Two explosions, said to be suicide bombs, are reported to have killed six member of Libya National Army in Benghazi’s war-torn Leithi district.

Twenty others are reported injured. The explosions occurred early this evening.

“The blasts were a huge,” a resident in nearby Hay Zawia (formerly Hay Al-Fatah) told the Libya Herald.

According to Al-Nabaa TV, Benghazi Revolutionaries’ Shoura Council (BRSC) has claimed the bombings were in revenge for the death of Bouka Al-Araibi, killed yesterday.

Bouka’s Brega Martyr’s Brigade was part of the BRSC.

The BRSC includes Ansar Al-Sharia but until now it had not thought to include fighters belonging to the Islamic State (IS).

However, suicide bombs are part of IS tactics (but generally not of Ansar) and it has claimed that Bouka had joined them.

Also, Ansar is reported not to be fighting in Leithi any longer and to have left the battle there against the LNA and Operation Dignity to IS.

The LNA have been slowly gaining territory in Leithi, almost all of whose residents have fled the area.
There is no confirmation yet that the explosions were suicide bombs. They could have been bobby traps, another IS tactic.

There are also unconfirmed reports that those killed and wounded had been attending a military meeting in Leithi.

BMC and Jelaa have put out an urgent call for doctors and other medical staff to report for duty, saying that the wounded are in critical condition.

The United States will maintain its current 9, 800 troops in Afghanistan through the end of 2015, the White House said in a statement on Tuesday after President Barack Obama met Afghan President Ashraf Ghani.

“Based on President Ghani’s request for flexibility in the US drawdown timeline, the US will maintain its current posture of 9,800 troops through the end of 2015,” the White House said.

“The specific trajectory of the 2016 US troop drawdown will be established later in 2015 to enable the US troop consolidation to a Kabul-based embassy presence by the end of 2016,” the statement said.

The Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram has abducted between 350-500 people from the northeast Nigerian town of Damasak, Borno state, according to a report by Reuters. The abduction follows news of Nigerian officials liberating a new town while the terror group lost two female suicide bombers to a premature detonation.

Reuters reports that the exact number of those abducted from Damasak remains unknown, but residents reported Tuesday that the terror group stormed the town and “kidnapped more than 400 women and children.” One witness told Reuters that Boko Haram “took 506 young women and children,” though fifty were killed before they left the town.

Damasak had been under the control of Boko Haram for almost five months before Chadian and Nigerien troops liberated it in March. The town was attacked, though not recaptured, today, as troops waiting for Nigerian forces to arrive analyzed the damage done to the area.

Boko Haram reportedly killed hundreds in their attempt to solidify their presence in Damasak. Following the end of their occupation of the town, the coalition forces that had taken it over discovered a gigantic mass grave under a bridge in the town where at least 100 bodies are believed to have been buried. Blood stained the side of the bridge, indicating that the bodies–most found with their throats slit–were tossed down to the grave from the bridge.

On Saturday, coalition troops warned that the Nigerian forces controlled by President Goodluck Jonathan had not made any indication that they were going to return to Damasak and secure it from further Boko Haram attack. Three days later, the group swept the town, though they do not have a presence there as they did before coalition troops removed them.

Boko Haram has begun using its captives as suicide bombers, particularly young women. The need for more captives was made clear by the failure of two female suicide bombers on Sunday, who had allegedly prepared to attack a market in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno, on Monday.

According to Nigeria’s Pulse, the two attackers, both young women, died when their explosives detonated on their persons on Sunday afternoon, far from any target they could have been planning to attack. One witness stated,  “The suicide bombers were said to have been brought from Damaturu by one suspected Boko Haram terrorist, who dropped them in Jakana and told them to take a bus to the next town.” The girls were asking about the weekly Monday Market in the capital, the witness added.

Boko Haram is an official wing of the Islamic State, after ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi accepted a pledge of allegiance issued in audio allegedly by Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau.

A message purporting to be from Russian-speaking women with the Islamic State (IS) group in Syria and calling for other women to join them has been shared on social media.

