A senior Yemeni politician says Shiite rebels in control of the capital, Sanaa, are demanding their militia becomes part of the country’s army and police as a precondition for talks on releasing nation’s president and Cabinet members from house arrest.

The development is the latest in the power grab by the rebel Houthis who also control all major government buildings in Sanaa and several key military facilities.

Abdullah Noaman said on Monday that his Nasserite Party pulled out of UN-brokered talks the day before, after the Houthis demanded that their 20,000-strong militia join the country’s military and security forces as a precondition to any kind of deal.

The Houthis gave Yemeni political factions on Sunday a three-day ultimatum to reach an agreement, otherwise they said they’ll take over themselves.

Meanwhile, at least 10 people have been killed in Yemen over the past four days in attacks led by an al Qaeda’s affiliate against Shi’ite Houthi fighters and the Yemeni army, local officials and the group said.

Yemen has been in limbo since its president and prime minister resigned less than two weeks ago after the Houthis seized the presidential palace and confined the head of state to his residence in a struggle to tighten control over Yemen.

On Sunday, Ansar Al-Sharia said its members targeted and killed Abu Abdullah Al-Ayadi, a Houthi commander in Yemen’s central city of Ibb, according the group’s Twitter account.

Local officials in the city confirmed the death of the commander without giving further details.

The militants targeted Yemeni soldiers on Saturday and said it had killed two at a checkpoint in the southern city of Abyan and wounded two others, according to a post on its Twitter account.

Local officials in the region said that clashes between the army and the militants had also led to the death of at least three Ansar Al-Sharia members.

The group also said on Twitter it shot an army officer in the southern province of Lahj on Friday and killed three other Houthi fighters in the central province of Al-Bayda on Thursday.

Source:  albawaba

Four years since the famous 2011 uprising centered on Tahrir Square, the hopes then raised of a huge, and relatively peaceful, political transition now seem naïve. Egypt is under unambiguous military rule once more.

Despite the best efforts of the Western-facing Egyptian intelligentsia – alongside the Anglophone commentators with whom they overlap and intermingle incestuously – to obfuscate what happened and blame Egypt’s first elected government for its own demise, there is very little ambiguity as to what went wrong.

Inexplicably bewildered by predictable Islamist success at the ballot box, secularists rushed back into the waiting arms of the security state. They sought and found authoritarian protection from the electoral success of the Islamists, whose conservative populism successfully mustered feelings of national and religious pride behind a project of economic and socially centrist nation-building..

The secularists lack of foresight and disregard for their fellow citizens has been matched by a lack of honest hindsight and of any sense of accountability for their part in the ongoing horror-show on Egypt’s streets and in her full-to-the-brim prisons (where protests have apparently broken out among the inmates).

As recently as late December last year, Hisham A Hellyer, perhaps the archetypical denialist (de-Nile-ist?), wrote in Foreign Policy on the topic of a constitutional declaration in which Morsi stripped the courts (staffed by Mubarak-era appointees) of the ability to annul presidential decisions (which they had been doing with counter-revolutionary gusto):

Morsi, in a move of supreme hubris, granted himself freedom from judicial oversight, provoking large protests against his government. In the aftermath, Brotherhood members were accused of physically abusing dozens of opposition protesters. Not surprisingly, any trace of the trust between the revolutionaries and the Brotherhood evaporated.

Hellyer presents both Morsi’s move against the judiciary (really a move to secure an imminent constitutional referendum), and the violence committed by his supporters outside the Ittihadiya Presidential Palace, in a vacuum. He doesn’t mention the fierce obstructionism of the old, Mubarak-era judiciary, which had dissolved an Islamist-majority parliament and one constituent assembly already at this point. Nor does he mention that Morsi, relinquished his judicial immunity 17 days later.

From the outset Morsi had promised to do this once the constitution had been voted on and was no longer threatened with judicial derailment by the judges of the old regime. In the end, as a reaction to public disquiet and international hysteria, he did so even before this. Thankfully the referendum still went forward, with a large majority of Egyptians expressing their support.

Similarly Hellyer doesn’t explain that the violence that Muslim Brotherhood members were accused of perpetrating took place during a street-fight with secular forces who were themselves violent – and indeed killed some five Muslim Brotherhood supporters. Also absent is the fact that this was part of a pattern of aggression directed at Brotherhood supporters.

In hindsight, one wonders even of the cosmopolitan core of the Tahrir movement how much they really wanted or expected real democracy – like with actual elections, and stuff.

