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Ottawa shooting magnifies extremism’s lone-wolf threat

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Two attacks in one week mark an unprecedented escalation in the terrorism threat for a country like Canada. Martin Couture Rouleau struck two members of the Canadian military with his car in Quebec on Monday before getting killed and Michael Zehaf-Bibeau is believed responsible for the attack in Ottawa yesterday, killing a soldier at the National War Memorial and breaking into the Parliament building.

Both attacks have the hallmarks of “lone wolf” terrorism, and the profile of Rouleau and Zehaf-Bibeau fit that of radicalized recruits of al-Qaeda or its more trending contemporary the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS).

Both men have been on the Canadian intelligence radar and Roleau had his passport seized while Zehaf-Bibeau was arrested five times for alleged drug use. Also significant is that both men are converts to Islam and Zehaf-Bibeau has been described as “radicalized” by the government. Neither man has been linked to either ISIS or al-Qaeda definitively, but the acts do beg the question of whether they were acting alone.

Lone wolves’ threat

The lone-wolf style of terrorism, whereby one individual plans and carries out the attack, is not by any means nascent or exclusive to extremist groups such as al-Qaeda or ISIS. It is as old as Ted Kaczynski, the “unabomber,” who carried series of bombings in the United States between 1978 and 1995. It is also versatile in its roots in that it also encompass anti-Islamist terrorists such as the Norwegian Anders Breivik who killed 69 teenagers in 2011, or the neo-Nazi Neil Lewington who is serving a life sentence in Britain.

In the case of al-Qaeda and ISIS, lone wolf attacks are a product of both increased recruitment efforts in the West, and their failure to execute a grand scale attack in the form of 9/11. Hence, and following September 2001 and the degradation of al-Qaeda central in Afghanistan and Pakistan, many sympathizers with the organization attempted to carry out attacks in the West. In 2009, Jihadi Jane was convicted for planning terrorist attacks, Nidal Hassan the former U.S. soldier opened fire killing 13 of his colleagues, and Faisal Shahzad attempted to blow up his car in Times Square in New York. Their names are only few examples of a long list of lone wolves who share many similarities with the profiles of Rouleau and Zehaf-Bibeau.

Other than their strong ideological leanings, lone wolves fit the background of socially isolated individuals or loners who plan and deliberate on their own how to carry a terrorist operation. Their strength is in their ability to plan creatively, stay under the radar and not be caught while communicating with fellow extremists or other groups. The weakness, however, is in their limited capability as individuals to orchestrate a big attack such as the London bombings which were coordinated and carried by four terrorists in 2005.

ISIS recruitment and returnees

ISIS has a superior ability when compared with other terrorist organizations in recruiting and attracting Westerners online. More than 40 percent of ISIS is made up of foreign fighters and the expansion of its cyber and territorial presence in the Levant along with its need to respond to the U.S. led airstrikes, increases the threat of lone wolf attacks in the West today. ISIS is succeeding at bringing delusional Islamic youth from Sydney to Saint Paul, who have joined its ranks in Syria. Just this week, the FBI returned from Frankfurt airport three American girls to Denver, spoiling their fantasy to join the land of the Caliph. Others such as the Australian teen Abu Khaled have made it to Syria and is now the spokesperson for ISIS, while Mamunur Roshid, a British citizen was killed in fighting with ISIS in Kobane.

Social media provides ISIS with a venue that was not as vastly available to Osama Bin Laden in 2001. YouTube videos in English, personalized messages to the Somali community in Minnesota, and a glossy monthly magazine in English speak to a big media operation by ISIS to speak to the West. Al-Qaeda has mostly communicated in Arabic, on the other hand.

The threat of returnees and those carrying lone wolf attacks is also more visible with ISIS than al-Qaeda. The shooting on Brussels Jewish Museum by Mehdi Nemmouche in May is one example of the threat that those returnees represent following training on using arms and explosives in Syria and Iraq. U.S. intelligence has pointed out that it’s nearly impossible to track all the returnees from Syria or fetch accurate data on those who have gone there.

As the events in Canada illustrate this week, combatting lone wolf attacks is a complicated and daunting task. While improved counterterrorism capability and legislations have prevented large scale attacks in the West and the Gulf, the lone wolf threat is on the rise, as a logical answer to ISIS in cashing in on its recruitment efforts and responding to the air campaign.

Source:  alarabiya.net

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IS imposes new rules on education in Syria, Iraq

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The Islamic State (IS) project goes beyond making a political change for the region’s map. The organization seeks a comprehensive and fundamental change at all levels, whether culturally, socially, economically or politically. It is a major ideological revolution akin to the communist revolutions in Russia and China.
Commonly, such ideological revolutions introduce radical cultural changes in the educational system, as soon as the groups that have launched them take up the reins of political power. Cultural goals are the main priorities of these groups, which view political power merely as a means to achieve these goals.

This has already happened in Russia, China, Iran and other countries that witnessed ideological revolutions and coups. The nature of the cultural changes differs according to the pattern and nature of these revolutions.

The communist revolutions sought to eliminate the bourgeoisie’s power from educational and cultural systems. The Islamic revolution in Iran, on the other hand, aimed at the Islamization of science and knowledge by eliminating scientific and scholarly theories that are not in line with their religious visions, expelling teachers from schools and universities who do not abide by religious disciplines.

