Yemen’s powerful Houthi movement surrounded the prime minister’s residence after firing on his convoy during deadly clashes with the Yemeni army on Monday, the most intense clashes since the Houthis, took control of the capital in September.
Houthi fighters were in control of all three entrances to the Republican Palace, a building Prime Minister Khalid Bahah has lived in since taking office in October, a government spokesman told AFP, while Houthi representatives negotiated with President Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi.
“Houthis meet with president to agree on terms for releasing chief of staff in return for changes in constitution and national authority,” Information Minister Nadia Sakkaf said on her Twitter account.
Earlier on Monday, Sakkaf said Houthi fighters had fired on Bahah’s motorcade after he left a meeting with Hadi and a Houthi adviser that had been called to try to resolve bitter disagreements over a draft constitution.
A Yemeni government spokesman slammed the shooting at Bahah’s armored convoy as an assassination attempt.
“The gunmen have surrounded the palace and the prime minister is inside,” government spokesman Rajeh Badi said. Two eyewitnesses confirmed the siege.
Sakkaf earlier told Reuters the presidential palace had come under “direct attack” in what she described as an attempted coup. Hadi was believed to have been at home in another district at the time. “Of course it is an attempted coup,” she said.
Witnesses said the fighting erupted early Monday after Houthis deployed reinforcements near the presidential palace.
The military presidential guard sent troops onto the streets surrounding the palace and outside Hadi’s residence.
A security official said the army intervened when the Houthis allegedly began to set up a new checkpoint near the presidential palace.
But a prominent Houthi chief, Ali al-Imad, accused the presidential guard of provoking the clashes.
“Hadi’s guard is trying to blow up the situation on the security front to create confusion on the political front,” he said on Facebook.
A ceasefire that came into effect after several hours appeared to be holding.
At least nine people were killed, including fighters from both sides, and more than 60 wounded, in an updated toll of Monday’s clashes.
The Houthis’ September takeover made them the country’s de facto top power, and tensions between them and Hadi had been growing since Saturday when they were accused of allegedly abducting his chief of staff, Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak.
Mubarak is the secretary general of the national dialogue on a political transition following the 2012 resignation of veteran President Ali Abdullah Saleh after a bloody year-long uprising.
The senior politician was “driven away to an unknown location,” an official from the national dialogue secretariat told AFP on Saturday, adding that the abductors “are suspected of being Houthi militiamen.”
Mubarak’s kidnapping came just before a meeting of the national dialogue secretariat to present a draft constitution dividing Yemen into a six-region federation, which the Houthis oppose.
Houthis, who hail from Yemen’s remote north and fought a decade-long war against the government, rejected the decentralization plan last year, claiming it divides the country into rich and poor regions.
The street battles on Monday marked a new low in the fortunes of the Arabian Peninsula state, plagued by tribal divisions, a separatist challenge in the south and a threat from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which claimed a series of deadly attacks in and outside Yemen, including the January 7 attack in Paris on a French satirical journal.
AQAP, reacting to the loss of its strongholds to Houthi fighters, has accused its opponents of acting as a proxy for both the United States and Iran, threatening renewed violence against them.
The instability in Yemen has raised fears that the country, next to oil-rich Saudi Arabia and key shipping routes from the Suez Canal to the Gulf, could become a failed state along the lines of Somalia.
Source: albawaba.com
With Kenyans still reeling from the devastating effects of the massacres in Mandera County, in which 64 have perished in nine days, pundits are increasingly divided on whether Kenya should reconsider its military presence in Somalia. This country, for decades the East, Central, Great Lakes and Horn of Africa ‘oasis of peace’ in a troubled region, has found itself stuck in Somalia since the Kenya Defence Forces were deployed in the world’s textbook example of a failed state three years ago.
Somalia has not known peace for two decades, while Kenya has suffered only bouts of internal political violence in the five decades since Independence, from which it quickly recovers, including the post-election violence crisis of 2007-08. But now Kenya seemingly cannot move out of Somalia, despite the all-too-frequent vicious attacks on Kenyan soil by the same people the KDF pursued across the border.