The extent to which they were unprepared for this can be gauged by the frenzied tracts written in reaction to their repeated electoral losses, and indeed at times written in attempts to stave off democratic competition. Novelist Alaa Al Aswany called for the illiterate to be banned from voting. Leading Egyptian liberal Mohammed El Baradei (a nuclear physicist) bafflingly declared Mohammed Morsi (a high-tech materials engineer) “not qualified to govern.”

Many secular Egyptians marched in support of both Shafiq and Sisi. While Islamists have often acquiesced to the military and police forces – whose main victims they have long been – it is difficult to find examples of large-scale Islamist support for the old regime. Despite all this it has been very difficult for secular Western progressives to accept that in Egypt the people who look and sound most like us, and who superficially at least think in the most similar terms, tend to be on the side of the state, of empire, of oppression, and horrendous inequality.

The Brotherhood
In the early days – the first three – of the uprising of January 2011, the Brotherhood vacillated before throwing its weight and numbers behind the revolution. After living in Egypt and meeting many people on both sides of the Islamist-secular divide, it became clear to me that one reason for the Muslim Brotherhood’s hesitance was that they doubted the revolutionary commitment of the young secular crowds in Tahrir.

This same segment of the population had, for decades, ignored the regime’s horrific oppression of Islamist opposition (and other opposition if and when it did crop up). The Islamists’ big fear was that if they joined the revolution and then halfway through the cool-kids-from-Cairo lost their nerve or their will to fight, it would be the Islamists left to face the regime’s wrath.

This is exactly what has happened, only far worse than anyone predicted.

Throughout its history the Brotherhood leadership has repeatedly stated that they see electoral democracy as compatible with the teachings of Islam, and stressed the importance of achieving change through peaceful and democratic means, while other groups advocated violent resistance.

In the immediate post-revolutionary period, it seemed this strategy would be vindicated.

Parliamentary elections were held, with voting taking place in stages from November 2011 to January 2012. The Muslim Brotherhood won a little over 40% of the seats in parliament, and, together with the more hardline Islamists, they formed a government.

Many secular Egyptians criticized the Brotherhood for this alliance. It is clear in hindsight, however, that they had very little choice. The secularists were not interested in a partnership with them. When assuming the presidency, Mohammad Morsi would offer Hamdeen Sabahi the job of vice president. He refused, instead joining with other losers from the election and Mohammed El-Baradei, a prominent Egyptian secularist and former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in Tahrir Square, from where they called on Morsi to join them as equals in a “presidential council.”

The new government’s first order of business was the creation of a new constitution; a constituent assembly was created, its membership roughly reflecting the proportions of each different political block. This wasn’t good enough for the secularists, who walked out of the process repeatedly, complaining of Islamist
domination. Most of their complaints focused on the demand that the Islamists surrender their voting majority and engage in a consensus-based process. The Islamists, who felt that they had made more than enough concessions – leaving the sections of the constitution relating to religion and its role in government basically untouched from the nominally secular constitution that preceded it – carried on without them.

As all this unfolded, the presidential elections took place, with Morsi claiming victory in June 2012.

Through elections monitored and approved by international observers like the Carter Institute, the Islamists had won control of both the legislature and the executive. Only the judiciary, and Egypt’s unofficial fourth branch of government, the military, remained in the hands of the old regime.

As Morsi assumed the presidency, the courts ordered the parliament dissolved over a technicality and the generals issued a decree taking over not only parliament’s legislative powers, including the power to choose a new committee to the constituent authority, but even a veto power over decisions by the president on military matters such as the declaration of war.

Attempting to regain the political momentum, Morsi pushed back. In August 2012, a little more than a month into his presidency, Morsi was emboldened by the armed forces’ embarrassment in the aftermath of an ambush which apparently caught the well-funded military unawares. The ambush led to the death of 16 soldiers and the loss of two military vehicles, which were then used in an attack on Israel.

Subsequently, Morsi forced the Head of the Armed Forces and Defense Minister Mohammad Hussein Tantawi into semi-retirement, naming Tantawi and his right-hand man, General Sami Annan, as presidential advisers.

In a compromise that arguably sowed the seeds of his downfall, Morsi did not name a civilian as the new defense minister. Instead he named former Head of Military Intelligence El-Sisi, the man who would lead the coup against him in less than a year’s time.

Morsi also tried to move against the courts, seeking the retirement of Chief Prosecutor Abdelmeguid Mahmoud by offering him the position of Egyptian ambassador to the Vatican. Mahmoud refused.
As Morsi announced his move, Egypt’s famous Tahrir Square was full once more with many of the urban secular youth who had been at the forefront of the 2011 uprising. They weren’t cheering against the prosecutor however; they were cheering against Morsi. The prosecutor kept his job.