With the beginning of the school year in Iraq and Syria, IS started to circulate general regulations to reform the educational system to be implemented in schools and universities.

The new regulations included a wide array of reforms to impose a radical cultural revolution in the educational system, by eliminating or replacing some of the materials in the curricula. This educational revolution stems from the hard-line Salafist ideology of IS, which makes it much worse than the Iranian model at the beginning of the Islamic revolution in Iran.

The regulations were introduced within an official statement issued by IS titled, “A good omen from the prince of the faithful to eradicate ignorance and disseminate Sharia sciences.” The statement was made in the name of “Diwan of Knowledge,” which is the new label of the ministries of education and higher education.

Al-Monitor contacted by phone a number of teachers, professors and workers in education in the city of Mosul in Iraq and the Syrian city of Raqqa to check whether or not the information in the flyer is accurate.
Al-Monitor has learned that the reforms include general and basic issues. Labels such as the Republic of Iraq and the Syrian Republic were both changed to become the Islamic State. All topics related to the values of citizenship, patriotism and the like have been omitted, in addition to chants and anthems that might be in contradiction with the religious views of the caliphate state, according to IS interpretations.

This is not to mention gender segregation, banning male teachers and cadres from teaching in girls’ schools, and taking all educational and administrative measures according to Sharia. This includes interrupting classes during prayer times, compelling students to wear Islamic garb for men and women alike, in line with the Salafist adherence to Sharia.

The regulations also stipulated canceling classes in music and art, the courses of philosophy, sociology and psychology, and banning the teaching of history and religious education on religious minorities. IS views some educational practices to be religiously forbidden, as they include ideas and theories that are contradictory to the Islamic vision, according to the organization’s Salafist interpretation.

Regarding religious education, IS imposed religious curricula that are already being taught in Saudi Arabia without making any major changes to them.

IS made copies of these curricula, which were distributed to schools and for all classes and grades under the title, “The official curriculum for religious education.”

The organization also distributed pamphlets and booklets on various topics related to Islamic ideology, Sharia and Islamic history under the title, “Additional sources to entice students to read and expand their religious knowledge according to the Salafist vision.”

The analogy between IS and Saudi Arabia religious curricula demonstrates that they are almost the same in terms of Salafist theological bases. This is reflected in the statements of a Saudi source quoted by British journalist Patrick Cockburn in the Independent newspaper. “It’s normal: All our life we have lived with IS and its thoughts, its schools and its curriculum,” the source said.

IS preserved the same programs for physics, chemistry, mathematics, English and Arabic languages, but removed some sections such as Darwin’s theory, which is contradictory to the religious theory of creation, according to the organization’s views. New labels and titles have been added to science courses, such as “God’s Laws in Creation.”

Al-Monitor also learned from its sources that teachers and administrative cadres in these areas are greatly concerned. They consider what is happening as a major setback that they cannot confront, as IS has been threatening and terrorizing people while circulating the new regulations that are being imposed by force.

Teachers and school staff have been informed that they are to continue their jobs; otherwise they will face final dismissal and other sanctions that could apply to their families as well.

Moreover, all research works in universities have stopped due to the lack of financial resources, which have been previously provided by the Ministry of Education in Syria and Iraq. IS does not have any interest in supporting such projects.

Source: al-monitor.com
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Libya government says gearing up to recapture Tripoli

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Libya’s internationally recognized government says its forces are getting ready to recapture the capital, Tripoli, from the militants and has urged a civil disobedience campaign in the city.

In a statement released on Tuesday, Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani’s government said its forces have been given orders to “advance toward Tripoli to liberate it and state institutions from the grip of armed groups.”

The statement also called on the capital’s residents to launch a “civil disobedience campaign until the arrival of the army.”

On Saturday, Thani said the country’s military forces had united in order to retake Tripoli and the country’s second largest city, Benghazi, from militiamen.

Following the seizure of the capital by Fajr (Dawn) Libya — a coalition of several armed groups –in August, Thani, along with the new parliament, took refuge in the eastern town of al-Baida.

The new Tripoli rulers have set up their own government which the international community does not recognize.

Benghazi has also been a war zone since May, when former General Khalifa Haftar joined forces with the army and declared war on militia groups.

The government’s planned operation in Tripoli comes on the heels of fierce fighting south and west of the capital.

The village of Kikla, which is located some 80 kilometers (50 miles) southwest of Tripoli, has witnessed over two weeks of raging battles.

Libya plunged into chaos following the 2011 uprising that toppled longtime dictator Muammar Gaddafi. The country has witnessed numerous clashes between government forces and rival militia groups that refuse to lay down their arms.

Source:  albawaba.com

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Purely military action in Syria could fuel extremism: UN

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United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned on Tuesday that using only military means to fight the threat of Islamic State in Syria could radicalise more Sunni armed groups and spark greater violence.

“Our long-term strategic objective in Syria remains a political solution,” Ban told the UN Security Council.
The United Nations is spearheading efforts to end a civil war sparked by President Bashar al-Assad’s crackdown on pro-democracy protests more than three years ago.