The message was shared on the VKontakte social network by an IS supporter calling himself Abu Dudjana and is signed “your sisters from Islamic State.”

In calling on Russian-speaking Muslim women to come to Syria, the message employs two religious ideological concepts — hijra and jihad — that are used by IS to give justification for why foreign Muslims should come to fight in the Middle East.

“Hijra,” an Arabic term meaning “emigration,” has its roots in the Islamic Prophet Muhammad’s migration with his followers to Mecca in 622 CE. The physical and spiritual concept of hijra was co-opted by proponents of global jihad: Osama bin Laden called on Muslims to engage in hijra and described his followers as if they were reenacting Muhammad’s journey to Mecca.

“Jihad,” the Arabic term meaning struggle, is used by IS to mean a military struggle or holy war.

“We are addressing you from the blessed land of Sham,” the message begins, using the historic name for the province of Syria under the early Islamic caliphates, a term often employed by IS and other militants to refer to Syria.

The authors of the message say that they are calling on their “Muslim sisters in the lands of the infidels” to undertake hijra “because the state in which you now find yourselves is a state of humiliation and shame.”

Russian-speaking Muslim women are being oppressed by their non-Muslim governments, who forbid them from practicing Islam properly, the “sisters from Islamic State” argue.

“Every step you take is monitored, and once you go beyond what the kuffar [infidels] have allotted you in terms of practicing religion, you are immediately driven back,” the message says.

The authors of the message compare this situation with that in IS-controlled lands, where non-Muslims are forced to pay a tax known as “jizya” to their Muslim rulers.

“At a time when the infidels should be humbly begging you to accept their jizya, you yourselves voluntarily belong to them as property, which they then use to fight Islam. You work for the infidels, receiving a salary from them, the amount of which depends on how much you deny your religion. You pay for teachers, so they can teach your children to be infidels,” the message says.

However, the “sisters from Islamic State” say, Russian-speaking Muslim women have a choice to relocate to Syria, and live under IS rule.

‘Hijra Is A Religious Duty’
Beyond the arguments that Russian-speaking Muslims should move to Syria to avoid oppression, the “sisters from Islamic State” say that Muslim women in “infidel lands” are under a religious duty to do so.

“And there is nothing that could result in this being postponed. Neither the existence of debts or obligations, neither your parents nor your property or work — nothing should deter you from resettlement…. Understand, sisters, this is your religion and there is nothing more important in this world,” the message insists.

‘Come To Syria, Marry A Militant’
If avoiding oppression and fulfilling religious duty were not enough, the “sisters from Islamic State” offer Russian-speaking Muslims one more inducement — the possibility of marrying a nice, God-fearing militant.

For those women already have husbands who refuse to go to Syria, the solution is simple — they should leave their husbands behind and get new ones in the Middle East.

“Encourage your husbands, and if they turn away, then dump them without hesitation and move yourselves. Allah will give you, inshallah [God willing] mujahideen [militants] as husbands, who are God-fearing and sincere,” the “sisters from Islamic State” say.

In stressing the importance of hijra to Islam, the “sisters from Islamic State” hark back, as Osama bin Ladin did before them, to the example of the Prophet Muhammad and his journey to Mecca.

“Hijra was not easy for the Messenger of Allah [Muhammad]. It was a risk, and that risk is still here today. So let your main reserve be piety, sister. After all, if you fear God and trust in Him, He will find a way for you,” the message says.

‘Come To Syria, Make History’
Those women who come to Syria as instructed will be part of an exciting historical movement, and will have the opportunity to follow in the footsteps of the early Muslims who joined the Prophet Muhammad, according to the “sisters from Islamic State.”

“This is the land where important events in Islam will occur. And you have the chance to get involved and be part of it. Become like the Companions [the early Muslims who accompanied Muhammad], those great women who were part of that generation, when Islam had only just been affirmed,” the message says.

The messages given to Russian-speaking Muslim women by the “sisters from Islamic State” echo those given by other IS militants.

The call for Western Muslims to leave their homelands and join IS in Syria and Iraq has been a common theme in recent propaganda videos.

