The new king of Saudi Arabia, Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud, has spent more than a half-century among the top echelons of one of the world’s most powerful families and is known to serve as mediator and peacekeeper between its often competing factions. 

Best known for overseeing the development of the Saudi capital, Riyadh, during his nearly 50 years as its governor, he became the country’s defense minister in 2011 as a series of uprisings were shaking Arab leaders who had long been Saudi allies. 

While Salman is popular inside the kingdom and in the ruling family, he ascended the throne after the death of his brother Abdullah on Friday amid increasing strains on the kingdom. The drop of world oil prices has hurt the country’s economic base; the jihadists of the Islamic State have questioned its status as the global lodestar of Islam; and new civil strife is shredding Yemen, its southern neighbor. Analysts said that those challenges would most likely keep the new monarch from making any sudden changes to policy.  

“There will be a strong emphasis on continuity,” said Bernard Haykel, a professor of Near Eastern studies at Princeton University. “Especially at a time when the price of oil is low and there is lots of turmoil in the region, the last thing they need is to get their people riled up.” It remained unclear how capable Salman would be at putting in place Saudi responses to these difficulties. As crown prince, he was said to have taken over many of the duties of the head of state as Abdullah grew ill, but Salman’s own health is in question. 

He is 79, has had at least one stroke and lost some movement in one of his arms. Robert Jordan, a former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, said that Salman had a strong record as a good administrator, best demonstrated by his governorship of Riyadh. “He is considered to be a straight-shooter, not corrupt, well educated,” Jordan said. His stances on social issues are less clear, but few think he will roll back the modest reforms put in place by his brother, which included encouraging women to enter the workforce – a move criticized by some parts of the conservative clerical establishment. 

“He is very conservative, of course, like the rest of the kingdom, but I don’t think he is likely to undo the reforms that King Abdullah initiated,” Jordan said. In a statement attributed to the new king read on Saudi state television, he promoted Prince Muqrin bin Abdul-Aziz, who had been deputy crown prince, to crown prince, putting him next in line to the throne. Muqrin, relatively young for a Saudi leader at 69, is a former air force pilot who also served as governor of Madina province before being named the head of Saudi intelligence, a post he held until 2012. Like Salman, Abdullah and the kingdom’s previous four monarchs, Muqrin is a son of King Abdul Aziz, the founder of the modern Saudi state. 

Jean-Francois Seznec, who teaches political economy of the Gulf at Georgetown University, said that the transition would probably not affect Saudi oil policy and the kingdom’s strategy of keeping production up despite falling prices in order to hang on to market share. “I think for the time being that they will be careful not to change very much and to go for stability,” he said. But dealing with the crisis in Yemen, which shares a long border with Saudi Arabia and harbors al-Qaida militants who are hostile to the monarchy, will probably be Salman’s first task. 

“I think it scares the hell out of the Saudis,” Seznec said. “It is a dangerous place for them, and their Yemeni policy has been a huge failure.” Salman’s sons, too, hold a number of powerful positions: Prince Abdulaziz is the deputy oil minister; Prince Faisal is the governor of Madina Province; and Prince Sultan heads the tourism authority and was also an astronaut.

Source:  ndtv.com

 http://edition.cnn.com/videos/us/2015/01/23/erin-sot-sciutto-us-to-evacuate-embassy-in-yemen.cnn

The most powerful form of lie is the omission – George Orwell. The news that UNSMIL queered the pitch on Libya is not surprising.

All the signs were there: misunderstanding the situation on the ground, information omissions, the ineffectiveness of UNSMIL to know exactly what is ongoing in-country during the talks, and trying to mediate with dodgy characters from Libya Dawn, the terrorist extremist hodgepodge of misfits claiming to be the internationally-recognised government of Libya in Tripoli through the General National Conference or GNC.

The UN, and the media, all fell into a mind-numbing trap.

The debacle in Geneva featured numerous miscalls by the UN on who will be attending the talks, the progress of the discussions, a ceasefire and the path forward.

The so called ‘partial’ ceasefire was a non-starter because everyone knew such a break would give Libya Dawn time to reorganise and resupply.