“A purely military response to the vicious new threat posed by (Islamic State) could ultimately contribute to the radicalization of other Sunni armed groups and spark a cycle of renewed violence,” he said.

Islamic State has seized large swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria and is being targeted by United States-led air strikes in both countries. The Sunni militant group has crucified and beheaded prisoners and told non-Muslims and Shi’ites they must convert to its brand of Islam or die.

“We must defeat (Islamic State) and other terrorist groups. We must hold accountable all those in the Assad regime responsible for its widespread atrocities,” US Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, told the Security Council. “But we wholeheartedly agree with the Secretary-General that a political solution is absolutely essential to address the root causes of extremism in Syria, and to address the legitimate aspirations and grievances of its people.”

Islamic State is battling Kurdish forces for control of the strategically important Syrian town of Kobani at the Turkish border.

UN envoy Staffan de Mistura, appointed by Ban to mediate a political solution in Syria, has warned that thousands of people could be massacred if Kobani falls to the group.

“Kobani is just one of many places across Syria where civilians are under imminent threat,” Ban told the council meeting on the Middle East, urging the 15-member body to fully support the efforts of de Mistura.

The United Nations says some 3.2 million Syrians have fled the violence that has killed nearly 200,000 people.

“In addition to the barbarity of (Islamic State), the Syrian government continues to brutally and indiscriminately attack populated areas, including with barrel bombs,” Ban added, referring to an explosive device usually made from a barrel filled with high explosives and other materials.

The United States launched air strikes against Islamic State targets in Iraq in August after the government asked for help. About a month later, the United States began bombing the militant group in neighboring Syria after notifying the Assad government of the operation, but not seeking its approval.

Washington justified its action under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which covers an individual or collective right to self-defense against armed attack.

Syrian ally Russia has questioned the legality of the strikes, saying that Syria’s consent was needed barring a UN Security Council resolution authorizing action.

“The so-called coalition has refused to cooperate with Damascus and Tehran which are logical allies in combating terrorism in the region,” said Russia’s UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin. “Perhaps the campaign against (Islamic State) would have been more successful with that support.”

Source:  dnaindia.com

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What do Kobani airdrops mean for regional politics?

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On October 19, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it had conducted multiple airdrops near the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani, which has remained under siege by Islamic State (IS) fighters for more than a month. CENTCOM said US C-13 cargo planes had made multiple drops of arms, ammunition, and medical supplies provided by Kurdish authorities in Iraq. The move is set to have a profound effect on regional balances between Turkey, the Kurds and the United States that will likely reverberate in Tehran and in Damascus as well.

For several weeks now, the US and its allies have been bombing IS positions around Kobani. But the delivery of weapons takes the de facto alliance between the Syrian Kurds and the United States to a new level.Turkey, which borders Kobani, is best positioned to help the Syrian Kurds. But the country’s ruling Justice and Development (AKP) party has spurned repeated Syrian Kurdish demands to allow weapons and fighters to cross through Turkey into the Syrian Kurdish enclave. On Oct. 18, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), whose armed wing the People’s Protection Units (YPG) is battling IS in Kobani, were “the same as the PKK. “It’s a terrorist organization. It would be very, very wrong to expect us to openly say ‘yes’ to our NATO ally America to give this kind of [armed] support [to the PYD],” Erdogan declared.

Erdogan was referring to the PYD’s close links to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been fighting on and off for self-rule inside Turkey since 1984. The PKK is on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations, and until last month successive US administrations refused to have any contact either with the PKK or the PYD. But the PKK and the YPG’s effectiveness against IS both in Iraq and Syria has triggered a paradigm shift in US strategic thinking. The US and the Syrian Kurds are now allies in the war against IS.

US Secretary of State John Kerry told reporters in Jakarta, Indonesia that while the Obama administration understood Turkey’s concerns, it would have been “irresponsible” and “morally difficult” not to support the Syrian Kurds in their fight against IS.

Kerry said IS had chosen to “make this a ground battle, attacking a small group of people there who, while they are an offshoot group of the folks that our friends the Turks oppose, they are valiantly fighting ISIL and we cannot take our eye off the prize here.” Kerry stressed, however, that it was “a momentary effort” and that the US had “made it very clear” to Turkey that it “is not a shift in the policy of the United States.”

Kerry’s words came hours after US President Barack Obama spoke over the telephone with Erdogan about Kobani. News emerged soon after that Turkey would be allowing Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga fighters to cross through Turkey into Kobani carrying fresh weapons for the YPG. How in the space of 48 hours did Turkey go from calling the PYD terrorists to opening an arms corridor for them?