A November video titled What Are You Waiting For? featured a group of French militants who, like the “sisters in Syria” said that French Muslims had no excuse for not making hijra and coming to Syria.

The French militants also argue that Muslims in France are oppressed by their non-Muslim governments, saying that France has imposed laws on them.

IS has also targeted women, including Western women, as recruits.

A recent report by the British-based think tank Strategic Dialogue examining the motivations behind Western women’s recruitment to IS found that women felt Muslims were being oppressed, and that there was a larger war on Islam being waged by “infidel” — both arguments made by the “sisters from Islamic State” in their call for Russian-speaking women to come to Syria.

Five people were killed and eleven wounded on Tuesday when a suicide bomber blew up a car laden with explosives in front of an army camp in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi, army officials said.

In a separate incident, a rocket hit a residential building, killing a 17-year old girl and wounding four, the officials said.

Libya’s second-largest city is a war zone where forces allied to the country’s recognized government are fighting Islamist militants.

Even to those who have hunted him and followed his every move, Islamic State (IS) Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi remains a mystery.

Iraqi forces had him in their crosshairs on Nov. 8, 2014, but an airstrike came too late and a wounded Baghdadi, 44, managed to slip across the Syrian border. The self-styled caliph now travels secretly and has avoided the public eye, apart from his infamous Friday sermons at a mosque in Mosul. While seclusion has only raised his profile, Baghdadi’s origins remain wreathed in more mystery than his movements.

Uncovering the man behind the demagogue was no easy task, so to find an answer I interviewed people who met him, saw him or lived with him in the past. I visited the neighborhood where he lived in Baghdad and the mosque he led the prayer services as an imam; I saw pictures of his family members, including his sons, daughters, brothers and wife. Based on all this, I will try to depict the man before he became the elusive Baghdadi, when his name was Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, or Sheikh Ibrahim, of Samarra and he led a fairly normal life.

How did Sheikh Ibrahim become Caliph Baghdadi?

This was the main question to answer. The first place to visit was the neighborhood of Tobji, nestled in northwest Baghdad, where he lived and was the imam of the Sunni mosque of Haji Zeidan, built in 1958.

“People here are afraid of discussing this issue openly,” Khaled said. “My father has been arrested several times because of Baghdadi. The last time he was detained for almost two months. The intelligence wanted to talk to him once more. I’m not sure you’ll find someone to tell you anything here.”

I then approached two men, one of whom seemed old enough to know all those who lived in the area in the last 40 years. When I asked if he knew Baghdadi, the man’s face changed, and he said with fear in his eyes while looking at his friend, “We don’t know him, he was one of few young students who lived here 15 years ago. Nobody knows him well. This is an old story that we prefer not to discuss.”

The last group of men I met were more forthcoming. A man in his late 70s told me he used to see him in the area but never spoke to him, while another man roughly the same age said, “He wasn’t the mosque’s imam, he was a tailor and he was a student too.” A third man, about 35 years old, said Baghdadi lived there while he was studying at the Iraqi University before the US invasion of Iraq. “He wasn’t alone, he had a family with him. The guy seemed very normal, and yes I do remember him very well,” the man told me.

The younger man waited until I left a group I had been standing with and then approached me, revealing that he knew Baghdadi very well. After introducing himself as Amjad, he said, “Sheikh Ibrahim [Baghdadi] was someone very normal, someone like you. He didn’t have any complexities in his life, and we used to play football here,” as he pointed to an empty piece of land next to the mosque. “He was obsessed with scoring goals; he would become nervous if he didn’t.” Amjad added, “When the US invaded Iraq he decided to take up arms and fight — he changed a lot after that.”

As Amjad finished speaking, one of the gentlemen I met earlier said, “Are you still asking about the same guy? We told you we don’t know anything about him. This is an old story and we have no intention to answer your questions.” It was obvious that my trip to Tobji was over, but my search wasn’t.

