Reports on Sunday of a drone attack on the home of Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi represent a major escalation in the region, like reported by jopost.com.

It represents the increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles, primarily by Iranian-backed groups, to spread terror throughout the Middle East. It also represents the increased use of drones as a strategic weapon, in this case, with the goal of intimidating the Iraqi prime minister just days after security forces clashed with pro-Iranian protesters.

It’s likely that the attack was carried out by pro-Iranian militias as there are probably no other culprits in Iraq who have drones that could or would attack the Iraqi prime minister.

While ISIS has used drones in the past, it’s not clear why they would suddenly emerge now to target the Iraqi leader and that leaves Iran-backed groups firmly in the frame.

While official reports have not yet specified what group was behind the attack and no one has yet taken responsibility for it, the trend of such attacks in the region points to Iranian-linked groups.

A drone was used to attack a US garrison at Tanf in Syria in October. In July, a drone was used to attack a commercial tanker in the Gulf of Oman, killing two crew members. In both instances, the US and other countries have pointed the finger at Iran.

In May, a drone was launched from Iraq, or possibly from Syria, targeting Israel during the 11-day war with Hamas. It is believed that Iran was also behind this attack.

For years, Iran has been building more sophisticated drones for surveillance and kamikaze-style attacks. The drones have become better at navigation and pre-programmed flight paths, or even real-time intelligence gathering. The fact they have targeted a moving ship is a clear indication of this.

An attack on the residence of Kadhimi is also a likely message by pro-Iran groups in Iraq that the prime minister is not immune.

Iraqi armed forces announced the start of investigations to discover the location of the launch of the booby-trapped drone that targeted Kadhimi, according to reports. Images showed the damage to the home, but it is unclear if drone fragments had been found that would link the design to any single country or entity.
One of the reasons pro-Iran groups — including Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis in Yemen — use drones, is that it is difficult to trace their launch site and to know who is behind them once they are launched.

Israel has, in the past, accused Iran of creating a drone training center. Drones from Iran and technology from Iran have been key to aiding Houthi efforts to attack Saudi Arabia.

Since January, the pro-Iran militias in Iraq have increasingly used drones to target US forces. This has occurred even in Erbil where the pro-Iran militias used a drone in the spring of 2021 to target what US media called, at the time, a CIA hangar at Erbil airport. Pro-Iran groups have done parades with drones.

But, the kind of drone used to attack the Iraqi premier may be smaller than some of the kamikaze drones, which tend to be larger than a human.
Locating parts of the equipment will be important, but Iraq’s security services may be reticent to conclude that Iran or any of its proxy groups were behind the attack.

Why? Because in previous incidents where Iraq’s prime minister has acted against pro-Iranian groups engaged in illegal attacks, they succeeded in freeing their jailed members as a result.

Now, the groups, most linked to the Fatah party in parliament and the paramilitary Hashd al-Shaabi, have been conducting a sit-in to demand the overturn of recent election results. This kind of election protest is designed to raise tensions and pressure the prime minister.

The problem that Iraq’s government is facing is that the militias are often tied to official paramilitary forces because former Iraqi prime minister, Haider Abadi, pushed to give the militias a legitimate role.

The militias were given increased power in 2014, based on some existing pro-Iran units, to fight ISIS but after the war on ISIS ended, the militias refused to go home and Abadi, who was backed by the US, empowered the militias.

They soon began taking over the border area of Albukamal in Syria, next to Iraq’s Al-Qaim, and funneling weapons from Iran to Hezbollah. They have been targeted by airstrikes, several of which were carried out by the US in retaliation for their attacks.

In Syria, after the decade-long and still unfinished war, the energy shortage resulting from the loss of control over the main oil fields in the East was replenished mainly by Iran and through smuggling from the Lebanon and Iraq. Nevertheless, due to a collapse in oil prices, increased sanctions and military pressure on Iran, the delivery programme was interrupted, like reported by israeldefense.co.il.

Another blow to the Syrian economy came from the financial crisis in the Lebanon: about a quarter of the deposits in Lebanese banks belong to Syrian companies, including those associated with the government. The introduction of currency restrictions in the Lebanon slowed down transactions for the import of essential goods, including the purchase of wheat, disrupted the supply chain for spare parts and components and led to a sharp increase in prices.