As analysts ponder these dizzying changes, here a few immediate factors to consider:

  1. Turkey could have led the effort to support anti-IS forces in Kobani by letting arms and fighters through its borders weeks ago. This would have bolstered the peace process between Turkey and its own Kurds, while averting the public relations disaster caused by images of Turkish tanks and soldiers looking on as the Syrian Kurds battled IS in Kobani, thereby reinforcing claims that “Turkey supports IS.
  2. The fact that Turkey was forced into opening a corridor to Kobani only after the US informed Ankara that it would go ahead with the airdrops anyway only increases doubts about Turkey’s commitment to working with its Western partners. It also plays into the hands of Erdogan’s domestic rivals, who will now say he is America’s poodle and that the US is using the PKK to tame Turkey.
  3. One big question is whether the recent days’ events mean that the PYD will move away from the PKK. The likely answer is that the PKK will seek to move closer to the US. The PKK has already established a channel of communication with the US via the PYD in Syria, and is also fighting alongside US-supported Kurdish peshmerga forces in Iraq. Any attempt to drive a wedge between the PYD and the PKK is doomed to fail. Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned founder and leader of their PKK, commands the loyalty of Syrian and Turkish Kurds alike.
  4. Any US-PKK dialogue would make the PKK less likely to resume violence against the Turkish army, as this would tarnish its burgeoning legitimacy. Turkey could yet turn the situation to its advantage and make goodwill gestures to the Syrian Kurds. These could include opening the sealed border with the PYD-controlled town of Serkaniye (Ras al Ain). The fact that US drones flew drone reconnaissance missions over Kobani out of the Incirlik air base has gone largely unnoticed in the media. So Turkey actually has helped, but chose not to advertise this.
  5. The Kurds adeptly used the media and global public opinion — which depicted them as the region’s secular, pro-Western force, a space formerly occupied by Turkey — to draw the US into the battle for Kobani. The battle for Kobani then became a symbol of the contest between IS and the coalition, one that the US could no longer afford to lose. Moreover, the concentration of IS forces around Kobani allowed the US to inflict heavy losses on IS fighters.
  6. Iraqi Kurdish President Massoud Barzani is probably unhappy about US engagement with the PYD/PKK, which he views as rivals. But, unlike Turkey, he has turned the situation to his own advantage by projecting himself as a benevolent leader who has aided fellow Kurds in their time of need.
  7. The US will use its new leverage over the PYD to push the Kurds to engage with factions opposed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, particularly the Free Syrian Army. The YPG’s existing battleground alliance with various rebel factions will, therefore, probably expand.
  8. Is the de facto non-aggression pact between the Syrian regime and the Kurds coming unstuck? It’s too early to say, because the US insists that its military intervention in Syria is limited to countering IS. The Kurds are likely to continue to hedge their bets for as long as they can.
  9. And what of the PYD’s other primary benefactor, Iran? Will its friendship with the Americans anger the clerics? Much will depend on whether the US and Iran can reach a deal over Iran’s nuclear program. Should the talks fail, the PKK may become an instrument of US policy to be used against Iran.
  10. Any alliance in the Middle East should never be taken for granted.
    Source:  al-monitor.com
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The Iran nuclear deal, the fight against ISIL and Iran’s domestic troubles

