama administration official said, refusing to rule out a repeat of the action if needed, possibly in the near future.

The supplies were “intended to enable continued resistance against ISIL’s attempts to overtake Kobane,” CENTCOM said in a statement, using an alternative acronym for Islamic State fighters who have overrun large areas of Iraq and Syria in a brutal campaign.

One senior Obama administration official said Kurdish fighters had put up an “impressive” effort in the face of the emboldened IS organization, but cautioned that Kobane could still fall to the IS and the security situation was “fluid.”

Nevertheless, “hundreds” of IS fighters had been killed in the escalating campaign in Kobane.

Washington and its Western allies have been pressing Turkey to take a more direct role in taking on the IS group in Kobane, but Ankara is reluctant to arm Kurds and intervene militarily against the militants, fearing an effective fighting force from its historic foes on its border.

On the prickly subject of whether the Turkish government has been informed beforehand of the resupply drop, a senior administration official in Washington said President Barack Obama spoke to his counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan yesterday “and was able to notify him of our intent to do this and importance we put on it”.

The official added: “We understand the longstanding Turkish concern with the range of groups, including Kurdish groups, they have been engaged in conflict with and in peace talks with.”

However, the official said, Islamic State was “a common enemy” for the United States and Turkey.

Source:  outlookindia.com

With all eyes on the militant group ISIL’s onslaught in Iraq and Syria, a less conspicuous but potentially just as explosive front line with the extremists is emerging in Lebanon, where Lebanese soldiers and Shiite Hizbollah guerrillas are increasingly pulled into deadly fighting with the Sunni militants along the country’s border with Syria.

The US has been speeding up delivery of small ammunition to shore up Lebanon’s army, but recent cross-border attacks and beheading of Lebanese soldiers by ISIL fighters – and the defection of four others to the extremists – has sent shockwaves across this Mediterranean country, eliciting fear of a potential slide into the kind of sectarian violence afflicting both Syria and Iraq, and increasingly prompting minorities to take up arms.

The crisis was slow in coming.

For long, Lebanon managed to miraculously avoid the all-out chaos gripping neighbouring countries – despite sporadic street clashes and car bombings, and despite being awash with weapons and taking in an endless stream of refugees from Syria who now constitute a staggering one third of its population of 4.5 million people.

Unlike in Syria or Iraq, the Al Qaeda-breakaway ISIL group does not hold territory in Lebanon. But along with Syria’s Al Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat Al Nusra, it has established footholds in remote mountains along Lebanon’s remote eastern border, from where it launches almost daily incursions further afield.

Militant recruitment in impoverished Sunni areas of northern Lebanon is on the rise, and black ISIL group flags fly freely in some areas, reflecting pockets of growing support for the radical group.

“Lebanon is in the eye of the storm,” said Fadia Kiwan, a political science professor at Beirut’s St Joseph University.

The Lebanese are bitterly divided over Syria’s civil war. Hizbollah fighters have gone to join Syrian president Bashar Al Assad’s forces in their battle against Sunni rebels, drawing anger at home from Lebanon’s Sunnis and stoking Sunni-Shiite tensions. This in turn led to tit-for-tat suicide bombings and several rounds of street clashes in Lebanon in the past year.

The ISIL threat first came to Lebanon in August, two months after the group’s summer blitz in which it seized large swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria.

In a surprise attack, ISIL and Jabhat Al Nusra militants crossed over from Syria and overran the predominantly Sunni Lebanese border town of Arsal, hitting Lebanese army positions and killing nearly 20 soldiers.
After weeklong clashes, the militants pulled back to mountain caves near Syria’s border, taking more than 20 Lebanese soldiers and policemen with them.

ISIL fighters have since beheaded two Lebanese soldiers. Jabhat Al Nusra militants have shot dead a third. In return for remaining hostages, they have issued various demands, including the withdrawal of Hizbollah troops from Syria, and the release of Islamists from Lebanese prisons.

Lebanese army commander Jean Kahwaji said in comments published this week that the militants from Syria want to ignite a civil war and create a passage to Lebanon’s coastline by linking the Syrian Qalamoun mountains with Arsal on the border and the northern Lebanese town of Akkar, an impoverished Sunni area.