Although a list of ‘agreed to’ points were released to the media at the conclusion of the first day’s meeting, the statement might as well been copied and pasted from other talks where countries are trying to negotiate a way to avoid State failure. It was standard content to give the air of forward progress, which everyone knew except for the UN.

The confusion over the Geneva talks became more acute when the GNC proposed moving the talks from Geneva to Ghat, in Libya. GNC president Nuri Abu Sahmain then flew to Turkey to meet the main sponsor of the Muslim Brotherhood, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to seek to negotiate with UNSMIL’s Bernardino Leon.

That the UN thought that Turkey should be involved as a negotiator, given the recent emerging revelations of Erdogan’s support for terrorism, is incredible.

Besides, fighting was being reported in the south, including Aubari, near Ghat. Clearly, this notion of Turkey’s involvement was recognised immediately by the Al Thinni government as a ruse, allowing Ankara to become an important player in the talks, thereby protecting Muslim Brotherhood interests.

At that point, with a non-starter proposal to move the location and given Turkey’s interference, the Geneva talks fell into fiasco.

It was quite telling what Prime Minister Abdullah Al Thinni thought about the UN talks in Geneva.

His interview to a Sudanese newspaper during the talks contained a plea for the ability to fight for themselves: “All we ask from the international community is to help us address the situation in our country and provide us with expertise and equipment and, more importantly, lift the ban on arming the Libyan military to enable the State to take full control over national soil.”

Consequently, as the talks ended in disarray, Al Thinni’s government released a decree declaring the recall of Khalifa Haftar and 107 other Libyan military officers. The decree was issued weeks ago but had not previously been made public because the Al Thinni government knew that the UN talks would not succeed.

The media is mistakenly reading into this announcement that the ties between Al Thinni and Haftar is “cementing an alliance”. This idea is folly because this alliance was cemented long ago with Operation Dignity.

Speaking of the media, many stakeholders are involved in the info war regarding Libya on the ground and the press is evidently finding it confusing to illustrate an accurate portrait of what is actually happening.
This information architecture being used in the Libyan battle space is to ‘confuse’ the enemy.

Upping the info war narrative to reveal the treacherous nature of supporters of Libya Dawn is a necessary requirement.

To be sure, this confusion among the Western diplomatic community, and specifically UNSMIL, causes them to keep sending out such mixed messages with regard to their policies and the negotiations in Geneva and this resulted in the poor and confusing media war with whipped up tweets.

European Union policymakers are demonstrating their frustration with the UN process too.

A policy paper in the wake of the Geneva debacle calls for the disbandment of EUBAM Libya, the EU mission to control Libya’s borders, and the closure of the Peacock Compound in Tripoli.

The EU, instead, wants to give assistance to the countries surrounding Libya – Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, Chad and Sudan – by sealing their borders and focusing on maritime surveillance and search and rescue.
By scuttling EUBAM, a sharp message is being sent to Libya Dawn and the GNC of the shape of things to come, meaning game over for them at least.

Importantly, the United States now appears to be more proactive than the UN in shaping the future of Libya.
During the Geneva talks, the US agreed “to safeguard Libyan domestic and overseas assets from being used to finance terrorism or war in Libya”.

This statement is interpreted to mean that no money goes to the GNC and Omar Al Hassi in Tripoli.

The agreement came at the end of a three-day visit by the governor of the Central Bank of Libya, Ali Salem Hibri, and the chairman of the Libyan Investment Authority, Hassan Bu Hadi.

It is to be recalled that the present currency crisis in the North African State and the reforms made by Al Thinni to change the payment system for oil production and sales are linked to the discussions with Washington.

The UN’s attempt to mediate, without a clear plan, means that the West and America, in particular, will not recognise or deal with Tripoli and further means that, probably, Libya Dawn will split.

The only unintended good outcome of calling for talks in Geneva was allowing the Misratans to hopefully break away, leaving only violent extremists and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Perhaps this potential development will play into Al Thinni’s hands.

Geneva was, to all intent and purposes, just a waste of time and energy.

Source:  timesofmalta

Changing the rules of the game along Lebanon’s southern border was the main challenge Hezbollah faced after the 2006 war with Israel. In the years since, the group has been touting deterrence as the main accomplishment of the war.