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According to a Reuters report, Iran is ready to work with the United States and its allies to stop the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS), but would like more flexibility on Iran’s uranium enrichment program in exchange. “Iran is a very influential country in the region and can help in the fight against the ISIL [Islamic State – IS] terrorists … but it is a two-way street.
You give something, you take something,” said a senior Iranian official. “ISIL is a threat to world security, not our (nuclear) program, which is a peaceful program,” the official added. Another Iranian official echoed the remarks. Both officials said they would like the United States and its Western allies to show flexibility on the number of atomic centrifuges Tehran could keep under any long-term deal that would lift sanctions.
According to this report, Iran has sent mixed signals about its willingness to cooperate on defeating ISIL. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said recently that he vetoed a U.S. overture to the Islamic Republic to work together on this matter, while U.S. officials said there was no such offer. In public, both Washington and Tehran have ruled out cooperating militarily but in private, Iranian officials have voiced a willingness to work with the U.S., though not necessarily on the battlefield.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said on September 19 that Iran has a role to play in defeating Islamic State, indicating the U.S. position may also be shifting. Despite not being invited to join the U.S.-led military coalition, Iran – Kerry said – could help “take out” IS.
In a recent article analyzing Iran’s nuclear negotiating strategy toward a deal before the November 24 deadline, Suzanne Maloney, a former U.S. State Department policy advisor and Iran expert, argues that the Iranian approach “also relies on [Iranian President Rouhani’s] calculation that after more than a decade of frustrating talks and amidst a context of regional chaos, international resolve on the protracted, intractable nuclear crisis may be waning” against the backdrop of the emergence of the arguably more compelling threat from ISIL.
She notes that both Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif focused their public remarks while at the UN General Assembly in New York in September “on the proposition that an expeditious nuclear bargain could be instrumental in securing Iranian assistance in the U.S.-led campaign to degrade ISIL.”
Maloney notes that this attitude has influenced some audiences, among them former British foreign secretary Jack Straw, who recently published an article claiming PM “[David] Cameron should risk doing a deal with Iran” and his colleagues in the “P5 +1” (US, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany) should be careful “not to make the best the enemy of the good.”
Actually, it is Iran that needs the West against ISIL, as it could soon become the priority target in the evolving Sunni-Shiite sectarian terrorist war.
The ISIL threat to Iran
A recent document attributed to Abdullah Ahmed al-Meshedani, said to be a member of ISIL’s “war cabinet,” which Western security officials have deemed authentic, proposes an unlikely [wishful thinking] alliance with Russia against Tehran and Damascus in exchange for “Iran and its nuclear program” which would include inter alia Moscow access to an ISIL-held gas field in Iraq and backing the Sunni Gulf states against Shiite Iran and Alawite Syria. ISIL’s ultimate goal was to strip Iran of “all its power,” killing Iranian teachers, diplomats and businessmen and even destroying the Iranian caviar industry and “exterminating” its carpet industry.
Since ISIL took control of Mosul, the second biggest Iraqi city, the Iraqi army crumbled like a house of cards, ISIL stormed most of the Sunni towns in the Nineveh and Anbar provinces at the beginning of June 2014, approached Baghdad and threatened to attack the Shiite holy sites in Karbala and Najaf, the Iranian military leaders issued numerous, quite hysterical, declarations and went out of their way to convince their audience that Iran’s territory is not under threat.
At the end of June 2014, Iranian border guards commander General Hossein Zolfaqari said the “ISIL terrorist group which has caused chaos in Northern and Northwestern Iraq in the last two weeks” has not approached Iran’s borders in the West. He said Iran was boosting border checkpoints and plans to improve equipment of border units. Iranian Interior Ministry Spokesman Hossein Ali Amiri noted that there is no security lapse along Iran’s borders with the neighboring countries, and no notable problem along the border with Iraq. “However, the necessary measures have been adopted by the Interior Ministry and border police,” he added.
At the same time, Deputy Chief Liaison of the Iranian Army’s Ground Force troops General Ali Arasteh said divisions in the South and Southeast have gone on alert due to the unrests in Iraq. Lieutenant Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Force Brigadier General Abdollah Araqi also stressed that the country’s borders are fully secure, adding that Iranian borders have been reinforced in terms of manpower and military equipment. Lieutenant Commander of the Iranian Ground Force Brigadier General Kioumars Heidari reiterated full control over the country’s borders, and said the terrorists active in Iraq don’t dare to pose a threat to Iran. Heidari claimed that what is happening in the regional states “is a part of the plots hatched by the arrogant powers and the Zionist regime.”
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces for Cultural Affairs and Defense Publicity Brigadier General Massoud Jazayeri warned that Iran will give a crushing response to terrorists “and even their supporters” (hinting to U.S. and its regional allies) in case they dare to approach its borders.
By the beginning of July, Iran’s Police Chief Brigadier General Esmayeel Ahmadi Moqaddam underlined preparedness of the country’s military, security and intelligence forces “to thwart any destabilizing threat to Iran’s borders, particularly in the West”. He said some ISIL militants may be arrested at Western borders, but no ISIL command has entered Iran “and there is no concern about terrorism.”
While Iranian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari underscored the country’s special and influential role in the region and the world he also mentioned the necessity for increasing security levels in Iran’s coastal areas.
The Commander of Iran’s Basij (volunteer) Force Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi claimed that “the US has created and supported the terrorist Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to sow discord among Muslims” and as a means to cause division in the Middle East region.
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani underlined Tehran’s preparedness to help Iraq in fighting terrorism, but dismissed any military assistance to Iraq or deployment of any Iranian troops there. However he claimed “that the great Iranian nation will spare no efforts to protect their holy sites.”
However, several days later, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian expressed concern about the situation in Iraq and said Tehran “is ready to dispatch weapons to Iraq within the framework of fighting terrorism” if asked by the Iraqi government. Abdollahian accused the U.S. of “trying to create a chaotic atmosphere in the Arab country similar to what it did in Ukraine.”
By mid-October, Iranian television published a picture of Quds Force Major General Qassem Suleimani on an Iraqi battlefield surrounded by Kurdish peshmerga fighters. His “transformation from a man in the shadows as chief of covert foreign operations for the Revolutionary Guards into a public hero” is central to Iran’s message to the world: If you want to beat Sunni militants, you need the help of the Shiite nation and its top military commander. “He is sending a message to the U.S. about their influence,” said Antony Cordesman, a senior analyst at the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies. “And there is a message to the Arabs that they too have to deal with Iran.”
Iranian General Amir Ali Hajizadeh said on state television in August that ISIL would have seized the Iraqi Kurdish capital of Erbil had it not been for Suleimani and 70 of his men intervening to defend the city.
Although Iran fell short of declaring an official armed intervention, the IRGC did send to Iraq Qods Force personnel, ground attack aircraft, and drones to protect key Iraqi Shiite communities and holy sites from ISIL takeover. Qods Force teams are located at Samarra, Baghdad, Karbala, and near Tikrit. These units have also been central to Iran’s plan for organizing local Shiite militias that work with Iraqi government forces but are aligned with Tehran, on the model of popular militia units in Syria. Iran also reportedly deployed to Iraq up to seven ground attack Su-25 jets.
Initially these steps were taken to protect the then close ally Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki, but Iran is prepared to offer substantial military support to any agreed successor in order to keep its influence in Baghdad and secure its own borders and stability.
Iran’s Domestic Troubles