Under these conditions, the Syrian government can only print money, rely on Iranian loans and force Syrian businessmen to help the State directly. Earlier this year, a banknote of 5,000 Syrian Pounds (about 3.98 US dollars) was put into circulation, while the previous maximum denomination was 2,000 Syrian Pounds.

In 2011, Syria ranked 33rd in terms of oil production, after South Sudan and ahead of Vietnam. While in 2011 its production share was 0.4% of the world volume, in 2012 that figure dropped to 0.25% (BP Statistical Review of World Energy calculations).

In the Middle East, the Syrian share before the outbreak of armed clashes was also very small: 1.2% of all production in the region in 2011 and 0.75% in 2012 (BP Statistical Review of World Energy calculations).

The level of oil production in Syria in 2010 was 386,000 barrels per day. With the onset of the crisis in 2011, production fell to 333,300 barrels, and in 2012 it was already almost half the volume of 2011, i.e. 182,000 barrels. In the autumn of 2015, Russia intervened with military means in the Syrian conflict: upon Bashar al-Assad’s initiative, Russian military advisers were deployed in the West of the country.

This changed the entire course of the conflict: it enabled Assad to remain in power and made Russia a major political player in the region. At that time, Russia’s relations with Western countries were in deep crisis due to the return of Crimea to its traditional borders and the outbreak of war in the Donbass.

The intervention in the Syrian conflict changed the dynamics of Russia’s contacts with the international community: In particular, cooperation between the Russian military and the United States of America intensified and relations with Israel reached a new level (the Jewish country has recently opened a new consulate in Yekaterinburg).

From a tactical viewpoint, Russia can be considered one of the beneficiaries of the conflict. The successful, relatively low-budget military operation quickly turned Russia into a key external player in the Syrian arena. As far as can be judged, however, in six years of direct involvement in the Syrian conflict, Russia has not developed an exit strategy. The extent of Russia’s influence on the Syrian regime also remains an open issue.

The active phase of the Russian military operation in Syria lasted 804 days, from September 30, 2015 to December 11, 2017. As a result of the Russian air force attacks, over 133,000 terrorist facilities were destroyed, including illegal oil refineries; 865 gang leaders were eliminated and over 133,000 followers were neutralised (4,500 came from Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States).

In December 2017, during a visit to the Khmeimim air base, President Vladimir Putin ordered the withdrawal of most Russian troops from the country.

According to the Defence and Security Committee of the Council of the Russian Federation, as of September 2018 Russian casualties in Syria since the start of the operation have amounted to 112 people – almost half in the crash of the An-26 transport plane (39 people) and of the Il-20 one shot down by anti-government Syrian forces’ anti-aircraft (20 people).

Furthermore, Bloomberg and Reuters reported that hundreds of Russian mercenaries were killed in Syria. The Russian Defence Ministry, however, did not confirm those figures.

At the same time, Russia has two points of presence in the Syrian Arab Republic. The aforementioned Khmeimim air base, where an air group is deployed, which, in 2018, included 28 combat aircraft of the Russian air force, and ten transport and special aircraft and nine helicopters.

Moreover, the naval logistics centre is located in the port of Tartus. In December 2019, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, who oversaw the defence industry, said that over the following four years it was planned to invest 500 dollars million in the modernisation of Tartus, the management of which had been entrusted to the Russian Prime Minister.

The precise number of Russian military and civilian personnel in these two sites is unknown. According to the Central Electoral Commission, in 2020 in Syria, 6,424 Russians took part in the vote on amendments to the Russian Constitution.

The combat experience gained by the Russian officer and non-commissioned officer corps is also relevant. During the period of counter-terrorist operations in the North Caucasus, the control, planning, financing and supply centres were located outside Russia – hence the operation in Syria was necessary from a political-military viewpoint.

If the ISIS pseudo-State with all the resources of that country had emerged on the Syrian territory, it would have posed a deadly threat to neighbouring States, starting with the Western European ones, by financing and swelling the ranks of terrorists. We can thank Russia and certainly not the United States, which has begun to destabilise Syria as the final stop on the Chinese Silk Road.

