On Feb. 2, 2014, the Mujahedeen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem in Gaza issued a statement announcing that it was “committed to helping ISIS and bolstering its ranks.” Nine days later, another Salafist jihadist group posted a video announcing its support for the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, now the Islamic State (IS). By the end of 2014, things appeared to have moved beyond mere support, as Al-Monitor met with Gazans who claimed to be affiliated with IS, although, according to the spiritual leader of pro-IS youth in Gaza, IS had rejected their pledge of allegiance.

 
An estimated 670,000 children in Syria are being deprived of education after Islamic State forces ordered schools closed while the curriculum is made to conform with religious rules, the UN Children’s Fund (Unicef) said on Tuesday.

Islamic State, an offshoot of al-Qaeda which has recruited foreign fighters, has seized land in Syria and Iraq, imposing its strict reading of Islamic law.

In November it shut schools in areas it controls in eastern Syria pending a religious revision of the curriculum. The group stands accused of massacres, sexually enslaving women and girls and recruiting children as fighters.

“In December there was a decree of the Islamic State ordering the stoppage of education in areas under its control,” Unicef spokesman Christophe Boulierac told a news briefing. The militant group decreed that schools be closed until the school curriculum had been made “compliant with the religious rules”, he told Reuters.

Children enrolled in primary and secondary schools in Raqqa, and rural areas of Deir al-Zor and Aleppo provinces are affected by the closures, he said. Teachers must undergo retraining.

Source:  thenews.com.pk

There was a time when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria appeared unstoppable. In September and October, as the jihadist group captured territory through a major offensive in Iraq’s Anbar province, culminating in the fall of the town of Hit on October 13, observers feared that even Baghdad was in danger of being overrun. ISIS is now in the midst of another major military movement in Anbar, but the always-overblown fears about the organization’s advance are now receding—and the group’s decline has grown increasingly apparent.

ISIS’s signature attributes, ferocity and unpredictability, have raised the group’s profile and inspired a spate of lone-wolf attackers. But the organization has also made several strategic errors along the way. The Islamic State’s lifeblood is partially money and territory, but primarily momentum against weak and ill-prepared enemies. And that momentum, which peaked in early August, has stalled.

Where has ISIS overplayed its hand? The group already had an impressive array of foes when a June blitzkrieg extended its reach into Iraq—enemies that included the Iraqi government, the Iranian regime, and even other jihadist groups like the Nusra Front, with whom it frequently skirmished in Syria. This offensive wasn’t solely the work of ISIS, which fought alongside a coalition of Sunni insurgent groups that included former members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath party. The offensive was also widely backed by Iraq’s disaffected Sunni elite.

But once its initial gains were secured, ISIS quickly betrayed the very groups that had aided its advance. Most prominently, ISIS declared the reestablishment of the caliphate, with the group’s spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani claiming that “the legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah’s authority.” The statement clearly signaled that ISIS believed it had usurped the authority of its allies; indeed, in early July it rounded up ex-Baathist leaders in Mosul (doing so proved particularly problematic for ISIS because the ex-Baathists were also managing the actual governance and administration of the northern Iraqi city, and their arrest hastened the rapid disintegration of basic services).

ISIS committed a more damaging error at the beginning of August, when it launched a surprise incursion into Iraq’s Kurdish territory and promptly engaged in a campaign of genocidal slaughter and enslavement against the Yazidi minority sect. The moves were pointless from a military perspective, since the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Peshmerga forces weren’t fighting ISIS and the Yazidis didn’t pose a threat to the incipient caliphate. These decisions, along with the beheading of the American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff, helped draw even more enemies into the theater, including the United States and an international coalition backing U.S. military action.

The most obvious sign of ISIS’s decline is that the group is no longer conquering territory, seizing no major towns or cities since Hit (and this hasn’t been for lack of effort on its part). ISIS continues to capture villages from time to time; for example, on December 27 it gained control of 14 villages in Anbar after Iraqi security forces withdrew from the area. But those villages aren’t equivalent to a major urban area and had been taken from ISIS by Iraqi forces just two days earlier. In October, ISIS advanced ominously on the Syrian city of Kobane: In The New Republic, the French philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy declared that “Kobane will fall. In a matter of hours.” It has yet to fall, and Kurdish forces now appear to have the advantage, though the town remains contested. ISIS has even been losing ground, albeit unevenly. In December, the group pulled its forces from Iraq’s Sinjar district, home to one of ISIS’s main resupply routes from Syria into Iraq (the other being Tal Afar). This has threatened to isolate ISIS-held Mosul.