Analysts agree that in Lebanon, ISIL fighters also see an opportunity to strike at Hizbollah’s patron, the Shiite powerhouse Iran but that they are not too eager to immediately embark on yet another war.
“The territory of Lebanon is a longer-term goal,” said David Schenker, director of the programme on Arab politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

But there are fears that eventually, Mr Schenker said, ISIL could stage a spectacular bombing of, for example, the Hizbollah stronghold of Dahyeh south of Beirut, recreating an incident similar to a 2006 attack in the Iraqi city of Samarra, and “unleash this incredible sectarian tension that results in a resumption of civil war”.
In Samarra, the Sunni extremists bombed a major Shiite shrine, setting in motion two years of sectarian bloodletting that pushed Iraq to the brink of civil war. Lebanon is still recovering from a 15-year civil war that ended in 1990.

The global war against ISIL and its attacks in Lebanon have somewhat bolstered Hizbollah’s narrative that its intervention in Syria was necessary to ward off a Sunni extremist threat to Lebanon.

Paradoxically, it has brought Hizbollah closer to Christians and other Lebanese minorities through their shared fear of the Sunni militants. But the Lebanese Shiite group is hated by most Lebanese Sunnis, many of whom refer to Hizbollah as the “Party of Satan” – a dark play on Hizbollah’s name, which in English means “Party of God”.

In addition to being bogged down in the fighting in Syria, Hizbollah is increasingly embroiled in clashes inside Lebanon. In an unprecedented attack, Jabhat Al Nusra fighters overran positions manned by Hizbollah along the Syrian border last week, killing eight of its fighters in battles that lasted several hours.

“Such attacks not only erode the stature of Hizbollah, they show it to be vulnerable. I think in the long run or as the months go by we’re going to see more and more of this,” Mr Schenker said.

Source:  thenational.ae

Mentre l’attenzione del mondo continua ad esser fissata sulle tragiche vicende in Siria e in Iraq, la Libia si stà avvicinando sempre di più  a diventare un campo di battaglia senza che nessuno faccia davvero nulla per evitarlo. È emerso un tiro alla fune tra due governi rivali nel paese per il controllo di istituzioni chiave, per la supremazia militare, e in ultima analisi, per ottenere la legittimità internazionale…

Most countries recognise the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) as Libya’s legitimate legislature, yet the HoR is haemorrhaging support. It is becoming increasingly marginalised as it hunkers down in its safe house a thousand miles from the capital while domestic support shifts towards Operation Dawn, a Misrata alliance that controls Tripoli and has been able to administer it semi-competently.

This dynamic is reflected in the international community’s change of strategy regarding peace talks. While the Madrid conference invited only Tobruk-based HoR representatives, the follow-up Ghadames talks expanded to include boycotting HoR members who support Dawn. 

Recently, the UN has pledged that the next round of discussions will include Libya’s powerful militia leaders. Although all parties are guilty of adopting polarising discourses and uncompromising positions, the majority on both sides now recognise the potential importance of these mediation efforts. 

Consequently, recent developments in Libya can be understood as attempts by rival factions to establish facts on the ground which can later be bartered away for a stronger position in a future negotiated settlement. Only the very few factions which will not be invited to the talks, such as Ansar Sharia or the rogue Misratan commander Salah Badi, aim to act as spoilers and derail the whole process.

Strengthening positions
None of Libya’s factions are strong enough to rule the whole country and it seems unlikely that any are deluded enough to think they can score a knockout blow, even if buttressed by outside help.

On October 15, Haftar renewed his offensive in Benghazi  while Zintani forces in the west attempted to retake Kikla from Operation Dawn. 

In recent months, both the Zintanis and Haftar’s forces have been overpowered by their Dawn opponents and this coordinated anti-Islamist offensive does not mean they suddenly believe they can beat the Islamists militarily, despite Haftar’s rhetoric. 

Rather, it is a move to strengthen their position before entering peace talks or before Haftar steps down leaving the way for more institutional actors. Indeed, during the offensive the Libyan Army announced it had adopted Haftar’s Operation Dignity campaign as its own, allowing the Tobruk administration to take credit for any military advances by Haftar’s campaign, while also making clear that the body is no more legitimate than its overtly militia-aligned adversary – Operation Dawn.

In the capital, Islamist-aligned members of the former parliament, the General National Congress (GNC), and Omar al-Hassi’s National Salvation government are backed by Dawn militias. While this camp undoubtedly has the military advantage, they need greater  political legitimacy to strengthen their hand, if and when, they take part in peace talks. They will not wrest international recognition away from the HoR by brute force and institutional guile alone, but by administering Tripoli coherently they may succeed in becoming legitimate participants on an almost equal footing with the HoR when negotiations begin.