According to official documents, Baghdadi is married to two women who gave birth to his six children. His first wife, Asma Fawzi Mohammed al-Kubeisi, his first cousin, is the mother of Huzaifa, Omaima, Yaman, Hasan and Fatima. Israa Rajab Mahal al-Qaisi is his second wife and the mother of his youngest son, Ali. It is unknown whether Asma or Israa live with him, yet Abu Ahmad, who claims he has known Baghdadi since the 1990s and studied with him at the same university and was part of his close circle, suggested they reside within the territories that he controls. Abu Ahmad agreed to talk to me on two conditions: that he cover his face and we conduct the interview in my hotel room.

According to Abu Ahmad, the IS leader has three brothers: Shamsi, Jomaa and Ahmad. “There are serious differences between Sheikh Ibrahim and his brother Shamsi. On several occasions Shamsi objected openly to his brother’s choices, but this didn’t stop him from being detained by US and Iraqi forces many times,” Abu Ahmad said. “Jomaa was a Salafist from the beginning. He was an extremist even when Baghdadi was not yet part of that circle, causing many problems between them. But things are different now. Jomaa is one of his brother’s bodyguards and one of the closest aides to him. His third brother Ahmad caused Baghdadi some problems, and his reputation isn’t that good in regard to financial issues,” he added.

Shamsi is detained at one of the Iraqi intelligence detention facilities to the north of Baghdad and suffers from serious health problems. An official Iraqi security source ruled out the possibility of conducting an interview with him.

In regard to Baghdadi’s time at university, Abu Ahmad said, “Sheikh Ibrahim was a calm person. He used to take part in social activities, but started changing after he was introduced to Dr. Ismail al-Badri, who directed him toward a special path with the Muslim Brotherhood. He became a member of the jihadist Ikhwan [Brotherhood] and a sincere follower of Sayyid Qutb. He quit in 2000 after reaching the conclusion that they [Brotherhood] were people of words and not action.”

Hisham al-Hashimi, the author of “Inside Daesh” and an adviser to the Iraqi government on extremist groups, said Baghdadi became a Salafist in 2003. “He was influenced by Abu Mohammed al-Mufti al-Aali, the man who was seen at that time as the main ideologue of the jihadist groups in Iraq. Baghdadi along with other followers of Abu Mohammed — what was known as the Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a movement — had people in Baghdad and Samarra,” Hashimi said.

Then somewhere near Baghdad I met Abu Omar, a former IS member who was held three years at the Camp Bucca detention center that was managed by the US occupation forces in Iraq near the city of Umm Qasr. The camp was named after Ronald Bucca, an American firefighter who was killed during the 9/11 attacks in New York. “Camp Bucca was a great favor the United States did to the mujahedeen,” Abu Omar, who served his time at Camp Bucca for being a member of al-Qaeda, said. “They provided us with a secure atmosphere, a bed and food, and also allowed books giving us a great opportunity to feed our knowledge with the ideas of Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi and the jihadist ideology. This was under the watchful eye of the American soldiers. New recruits were prepared so that when they were freed they were ticking time bombs.”

Baghdadi was arrested in 2004 while visiting an al-Qaeda-affiliated friend. At that point, the future IS leader wasn’t a member of the organization. He had just graduated with a master’s degree in Islamic studies from the Iraqi University in Baghdad, now known as the Islamic University of Iraq, and was preparing to start his doctoral degree. Hashimi said, “At Camp Bucca, Baghdadi absorbed the jihadist ideology and established himself among the big names. He met Haji Bakr, back then known as Samir al-Khlifawi, Abu Muhannad al-Suedawi, Abu Ahmed al-Alwani. These were officers in Saddam [Hussein]’s army, and despite their Baath origins they impressed him with their military knowledge. He also influenced them with his religious background — mainly his expertise in Quranic studies.”

Abu Omar, Baghdadi’s friend at Camp Bucca, filled in other details of Baghdadi’s daily life there: “I saw him playing football with other prisoners. I was amazed by his skills, and I understood later that he was given the name Maradona. This is the only thing I saw in him. I heard his speeches but he was nothing compared to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. His words lacked power,” he said.