This was just one of the battles between the elected branches of government and the judiciary, which remained staffed by officials appointed under the old regime. The courts had already dissolved one constituent assembly and the parliament that had selected them.

The second constituent assembly, however, was able to finish its work after Morsi made an extraordinary declaration: until a referendum was held on the new constitution, his decisions could not be challenged in court. The declaration also included more general attacks on the judiciary and the military. He ordered the former to conduct fresh investigations into protester deaths and reclaimed the extraordinary powers the latter had granted itself by decree. These had included legislative powers, which Morsi took over pending elections of a fresh parliament. This was something he eagerly sought, but which was thwarted first by the courts, who prevented him from bringing the elections forward, and then finally by the military, who staged a coup three months before their scheduled date.

In the large section of the Egyptian media that was hostile to the Brotherhood, and basically the entire international media, however, the decree played very differently. Morsi was presented as riding roughshod over the wishes of the people, with fingers pointed to fresh protests in Tahrir as proof.

Yet, when the referendum went ahead (in the face of threats from the judiciary that judges would refuse their role in overseeing the vote), the anti-Morsi protesters were shown to represent a clear minority. The Brotherhood-backed constitution was approved; the yes-vote prevailed with a 63% majority.

Morsi had by then lifted his power of immunity from judicial review, earlier than promised. This action had gone largely unreported at the time though, making the misrepresentations of Hellyer and his ilk possible even now, more than two years later.

The Empire’s Pet Rebels
These events did not stop Morsi’s critics from questioning his legitimacy. Prominent members of the protest movement against Mubarak increasingly used the same tactics and language they had used against the dictator against this newly elected leader, accusing him of appointing himself as a new pharaoh. This while press controlled by military regime accomplices published protest movement claims of mass popular opposition to the elected president alongside editorial calls for the army to retake power.

Over the first half of 2013, a movement called Tamarod, which means “Rebel” emerged, calling for mass protests to force Morsi from power. Tamarod collected signatures calling for an early election and claimed they had gathered more than 20 million, but refused independent verification of this.

The combined efforts of Al Jazeera and the Investigative Reporting Program at UC Berkeley would later reveal Tamarod’s leaders had long histories of receiving funds from the United States. Following the coup, they threw their support behind Sisi despite his ever expanding crackdown leading to the arrest of many secular protesters and activists, including those who had participated in their anti-Morsi campaign.

The climax of the Tamarod movement came with mass protests held on June 30, 2013. On 1 July, Sisi’s voice was broadcast across the nation, announcing that unless Morsi took unspecified actions to “respond to the people’s demands” within 48 hours, the army would step in and impose a “road map.” On 3 July the deadline passed and General Sisi declared Morsi’s presidency over. Egypt’s first elected president’s own presidential guard took him into custody.

The international press – and even much of the left-wing press – celebrated this as a display of Egyptian people power, largely ignoring the role played by establishment forces.

The Sisi Era
A few days later the army and police opened fire on a sit-in by Morsi’s supporters outside the republican guard building where they believed the elected head of state was being held. A minimum of 51 protesters were killed.

Despite this massacre, pro-Morsi protests continued, the main one being in Rabaa square. In August it too would be cleared with massive violence. According to Human Rights Watch a minimum of 817 people were killed, but they add that the real number was likely more than a thousand. We may never know. It was to be the beginning of the most violently repressive period in Egypt’s modern history.

On 28 April 2014, with the army still struggling to control the country and put down constant anti-coup protests, The Muslim Brotherhood’s General Guide Mohammad Badie was sentenced to death along with 680 others (mostly tried in absentia). The court case reportedly took less than 10 minutes. No defense was presented and the full list of defendants’ names was not even read. This was the second such mass trial, with the same court previously sentencing 527 people to death for murder following the death of a single police officer at a protest.

It was not just the top figures who faced threats from the resurgent security state. The Brotherhood’s leadership was systematically hunted down. A Carnegie Foundation report from March 2014 estimated some 2,590 political leaders, mostly from the Brotherhood, had been arrested along with at least 16,000 protesters.

In this context fresh elections were held, which Sisi won easily, having already put those who would be his main opponents in jail.

The turnout at the ballot-box was anemic. Estimates stand as low as 7.5% (for the first two days of voting); most observers accept that the official figure of 46% of registered voters was not credible. Even Hamdeen Sabahi, who ran again – this time coming third with around 3% of the vote (beaten by invalid or protest votes) – called the official turnout figures “an insult to the intelligence of Egyptians” during his concession speech.