So, how did Kenya get it so wrong? In October 2011, the Grand Coalition regime boldly embarked on ‘Operation Linda Nchi’. This was Kenya’s first military intervention inside a neighouring state and was confidently, even proudly, touted as the last nail in al Shabaab’s coffin. Many described it as timely and cheered KDF on in its mission to “tame” al Shabaab, which had wreaked havoc in the region, with its terror tentacles rapidly spreading as far afield as Uganda.
Since the incursion, at least 782 Kenyans have been killed in terror-related attacks, mainly waged and claimed by al Shabaab, allegedly on account of “Kenya’s occupation of our lands”. On September 21 last year, unidentified shooters attacked the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, a raid that lasted for three days, resulting in the death of least 67 shoppers and mall staffers as well as police and military personnel.
Killing in the name of ‘all Muslims’
In July this year, more than 60 people were killed in an hours-long night raid in Mpeketoni, Lamu County. Surprisingly, President Uhuru Kenyatta blamed “local political networks”, even after al Shabaab claimed responsibility. The first of the two latest targeted killings occurred on November 24, when gunmen attacked a Nairobi-bound bus and shot 28 non-Somalis at close range, execution style.
This was after they separated them from fellow passengers, mostly Somalis. Security analyst Andrew Franklin said the group’s intention is to a wage a religious war among Kenyans by pointedly killing non-Muslims. “The intention of every terror group is to win the hearts of as many followers as possible. That is why they claim to be killing in the name of all Muslims in Kenya,” he said. On Monday this week, gunmen attacked a quarry in Komorey in the same county, targeting hapless stone masons who were fast asleep in their tented camp. They were killed in the same style, all shot at close range. The assailants disappeared on foot, according to survivors and other witnesses.
The attackers said they were avenging “Muslim suffering in Mombasa”, after four mosques were closed in police raids. The mosques had actually already been reopened. These attacks appear to constitute a turning point, with Kenyans raising doubts on Kenya’s ability to protect its citizens against both internal and external aggression. Ethiopia sent its troops into and out of Somalia before Operation Linda Nchi and, in fact, dismantled the then Islamic Courts Union, but it soon morphed into al Shabaab.
The ancient eastern African nation, which also shares a long border with Somalia, has recorded no al Shabaab terror attacks on its soil. The Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service is reputed to have an excellent system to detect and defuse terror attacks. “Every information is important. Yours is decisive. Do you have information? Let us protect our country Ethiopia together,” is the slogan of the ENISS. The then al Shabaab leader, the late Ahmed Godane, vowed that Kenya will be “witness a bloodbath”. “We tell the Kenyan public: You have entered a war that is not yours and is serving against your national interests,” he declared.
On the other hand, the Uhuru Kenyatta-led Jubilee government has also vowed to dismantle the terror group and “pursue them within and without our borders”. The way the terror group comes into and out of Kenya involves an intricate web of informers and helpers, including the security agencies such as corrupt police and Immigration officers. The ragtag militia has dealt a devastating blow to Kenya’s peace and tranquility, with tens of gun and grenade attacks experienced since 2011.
Tendai Marima, a Zimbabwean blogger and doctoral scholar in the UK, in a scathing attack in an article headlined “Kenya’s blundering in Somalia”, published on the Aljazeera English website, described Kenya as a “clumsy, overgrown, weak-muscled 17-yearold stumbling onto a rainy, muddy battlefield for the very first time”, when it crossed into Somalia with no experience in war and in the face of a possible severe backlash. She characterized the typical KDF infantryman as, “Weighed down by his Kalashnikov and ego, he fiddles about to get his aim right, but his younger, more agile, bloodthirsty opponent is already waiting with his weapon cocked and ready to fire”.
Billions of shillings spent; more terrorists inside Kenya
President Mwai Kibaki’s Grand Coalition government, under whose tenure KDF moved into Somalia, grossly underestimated the consequences of the foray. Kenya initially claimed successes against the militants when it mounted air and ground strikes, allegedly killing many fighters. The Senator for Mandera, Billow Kerrow, now says: “We have spent billions since October 2011 on our KDF forces in Somalia, but have only succeeded in transferring more terrorists onto our soil”. He says Kenya should first police its own towns before engaging in external wars.
While Amisom and KDF have mounted successful attacks against the extremists, potentially weakening the group’s capacity to mount attacks both inside and outside Somalia, militants still pass unimpeded through the porous border, recruiting fighters with a history of marginalization, exclusion and disenfranchisement within this country. In September, the International Crisis Group, in a report titled “Kenya: al Shabaab Closer Home”, explained how historical marginalization has proved to be a recipe for violent extremism, especially among the youth.