Scramble for oil money
This battle for legitimacy and power is being played out within Libya’s two most influential institutions: the Central Bank and the National Oil Corporation (NOC). The HoR voted in September to dismiss Sadiq al-Kabir from his position as Central Bank governor, however Kabir appears to still be running the bank. Through him, the Islamist-aligned government has at least some control over Libya’s finances.
Last week, the Central Bank transferred Hassi’s government enough funds to cover three months of family allowance payments, while a GNC-controlled public spending authority has managed to impose a payment limit of 200,000 Libyan Dinar across the public sector. 

Meanwhile, Hassi’s Oil Minister Mashallah al-Zwey has physically taken over the NOC headquarters in Tripoli along with the NOC website. As such, officials are reportedly taking direction from him. Indeed, the official Libyan government website has been taken over by Hassi’s National Salvation government. Those cyberspace realities go a long way to validating the Tripoli government’s claim to sovereignty and legitimacy.

Recent military moves reveal that neither side can win the battles they are fighting in Libya, but both can glean political advantage from military manoeuvres if they are able to parlay them into a successful strategy at the negotiating table.

Source:  aljazeera.com

Il primo ministro della Libia, l’unico riconosciuto a livello internazionale, ha dichiarato che le forze militari fedeli al governo sono pronte ed unite per cercare di riconquistare dalle milizie islamiste Tripoli e Bengasi, la seconda città della Libia.

Abdullah Al Thani, il primo ministro legittimo, ha anche espresso la sua frustrazione per la mancanza di sostegno da parte della comunità internazionale, chiedendo armi e assistenza nella lotta contro gli islamisti…

“All military forces have been placed under army command to liberate Tripoli and Benghazi soon, inshallah (God willing),” Thani told AFP in a telephone interview from the eastern town of Al Baida.

Since a 2011 revolution which toppled Libya’s longtime leader Muammar Gaddafi, interim authorities have failed to establish a regular army and had to rely on state-backed militias.

Former rebels who fought against Gaddafi have formed powerful militias and seized control of large parts of turmoil-gripped Libya over the past three years.

On Wednesday, retired general Khalifa Haftar launched an operation against Islamist militias in the eastern city of Benghazi with the backing of army units and civilians who have taken up arms.

The operation is “under the control of the regular army and the control of the government and the parliament,” said Thani.

An AFP count based on hospital sources in the city put the death toll in Benghazi at 66 since Haftar’s offensive began, including eight killed yesterday and four who died in a suicide attack the previous day.

Haftar launched a first, unsuccessful campaign against Islamists in the city back in May but failed to muster support from the authorities who accused the Gaddafi-era general of trying to mount a coup.

Before this week’s assault, Haftar’s forces had been steadily beaten back to a final redoubt at Benghazi’s airport, which has come under attack by Islamists since mid-September.

Thani’s government and parliament, elected on June 25, have taken refuge in the country’s east to escape Fajr Libya, a mainly Islamist coalition which seized control of Tripoli at the end of August.

The fall of the capital followed a weeks-long battle with pro-government militias from the town of Zintan in western Libya.

Thani said the Zintan forces had also been placed under army command and joined regular units which aim to recapture the capital.

“All the forces have been placed under the command of the army to liberate Tripoli,” Thani said.

He branded Fajr Libya as “outlaws” who had set up an “illegitimate” parallel government and alleged the group was the armed wing of movements such the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist factions.

Unlike its predecessor, Libya’s new parliament is dominated by anti-Islamist lawmakers.

Source: thepeninsulaqatar.com

Dentro e fuori l’Iraq, si cerca di capire il motivo del ritorno dello Stato islamico nella provincia di Anbar e lo sforzo mirato a riprendere il controllo delle sue città, una dopo l’altra. Lo Stato islamico ‘stato in grado di avanzare nelle città di Hit e Kabisa e controllare una parte di Ramadi, minacciando la capitale irachena Baghdad.

However, the question that has never been responsibly considered within the context of the fight against IS is: Did IS ever truly leave Anbar before its return today?

The group still considers Anbar its most sensitive military arena, being Iraq’s largest province at a third of the area of the country and a main arena for extremist groups since 2003. It is geographically linked to three countries — Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria — as well as to six other Iraqi provinces: Mosul, Salahuddin, Baghdad, Babil, Karbala and Najaf.

