The site, located on the outskirts of the village of Ras Baalbek in the northern Bekaa, 40 kilometers (25 miles) north of the town of Baalbek, was reinforced with additional units arrived after it became apparent that the militants aimed to attack the Christian-majority villages there. The move was part of IS’ plan to take over the lands surrounding Arsal, connect them to the town of Arsal then to the rest of the Christian towns of the northern Bekaa, reaching Danniyeh and Akkar in the north.

After the attempt failed, the armed groups turned their attention to taking control over the largest area possible and impose their conditions on the Lebanese government.

Well-informed security sources told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity that the available intelligence revealed that the main goal was to kidnap more soldiers to add to those in captivity since the Aug. 2 battle in Arsal. IS hopes to strengthen its position in the negotiations to release the kidnapped soldiers, as well as build pressure on the Lebanese government.

Interestingly, the attack took place less than 24 hours after Lebanese commander Gen. Jean Kahwagi visited the units spread across the outskirts of Arsal, where he stressed the need to “prevent terrorism from reaching Lebanon, no matter how much blood and sacrifice it takes.” The sources believed that the militants wanted to send a message to the army leadership, reaffirming that they still have cards to play.

Although controlling the hills in the region is an essential goal for the armed groups, the sources ruled out the possibility that the recent attack on Tallet al-Hamra was intended to let IS remain there, since that would require a comprehensive military operation to protect the militants and secure logistical supply roads by occupying the neighboring hills, including Tallet Umm Khaled (the closest to Tallet al-Hamra), Tahoun al-Hawa hill, Mkhairmeh and Khirbet al-Jrash. 

The sources noted that there is no military presence in these hills, but they are strategic points of access to the area around Arsal. In addition, such an operation would require a much larger number of militants than the around 70 who executed the attack. According to the same sources, after regaining control over Tallet al-Hamra, the Lebanese army took over a number of neighboring hills after using bulldozers to open roads and connect them to one another.

There are two factors behind the attack against this specific hill. The first is the tight measures taken by the army after the battle in August 2014, which saw the closing of the crossings between the town of Arsal and its surroundings. Attempts to attack regions controlled by Hezbollah, such as al-Labweh and Brital, failed.
The second factor seems to be the purposeful attacking of a Christian-majority region in the outskirts of Ras Baalbek, because if it fell, it would create fear and instability among Christians, which might result in their displacement, as has been the case in neighboring countries. 

This would allow the militants to easily take control over these villages. However, investing in the field aspect might not be limited to displacing the Christian residents of Ras Baalbek and could extend to spreading fear in the Christian villages of Central Bekaa such as al-Firzel, Ablah, Zahle and Drous. The sources believed that targeting these towns would allow the militants to achieve both field and moral gains.

The field aspect is related to how close these villages are to the international road connecting Beirut to Damascus. Al-Sham Road has a strategic importance to the supply lines to Syria and is a vital crossing connecting the northern Bekaa to central and western Bekaa, where some Christian villages are located. It also connects the Bekaa region to the south, particularly to the villages of al-Arkoub, adjacent to the Syrian town of Beit Jinn, which is under the control of the militants and the entry point from which they try to get through to Arkoub. 

This goal cannot be achieved unless the militants invest in the moral gains they are aiming to accomplish in the event that their plan in Ras Baalbek had worked and they had succeeded in displacing its residents as well as the residents of other regions by spreading fear across the Christian villages of the central and western Bekaa, guaranteeing there would be no resistance.

This plan does not seem to have been implemented so far, as the Lebanese army has prevented the militants from advancing in Tallet al-Hamra and have taken control over the neighboring hills. In addition, the Syrian army is in control over the other side of the borders in central Bekaa toward Jdeidet Yabous, al-Masnaa and the adjacent regions to Qusaya, Helweh and Kfar Zabad. Thus, the situation will remain as it is, as both parties wait for field developments to allow them to improve their positions.

On Jan. 31, the militants advanced in Tallet al-Hamra before the army stopped them. On Feb. 2, the army also targeted the terrorists’ movements in Tall el-Mkhairimi in the same area. As the terrorists persist in their attempts to breach this location and the army retaliates, the next round is only a matter of time.

One of Libya’s senior diplomats is in Washington this week on a lonely mission to drag the US back into the Libyan fray.

Aref Ali Nayed, the Bayda-based government’s ambassador to the UAE, says the Islamic State (IS), or ISIS, risks taking over Libya and turning it into a global terrorism base. He wants help kicking IS militants out — along with the rival Libyan Dawn government in Tripoli that he says made their rise possible.“What I think many people don’t know is how much [IS] has infiltrated Libya [and turned it] into its ATM machine, gas station and airport from which it can basically attack any European target,” Nayed said in an interview at Al-Monitor’s Washington office.

“It’s the most important risk to the security of the region, be it to our Arab neighbors, our African neighbors or our European neighbors across the Mediterranean.”