Iran’s borders and its stability are threatened not only by external Sunni radical forces like ISIL, but also by internal ethnic and sectarian hazards which could erupt under certain conditions as Iran is sucked more deeply into the Iraqi and Syrian quagmire.
Iran is not different from Iraq and can be even compared with Syria. According to the Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden) Persians represent only 65% of its population (55% according to other sources), Azeris 16%, Kurds 7%, Lurs 6%, Arabs 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmens 1%, and others less than 1%. Most of Iran’s minorities live in the provinces adjacent to its borders, the Kurds and the Arabs next to Iraq and the Baloch on the two sides of the Pakistani border. In contrast to the diversity of its ethnic landscape, Iran is relatively homogenous in terms of religion as 89 percent of the population is Shiite. The Sunni Muslims are largely drawn from Iran’s Kurdish, Baloch, and Turkmen populations.
Western analysts and policymakers pay little attention to the plight of Iran’s ethnic minorities, which have been heavily marginalized by the Persian-dominated Shiite theocracy. The suppression of minority rights has resulted in ethnic insurgencies over the years, some of which continue to trouble the Iranian regime. RAND analysts evaluated in April 2013 that Iran’s quickly declining economy and its increasing international isolation could push ethnic minorities and their Persian brethren to join forces and to pose a serious challenge to the Tehran regime.
Arabistan
The Iranian Arab ethnic minority, the Ahwazis, has long endured oppression and discrimination and could be the first to emulate its Sunni brethren in Iraq and Syria. Iranian Arabs suffer from widespread poverty despite the fact that they inhabit a region rich in natural resources. Arab nationalist insurgents led by the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz (ASMLA) were responsible for six attacks against energy infrastructure in the oil rich Khuzestan Province in 2013. Iranian Arabs and many pan-Arab nationalists refer to Khuzestan Province as Arabistan.  According to the Iranian media ASMLA militants staged 20 operations in 2012 and they had received financial support and operational training in Dubai. A group of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) named itself “the al-Ahwaz Battalion” in a sign of solidarity with the Iranian Arab cause and to single out Iran’s support for the Alawite regime.
Iranian Kurdistan
The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) is the largest and best organized of the Kurdish opposition groups and seeks autonomy for the Kurds in Iran. It was established in 1945 in Mahabad in Iran. A few months after its creation, on January 22, 1946, the PDK established the short-lived independent “Republic of Kurdistan,” destroyed by the Iranian army on December 17, 1946. After the revolution of 1979 it emerged as a mass-based party and one of the mainstream political forces in Iran. Two of KDPI’s general secretaries, Dr. A.R. Ghassemloo and Dr S. Sharafkandi were assassinated by the Iranian agents in Vienna and Berlin. Today the group is based in Iraqi Kurdistan, but agreed to respect the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) demand not to carry out armed operations against the Islamic Republic.
According to PDKI’s website, during a couple of weeks between August and September 2014 at least 25 members of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as well as an agent of the intelligence agency Ettela’at were killed in different locations in Iranian Kurdistan. It is noteworthy that these operations have coincided with the 22 anniversary of the assassination of Kurdish leader Dr. Sadeq Sharafkandi.
The KDPI’s fights with the Iranian military in Iran marked the first clashes between the two in years. An Iranian army commander and several Iranian soldiers were killed in clashes in Shino. The KDPI has claimed responsibility for the recent battles and announced that they are deploying their fighters to Iran for “political activities,” apparently in defiance of the KRG’s stance. Despite the concerns of the KRG, KDPI senior officials announced the group will not retreat from the Iranian Kurdistan.
Khalid Azizi, the secretary-general of KDPI claimed that the September clashes happened when Iranian troops set ambushes to his forces, prompting a response from the Kurdish guerrillas. The Iranian Kurdish leader said he was committed to resolving issues with Tehran peacefully. Azizi denied he came under pressure from the KRG in Iraq to halt the fighting, but acknowledged: “We cannot use Kurdish lands [in Iraq] to launch attacks against Iran.” Azizi could not explain why these Iranian provocations happened “while the region is on fire and Iran is involved in one way or another in the wars in Syria and Iraq?”
Other Iranian Kurdish opposition groups are split on the KDPI’s new armed campaign against Iran. The Kurdistan Tailors’ Movement, said his group “will support any Kurdish political parties that fight the Islamic Republic,” as time is right for armed struggle. He said he expects the fighters could suffer losses in the early stages but will gradually gain experience. The Kurdistan Struggle Agency also supports armed activities against Iran and if they “have a good opportunity will resume armed struggle.”
The Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê – PJAK) is a pan-Kurdish militant nationalist group operating since April 2004 from bases located in mountainous regions of Northern Iraq striving to establish a semi-autonomous Kurdish regional entity in Iran, similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. The PJAK has about 3,000 armed militiamen, half of them women. The PJAK, an offshoot of the Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan – PKK), adopted many of the political ideas and military tactics of the PKK.
General Ahmad Reza Pourdastan, Iranian Ground Force Commander Brigadier, announced that his forces have killed a number of PJAK militants who were trying to sneak into Iranian Kurdistan region (Rojhelat) carrying packs of explosives in June 2014.  He termed the operation as a hard blow to PJAK.
Iranian Baluchistan
A Sunni extremist group, Jaish ul-Adl, or the Army of Justice, based in Pakistan, has been carrying out a program of harassment, train derailments, assassinations and bombings since mid-2013. There has been a surge of attacks against Iranian military and provincial officials in Iranian Baluchistan in autumn 2013. On October 25, 2013, Jaish-ul-Adl killed 14 Iranian border guards and wounded six others in the border region near the city of Saravan in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.  Iranian Sunni Islamists claimed responsibility for the killing of an Iranian prosecutor in Sistan Baluchistan province in November 2013 as revenge for the hanging of 16 prisoners carried in Iranian jails after the attack by the Jaish ul-Adl group in which Iranian 14 border guards were killed.
Five Iranian border guards were kidnapped by Jaish-ul-Adl on February 6, 2014 in southeastern Iran and taken into Pakistan.  Jaish-ul-Adl killed one of the abductees. Iran has declared that it holds the Pakistani government responsible for the lives of the Iranian hostages.
However, in April Jaish Al-Adl released four of the five Iranian border guards who were kidnapped in February. After the fifth guard was executed Jaish ul-Adl threatened to kill another captive in 10 days but the insurgents “suspended the threat because it was in talks with Iranian authorities.”
According to the New York Times, Sunni insurgents in Pakistan increased attacks on Iranian border posts in the southeast of the country at the beginning of October, employing methods similar to those used by Islamic State militants in Syria and Iraq. A car bomber struck a fortified base near the city of Saravan, killing a senior officer; three police officers were killed in an ambush after responding to a distress call. In September, insurgents rammed a vehicle laden with more than 1,000 pounds of explosives into one of the outer walls of a central base before launching a surprise attack with a convoy of pickup trucks carrying 70 militants. Brig. Gen. Mohammad Pakpur of the IRGC said the attackers had been repelled only after a long firefight and the arrival of reinforcements.
On October 11, 2014 an Iranian police aircraft crashed in southeastern Iran killing all seven people on board. The victims included three senior police officers and a police employee travelling to the area to investigate the killing of four Iranian police border guards by gunmen near the Iran-Pakistan border. No group has claimed the attack, but Jaish ul-Adl is suspected to be responsible for the crash.
Conclusion
Against the backdrop of Iran’s external and internal woes why the United States and its allies should be impressed by Tehran’s proposals to help in the fight against ISIL and Sunni jihadists? More importantly, why should the West compromise on the vital nuclear issue when it is clear the Islamic Republic regime itself is a destabilizing force in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and the Middle East at large?
Source:  Ely Karmon,  ict.org.il
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Russia supplying weapons to Iraq, Syria – Lavrov