The same could have been said of much of Sisi’s so-called “campaign,” during which he had several disastrous television appearances. When questioned about unemployment in one such appearance, Sisi detailed a job creation plan apparently off the top of his head, involving 1,000 refrigerated trucks, each with a staff of three to sell vegetables, creating a total of 3,000 jobs, when Egypt’s official unemployment figure is over 3.5 million. Most credible observers moreover believe this number to be a drastic underestimate. Sisi suggested the solution for Egypt’s bread crisis was to cut each loaf into smaller pieces. He suggested the solution to the problem of Egypt’s slums was to simply demolish them, saying:

We can very well go to 10,000 houses, and bring them down in two hours. Reduce them to rubble, like this [gestures a falling motion with both hands] reduce them to rubble like this, they will be reduced to the ground [still gesturing with both hands]. This will send a message. But will people endure this? Egypt’s problems have not been confronted for 50 years. Since ’67 they were not confronted. And they grew and accumulated, until it became like a monster, that will devour our country.

The most terrifying thing, perhaps, about this last rant was Sisi’s apparent lack of any understanding that others may see him as the personification of the problems that need to be confronted; that the military he led was the monster, devouring Egypt.

Incredibly Sisi’s visions of mass slum demolition did indeed go ahead during the early part of his presidency, only worse. Between four and twenty children were killed in the Cairo suburb of Dar EalSalam when one such demolition was shoddily conducted.

The Egyptian army, in a move reminiscent of Sisi’s deadly slum demolitions mentioned above, also destroyed hundreds of houses in the border town of Rafah to create a 500 meter buffer zone along the border with Gaza. Residents were reportedly compensated with payments of US $125, supposedly to get them through the first three months of homelessness while more substantive compensation is organized.

Protesters are being arrested and killed in unprecedented numbers. Even the taboos that had partially protected female protesters have eroded and they are subject to violence like never before. This should not be surprising considering Sisi’s role defending the infamous “virginity tests” back in 2011.

In general, it is business as usual, only worse. Similarly, terrorist tactics from the extreme Islamists have continued, but worse. A 24 October 2014 attack in Sinai was the deadliest on record, killing 31 soldiers. Increased attacks have also hit targets in Cairo and other built up areas like Mansoura. The group that carried out the Mansoura attack which killed 16 police, Ansar Bayt al Maqdis, has since pledged its allegiance to the nascent “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria.

This author cannot help but speculate more broadly that such forces – the violent fundamentalists – are gaining ground in the intra-Islamic debate between those who advocate violent means and those who say that Islam and democracy can be compatible. The latter position has no better representative than the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, who suffered repression for decades and continue to, while maintaining a strong ethos of non-violence. For a brief moment it looked like that might pay off better than anyone had hoped. But, in an example of history repeating (both as tragedy and farce) their peaceful victories were taken from them by men with guns and a line to Washington

Source:  annahar

On Saturday, members of the U.S. Congress criticized Turkey for letting ISIS organization enter the country and travel to Europe through its territory to carry out suicide and armed attacks.

The American website ‘BuzzFeed News’ interviewed members of the Senate and House of Representatives who “warned Turkey that the country’s government must take aggressive steps to stop the passage of ISIL militants to Europe.”

The website quoted the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee Richard Bohr as saying, “I think the Turks have a lot of work to do, in terms of the level of their cooperation. This is a war. And they certainly aren’t treating it that way.”

Source:  iraqinews

A Taliban source announced that the Taliban captured the ISIS group leader in Afghanistan, known as Mullah Abdul-Rauf Kazim, according to the Pajhwok Afghan News.

The Taliban captured Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim, along with 45 supporters in the district of Kajaki, located in southern Helmand province, a reliable source told the Pajhwok, but Afghan officials did not yet confirm the detention.

A US defense contractor said Sunday that two of its American employees came under fire in the latest attack against Westerners in Saudi Arabia.

It was the second time in recent months that staff of the contractor Vinnell Arabia have been targeted.
“We can confirm that two Vinnell Arabia employees were involved in an incident on Friday, in which they were shot at by assailants in the al-Ahsa province of Saudi Arabia,” the company said in a statement issued through a public relations firm.

“Both employees were injured but are in stable condition at a local hospital,” it added.

Saudi police said earlier that one American had been wounded in a shooting.

“A car carrying two American nationals… came under fire from an unknown source,” on Friday afternoon in al-Ahsa, part of the eastern region which is the source of most of the kingdom’s oil wealth, police said.

Vinnell Arabia provides training for the Saudi National Guard, a parallel army.

A source close to the incident told AFP that several rounds were fired at the Vinnell vehicle from a white car.
The Vinnell driver was hit several times, the source said, adding he was not aware of injuries to the second employee who was able to drive his wounded colleague to hospital.