“Not only are there plenty of immediate grievances to exploit, but nearly two decades of radicalization and recruitment in Kenya mean that the threat is both imminent and deep,” the report observed. Other analysts say that, with Kenya’s weak and uncoordinated intelligence and judicial system, coupled with the porous border it shares with Somalia, it may have invited trouble to the homeland, opening the door wider than ever before to terrorism. Punitive measures, mass arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, rape, and extrajudicial killings are also said to fan deepening anger and aggression against the state
– See more at: http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/has-kenya-lost-al-shabaab#sthash.lzANavfZ.dpuf
Somalia has not known peace for two decades, while Kenya has suffered only bouts of internal political violence in the five decades since Independence, from which it quickly recovers, including the post-election violence crisis of 2007-08. But now Kenya seemingly cannot move out of Somalia, despite the all-too-frequent vicious attacks on Kenyan soil by the same people the KDF pursued across the border.
So, how did Kenya get it so wrong? In October 2011, the Grand Coalition regime boldly embarked on ‘Operation Linda Nchi’. This was Kenya’s first military intervention inside a neighouring state and was confidently, even proudly, touted as the last nail in al Shabaab’s coffin. Many described it as timely and cheered KDF on in its mission to “tame” al Shabaab, which had wreaked havoc in the region, with its terror tentacles rapidly spreading as far afield as Uganda.
Since the incursion, at least 782 Kenyans have been killed in terror-related attacks, mainly waged and claimed by al Shabaab, allegedly on account of “Kenya’s occupation of our lands”. On September 21 last year, unidentified shooters attacked the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, a raid that lasted for three days, resulting in the death of least 67 shoppers and mall staffers as well as police and military personnel.
Killing in the name of ‘all Muslims’
In July this year, more than 60 people were killed in an hours-long night raid in Mpeketoni, Lamu County. Surprisingly, President Uhuru Kenyatta blamed “local political networks”, even after al Shabaab claimed responsibility. The first of the two latest targeted killings occurred on November 24, when gunmen attacked a Nairobi-bound bus and shot 28 non-Somalis at close range, execution style.
This was after they separated them from fellow passengers, mostly Somalis. Security analyst Andrew Franklin said the group’s intention is to a wage a religious war among Kenyans by pointedly killing non-Muslims. “The intention of every terror group is to win the hearts of as many followers as possible. That is why they claim to be killing in the name of all Muslims in Kenya,” he said. On Monday this week, gunmen attacked a quarry in Komorey in the same county, targeting hapless stone masons who were fast asleep in their tented camp. They were killed in the same style, all shot at close range. The assailants disappeared on foot, according to survivors and other witnesses.
The attackers said they were avenging “Muslim suffering in Mombasa”, after four mosques were closed in police raids. The mosques had actually already been reopened. These attacks appear to constitute a turning point, with Kenyans raising doubts on Kenya’s ability to protect its citizens against both internal and external aggression. Ethiopia sent its troops into and out of Somalia before Operation Linda Nchi and, in fact, dismantled the then Islamic Courts Union, but it soon morphed into al Shabaab.
The ancient eastern African nation, which also shares a long border with Somalia, has recorded no al Shabaab terror attacks on its soil. The Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service is reputed to have an excellent system to detect and defuse terror attacks. “Every information is important. Yours is decisive. Do you have information? Let us protect our country Ethiopia together,” is the slogan of the ENISS. The then al Shabaab leader, the late Ahmed Godane, vowed that Kenya will be “witness a bloodbath”. “We tell the Kenyan public: You have entered a war that is not yours and is serving against your national interests,” he declared.
On the other hand, the Uhuru Kenyatta-led Jubilee government has also vowed to dismantle the terror group and “pursue them within and without our borders”. The way the terror group comes into and out of Kenya involves an intricate web of informers and helpers, including the security agencies such as corrupt police and Immigration officers. The ragtag militia has dealt a devastating blow to Kenya’s peace and tranquility, with tens of gun and grenade attacks experienced since 2011.