During his years at Camp Bucca, Baghdadi built his contacts and established good ties inside Iraq’s al-Qaeda. As soon as he was released he became a member of the group, taking the name Abu Duaa as his alias. Baghdadi sought to continue his studies and acquired a doctoral degree in Sharia from the Islamic University in Baghdad. Outside prison, Baghdadi met Sheikh Fawzi al-Jobouri, one of the influential intellectuals within the ranks of Iraq’s al-Qaeda. Jobouri introduced him to the organization’s Minister of Information Muharib Abdul Latif al-Jubouri, who used his authority to help Baghdadi go to Syria and concentrate on his writings on condition that he would help in media issues whenever they needed him.

There was no obvious candidate within al-Qaeda in Iraq to succeed Zarqawi. He had possessed an unchallenged reputation and charisma within the organization’s ranks, and he had in fact posed as great a threat to the authority of Osama bin Laden as US President George W. Bush.

Zarqawi’s ideology differed from bin Laden and he resented pledging allegiance to bin Laden. Zarqawi’s priorities were different; he believed in focusing on the enemy nearby, not the one afar. This meant killing Muslim enemies, Shiites for instance, came before killing US soldiers. Because of the similarity of IS’ philosophy to Zarqawi’s beliefs, jihadists widely believe that Zarqawi is the real founding father of IS.
After Zarqawi’s death the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq, then affiliated with al-Qaeda, was also announced. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was chosen as its first emir, while Abu Hamza al-Mohajer (known also as Abu Ayyub al-Masri) was his deputy and minister of war.

When he finished his studies, Baghdadi went back to Syria to take on more serious roles within al-Qaeda. He became the assistant of Abu Ghadiya, who was responsible for moving fighters through Syria to Iraq.
“Abu Ghadiya was said to have been killed by the US forces in a strike on the border between Syria and Iraq,” Hashimi said. “The truth is that he survived and was detained by the Americans. He was later handed over to the Iraqi authorities, but he succeeded in fleeing along with others on July 21, 2013, from Abu Ghraib prison.”

After the attack on Abu Ghadiya, Baghdadi returned to Baghdad, where he was introduced by Haji Samir, whom he met in prison, to the Islamic State of Iraq’s second-in-command, Abu Hamza al-Mohajer. Mohajer was impressed by Baghdadi and introduced him to the group’s emir, Abu Omar. It was clear that Baghdadi had sponsors inside the Islamic State of Iraq who helped him to quickly climb the ranks. “His relation with Abu Omar wasn’t direct at the beginning, yet Mohajer recommended him for several roles,” Hashimi said. “He was later appointed as member of the powerful Shura Council.”

Iraqi intelligence believes that Baghdadi was later promoted to be a member of the coordination committee. “Members of al-Qaeda call it the blessed coordination committee. It’s responsible for coordinating between the emir of the organization and governors of the states,” Maj. Bakr, the intelligence officer, said “He was one of three men and became the most prominent and trusted one among them. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi gave this committee high authority.”

During this period, Baghdadi began to be noticed. The higher he climbed up the al-Qaeda organizational ladder, the higher he was ranked on Iraq’s most-wanted list. It was not until April 18, 2010, that he became a priority to be captured.

On that date, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri were both killed in a US-Iraqi joint operation. Al-Qaeda in Iraq had lost its leader and his deputy, and there was a dire need to choose a successor. Al-Monitor found that Haji Bakr backed Sheikh Ibrahim to be the next emir of al-Qaeda in Iraq. But bin Laden wanted a different man — Haji Iman — to be the successor. This made Haji Bakr’s task difficult; he had to convince the key players that the man he supported was the best choice. Eventually, he succeeded, and nine members of the Shura Council agreed to vote for Sheikh Ibrahim.