In fact, neither the European Union nor the United States of America have imposed full sanctions against Russia due to the conflict in Syria, but only some partial ones. The US personal restrictions apply to twelve individuals and seven Russian companies: Tempbank, AKB RFA Bank, Rosoboronexport, Russian Financial Corporation, Global Concept Groups, Promsyryeimport, Maritime Assistance.

Russian companies do not yet carry out large-scale activities in Syria. Earlier, the Financial Times wrote that Stroytransgaz’s subsidiary, Stroytransgaz Logistics, associated with the family of billionaire Gennady Timchenko, obtained permission from the Syrian authorities to extract phosphates, as well as a contract to manage the port of Tartus for deliveries abroad.

Timchenko, however, is already subject to US sanctions and the EU does not ban the supply of phosphates. The media also wrote about businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin’s interests in Syria. It was claimed that in 2019 the Syrian Parliament approved the conclusion of contracts for oil exploration, development and production with two Russian companies – Vilada and Mercury Limited.

Novaya Gazeta wrote that both companies were connected to Prigozhin’s facilities, to which the media had previously related the activities of Wagner’s Private Military Company (PMC). The businessman himself denied the existence of such a connection. Prigozhin, however, is already subject to sanctions by both the EU and the USA.

Nevertheless, the sanctions are hampering Russian companies’ wider participation in the Syrian economy. During Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Abu Dhabi, UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan complained that the law “on the protection of Syria’s civilian population” – the

“Caesar Act”, adopted in the United States of America and in force since June 2020, which strengthens the existing restrictions on Syria’s allies and expands them – complicates the country’s relations with Syria and interferes with the establishment of a dialogue. The Russian Foreign Ministry called this a serious interference with the provision of even humanitarian aid to the country.

What is the prospect of a political solution in the country? Turkey, the United States and their other sponsors maintain their interests in the region, which means they cannot be taken for granted. Syria has lost its sovereignty and decisions are often taken without it by Russia, Turkey and Iran.

We can therefore say that Assad won the war, but did not achieve peace, and the opposition lost the war, but did not lose peace. Moreover, many Syrians do not live in the territories controlled by the regime.

Assad’s regime will continue to give proof of miracles of survival against the backdrop of growing economic problems, new sanctions and the ongoing power struggle in Damascus itself. In the near future, the country surely expects neither the full restoration of territorial integrity, nor the return of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons, nor a large-scale plan for post-conflict reconstruction. Neither European nor Gulf countries have the financial resources to do this.

At the same time, the Chinese government is strongly opposing the use of force to resolve the Syrian issue and has advocated a political solution to the internal issue. In the process of rebuilding Syria, China has put forward the idea of developing the Silk Road Initiative and post-conflict reconstruction, and it has received a positive and proactive response from the Syrian government.

The connection between the Silk Road and post-conflict reconstruction is a historic opportunity for the two countries to achieve interconnectedness. The current internal situation in Syria, however, is still subject to many uncertainties and the current security risks need to be carefully examined, as noted above.

The friendship between China and Syria has a long-standing tradition and the ancient Silk Road is a symbol of this mutual feeling. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Syria was one of the first Arab countries to recognise and establish diplomatic relations with China.

In the aftermath of the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the Chinese government took the UN Charter and the basic rules of international relations as the principles and fundamental steps to deal with the Syrian crisis and firmly opposed the military solution, which was aimed precisely at breaking the Silk Road.

In 2018, the focus of Sino-Syrian relations began to shift from the Syrian civil war to the country’s post-conflict reconstruction. With the gradual improvement of the internal situation in Syria and the stabilisation of security, the Chinese government readily suggested to Syria it wished to participate in the post-war reconstruction process, thus resuming to restore and strengthen the Silk Road, which hetero-directed terrorism from the West had tried to disrupt.

The Chinese government not only adheres to a policy of impartial political resolution of the Syrian issue and actively participates in the UN-led multilateral peace process negotiations on the Syrian issue, but also provides a large amount of free humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people for free.