Tit-for-tat strategies made the equation clear to all concerned, and both Israel and the Shiite Islamist group adhered to the de facto red lines. Since no one had any interest in igniting a new war, the Israeli-Lebanese border became the most stable area in a region prone to explosions. The Jan. 18 Israeli missile strike on the Golan Heights looks like it might alter the equation, although nothing in the immediate aftermath appears to have really changed.

One option is a strong response commensurate to the level of the Iranian and Lebanese commanders killed in the Israel attack. This, however, could lead to an Israeli reprisal and escalate tensions toward an unwanted, larger confrontation. Another option would be to remain calm for the time being and issue a public statement warning that Hezbollah reserves the right to retaliate at the appropriate time and location.

This could be troubling to the popular base if not up to expectations while also sending the incorrect message to Israel that Hezbollah considers the era of mutual deterrence to have come to an end. Yet another, although unlikely, option, would be for Hezbollah to respond in a cold manner, conveying the message to the Israelis that no action they take will go without a response.

All three options are on the table, and Hezbollah is known to be deliberate when it comes to decisions such as the one it faces. Complicating the matter is that any considered response must involve two other parties: Iran, which lost a general from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the Israeli strike and is considered the leader of the “resistance bloc,” and Syria, where the attack took place.

On Jan. 20, the IRGC High Commander Mohammed Ali Jafari warned the Israelis that they should expect an “annihilating thunderbolt.” He also said, speaking of Israel, “The IRGC … will continue and deepen our support for the Muslim combatants and fighters in the region until full removal of this very epitome of evil from the geopolitics of the region.” Hours after Jafari’s comments, an Israeli security source said in an interview that Mohammad Allahdadi, the Iranian general killed, had not been the intended target. Rather, Israel believed it was attacking low-ranking guerrillas.

Iran’s stance, coupled with Israel trying to walk back its strike and complete silence from Hezbollah, has resulted in an oddly calm holding pattern. An Iranian security source requesting anonymity told Al-Monitor that the resistance bloc was not interested in a war.

That said, however, “We won’t accept at any price Israel acting freely, killing, bombing, occupying and oppressing people. This bloc said no before, and today our ‘no’ is going to be heard very clearly,” he said. “Everything has its own time. Let them stay on alert, revise their scenarios and take maximum measures. They know what to do, and our bloc knows well how to draw the real red lines with blood.”

An official source in Beirut suggested that Israel was attempting to change the rules of the game, saying, “Hitting Hezbollah this strong in the Golan means that Israel well understands what it did. The only thing we hope for is that any escalation remains outside Lebanese borders.”

This is the first confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah in Syria. Israel has on several occasions struck targets said to be related to the Lebanese group. These have typically been along the lines of strikes on trucks thought to be carrying missiles and were not always confirmed by Israel. This most recent attack raises the question of what Hezbollah and Iranian commanders were doing in the Quneitra area.

Some allege that the infrastructure for a resistance war against Israel is being laid there. This would mean that Hezbollah, Iran and Syria are eager to diversify their military options in any future standoff with allies of Israel. Hezbollah’s TV station Al-Manar reported Jan. 19 that the “delegation was inspecting Israeli aggressions on the area and cooperation between the Israeli occupation army and the takfiri groups.”

A source close to Hezbollah told Al-Monitor that the first result of the Israeli attack is the expansion of the front with Israel from the Mediterranean to the Golan. “Now that they hit in the Golan, they know well that their northern borders with Hezbollah expands to the Golan. The whole equation is going to change, which also proves that Hezbollah’s decision to fight in Syria was right. Israel is interfering to help its allies, who are being defeated by the Syrian army and Hezbollah,” the source said.

There were a few dust-ups between Israel and Hezbollah in 2014, including Israeli attacks against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon and on the border with Syria. A Feb. 23 attack on Israeli posts, coming after three roadside bombs in two weeks and the launching of rockets at an Israeli outpost on Mt. Hermon, was viewed as a Hezbollah operation, although the group did not claim responsibility.