An Islamic scholar and longtime foe of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamists who have taken over the western part of the country, Nayed is officially in Washington to update the US Institute of Peace on its 15-month-old partnership with the Libya Institute for Advanced Studies, an educational program he chairs. Among its efforts is a groundbreaking compendium of Islamic State incidents — kidnappings, executions, etc. — in Libya since July.

As Congress prepares to debate a new war authorization against Islamic State, Nayed plans to share those findings with key members of both parties and urge them not to forget about Libya. He points out that the democratically elected and internationally recognized parliament in Tobruk last week announced its desire to be part of the international coalition against Islamic State, and would welcome US help.

“There is no reason to treat Libya as an isolated case, especially when it is the most important country when it comes to resources,” Nayed said. “You cannot fight [IS] effectively in Iraq or Syria without including Libya, because of the flow of arms, fighters and money. It is a network, and a network of darkness needs a network of light to fight it. You cannot fight networks by simply focusing on certain nodes; it’s like trying to eliminate cancer from a body by treating one tumor.”

The embattled government is seeking help with humanitarian assistance, as well as technical coordination with NATO, Africom and regional forces on counter-terrorism, border control and trafficking of arms and fighters, Nayed said. The Bayda-based government doesn’t want US boots on the ground, but may welcome air strikes such as those targeting Islamic State fighters in Syria and Iraq.

Just as important, he said, the international community needs to put its support behind Libyan government entities that it has formally recognized, such as the Central Bank, the National Oil Company and the Libyan Investment Authority.

“Ambiguity about who’s in control of Libyan assets is a very destructive thing — it leads to the misuse of these assets and continued looting for the use of terrorism,” Nayed said. “We need to act on actually supporting these entities. For example, it’s ludicrous that the Libyan army still cannot import the equipment it needs because of UN sanctions.”

The Obama administration and Congress soured on Libya after the civil strife that followed the fall of strongman Moammar Gadhafi. Relations further deteriorated after the attack that killed US Ambassador Christopher Stevens in 2012, but Nayed said the previous government’s seeming reluctance to help catch and punish those responsible argues in favor of getting involved now.

“The problem is the infiltration of extremists,” Nayed said. “The reason the Libyan state did not cooperate with the USA in capturing the killers of my friend Chris Stevens is precisely because that government was infiltrated.

How can you expect them to help you when the extremists control the nodes of the state?”
Nayed went on to argue that Washington has fallen for a two-pronged narrative about Libya: That the situation is hopeless, and that the two rival factions in Tripoli and Bayda just need to agree to share the spoils. He’s here to tell them that’s bunk.

“Muslim Brotherhood-associated lobbyists have been pushing this line of ‘two governments that have to discuss things with each other.’ That’s a huge mistake and a betrayal of the values of democracy,” Nayed said. “The guys in Tripoli are basically a bunch of thugs. They’re not partners in the fight against terrorism; they are precisely part of the problem. They are incubating terrorism and using the democratic system to further their ends.”

He said he welcomes the UN-sponsored peace talks that are set to start inside Libya within the next few days. But he cautioned that a unity government “cannot be inclusive of exclusivists or Trojans who are trying to sabotage the Libyan state.”

“That process must not be a process of letting Trojans back into the system whereby they can control the nodes of the state,” Nayed said.

Asked if last week’s attack against the Corinthia Hotel, which has been claimed by the Islamic State’s Tripoli branch, could bring the two governments closer together, Nayed scoffed. The hotel serves as residence to Libyan Dawn Prime Minister Omar al-Hassi, who appears to have been the target of the attack.

“Part of the reason [IS] is rising in Libya is because Islamists have been able to control nodes of the Libyan state for the past four years by having key positions in the Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry, the Central Bank, the Auditor General, the intelligence service,” he said. “They’ve been able to further their interests and to use Libyan funds.”

Tripoli officials have taken a similar stand, placing the blame for the attack on Gen. Khalifa Hifter, the military commander of the eastern forces trying to dislodge Libyan Dawn.

“We have seen initial reports on Facebook and social media from some sites that they are saying they are from [IS] and are claiming the attack. Following up with our own intelligence services, we have seen that these social media are not authentic sources,” Hassi told the Bloomberg news service.

“We do believe this action was taken by the Hifter government with the possible aid of Egyptian intelligence, in an operation to try to show that there is instability in the capital, where we have provided stability for the residents, and to give the impression that terrorist organizations are able to operate in Tripoli.”

Such accusations of political shenanigans are rife in Libya, and Nayed himself has been accused of using his diplomatic office to get the UAE to arrest several Libyan political rivals.

He says the stories were planted by Muslim Brotherhood operatives that he’s been battling since working with the National Transitional Council during the uprising against Gadhafi in 2011, and points out that he’s even helped get the UAE to release three of the arrested Libyans.