The complex and vast desert of Anbar has always been a focal point for terrorist groups and a field for their movements across cities, away from the main transportation lines and monitoring by intelligence organizations. The demographics of Anbar, where tribal and nomadic ties dominate, has created an environment socially suitable for IS. Throughout 2013, Anbar also saw Sunni protests against the government, and was the first battlefield for IS in Iraq at the start of 2014.

The IS threat to Iraq started when it took over Fallujah (west of Baghdad) in January of 2014. Residents of Anbar see it as the most important city in the province, and armed groups and the biggest opponents to IS gravitate toward it.

Controlling Fallujah for six months did not allow the group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, to declare himself the caliph; this he did following the occupation of Mosul.

Circumstances suggested that during the months that followed IS’ occupation of Mosul, the group’s deterioration would start in Fallujah, as control over this city had implications for all of Anbar province. IS’ loss of control in Anbar would hasten the group’s fall not only in Iraq, but also in Syria.

The international coalition’s intervention only paid serious attention to Anbar at the beginning of August, while the political circles wasted time by changing the government and choosing its members, which gave IS an opportunity to deepen its existence and settle in a number of towns and cities.

On June 15, IS took control over the strategic town of al-Qa’im on the Iraqi-Syrian border and then the Syrian city of al-Bukamal in August, finally announcing the formation of what it called “the state of Euphrates.” In September, IS declared Fallujah independent from Anbar, whose other cities it called “the state of Anbar.”

The group divided Anbar into three administrative and military units and gradually organized its power to repress the villages and towns accordingly, by first controlling the Anbar desert, opening lines to battles it is currently fighting in Ramadi and Hit, and finally threatening the military camp called Ain al-Assad from the Khan al-Baghdadi side.

The Iraqi government’s delay in taking measures to stop the takeover of Anbar was revealed by the chairman of the Anbar Provincial Council, Sabah Karhut, who told Al-Monitor, “The tribes as well as the security and military forces in Anbar were not given the right munitions and aid, despite continuous demands raised by tribes and the local government to provide support for the cities of Anbar, which resisted IS for over 10 months.”

Karhut, who had previously asked for a US ground invasion in Anbar, said that IS gradually advanced to besiege dozens of villages along the Euphrates river, most importantly al-Buamer, al-Khafajiyah, al-Bunamer, al-Abid, al-Joghayfa, al-Hetaween and Khan al-Baghdadi. He said this advance was not accompanied by suitable governmental measures to support the resistance of the tribes in these villages.

The concept of “tribe support” seems loose. No government will be able to provide any open support for the civilians in conflict zones without clear answers to questions such as: Who receives the support? How are they coordinating with official security services? How are the tribal fighters included in the security plans? What is needed?” Is it financial, weapons, logistics or aerial support?

Finding those answers will only happen after translating the “war on IS” into practical details, including the organization, training and arming of volunteer fighters from inside the cities. This project, the “National Guard,” has not officially seen the light of day so far, and is not expected to take on an effective role in the war for several months.

Several considerations are driving urgent warnings about the deterioration of the security situation in Anbar and its repercussions on Baghdad’s security. Most importantly, Anbar has an extremely dangerous view over the cities of Baghdad, Babil and Karbala, which will put all of these cities in the circle of danger.

The group appeared last April, two months before the occupation of Mosul, in the town of Abu Ghraib, which is part of Baghdad’s western administrative area and connects the capital to Anbar. IS carried out a military parade in this town, where it took over the Fallujah Barrage during the same month, cut off the water supplies, threatened large areas south of Baghdad and drowned other areas in Abu Ghraib.

The early presence of the group on the borders of Baghdad poses additional threats to the security of the capital. Attention is needed on Anbar in general and the city of Fallujah in particular, as a source of real threat and a critical factor in the war.

Regaining complete control over Anbar, including the city of Fallujah, must be the essence of the new security plans for Iraq. A dialogue must take place for the formation of the forces responsible for fighting the war against IS in Anbar as quickly as possible. The international alliance must focus its efforts on changing the equations of power in this province as a prelude to changing them in all other areas controlled by the group.