On Oct. 7, Hezbollah fighters “detonated an explosive device on the Shebaa hills against a motorized Israeli patrol, causing a number of injuries among the occupation’s soldiers.” This attack was in retaliation for the killing of Hezbollah’s explosives expert, Hassan Ali Haidar, who was killed Sept. 5 while trying to dismantle four Israeli spying devices on Hezbollah’s telecommunications network in Adloun, in south Lebanon.

Source: Al Monitor

In a newspaper interview in November 2013, Salih Muslim, the co-chairman of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party of Syria (PYD) had predicted: “The situation in Hasakah is sensitive. If pushed, it could lead to Kurdish-Arab clashes.”

News reports from the northeast Syria town of Hasakah, which we don’t usually hear much about, proved Muslim’s warnings were on the mark.

Clashes that erupted in Hasakah on Jan. 17 between the PYD’s military wing, the People’s Defense Units (YPG) and National Defense Forces, an auxiliary of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s army, couldn’t be halted and inflicted casualties on both sides.

A glance at the map of Syria is enough to understand the strategic value of Hasakah. Above all, Hasakah dominates the roads between IS-controlled Mosul and Raqqa. It is the southern access to Jazeera canton of the Kurdish Rojava region.

It is also the last bastion of the Assad regime in that area. The latest developments in Hasakah show that the town. which had been generally calm in the 4-year-old civil war, is now the focus of the power struggle between Kurds, Arabs and IS.

Kurds live north of the Khabur River that divides Hasakah, while mostly Arabs live to the south of it. The town is already divided demographically. What is escaping attention is that tens of thousands of Syrians of different religious and ethnic origins escaping from the war have increased the population of the town to 400,000.

In the summer of 2014 Hasakah appeared as a true no-man’s-land and IS, despite its reinforcements, could not capture it. Coalition air attacks that sought to sever the links between IS forces in Syria and Iraq diminished the effectiveness of IS in the region. That meant a new balance of power in mixed town of Arab-Kurd Hasakah between the YPG and pro-Assad militias. The new balance shows the YPG in charge in predominantly Kurdish north Hasakah, pro-Assad militias controlling the town center and its south while IS prevails in a small portion of its southwest.

The first clashes between the Kurdish YPG and pro-Assad militias caught many off guard, as these two forces were believed to be observing an undeclared nonaggression pact.

A brief news report on the night of Jan. 17 said at least three people were killed and many others wounded by blasts in Hasakah’s Salihiye, Miftiye and Tel Hacer neighborhoods.

Reports followed of militia mortars firing on the Kurdish part of the town and barrel bombs dropped by Syrian army helicopters. The YPG said Syrian army helicopters had attacked Hasakah’s cattle market with barrel bombs, killing 65 people.

After Syrian planes attacked a YPG convoy moving from Qamishli to Hasakah on Jan. 18, the YPG responded by attacking a pro-Assad militia post in Tel Hacer that afternoon and took 30 militiamen prisoners.

Kurdish-affiliated Ara News reported that on Monday night Syrian Gen. Ali Memluk convened a meeting of YPG commanders and Arab sheikhs of the town and secured a 24-hour cease-fire. Jan. 19 was a quiet day.

Field reports say the YPG has taken over many official buildings in Hasakah and that it is in full control of northern Hasakah and is advancing to the town center after receiving reinforcements from Serekani and Qamishli. A local source told Al-Monitor that the real aim of IS was to capture Hasakah and that is why it was still bringing reinforcements to its south but dispersing them under persistent coalition air attacks.

Our source said IS has issued an ultimatum for the town to surrender by Jan. 24 or be hit with heavy weapons. This source says that pro-Assad militias actually want to have IS control the town.

Field developments indicate a trend for the clashes in north Syria to shift from Kobani to Hasakah. IS has no problems moving around troops and materiel in this area. Mosul is not far from Hasakah, tempting IS to easily hit Qamishli, seen as the capital of Kurdish Rojava. More heavy fighting in Hasakah center and in its periphery seems inevitable in the coming days.

How do parties explain the eruption of clashes at Hasakah? After a prolonged cease-fire with the YPG, suddenly Assad’s forces stepped up the brutality by killing many civilians in Hasakah, particularly by airdropped barrel bombs. Pro-Assad forces that made a deal with IS in northern Syria want to bring Hasakah under their joint control with IS, then move toward Qamishli and split the Kurdish Jazeera canton. To achieve that goal, the Assad regime was even using illegal cluster bombs, the YPG reported.