Former IS member Abu Omar said one of the main reasons for Baghdadi’s selection was that he was descended from the Quraysh, the same tribe of the Prophet Muhammad, one of the conditions for being selected as caliph. “This was very important to those planning the future strategy of the group, those who wanted to fulfill Zarqawi’s dreams in subsequently announcing the caliphate,” Abu Omar said. “There was a great challenge to face after the Sharia Council abstained from accepting him. He [Baghdadi] wasn’t up to it, I heard many of his speeches, he lacked the charisma, he’s not to be compared with Zarqawi.”
Sheikh Ibrahim then chose the name Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as an alias — an odd choice for someone hailing from Samarra. “It’s like saying that Baghdad will always be their target,” Abu Omar said. “The final battle will be in Baghdad. Baghdadi wants to revive the glory of the Abbasid Caliphate, so this is also a message to the enemy that Baghdad is ours.”

Baghdadi’s main mandate was to revive the Islamic State of Iraq. He started by gathering members he thought were capable of helping him achieve his goal. Within a few months, the Arab Spring ignited and the revolution in Syria began. It was the best opportunity for the group to spread in a fertile environment.
Months later, developments further cleared the field for Baghdadi. Bin Laden was killed and the less charismatic Ayman al-Zawahri succeeded him. Taking advantage of the leadership vacuum, Baghdadi sent two of his aides to Syria to expand his state. These aides, Abu Mohammad al-Golani and Mullah Fawzi al-Dulaimi, formed Jabhat al-Nusra.

The new group started gaining ground within months and Baghdadi decided it was time to declare a state under his rule in both countries under the name of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Golani, however, refused to go along with Baghdadi’s decision, as did Zawahri. These were hard times for Baghdadi’s organization as it stood on the verge of its first serious defection.

“Abu Mohammad al-Golani was one of Baghdadi’s soldiers,” Abdel Bari Atwan, a veteran Arab journalist who met bin Laden and wrote a book on ISIS, said. “He was sent to establish a branch for the Islamic State in Syria. Baghdadi wanted to expand through Golani, but the latter decided to instead look to their leader [Zawahri]. He [Golani] wanted to be a branch for the main al-Qaeda, he wanted to be an emir in the same way as Baghdadi. He also wanted it to represent the Syrians only.”

Golani’s decision intimidated Baghdadi, who decided to take revenge by going himself to Syria. “Golani’s move was a punch in the face to Baghdadi; it was a stab in the back,” Abu Omar said. “Baghdadi gave him everything; men, money and contacts. Yet, Golani saw himself as a possible leader with direct links to Khorasan [al-Qaeda’s central command]. He thought it was time to make a great leap.” A serious crack appeared within al-Qaeda in Syria: Baghdadi and Golani were at war with each other. Soon ISIS began taking control of areas that were held by Jabhat al-Nusra, and Raqqa was the first Syrian province to fall completely into the hands of ISIS. It was obvious Baghdadi’s men had the upper hand in the fight, and in June 2014, ISIS entered Mosul in Iraq and delivered the decisive blow in the battle for supremacy, starting a new era.

Baghdadi declared the caliphate and pronounced himself as the new caliph. “Four men declared him caliph — Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, Abu Ibrahim al-Masry, Turki al-Binali and Abu Suleiman al-Otaibi — before his defection,” Hashimi said. “They convinced him to take this step fearing that Zawahri might precede them; such a declaration attracts new recruits and donations.” The move put to rest the competition.
The journey was complete, and Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai — the local imam, academic, US-held prisoner and al-Qaeda officer — had become Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

The conflict in Syria entered its fifth year this month, and many parts of the country and their inhabitants are hardly recognizable. This is true of the war-torn city of Aleppo, my hometown, with its mosaic of religious, social and ethnic groups who have all had to deal with the harsh realities and horrors of war on a daily basis.

It’s one of the few areas of Aleppo where churches outnumber mosques, and communal relations had always been jovial and friendly, as could be seen while strolling its maze-like narrow streets, lined with markets, cafes, sandwich shops, bars and liquor stores. But as the conflict took its toll, the atmosphere grew perceptibly edgier and increasingly paranoid.

Siryan Adeemeh sits within sight of the rebel-held areas of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh, less than 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) away, and has been on the receiving end of indiscriminate rebel shelling, the most recent of which killed and wounded several people last month. The fear of shelling is ever-present, but just in case one briefly forgets about it, loud explosions and gunfire from the nearby fronts are there to remind you. The din of generators and stench of diesel fumes are your constant companions here, as is the crazy driving of the military pickups rushing dangerously along the main road.