“I have no illusions: I am under attack by the Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. “But at the same time I am neither afraid of that attack, nor does it dissuade me from supporting Libyan citizens even if they belong to the Muslim Brotherhood. I still deliver their consular rights, and I dare anyone or challenge anyone to prove otherwise.”

 Local news portal Nice Matin has reported that one soldier sustained a facial injury, another a leg wound, and one was grazed on the chin.

The suspected attacker was quickly taken into custody by the police.

L’avanzata militare degli Houthi verso la capitale Sana‘a ha dato una forte accelerata alla crisi yemenita, provocando la caduta del secondo governo in quattro anni – con la destituzione e l’arresto del presidente Hadi e del suo esecutivo da parte dei ribelli – e privando Barack Obama di un prezioso alleato nella lotta al terrorismo qaidista.

 Il frazionamento politico e settario che vive oggi lo Yemen pone rischia di far precipitare il paese in un nuovo conflitto civile. I diversi piani di instabilità paralleli (richieste indipendentiste a sud, rivolta Houthi, rivendicazioni clanico-tribali sunnite, in parte appoggiate dall’Arabia Saudita, e il jihadismo legato ad al-Qaida nella Penisola arabica) pongono seri dubbi riguardo alla sua evoluzione nel breve e nel medio termine. Sulla base delle attuali contingenze sul campo, si possono elaborare due possibili scenari sul prossimo futuro del paese.

Scanario A: Una mediazione possibile – nel primo caso, potrebbe prevalere la spinta al dialogo tra le fazioni più moderate che si oppongono agli Houthi, in linea con la scadenza di tre giorni fissata dagli stessi Houthi ai partiti per formare una coalizione di governo. Fin dalla fine del 2014, il partito al-Islah, affiliato ai Fratelli musulmani e principale oppositore politico del movimento armato sciita, ha cercato una mediazione politica con esso.

Come già è avvenuto a fine novembre scorso, i vertici di al-Islah potrebbero dunque trovare un accordo con gli Houthi per uscire dall’impasse nel quale è precipitato il partito sunnita, schiacciato militarmente tra i combattenti sciiti e l’ex presidente Saleh sempre più schierato con essi da un lato, e una scomoda alleanza forzosa con Ansar al-Sharia, la sezione yemenita al-Qaida nella penisola arabica (Aqap), dall’altro. In questo caso andrebbe ricostituendosi una base di consenso – se non di parziale unità – nazionale, dalla quale le forze yemenite, sciite e sunnite, potrebbero ripartire per appianare le divergenze interne e fare fronte comune contro il terrorismo jihadista – scenario questo sicuramente apprezzato dagli Usa, ma che potrebbe suscitare alcune perplessità in Arabia Saudita, decisamente contraria ad un coinvolgimento politico dei gruppo filo-islamisti.

Scenario B: Verso il conflitto – Qualora invece non venisse raggiunto alcun accordo intra-settario tra i partiti, potrebbe verificarsi quella ‘protezione dello stato’ già prospettata dalla ‘leadership rivoluzionaria’ degli Houthi. Uno sviluppo di questo tipo potrebbe tradursi in due ulteriori possibili scenari per il paese. Nel primo caso – che parrebbe il più probabile – la presa effettiva del potere da parte del movimento armato zaydita farebbe precipitare il paese nel caos: le numerose proteste sunnite anti-Houthi, finora pacifiche, si trasformerebbero probabilmente in aperta guerriglia contro il gruppo zaydita.

Al contempo, un simile scenario farebbe indubbiamente il gioco di Ansar al-Sharia, vista l’ulteriore radicalizzazione sunnita che un gesto unilaterale di questo tipo provocherebbe. Alternativamente, grazie alla superiorità sul campo degli Houthi e alle divisioni interne ai suoi oppositori, anche a fronte di un colpo di mano del movimento armato sciita la situazione yemenita potrebbe cristallizzarsi in una situazione di ‘stabile instabilità, ovvero in un protratto conflitto a bassa intensità. Quest’ultima ipotesi tuttavia nel lungo periodo non gioverebbe alla stabilità regionale, e in ogni caso aiuterebbe quella radicalizzazione in cui sperano i jihadisti.

Molto dipenderà in ogni caso dall’eventuale riavvicinamento tra Arabia Saudita e Iran sul dossier Yemen. Così come in ciascuna delle instabili realtà regionali, nel lungo periodo la mancanza di dialogo e l’aperta opposizione tra queste due potenze di area minerebbe alla base qualsiasi processo di risoluzione della crisi yemenita.

Source. ISPI

The Iraqi Defense Ministry has received an undisclosed number of Russian ‘Night Hunter’ helicopters, according to a statement released on Monday.

The Iraqi government first put Night Hunters into service against Islamic State (IS) militants in 2014. They are used to support ground forces attacking the extremists.

There have been international military support for Iraqi army as well as Kurdish Peshmerga forces in recent month to strengthen Iraqi forces in its fight against the Islamic State militants.