ISIS’s brutality has also proven isolating. Local opposition against the group, including by Sunnis, is mounting in Mosul and Anbar, although ISIS did recently succeed in suppressing a revolt against it in Syria’s Dayr al-Zawr. These uprisings are certain to grow if ISIS weakens. Meanwhile, the group’s leaders seem increasingly paranoid, reportedly executing many of their own fighters in Mosul and elsewhere. In December, for example, Muammar Tawhlah, ISIS’s top official in Mosul, was killed by firing squad for suspected espionage. And ISIS’s bureaucratic mismanagement has alienated local populations, leaving them with a lack of job opportunities and basic services. As a resident of Mosul told the Financial Times, “When I was seven years old the war against Iran started. Since then, we’ve been at war. We’ve endured international sanctions, poverty, injustice. But it was never worse than it is now.”

ISIS’s financial and military resources have also shrunk as U.S. airstrikes have destroyed the group’s materiel and capacity to refine oil. The Islamic State is still able to sell unrefined oil on the black market, but the difference between the price it can set for unrefined versus refined oil is significant. Reports this week indicated that ISIS expects a $250-million surplus in its $2-billion budget, but these figures are entirely self-reported: Accountants aren’t exactly lining up to get into ISIS-controlled territory and perform an outside audit.

ISIS, moreover, lacks an industrial base capable of sustaining its military efforts (Ninawa and Salahaddin governorates have a number of factories, but the group has a shortage of qualified technical personnel to man and supply them). It cannot build its own heavy armor, armored personnel carriers, Humvees, anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft weapons, or radar stations. Only through successful raids can the organization capture the equipment it needs for battle, and the last time it did this successfully was in August.

All of these setbacks seriously threaten ISIS because of its reliance on momentum—a dependency articulated in a recent issue of the group’s English-language magazine Dabiq. An article carrying the byline of the British journalist John Cantlie, ISIS’s forcefully conscripted propagandist, noted that “as an entity enjoys success, it attracts more to its fold, thereby causing expansion and breeding more success until it achieves some sort of critical mass, the point at which it becomes self-perpetuating, self-sustaining.” ISIS is not yet self-sustaining.

Drawing a steady flow of zealous recruits remains a necessity for the group, not a luxury.
Nevertheless, to borrow President Obama’s words, the United States and its allies are far closer to degrading ISIS than destroying it. The Islamic State is currently positioning itself to attack the Al-Asad airbase in Anbar province, where U.S. military advisors are now located, and such an assault could amplify calls in the United States for an American withdrawal from the region. ISIS could conceivably launch a major cross-border attack against Jordan or move into Suwayda, the only majority-Druze province in Syria, carrying out massacres comparable to those that the group committed in Sinjar or Hit.

In the latter scenario, the Islamic State would be goading the U.S. to intervene militarily on what could be seen as the side of Bashar al-Assad’s supporters. ISIS could yet seize the Iraqi cities of Ramadi or Haditha, which would be powerful symbolic gains for the group and disasters in terms of lives lost, but would do little to improve the group’s overall strategic position. Even if ISIS lost all its Iraq holdings (which won’t happen anytime soon), the organization would simply be back to where it started before the June offensive, hunkered down in its stronghold of Raqqa, Syria. Even if its “caliph,” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is killed, and even if large portions of the organization subsequently reconcile with—and return to—al-Qaeda, a core is likely to persist for a long time under the ISIS label.

None of these developments, however, would necessarily reverse the Islamic State’s noticeable decline. Indeed, ISIS’s jihadist rivals have been gaining ground. The Nusra Front, which Syria watchers once considered a spent force, has in recent weeks made major gains in Idlib, Hama, and Daraa, and its growing strength has effectively marginalized the “moderate” Syrian opposition. It’s a clear sign that jihadism will bedevil Iraq and Syria for some time to come—and that this problem is much broader than ISIS.

Source: The Atlantic

The end of 2014 and the first days of 2015 witnessed a series of events that targeted Hezbollah, the most powerful Shiite group in Lebanon and perhaps the Middle East. Within a few days, a series of political, security, judicial and military events in Lebanon and in neighboring and other countries all seemed to be targeting Hezbollah.

On the Lebanese political level, news spread on Dec. 28 that Ghaleb Abu Zeinab, a member of Hezbollah’s political bureau, had resigned from his position as an official in charge of his party’s relations with the Christian political authority.

Abu Zeinab quickly explained that he had decided to hand in his resignation weeks ago for personal reasons that are not linked to any political or partisan dimensions. He wanted to have more time to take care of personal and family matters. However, news leaks continued to aggravate the event and included it in the list of suspicious matters happening within the party.