Against this backdrop I went to see Abu Fadi, a middle-aged man, tanned with silver hair and sharp dark eyes — a striking appearance to match his striking personality. He was the de facto mayor of his neighborhood, the go-to guy for news, stories and gossip, a figure much liked and respected by his Christian community and beyond.

As we sat on chairs and wooden stools in one of the back alleys that crisscross this peculiar neighborhood, a few of Abu Fadi’s neighbors, mostly middle-aged men, joined us. The mood was gloomy as darkness fell. This was the way the residents had always socialized, sitting together outside their homes, their front doors open. But all talk and gossip these days is about the war — and rumors, lots of rumors. Abu Fadi did not need much prodding. He talked candidly, almost continuously. “We no longer fear speaking out — that was long ago,” he explained. “And we have no other way to express our frustration.”

I asked Abu Fadi about the impact of the conflict on his community, and the prevalent sentiment. “Everything has changed,” he replied, his tone more somber. “Before the war, we [the Christians of Aleppo] were secure as a community, but now we live in fear for our continued existence in Syria. It has never been this way, not in anyone’s living memory. We are feeling persecuted in our own country.”

“So many of our young people left. There are only children and old people now, but can you blame them? Look at the situation here, the conditions are awful. It is dangerous. There are bombs and bullets falling everywhere, and there is no work and no money and everything is so expensive. Is this a proper and dignified life? The young have ambitions, while we are glued to our land and resigned to our fates. They want to go to Europe to start a new life and have better futures. Our community is dying out. If the war doesn’t kill it, emigration will.”

I asked him how he felt about the warring camps in Syria, whom he supports and why. He answered, “There is no question at all about whom we support: the government, of course. It is the only force protecting us from the jihadists and extremists.”

“Why do you feel this way? Aren’t there armed groups and an opposition that are not extremists and represent other Syrians and their legitimate interests, too?” Al-Monitor asked.

“No, not anymore,” he said. “You see, at the beginning, some welcomed the protests because they felt it might get the government to fix the problems, you know, like the corruption and other important issues and reforms, like an alarm bell to wake them up. But we soon saw this is not what it was about. They just wanted to take power at any cost; they will destroy Syria to do that. They soon showed their true faces, the religious extremism they were hiding. Anyone who took up arms against the state is wrong.”

“Is this just the Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda and the foreign fighters, or all? Many groups are local ones,” Al-Monitor said.

“You mean the local ones throwing their rockets at our houses?” he laughed, mockingly. “What difference does it make? Look, we are targeted now as a religious community; this is very clear to us. They want to get rid of us, drive us from our lands that we have inhabited for centuries. They have destroyed churches. Look at Kassab and Maaloula, do you need further proof?”

“In that case, why do you not take up arms to defend yourselves, like the Assyrians did in Hasakah?”
“It is a different case,” he replied. “There they are fighting IS, so there is acceptance for them to form their own militias. They will even get international support for doing this. Here, it is different in Aleppo. If we want to fight we must join government formations and we are called shabiha thugs. It’s all about global politics. But many have joined up anyway.”

Abu George, a neighbor, cut in, “My nephew died fighting for the government and defending Aleppo against those terrorists. We consider him a martyr and a hero, even if those countries outside and the UN consider him a regime shabiha.” Judging by the nods around him, this seemed to be a widely shared view.
“What do you think the future holds for your community?” Al-Monitor asked.

“We are not optimistic. Even if the war ends, the scars will not heal and trust will not come back. Life will not be normal again, and those who left will never return. I just hope to die and be buried on my land, and not be driven out. This is all I want now.”

As I bid the group of men farewell, I could not help but think that despite what Abu Fadi had said about no longer fearing speaking out, this was not really the case, at least not if you’re criticizing the government in public. It was clear enough, though, that people here genuinely felt the incumbent regime was their last hope.

Regardless, hints of dissent and disillusion were always present in the conversation, from the sarcastic ridiculing of the ineptitude and corruption of the city’s officials, to the vitriol about shortages and corruption in distributing rations and skyrocketing prices.