The Silk Road in Syria is of great importance geopolitically and strategically. Infrastructure construction, energy and industrial cooperation, as well as seaport construction projects are key areas of China’s participation in Syria’s reconstruction. At the same time, China should also address the uncertain risks of Syria’s internal security situation and the influence of political games between the major powers.

Here lies Syria’s tragic recent past, and a desirable future of peace and prosperity.

The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan is transforming the regional landscape and unnerving neighbouring countries. Central Asian countries face migration flows, humanitarian challenges and political uncertainty. The post-American Afghanistan also provides Moscow and Beijing, as well several other regional powers like Tehran and Islamabad, with opportunities to enhance regional engagement as the world moves towards multipolarity, like reported by eurasiareview.com.

China and Russia, and regional powers, are eager to increase their influence in Central Asia, though with divergent goals. No single power is capable of taking on the security role the United States played.

The Taliban’s success should not have taken regional actors by surprise. Popular grievances across Afghanistan towards inept and corrupt governance delegitimised the government of now deposed president Ashraf Ghani and facilitated the Taliban’s takeover. Most worrying to Central Asian leaders is that they are facing similar grievances at home, a trend pushing governments to curtail public dissent, opposition sentiment and overt displays of religion.

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which border Afghanistan, have fortified their frontier zones and are eager to avoid large-scale refugee flows and militant movements across their borders. These countries experience high poverty rates and growing human insecurity, which has been made worse by COVID-19. With electricity shortages of their own, Central Asian capitals now face the question of cutting off electricity exports to Afghanistan, which can no longer pay for them, likely exacerbating the humanitarian situation in urban areas.

Uzbekistan is the most willing to engage with the Taliban. As one of the world’s two double landlocked countries, it has invested heavily in regional transportation infrastructure to reach global markets via South Asia and wants to protect those ambitions.

Tajikistan’s government has long been wary of the Taliban and serves as a refuge of anti-Taliban Afghan dissent. Given the large Tajik minority in Afghanistan, Tajikistan has also made clear that any recognition of the Taliban would be contingent on creating an ethnically inclusive government.

The Taliban’s victory provides Moscow with a potential opening to reassert its influence in Central Asia. Russia seeks to exploit the US withdrawal and growing perception that the United States is not committed to its allies or regional partners. It has presented itself as a key hard power security provider for Central Asia — a region that Russia views as part of its ‘sphere of influence’ and where it has two overseas bases.

In August 2021, Uzbekistan participated in a virtual summit of the Cooperative Security Treaty Organisation, a military alliance of former Soviet states that it has exited twice over disagreements with Moscow. There is speculation that Uzbek membership may be back on the table. Russian forces have held joint training exercises with their Uzbek counterparts along the Afghan–Uzbek border and joint drills with Tajikistan.

But expanding its security footprint deeper into Central Asia poses risks. Russia is stretched thin between deployments to Armenia–Azerbaijan, Syria and Ukraine. Moscow also has a poor track record of living up to its security commitments to its allies. It stood on the sidelines when ethnic violence rocked Kyrgyzstan in 2010, despite government requests for help, and in April 2021, when intercommunal violence occurred along the Kyrgyz–Tajik border.

Washington sees Central Asia, particularly the bordering countries of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as partners in its efforts to stabilise the region after the withdrawal. The Biden administration has sought permission to conduct limited military operations — likely drone operations — from both countries and to secure safe-harbour for Afghan migrants seeking refuge. Biden even deployed Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman to Tashkent for discussions — an indication the US sees Uzbekistan in particular as strategic regional interlocutor.

But gaining permission for any renewed US military presence in the region has been an uphill battle. Moscow and Beijing are using their economic influence, political clout and disinformation to tarnish Washington’s image among its partners and actively discouraging them from allowing any US security presence on their territory.

Beijing views Central Asia as a buffer zone between the instability in Afghanistan and Xinjiang. China is gradually expanding its security footprint in Central and South Asia to protect its financial investments and prevent the region from becoming a haven for ethnic Uyghurs. Beijing has enhanced counterterrorism cooperation, established a small military facility on the Afghan–Tajik border, is constructing additional security infrastructure in the country, and pressured local governments to repatriate ethnically Uyghur Chinese citizens.