Assad forces alleged that the PYD cooperated with coalition forces and has long sold out the Assad regime. On the political front, the PYD has succeeded in having itself invited, despite opposition by Jabhat al-Nusra and the Damascus regime, to the Syrian Forces Conference planned to be held in Russia. In short, the PYD has betrayed Damascus by violating their agreement.

What are the positions of other relevant parties? While IS appears to be satisfied with the clashes, the Syrian opposition thinks that it may be a setup between the PYD and Assad regime on the eve of the Russia meeting. Opposition leader Abdulaziz Halife said: “The regime, by clashing with its partner YPG before the Moscow meeting, wants to create the impression that the Kurds are actually a part of the opposition and thus shake the unity of the opposition.”

In a nutshell, it is the IS that is delighted with the Hasakah clashes while Kurds, the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition accuse each other. Further escalation of Hasakah clashes can lead to a new and massive wave of displacement after housing tens of thousands of Syrians escaping from the war. The question now is whether Hasakah will be a new Mosul or Kobani.

Of course, this vital question has no meaning for those trying to survive the war in Hasakah. Should the clashes escalate, they will have no other option then but to take to the roads again for yet another uncertain future as another city in Syria goes feral.

Chad’s President Idriss Deby has secured control of regional operations against deadly Boko Haram Islamists, riding roughshod over his supposed allies in a week-long diplomatic and military offensive.

The strategy bore fruit on Wednesday, after a day of talks in Niger’s capital, Niamey, when the African Union confirmed that the headquarters of a new regional force would be based in N’Djamena.

There have been months of disagreement among the countries directly threatened by Boko Haram — Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger — on exactly how to take on the jihadists.

Each country agreed at a meeting in Paris last May to provide 700 soldiers for a regional force that was supposed to be deployed in November last year but has yet to materialise.

The issue came into sharp focus after the insurgents on January 3 captured the town of Baga on the shores of Lake Chad, where the borders of the four nations converge. They also overran the headquarters of an existing multi-national force.

Concern about the wider threat from Boko Haram has not just been regional. France’s Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian on Thursday said African countries must take action.

“It’s important that the countries in the region can organise themselves to be able to respond to this dramatic offensive which could destablise the whole of this region,” he told RTL radio.

– ‘Vital interests’ –
But veteran strongman Deby’s bid for control of the proposed new force had all the appearance of unilateral action as he invoked “the vital interests” of his country.

The first salvo came on January 14, when Chad’s government said it was minded to provide Cameroon’s military with “active support” in its response to the “criminal and terrorist acts of Boko Haram”.

“Faced with this situation which dangerously threatens the security and stability of Chad and harms its vital interests, the Chadian government would not stand on the sidelines,” it added.

The following evening, Cameroon’s President Paul Biya announced that N’Djamena “has decided to send a large contingent of Chadian armed forces to come and support the Cameroonian armed forces”.

On the morning of January 16, lawmakers hardly had time to vote on a motion authorising military deployment to Cameroon and Nigeria before columns of armoured vehicles set off from N’Djamena.

Nigerians, on the back foot for months over their willingness to lead regional military operations, appeared to be taken by surprise.

“Any support to our operations will be welcome but it has to be properly channelled to key into our own ongoing operations, considering the fact that place is a territory of Nigeria,” defence spokesman Chris Olukolade told AFP on January 17.

His words went unheeded as rumours swirled about the advance of Chadian troops.

A contingent is already in the Cameroonian town of Maltam, which is virtually opposite N’Djamena, to secure the Chadian capital’s airport.

French Rafale fighter jets are based there as part of Operation Barkhane targeting jihadist groups in the Sahel region.

Paris controls the fight against Islamists in Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Mauritania from N’Djamena, where it has long stationed troops.

Yaounde was guarded about the methods of its neighbour, saying on January 19 that “a large contingent” of Chadian soldiers was now in the country.

Leaders of both nations’ militaries needed to meet to work out precisely where to send the troops and when, said government spokesman Issa Tchiroma Bakary.