Mentre il mondo concentra da mesi la sua attenzione sul Medio Oriente, più specificamente sulla Siria e l’Iraq, un’altra nazione nella regione è minacciata dallo spettro triste delle lotte interne e dall’anarchia: la Libia…

Only three years after the Libyan Revolution, Libyan citizens are wondering which parliament they should view as legitimate as only two entities claim the title. The first is the lawfully elected Libyan Parliament, elected by national suffrage in June of this year. The second parliament laying claim to legitimacy is the self-proclaimed “National Parliament.” The National Parliament is an Islamic-bent party constituted of remnants of the former Libyan National Parliament, which was dissolved upon the June elections. Notable in these elections was the poor faring of Islamist candidates.

To further complicate matters, the elected parliament had to flee the state capitol, Tripoli, in the late summer due to the escalation of violence between Islamist and sectarian militias. The parliament has since relocated to Tobruk in the northeastern region of Libya. Meanwhile, The National Parliament has claimed its headquarters in the capitol and has appointed a shadow Prime Minister, Omar al-Hassi, to provide an substitute for the legally appointed Prime Minister, Abdullah al-Thinni, whose office is currently located in Tobruk, as well.

During this past August, two alliances of militias battled intensely for control of Tripoli. On one side stood the Zintani Militia-led coalition, a self-proclaimed nationalist coalition that claims to resort to arms to protect Libya from the rise of militant, political Islam. On the other side of the court stood the Misrata Militia-led Libyan Dawn coalition. This coalition, although heavily Islamist, is also economically motivated. It has city-based militias, Islamic fundamentalist groups, as well as Berbers (a minority group in Libya) amongst its membership.

The prize of the one-month conflict, which was won by Libyan Dawn, was Mitiga Airport, the only functional airport in Tripoli due the destruction of Tripoli International Airport amid unending battles in the capitol. The airport had been held by the Zintani Militia since the overthrow of Qaddafi in 2011. From here, the ‘one million dollar question’ presents itself: Why is the control of the airport so important to these entities that are vying for power? The ‘one million dollar answer’ is simple: He who controls Tripoli’s airport, controls the distribution of much aid, oil, food, and water to other cities throughout Libya. Hand-in-hand with the Libyan Dawn takeover of Tripoli, the National Parliament has surged back into the spotlight in Tripoli, as mentioned above.

Curiously, since Libyan Dawn has seized control of Tripoli, Libyan oil exports have surged. While the daily oil exports amounted to a meager 160,000 barrels through July 2014, they have surged to 900,000 barrels a day at present. If a certain group is controlling the majority of the revenues generated from these exports, it will most certainly have deep coffers for arms procurement and recruitment.

Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are extremely concerned about the recent developments in Libya—not only of the rise of Islamist militias across the country, but also of the Muslim Brotherhood’s role within Libya. In late August, the two nations launched joint air strikes on Libyan Dawn targets in Tripoli that were fighting the Zintani Militia. These strikes were not coordinated with the Western powers and allegedly irked the U.S. administration. Egypt and the UAE simply responded by communicating that the situation in Libya—most specifically the rise of militant, political Islam—is being dangerously ignored by the West. Despite their intervention, Egypt and the UAE were unsuccessful in preventing the Zintani Militia from being driven from Tripoli.

Egypt and the UAE have also supported Libyan General Khalifa Haftar’s forces in Benghazi against the Islamist coalition led by Ansar al-Sharia. Haftar and his supporters, however, were driven out of the city in late-August by the Islamist militias. The Ansar al-Sharia led coalition presently controls Benghazi and also seized a large portion of Haftar’s weapons, ammunition and vehicles.

At the other end of the proxy war spectrum lie Qatar, Sudan and Turkey. Qatar has been accused by members of the current elected Libyan parliament of supporting the Islamic militant groups in the country. Qatar, although rather inexperienced in foreign affairs and in steering international conflicts, is flush in cash from its oil and natural gas revenues and allegedly opening up its coffers to assist Islamist groups in the region, including militant ones. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE have all voiced their concern with Qatar’s support to terrorist and militant Islamic entities in both Syria and Libya. Ahmad al-Hirati, the Mayor of Tripoli, has recently accused Qatar, as well as Turkey and Sudan, of financially and logistically supporting militant Islamists from Yemen to enter Libya from Sudan. These militants, consequently, have joined the Libyan Dawn coalition and assisted them in tilting the scales in their favor.