Yet China has a mixed reputation in the region. Local governments want Chinese investment, but the publics are wary of China’s mistreatment of its Muslim citizens — including ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. Chinese businesses in Central Asia are facing popular backlashes due to the lack of transparency in their operations and employment practices.

The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan enhances the prospects for cooperation between the Russian, Chinese and Central Asian governments, but does not guarantee it. Both Beijing and Moscow enjoy far greater economic clout in Central Asia than any Western state does, due in part to geographic proximity. Yet, regional states remain wary of Beijing and Moscow, and will seek ways to keep the West, especially the United States, engaged in the region.

Central Asian states are also reaching out to smaller regional powers, including India, Iran, Japan, Pakistan and South Korea, indicating that regional elites hope to continue their long-standing foreign policy balancing acts. Yet these powers have divergent interests and Central Asian capitals have often seen Iranian and Pakistani ambitions as destabilising in the region.

This emerging landscape in Central and South Asia is a clear example of the shift towards a messier multi-polar world, where great and rising powers and local actors increasingly collide.

Africa was supposed to be the Islamic State’s success story. Observers saw the group’s rising attacks there as proof that the continent had become the new center of global jihad. In August 2021, the United Nations even declared that “the most alarming development in recent months is [the Islamic State’s] relentless spread across the African continent”, like reported by warontherocks.com.

In reality, the Islamic State faces many problems in Africa, largely of its own making. Chief among them is factionalism. Three prominent African jihadists died over the last few months, two at the hands of other jihadists. Where the Islamic State attempted to exploit local grievances, it has now been sucked into local conflicts. To the disappointment of the Islamic State’s leaders, the group is now party to fights between different Fulani clans, and between nomads and farmers.

The deaths of three legendary jihadists — Abubakar Shekau, Abu Musab al Barnawi, and Adnan Abu Whalid al Sahrawi — reveal the limitations of the Islamic state in the region, as well as the way local conflicts feed into organizational rivalries. Internal disputes are compromising the Islamic State in West Africa, and the Central Islamic State has had little success in addressing the problems.

Factionalization

Just summarizing the evolution of the Islamic State in West Africa conveys how deeply factionalized it is. The organization often referred to as Boko Haram (it called itself Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna lil Da’wa Wal Jihad, meaning “People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad”), swore allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015. Then, in 2016, it split into two. One faction, led by the son of the group’s founder, stayed loyal to the central leadership of the Islamic State and became known as the Islamic State’s West African Province. The other faction, led by Abubakar Shekau kept the name Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna.

In 2019, the Islamic State’s West African Province was granted control over the Islamic State in Greater Sahara, which operated in the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali. After incorporating the Islamic State in Greater Sahara, the Islamic State’s West African Province dramatically increased its activity in the border areas between Niger and Mali and its power seemed to be on the rise.

But even as it expanded and incorporated other groups, the Islamic State’s West African Province could not escape its own past divisions. Its 2016 split with Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna set the stage for two of the three most important jihadist deaths in 2021. After 2016, Shekau, the leader of Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna, had concentrated his forces around the Sambisa Forest in Northeast Nigeria close to the Cameroonian border. But his Islamic State rivals were close on his heels. In May 2021, they were powerful enough to lead an attack deep into the Sambisa that killed Abubakar Shekau.

During the summer of 2021 the Islamic State’s West African Province tried to capitalize on this victory by releasing speeches in the Hausa language accusing Shekau of targeting Muslim civilians, imposing forced marriages, and supporting the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The goal of this propaganda was to convince remaining Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna members to abandon the group, and it seemed to work. During the summer of 2021, a large number of fighters — some sources say 2,000, others as many as 6,000 — surrendered. Some did so because they did not want to join the Islamic States West African Province after it killed their old leader. Others surrendered because they were finally allowed to leave after being forced by Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna to stay in Sambisa against their own will. The rates of surrender suggested that Shekau’s “Boko Haram,” estimated to have between 1,500 and 3,000 men at its peak, was dying.