The incident occurred just east of a National Guard base near Hofuf city.

On Friday, a resident of al-Ahsa told AFP that police had blocked off the area around a National Guard facility.

Asked about a possible motive for the shooting, interior ministry spokesman General Mansour al-Turki said: “We’re still waiting for the results of the investigation.”

The attack is the fourth against Westerners in the kingdom since October. It comes as Saudi Arabia participates in United States-led air strikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) jihadist group in Syria, raising concerns about possible retaliation.

In October, one Vinnell employee was shot dead and another wounded at a petrol garage in the capital Riyadh.

The interior ministry identified the suspected shooter as a US-born Saudi who had been fired from Vinnell Arabia.

He was shot and wounded in a gunfight with security officers.

“It was not a terrorist-related incident,” Turki said.

Vinnell’s Facebook page says it is “dedicated to providing the best in military training, logistics and support” to the Saudi National Guard, using expertise from former US military and government personnel.

The Guard has around 200,000 men whose duties include combatting “terrorism.”

It has infantry, mechanised and special forces wings, and is reportedly to acquire Black Hawk and Apache helicopters from the US this year.

Formed from tribes traditionally loyal to the al-Saud dynasty, it operates in parallel, and as a palace-directed counterbalance, to the regular armed forces.

The October shooting of a Dane was the first deadly attack on Westerners in Saudi Arabia since several were killed in a wave of Al-Qaeda violence between 2003 and 2007.

Among the targets at that time were housing compounds where foreigners lived, including one which was home to Vinnell staff.

Security around Western facilities has since been markedly increased.

The latest attack on Vinnell recalls the wounding of a Dane in November. He was driving away from his workplace when he was fired on from another car.

Last month, security officers arrested three Saudis on suspicion of involvement in that attack, saying the suspects acted “in support of” ISIS.

A week after the Dane’s shooting, someone stabbed and wounded a Canadian while he shopped at a mall on Saudi Arabia’s Gulf coast.

Police arrested a Saudi suspect but Turki said the incident was not “terrorist”-related.

Saudi Arabia blamed ISIS-linked suspects for the November killing of seven members of the minority Shia community in Eastern Province, including children.

Saudi Arabia’s air force participated in US-led bombing strikes against ISIS, which has seized swathes of Iraq and Syria, since September. Jordan, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates are also participating in the bombing led by the US.

It is the first time since the 1991 Gulf War that Arab states have made common cause to join US-led military action.

Source:  al-akhbar

A suspected US drone strike on a car in Yemen killed three men believed to be Al Qaida militants on Saturday, local residents said, showing no let up in the hits despite the resignation of the president who backed the programme.

Chadian forces have killed 120 militants from Boko Haram in a battle in the north of neighbouring Cameroon that began when the insurgents attacked its troops, the army said in a statement on Saturday, adding that three of its soldiers were killed.

Boko Haram has recently launched cross-border attacks from Nigeria into Cameroon and Chad as part of its five-year drive for an Islamist state in the northeast of Nigeria.

Chad and Cameroon have stepped up troop deployments to fight the militants and on Saturday Chad’s army said it bombarded Boko Haram militants.

The African Union (AU) has authorised a force of 7 500 troops from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin to fight the militants and the nations will meet in the Cameroon capital next week to decide on its command structure, Ghana President John Mahama told journalists on Saturday.

“When they meet in Yaounde the rules of engagement will be agreed by the nations constituting the force. It will allow them to move across borders because Boko Haram does not recognise borders,” Mahama said on his return from an AU summit.

Chad has a reputation as one of the region’s best militaries and it helped French forces drive al Qaeda-linked Islamists from northern Mali in 2013. But previous efforts to create a regional force to fight the militants have faltered.

Source:  sabc.co.za

A Peshmerga source explained the situation to BasNews: “Following the IS attack in western Kirkuk early on Friday morning, they captured Mullah Abdullah. Fifteen Peshmerga near the village found themselves surrounded by insurgents.”

After the village and area was retaken by Peshmerga forces on Saturday, they found that four of the Kurdish fighters had been killed in the battle.

Al-Anbar (IraqiNews.com) On Saturday, Iraqi Ministry of Defense announced, that 30 elements of the ISIS group have been killed during fierce clashes with the Iraqi forces in areas of southern Anbar.

The ministry said in a statement obtained by IraqiNews, “Iraqi troops of the Army’s Eighth Brigade have managed to repel an intensive attack by the ISIS group militants on the area of al-Fallahat,” pointing out that, “The fierce clashes between the two sides resulted in killing 32 terrorists, including four snipers and seven suicide bombers within the ISIS group.”