Tendai Marima, a Zimbabwean blogger and doctoral scholar in the UK, in a scathing attack in an article headlined “Kenya’s blundering in Somalia”, published on the Aljazeera English website, described Kenya as a “clumsy, overgrown, weak-muscled 17-yearold stumbling onto a rainy, muddy battlefield for the very first time”, when it crossed into Somalia with no experience in war and in the face of a possible severe backlash. She characterized the typical KDF infantryman as, “Weighed down by his Kalashnikov and ego, he fiddles about to get his aim right, but his younger, more agile, bloodthirsty opponent is already waiting with his weapon cocked and ready to fire”.
Billions of shillings spent; more terrorists inside Kenya
President Mwai Kibaki’s Grand Coalition government, under whose tenure KDF moved into Somalia, grossly underestimated the consequences of the foray. Kenya initially claimed successes against the militants when it mounted air and ground strikes, allegedly killing many fighters. The Senator for Mandera, Billow Kerrow, now says: “We have spent billions since October 2011 on our KDF forces in Somalia, but have only succeeded in transferring more terrorists onto our soil”. He says Kenya should first police its own towns before engaging in external wars.
While Amisom and KDF have mounted successful attacks against the extremists, potentially weakening the group’s capacity to mount attacks both inside and outside Somalia, militants still pass unimpeded through the porous border, recruiting fighters with a history of marginalization, exclusion and disenfranchisement within this country. In September, the International Crisis Group, in a report titled “Kenya: al Shabaab Closer Home”, explained how historical marginalization has proved to be a recipe for violent extremism, especially among the youth.
“Not only are there plenty of immediate grievances to exploit, but nearly two decades of radicalization and recruitment in Kenya mean that the threat is both imminent and deep,” the report observed. Other analysts say that, with Kenya’s weak and uncoordinated intelligence and judicial system, coupled with the porous border it shares with Somalia, it may have invited trouble to the homeland, opening the door wider than ever before to terrorism. Punitive measures, mass arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, rape, and extrajudicial killings are also said to fan deepening anger and aggression against the state
– See more at: http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/has-kenya-lost-al-shabaab#sthash.lzANavfZ.dpuf
With Kenyans still reeling from the devastating effects of the massacres in Mandera County, in which 64 have perished in nine days, pundits are increasingly divided on whether Kenya should reconsider its military presence in Somalia. This country, for decades the East, Central, Great Lakes and Horn of Africa ‘oasis of peace’ in a troubled region, has found itself stuck in Somalia since the Kenya Defence Forces were deployed in the world’s textbook example of a failed state three years ago.
Somalia has not known peace for two decades, while Kenya has suffered only bouts of internal political violence in the five decades since Independence, from which it quickly recovers, including the post-election violence crisis of 2007-08. But now Kenya seemingly cannot move out of Somalia, despite the all-too-frequent vicious attacks on Kenyan soil by the same people the KDF pursued across the border.
So, how did Kenya get it so wrong? In October 2011, the Grand Coalition regime boldly embarked on ‘Operation Linda Nchi’. This was Kenya’s first military intervention inside a neighouring state and was confidently, even proudly, touted as the last nail in al Shabaab’s coffin. Many described it as timely and cheered KDF on in its mission to “tame” al Shabaab, which had wreaked havoc in the region, with its terror tentacles rapidly spreading as far afield as Uganda.
Since the incursion, at least 782 Kenyans have been killed in terror-related attacks, mainly waged and claimed by al Shabaab, allegedly on account of “Kenya’s occupation of our lands”. On September 21 last year, unidentified shooters attacked the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, a raid that lasted for three days, resulting in the death of least 67 shoppers and mall staffers as well as police and military personnel.
Killing in the name of ‘all Muslims’
In July this year, more than 60 people were killed in an hours-long night raid in Mpeketoni, Lamu County. Surprisingly, President Uhuru Kenyatta blamed “local political networks”, even after al Shabaab claimed responsibility. The first of the two latest targeted killings occurred on November 24, when gunmen attacked a Nairobi-bound bus and shot 28 non-Somalis at close range, execution style.