One of the reasons mentioned behind Abu Zeinab’s resignation, which was denied by the former official, were rumors about him being related to another official in Hezbollah who’s said to have been arrested on charges of spying for Israel. This was the second targeting of Hezbollah on the security and on the Lebanese-Israeli levels. Gulf newspapers published stories on Dec. 17 saying that a prominent official who occupies a sensitive security position in Hezbollah with the initials M. S. was spying on his party for Israel.

Days later, further leaked media information became public. On Dec. 25, the same media outlets reported Agence France-Presse publishing a detailed report about the suspect from Hezbollah; his full name was Mohammad Shawraba and that the fact that he was spying for Israel resulted in the failure of a series of security and intelligence operations Hezbollah was planning to execute against Israel.

While Abu Zeinab quickly rushed to explain his resignation to the media, Hezbollah remained silent regarding the arrest of one of its members on charges of spying. No governmental source and no Lebanese official commented on this news and there was no mention of whether the figure was arrested by the government or the party. This is considered to be a common tradition in the so-called resistance security in Lebanon, which is surrounded by maximum secrecy on both the official and partisan levels, except for what one party willingly wishes to reveal.

Simultaneously to the political and security events on both the Lebanese and Israeli levels, a third judicial event on the international level occurred. Lebanese media outlets reported on Dec. 27 that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which opened after a resolution issued by the UN Security Council to investigate the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, might decide to summon one of Hezbollah’s deputies in the Lebanese parliament.

The same leaks indicated that the reason behind the possible summoning is the discovery of a phone call between the deputy’s phone number and one of the suspected phone numbers in the case, which launched guesses as to which Hezbollah deputy was involved.

Then on Dec. 29, parliament member Ali Ammar turned out to be the one the STL might summon. He is a deputy for Baabda district, southern Maten, which includes Beirut’s Shiite-dominated southern suburbs of Dahiya (Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut). Ammar belongs to the party’s first generation that was present during its establishment in the early 1980s. In the event that the news was indeed accurate, it might result in a serious and a first-of-a-kind challenge for Hezbollah and the Lebanese government.

Again, as Hezbollah remains silent regarding news about the possible summoning of one of its deputies and founding members, the fourth strike hit. It was on the military level this time. Jabhat al-Nusra announced on Jan. 3 that hours before it had launched an attack on a Hezbollah military site at the edge of the Syrian town of Vlita, near the Lebanese border.

As information on the results of this attack were unclear, it was certain that violent clashes have been taking place over the past few months between the two parties in the context of a series of military confrontations by Hezbollah fighters and the Lebanese army units against militants from terrorist groups on the borders between Syria and Lebanon.

This is how the entire picture has painted an illogical paradox. Within a few days, Hezbollah was targeted by local Lebanese political news, a spy for Israel, a possible international prosecution and a terrorist military attack. It’s a paradox whose elements have nothing in common, rationally, except for the great purpose and magnitude against this political and military group.

Hezbollah is considered one of the main actors in Lebanon and on several international scenes, including Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen and other countries. All of these issues indicate that 2015 is going to be an eventful year for Hezbollah and raise curiosity as to what developments this might involve.

Source: Al Monitor

Al Qaeda’s branch in Yemen is surging in strength, finding new support and recruits among the country’s Sunni tribesmen, in a backlash to drone strikes and the rise to power of Shiite rebels who have taken over the capital and other parts of the country, tribal leaders and Yemeni officials warn.

The militants’ rise comes after months of being squeezed by multiple challenges. Early last year, US drone strikes followed by Yemeni ground troops helped Yemen destroy a key Al Qaeda base in the remote mountains of the impoverished, unstable nation. The past year, Al Qaeda has also faced fierce competition from the Middle East’s new militant powerhouse, ISIL, which has sought to make inroads into Yemen.

But the expansion of the Shiite rebels known as Houthis has been a godsend for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, as the branch of the terror network in Yemen is called. The turmoil in Yemen has taken on a sharply sectarian tone, pitting Sunnis against Shiites, to the benefit of Sunni Al Qaeda. And while the group has lost some prominent figures in drone strikes over past years, deaths of members of prominent tribes in the strikes have pushed tribesmen toward the militants.

Over the long term, the United States’ years-long campaign to put down the Al Qaeda branch is likely to suffer, warns Bill Roggio from Long War Journal, which chronicles militant activities.

As Al Qaeda gains ground locally in Yemen, that strengthens its ability to carry out attacks abroad against the US, its main priority.