As a result, many expected Shekau’s death would enable the Islamic State’s West African Province to govern a more unified jihadist movement in Northeast Nigeria. But instead Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna was able to benefit from its own decentralization in fighting back. Since 2016, a smaller Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna group had remained in operation around Lake Chad, recruiting from the local Budumas, an ethnic group that lived largely of fishing and that had a troubled relationship with the Chadian state. Two notable leaders emerged in this group: Bakura Shalaba Modu and Bakura Doro. The Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna sub-group around Lake Chad became known as the Bakura group. Importantly, it was located far away from Sambisa, and thus well positioned to keep up the fight against the Islamic State after Shekau’s death.

In August, it appears the Bakura group struck back by killing the leader of the Islamic State’s West African Province, Abu Musab al Barnawi. When reports of Barnawi’s death started to surface, some local sources suggested that he had been killed by Nigerian forces. However, the Nigerian army, which has often claimed responsibility for killings it did not carry out and even declared jihadist leaders dead who were still alive, did not take credit for the death of Barnawi. Our local sources close to defectors from the organization pointed to an attack by the Bakura group, which had been actively targeting the Islamic State ever since Shekau’s killing in May.

The Bakura group’s success will change the dynamics of Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna as a whole. Bakura Shalaba announced Shekau’s death on behalf of the whole organization, indicating an increased importance for him and the Bakura group. Indeed, several reports suggest that Bakura Shalaba was the new Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna leader. This will give the group a new center of gravity in the Lake Chad region. It will also change the ethnic composition of the Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna leadership by adding several individuals of Nigerian and Chadian background. Local sources also report that several of the former Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna commanders that swore allegiance to the Islamic State have returned to the group after Barnawi’s death. In short, Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna seems to be bouncing back, albeit in a weakened state.

Yet we cannot completely rule out another possible explanation for Barnawi’s death: infighting within the Islamic State’s West African Province. There have seen signs of such splits in the past (e.g., when the group executed its veteran commander, Mamman Nur, in 2018). In 2019, Abu Mus’ab al Barnawi’s had seemingly stepped down or had been removed from his position, to be replaced by Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar al Barnawi. Confusingly, this was only announced by media affiliated with the Islamic State’s West African Province, not by central Islamic State channels. Then, in 2021, Abu Musab al Barnawi announced that he had been reinstated as the group’s head. In short, regardless of which explanation of the Barnawai’s death is correct, factionalism within the West African jihadi movement is clearly taking its toll.

Making matters worse for the Islamic State’s West African Province, the group’s Mali branch was facing a host of other problems. Initially, it had successfully taken advantage of Fulani politics, and Fulani grievances towards the central state in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The group’s deep embeddedness in Fulani disputes strengthened its presence in the tri-border area by facilitating local recruitment and earning the group local allies. But it also came at a cost. To maintain the support of these local allies, the Islamic State also had to fight in their local conflicts.

Consider an example described by scholars Tor A. Benjaminsen and Boubacar Ba. The local al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, more specifically the sub-group Katiba Macina, had joined with several traditional Fulani leaders in reinstating grazing fees for certain types of grass pastures. As a result, many pastoralists from the inner Niger delta in Mali joined with the Islamic State to resist this new financial burden. As conflict over grazing fees escalated, the Fulani sub-groups that sided with the Islamic State lost many clashes. This, combined with resistance to some of the group’s other policies, had already weakened the Islamic State when its leader, Adnan Abou Walid al Sahrawi, was killed by French forces in August 2021.

Conclusion

So where does this leave the West African jihadi movement as whole? The deaths of Shekau, Barnawi, and Sahrawi are a setback for West Africa’s jihadists, but not a long-term defeat.

Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna has re-emerged like a phoenix from the ashes. The rise of the Bakura group cannot fully compensate for the loss of strength following Shekaus’ death, but it will enable Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna to remain powerful away from the Sambisa Forest.

The Islamic State’s West African Province is no longer on the rise. It has been checked by its own factionalism and its involvement in local conflicts, including Fulani fights in the Tri-border area, and ethnic conflicts around Lake Chad. But the Islamic State will almost certainly rebuild, particularly as locals continue to seek sources of protection in the absence of state-provided security.

As the Islamic State’s West African Province re-emerges, clashes with Jamatu Ahli al-Sunna will likely resume, along with internal conflicts. So long as local states fail to address rural security issues for local ethnic groups, these factional battles will remain the most meaningful check on the expansion of jihadism in West Africa.