Tunisian diplomat Mohammed Bel-Sheikh, kidnapped in Libya, pleading for release negotiations.Other disconcerting events have also occurred in the past year and half, but have gone relatively unnoticed in the Western media. On August 29th, Yussuf Ali al-Seiffar, the lead military prosecutor for terrorist crimes in Libya, was assassinated by a car bomb. In August 2013, the vehicle of Nataliya Apostolova, the European Union Ambassador to Libya, was attacked in Tripoli. In April 2013, the French Embassy in Tripoli was bombed. One must also remember that U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens was killed by Ansar al-Sharia-affiliated elements in Benghazi on the anniversary of September 11th in 2012 (although this did generate a great deal of media coverage). There have been scores of assassinations in Benghazi over the last several months, including political candidates, government officials, and journalists. These targets have included Islamists, as well as secular figures.

Expanding our Focus and Priorities
In light of all of these events, and the disparate, fractionalized state of Libya, the West must pay heed and ensure that it does not ignore a dangerous and downward-spiraling situation. With all the media focus on the Islamic State’s (IS) inroads in Syria and Iraq, this can easily occur. Libya has a glut of arms circulating in its territory due to the ransacking of the Qaddafi arsenal after his downfall in 2011. The chaotic state of Libya makes it impossible to pinpoint which groups have arms and exactly what arms they possess (there were obviously no chain of custody forms signed, nor were inventories established upon Qaddafi’s demise). Add the regional conflicts that surround Libya, and the terrorist groups attached to them, and you have a recipe for serious concern.

The close proximity of regional Islamic terrorist conflicts to one another is a cause for great concern for the West. Within the North African and Middle Eastern regions, there are ongoing Islamic terrorist conflicts in Mali, Algeria, Libya, northern Egypt, Yemen and Syria/Iraq. The balloon effect comes into play with each concerted effort against the terrorist and insurgent organizations in these countries as terrorist soldiers slip away like water to join other nearby, kindred conflicts. Just look at the example of the robust Saudi Arabian response to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) from 2006-2008 and the resulting export of the group to Yemen, where it is currently domiciled and very active.

Benghazi anti-Qadafi protest in July, 2011.The West would do well to also reflect on its interventions and foreign policy in the region, as it presently assesses the dire situations in Iraq and Libya. First, it must realize that democracy is a very difficult concept to introduce to countries that have been ruled by the sword for generations. Second, “Zeitgeist” does not always possess permanence, such as the regional clamor for democracy during the Arab Spring in 2011 and the short-lived democratic experience that ensued.

There are always vested interests and groups looking to seize the political and economic opportunities that present themselves in times of political turmoil. As the perennial argument between the utopians and the realists plays itself out in the region, it seems that the realists have the current bragging rights. Lastly, if a policy of intervention and support for the change or overthrow of regimes in North Africa or the Middle East is to be pursued, the West must ensure that it understands the risks involved and that is has a long term plan in place for the new paradigms. These risks can include the creation of vacuums, anarchy or the rise of a regime that is less desirable than its predecessor.

There must exist a long-term plan for interventions such as the one in Libya. The military intervention of NATO, the toppling of Qaddafi, and the delivery of a book entitled, “Enjoy Democracy,” is probably not going to bring long-term stability to the region; it is simply too volatile to endure an additional vacuum such as the one that is unfolding in Libya. From a Western foreign policy standpoint, there may now exist too many regional hotspots for the West to effectively contain. Military interventions such as those in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Mali and now Syria cost millions of dollars. And in times of tighter purses, the West’s ability to continue to engage in multiple conflicts of this nature has become more limited.

Similar to the situation in Syria, as Libya fragments further into splintered warfare amongst a plethora of militias, the West may not have a viable option for intervention to effectively stem the darker specters of the Islamic terrorist groups. To counter the rise of such insurgent groups, there must be a viable counterforce to which to lend financial support, arms and training. There must also be stable locations to deliver these items to. In Libya, as in Syria, the West does not have a viable force to side with to counter the rise of the more heinous terrorist groups.

Furthermore, the West, most specifically the United States, is not willing to use its own ground troops in a new conflict. This “catch-22” does not portend good times to come for the Libyan citizenry, nor for their immediate neighbors. The first thing that the United States and its allies must do, however, is to place significant diplomatic pressure and leverage on Qatar, Turkey, and Sudan in order to dampen the money, foreign fighters, and weapons that are flowing into to Libya in support of terrorist organizations and other militant Islamic groups.

These flows are accelerating Libya’s path towards anarchy, or something even worse. The West cannot forget about this country just because the big man is gone.

Source:  siteintelgroup.com