“The local fuels the external. They will become more dangerous the more they draw local support,” Mr Roggio said. As Washington’s ally in Yemen, president Abed Rabbo Hadi Mansour, gets weaker, US ability to strike Al Qaeda “will diminish over time after losing its partner,” he said.

Backed by deposed president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Houthis pushed out of their enclaves in northern Yemen and took over the capital Sanaa in September. Mr Hadi’s government has been virtually under its thumb since. Houthi forces have since spread over eight of Yemen’s 21 provinces, taking over security powers in many cities and towns, with government officials and forces split in loyalties, either stepping aside or grudgingly co-operating with them.

At first the fight between Houthis and their opponents was largely a split along political and tribal lines. But now as the Shiite rebels push into largely Sunni regions of central Yemen on a declared campaign to fight Al Qaeda, the conflict has taken on a sharply sectarian nature of Sunni vs Shiite, to the benefit of Sunni Al Qaeda. The militants and their allies have responded with a guerrilla campaign of suicide bombings and other attacks against the Houthis.

Houthi power “is only increasing Al Qaeda membership,” an Al Qaeda member in Yemen said. He said the group’s strategy is to exploit the Houthis’ overextension from their base in the north, “drag them into a long war, and force them to retreat.”

The city of Radaa in the centre of the country, one of the heaviest battlegrounds, showcases how Al Qaeda is capitalising on the fallout.

Bombings hit Houthi positions in Radaa nearly every night, killing dozens in past weeks. Local tribes give Al Qaeda militants safe passage through their areas to strike the Shiites, said Ali Abu Sarima, a local tribal leader who opposes both the Houthis and Al Qaeda.

The city is a longtime stronghold for Al Qaeda. Its militants briefly took it over in 2012 but were driven out by Yemeni troops backed by local tribesmen. Now, because of resentment of the Houthis, some tribesmen are turning to back Al Qaeda, local tribal figures say.

“It’s a matter of vendetta against Houthis. Tribes can even ally with the devil,” Sheikh Ahmed Al Jabri, a tribal leader in Radaa, said.

Source: thenational.ae

Official data showed that approximately 52 per cent of the Palestinian Authority (PA)’s budget over the last 11 months was spent on the salaries of public sector workers, compared with 55 per cent in 2013, the Anadolu Agency reported yesterday.

According to the data obtained by news agency, the government’s total expenses reached about $3.306 billion during the last 11 months. Approximately $1.721 billion were spent on salaries.

In 2013, total expenses reached about $2.956 billion, around $1.643 billion spent on salaries, according to the data.

The Palestinian unity government is preparing for the 2015 budget, which must be approved before March. It is expected to be the largest since the establishment of the PA in 1993.

During the last financial year, wages amounted to around $1.92 billion, while the government expenses reached approximately $3.7 billion – 54 per cent of the budget.

Source:  middleeastmonitor

France says it is ready to carry out strikes against fighters crossing out of Libya’s southern border, and prevent the flow of weapons to groups fighting in North Africa’s lawless Sahel region.

French President Francois Hollande made the announcement on Monday, but Libya’s internationally recognised parliament rejected any Western military intervention in the conflict-wracked African nation.

“Foreign military intervention in Libya is rejected. If we need any military intervention, we will ask our Arab brothers,” parliament speaker Aqila Issa said.

While ruling out unilateral intervention, Hollande said that French forces would strike fighters “every time they leave these places where they are hiding”.

“We are making sure to contain the terrorism that took refuge there, in southern Libya. But France will not intervene in Libya because it’s up to the international community to take its responsibility,” Hollande told France-Inter radio.

France is currently setting up a military base in northern Niger, 100km from the Libyan border region, and troops have been based in the Sahel region since January 2013.

French and US drones are already operating out of Niger’s capital, Niamey.

Libya is mired in its worst fighting since a NATO-backed uprising toppled and killed long-time leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

Fighting between forces loyal to Libya’s western recognised prime minister, Abdullah al-Thinni, and rival militias threatens neighbouring nations including Chad, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso.

The country remains awash with weapons, as interim authorities failed to confront powerful militias which fought to oust the veteran leader.

On Sunday, a Libyan warplane from forces loyal to the internationally recognised government bombed a Greek-operated oil tanker anchored off the coast, killing two crewmen amid an escalation of conflict between factions vying to rule the country.

The airstrike was part of increasingly chaotic violence in Libya which has two parallel governments: the officially recognised one, which runs from the eastern city of Tobruk, and the administration run by a faction known as Libya Dawn that seized Tripoli last summer.

Source: Al Jazeera