Not surprisingly, this anger was seldom, if ever, directed at the top of Syria’s ruling hierarchy. Interestingly, very little was spoken about the menacing presence of the many non-local armed men and their armed trucks that now dot the area. Abu Fadi did concede they were a problem — an annoyance, as he put it — but said the worst they do is take items from shops without paying. Maybe he considered this an informal war tax to which they had begrudgingly acquiesced.

Two soldiers from the Afghan National Army were killed in an explosion while 47 militants were killed during military operations across the country, officials said on Tuesday.

The U.S. Marines, with more than a decade of  experience with counterinsurgency (COIN) in Iraq and Afghanistan, could prove to be an important asset in working to contain and eventually defeat the Nigerian terror group Boko Haram, reports the Marine Corps Times.

A study commissioned by the U.S. Naval Forces Africa and conducted by the non-profit research organization CNA Corporation concluded that to combat Boko Haram, Nigeria has to implement the short-term goal of working with its neighbors to contain the jihadist group.

The study, which was published days after Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic Slate (ISIS/ISIL), also prescribed employing a “whole of government” or COIN approach as a means to eventually break up the group.

“Our proposed containment strategy allows the USG [U.S. Government] to contribute to stopping the spread of the conflict in the short term, while buying time until the political conditions in [Nigerian capital] Abuja shift in such a way that the GoN [Government of Nigeria] becomes a genuine partner in dismantling the group,” reports CNA.

“Because the GoN has not taken a COIN approach to the conflict, Boko Haram has been growing stronger over time and appears to be increasingly able to operate outside of Nigeria’s borders,” it adds. “The group exploits the remote areas along the four- country border of Nigeria-Cameroon-Niger-Chad… where it sets up bases, conducts training, and coordinates logistics.”

Marine Corps Times notes that with the COIN experience acquired in Iraq and Afghanistan and units carrying out military exchanges in the region on a regular basis, experts agree that Marines could be the ideal force to contain and eventually defeat Boko Haram.

“If there was the opportunity to work with the Nigerian government, those types of skills Marines learned in Iraq and Afghanistan are transferable,” Julia McQuaid, a senior research scientist with CNA Corporation’s Strategic Studies Division and one of the study’s authors, told Marine Corps Times.

“Because Boko Haram is an insurgent group which is sustained by localized grievances and conflict dynamics, we argue that a starting point for devising an effective response should follow the tenets of a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy,” adds CNA, which conducts analysis to inform national decisions makers, in the study.

CNA proposes dealing with the corruption, poverty, and ethnic tensions that fueled the group’s rise to power.

Although Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan has refused to accept prerequisite conditions for U.S. military aid, the Marines are currently training the Nigerian navy in small boat maintenance since that is not directly linked to combat.

“It is an ongoing gesture of good will that helps keep a bilateral relationship — that is in fact strong in many other areas — open should the conditions for direct combat training ever be met,” the Marine Corps Times quotes experts saying.

“If conditions were set for direct training, the Marine Corps could share its robust expertise working around vulnerable civilians while minimizing collateral casualties… skills the Nigerian military badly needs,” added Carl LeVan, an associate professor at American University’s School of International Service who has closely studied the Nigeria’s internal politics and security.

Marines are well equipped to provide humanitarian assistance and aid the hundreds of thousands of Nigerian refugees, according to the Marine Corps Times article.

“Contingent on concessions from the Nigerian government, Marines could also help secure roads to camps as part of humanitarian operations to deliver supplies,” adds the article.

LeVan suggested that Marines could help prevent the radicalization of Nigerians by providing humanitarian aid.

“There are hundreds of thousands of people in northeast Nigeria who are hungry and in need of humanitarian assistance,” he said. “Those camps are potential breeding grounds for radicalization.”

The Nusra Front, Syria’s al-Qaeda affiliate, is consolidating power in territory stretching from the Turkish border to central and southern Syria, crushing moderate opponents and forcibly converting minorities using tactics akin to its ultraconservative rival, the Islamic State group