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Russia is supporting the governments of Iraq and Syria with massive supplies of weaponry and military equipment in order to help them fight against extremist groups, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Monday.

Lavrov, speaking at a panel discussion focusing on Russia’s foreign policy, said that with the Russian aid, the Iraqi and Syrian governments’ combat capacity has been greatly enhanced.

The Russian minister continued by saying that only the United Nations Security Council has the right to form a coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL.

Lavrov said that any plans made outside the Security Council are worrying because “these attempts result in an accumulation of chaos.”

He added that the aim of fighting against terror is adversely affected by linking it to geopolitical decisions to punish certain regimes, and thus forcing such a connection is morally indefensible.

The U.S. is leading an international coalition against ISIL militants. Coalition warplanes are striking ISIL targets in Iraq and Syria as well as supplying weapons to Kurdish and Iraqi security forces fighting the ISIL militants.

Russia and the U.S. agree that ISIL must be fought, but they disagree about who should do the fighting.
Russia is supplying the Assad regime in Syria, while the U.S and coalition forces are supplying weapons to forces battling to topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Source: aa.com.tr

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How to defeat the Islamic State’s war machine

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Although much has been written to explain the tactical military successes of the Islamic State (IS), there has not yet been a comprehensive assessment of how, since June 2014, IS has managed to rule over terrain larger than Lebanon to include eight million Iraqis and Syrians.

How has it been possible that in a short three months IS has been able to control extensive terrain, with 3,000 IS fighters capturing Mosul, which was guarded by 30,000 Iraqi soldiers, and after seizing Mosul on June 10 engage in battles two days later with Iraqi forces in towns north of Baghdad, 230 miles from Mosul?

Although one can allude to the delayed reaction of the international community, the lack of strong military opposition to IS, the international support IS has acquired, and the support from Sunni tribes and political bodies in areas it captures, none of it defies the reality that—at the tactical level—IS is an extremely  lethal and effective war machine. To understand this key determinant of IS gains, one has to understand that reality. This article will attempt to analyze the factors contributing to IS’ military efficiency, particularly at the tactical level.

Factors that boost tactical effectiveness of IS can be summarized as fluid and decentralized command and control structure; novel hybrid military tactics blending conventional warfare with terrorist tactics; effective use of armored platforms in offensive operations; dispersion; preservation of momentum at all costs; effective exploitation of topographic and human terrains; simplicity and flexibility in planning; and conducting operations and high levels of initiative and morale.

Fluid and decentralized command control structure

IS does not have permanent and centralized command and control structure in the traditional sense of warfare. Unlike contemporary armies of the world, IS doesn’t make sharp distinctions between strategic, operative and tactical levels. In their traditional warfare, tactical achievements is the way to achieve strategic objectives. For IS, the basic goal is to score tactical successes and expand on them step by step. Deviating from the traditional approach, what IS fields is a  bottom-up command structure focused on a fast pace for small military achievements. At the moment,  US-led airstrikes have been mostly against IS communication and training facilities. It is extraordinary that there is not a single control facility that has been hit by allied airstrikes.