This was after they separated them from fellow passengers, mostly Somalis. Security analyst Andrew Franklin said the group’s intention is to a wage a religious war among Kenyans by pointedly killing non-Muslims. “The intention of every terror group is to win the hearts of as many followers as possible. That is why they claim to be killing in the name of all Muslims in Kenya,” he said. On Monday this week, gunmen attacked a quarry in Komorey in the same county, targeting hapless stone masons who were fast asleep in their tented camp. They were killed in the same style, all shot at close range. The assailants disappeared on foot, according to survivors and other witnesses.
The attackers said they were avenging “Muslim suffering in Mombasa”, after four mosques were closed in police raids. The mosques had actually already been reopened. These attacks appear to constitute a turning point, with Kenyans raising doubts on Kenya’s ability to protect its citizens against both internal and external aggression. Ethiopia sent its troops into and out of Somalia before Operation Linda Nchi and, in fact, dismantled the then Islamic Courts Union, but it soon morphed into al Shabaab.
The ancient eastern African nation, which also shares a long border with Somalia, has recorded no al Shabaab terror attacks on its soil. The Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service is reputed to have an excellent system to detect and defuse terror attacks. “Every information is important. Yours is decisive. Do you have information? Let us protect our country Ethiopia together,” is the slogan of the ENISS. The then al Shabaab leader, the late Ahmed Godane, vowed that Kenya will be “witness a bloodbath”. “We tell the Kenyan public: You have entered a war that is not yours and is serving against your national interests,” he declared.
On the other hand, the Uhuru Kenyatta-led Jubilee government has also vowed to dismantle the terror group and “pursue them within and without our borders”. The way the terror group comes into and out of Kenya involves an intricate web of informers and helpers, including the security agencies such as corrupt police and Immigration officers. The ragtag militia has dealt a devastating blow to Kenya’s peace and tranquility, with tens of gun and grenade attacks experienced since 2011.
Tendai Marima, a Zimbabwean blogger and doctoral scholar in the UK, in a scathing attack in an article headlined “Kenya’s blundering in Somalia”, published on the Aljazeera English website, described Kenya as a “clumsy, overgrown, weak-muscled 17-yearold stumbling onto a rainy, muddy battlefield for the very first time”, when it crossed into Somalia with no experience in war and in the face of a possible severe backlash. She characterized the typical KDF infantryman as, “Weighed down by his Kalashnikov and ego, he fiddles about to get his aim right, but his younger, more agile, bloodthirsty opponent is already waiting with his weapon cocked and ready to fire”.
Billions of shillings spent; more terrorists inside Kenya
President Mwai Kibaki’s Grand Coalition government, under whose tenure KDF moved into Somalia, grossly underestimated the consequences of the foray. Kenya initially claimed successes against the militants when it mounted air and ground strikes, allegedly killing many fighters. The Senator for Mandera, Billow Kerrow, now says: “We have spent billions since October 2011 on our KDF forces in Somalia, but have only succeeded in transferring more terrorists onto our soil”. He says Kenya should first police its own towns before engaging in external wars.
While Amisom and KDF have mounted successful attacks against the extremists, potentially weakening the group’s capacity to mount attacks both inside and outside Somalia, militants still pass unimpeded through the porous border, recruiting fighters with a history of marginalization, exclusion and disenfranchisement within this country. In September, the International Crisis Group, in a report titled “Kenya: al Shabaab Closer Home”, explained how historical marginalization has proved to be a recipe for violent extremism, especially among the youth.
“Not only are there plenty of immediate grievances to exploit, but nearly two decades of radicalization and recruitment in Kenya mean that the threat is both imminent and deep,” the report observed. Other analysts say that, with Kenya’s weak and uncoordinated intelligence and judicial system, coupled with the porous border it shares with Somalia, it may have invited trouble to the homeland, opening the door wider than ever before to terrorism. Punitive measures, mass arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, rape, and extrajudicial killings are also said to fan deepening anger and aggression against the state
– See more at: http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/has-kenya-lost-al-shabaab#sthash.lzANavfZ.dpuf
Somalia has not known peace for two decades, while Kenya has suffered only bouts of internal political violence in the five decades since Independence, from which it quickly recovers, including the post-election violence crisis of 2007-08. But now Kenya seemingly cannot move out of Somalia, despite the all-too-frequent vicious attacks on Kenyan soil by the same people the KDF pursued across the border.