IS warfare combines and hybridizes terrorist tactics, urban guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare.

IS is adept enough to conduct armor attacks at night and is skilled in accurate firing of their main tank guns with thermal cameras, and is capable of planting improvised explosive devices in critical areas and routes. It wages hybridized guerrilla warfare and conventional armored warfare by deploying eight to ten men teams carrying out building-by-building, block-by-block clear and hold operations in urban terrain.

After the recent air attacks, IS has dispersed its forces to the extreme. Its teams have been minimized to two or three vehicles and eight to ten men. Their concealment has been highly professional. IS’ executive orders are brief, setting out what the mission is in simple terms, leaving how it is to be carried out to field units.

It is imperative to acknowledge that a typical IS militant is endowed with a win-win mindset that assures him that to kill in jihad is a blessing, but if he is martyred he will end up in paradise also. No wonder IS combatants are high-adrenalin fighters who can kill and get killed without hesitation.

A typical IS operation goes like this: An IS armored unit of tanks or a mobile unit of eight to 12 fighters with two to three vehicles are informed by WhatsApp, a message on Facebook or Twitter, or phone text message, and if this mode is not available through their own radio net, to assemble at a certain place at a certain time. This is the first time we are seeing combat units making use of social media in combat operations. Before its operations, IS disseminates propaganda messages via social media to enemy fighters and civilians living in the targeted urban settlements to demoralize and dishearten them. IS operations and logistics units that are thus alerted assemble at a meeting point within two to three hours, and after another one-and-a-half hours of co-ordination discussions and logistics preparations the operation is underway.

One must remember that a regular IS tank driver is trained to drive his tank at night with a thermal camera, and that the commander of the team has enough tactical military knowledge to best deploy his tanks. Then it is a matter of attacking the enemy’s weakest point, preferably after the morning prayers. Vehicles stage the first phase of the attacks, followed by infantry attacks that depend on the nature of the enemy’s opposition. In these attacks, IS has been remarkably successful in creating a balance between the phased campaign design and maintaining the tempo of warfare. The high tempo of combat is routine for an IS fighter, but usually too high for opposing soldiers.

How to defeat IS?

How to first stop IS and then defeat it? The secret is in a concept that has so far been lacking the forces fighting IS in Syria and Iraq: Close air support that can only be provided by intense cooperation between ground troops and air units. Coalition air attacks so far are at least limiting IS advances; close cooperation between ground forces and armed helicopters such as AH-64 or fixed-wing platforms such as A-10 Thunderbolts can enable full integration of each air mission with fire and movement of ground forces, and bring the end to IS.

The question then becomes how the US-led coalition can provide that level of air support, and who has the substantial technical know-how and military expertise needed on the ground.

We know special forces elements of countries contributing to the coalition are participating in operations to provide precision target guiding with laser pointers. But this has been limited. Then what can be the solution?

Either the local forces fighting against IS will have to learn this technique that requires high military expertise, or special detachments formed by countries contributing to the coalition will be assigned to each combat zone or to major units as a close air support coordinator. It is no surprise then that the hottest topic in ongoing military discussions is who will provide this close air support and how. When tailoring strategies of close air support, one should keep in mind that IS has MANPADs (man-portable air defense systems) that make air units providing close air support highly vulnerable in their low-speed and low-altitude missions.

Source:  yementimes.com

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Iraqi bombers kill top ISIL commander in Tikrit

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The hideouts and convoys of the Takfiri terrorists were hit by Iraq’s warplanes in Shurqat district on Monday. Too many terrorists including a top commander nicknamed Wali al-Qalat Abo Sarah lost their lives during the massive strikes.
The ISIL Takfiri terrorists currently control parts of Syria and Iraq. They have threatened all communities, including Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Christians, Ezadi Kurds and others, as they continue their atrocities in Iraq.
Senior Iraqi officials have blamed Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and some Persian Gulf Arab states for the growing terrorism in their country.
The ISIL has links with Saudi intelligence and is believed to be indirectly supported by the Israeli regime.
Source: farsnews.com
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Iran sending ‘defensive items’ to Lebanon

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Iran’s semi-official Mehr news agency is quoting the country’s defence minister as saying Iran is ready to ship defensive materials to Lebanon to aid its army.

The Monday report quotes Gen. Ahmad Dehghan as saying in order to thwart extremists who plan to commit inhuman crimes in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, “we will provide an Iranian-made consignment of defensive items to the Lebanese army for their use in fighting the group and other terrorist groups.”

The contents of the shipment were unknown. The UN in 2007 banned Iran from exporting and importing weapons. Dehghan said the shipment now awaited approval from Lebanon, a country he described as having a “special position” in Iran’s foreign policy.

His remarks came during a joint briefing with visiting Lebanese Defence Minister Samir Moqbel.

Meanwhile the head of the UN atomic energy agency said on Monday that Iran has still not implemented all the nuclear transparency measures it had agreed to carry out by late August, suggesting little headway in an inquiry into suspected bomb research.

Source:  gulftoday.ae

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