So, how did Kenya get it so wrong? In October 2011, the Grand Coalition regime boldly embarked on ‘Operation Linda Nchi’. This was Kenya’s first military intervention inside a neighouring state and was confidently, even proudly, touted as the last nail in al Shabaab’s coffin. Many described it as timely and cheered KDF on in its mission to “tame” al Shabaab, which had wreaked havoc in the region, with its terror tentacles rapidly spreading as far afield as Uganda.
Since the incursion, at least 782 Kenyans have been killed in terror-related attacks, mainly waged and claimed by al Shabaab, allegedly on account of “Kenya’s occupation of our lands”. On September 21 last year, unidentified shooters attacked the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, a raid that lasted for three days, resulting in the death of least 67 shoppers and mall staffers as well as police and military personnel.
Killing in the name of ‘all Muslims’
In July this year, more than 60 people were killed in an hours-long night raid in Mpeketoni, Lamu County. Surprisingly, President Uhuru Kenyatta blamed “local political networks”, even after al Shabaab claimed responsibility. The first of the two latest targeted killings occurred on November 24, when gunmen attacked a Nairobi-bound bus and shot 28 non-Somalis at close range, execution style.
This was after they separated them from fellow passengers, mostly Somalis. Security analyst Andrew Franklin said the group’s intention is to a wage a religious war among Kenyans by pointedly killing non-Muslims. “The intention of every terror group is to win the hearts of as many followers as possible. That is why they claim to be killing in the name of all Muslims in Kenya,” he said. On Monday this week, gunmen attacked a quarry in Komorey in the same county, targeting hapless stone masons who were fast asleep in their tented camp. They were killed in the same style, all shot at close range. The assailants disappeared on foot, according to survivors and other witnesses.
The attackers said they were avenging “Muslim suffering in Mombasa”, after four mosques were closed in police raids. The mosques had actually already been reopened. These attacks appear to constitute a turning point, with Kenyans raising doubts on Kenya’s ability to protect its citizens against both internal and external aggression. Ethiopia sent its troops into and out of Somalia before Operation Linda Nchi and, in fact, dismantled the then Islamic Courts Union, but it soon morphed into al Shabaab.
The ancient eastern African nation, which also shares a long border with Somalia, has recorded no al Shabaab terror attacks on its soil. The Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service is reputed to have an excellent system to detect and defuse terror attacks. “Every information is important. Yours is decisive. Do you have information? Let us protect our country Ethiopia together,” is the slogan of the ENISS. The then al Shabaab leader, the late Ahmed Godane, vowed that Kenya will be “witness a bloodbath”. “We tell the Kenyan public: You have entered a war that is not yours and is serving against your national interests,” he declared.
On the other hand, the Uhuru Kenyatta-led Jubilee government has also vowed to dismantle the terror group and “pursue them within and without our borders”. The way the terror group comes into and out of Kenya involves an intricate web of informers and helpers, including the security agencies such as corrupt police and Immigration officers. The ragtag militia has dealt a devastating blow to Kenya’s peace and tranquility, with tens of gun and grenade attacks experienced since 2011.
Tendai Marima, a Zimbabwean blogger and doctoral scholar in the UK, in a scathing attack in an article headlined “Kenya’s blundering in Somalia”, published on the Aljazeera English website, described Kenya as a “clumsy, overgrown, weak-muscled 17-yearold stumbling onto a rainy, muddy battlefield for the very first time”, when it crossed into Somalia with no experience in war and in the face of a possible severe backlash. She characterized the typical KDF infantryman as, “Weighed down by his Kalashnikov and ego, he fiddles about to get his aim right, but his younger, more agile, bloodthirsty opponent is already waiting with his weapon cocked and ready to fire”.
Billions of shillings spent; more terrorists inside Kenya
President Mwai Kibaki’s Grand Coalition government, under whose tenure KDF moved into Somalia, grossly underestimated the consequences of the foray. Kenya initially claimed successes against the militants when it mounted air and ground strikes, allegedly killing many fighters. The Senator for Mandera, Billow Kerrow, now says: “We have spent billions since October 2011 on our KDF forces in Somalia, but have only succeeded in transferring more terrorists onto our soil”. He says Kenya should first police its own towns before engaging in external wars.
While Amisom and KDF have mounted successful attacks against the extremists, potentially weakening the group’s capacity to mount attacks both inside and outside Somalia, militants still pass unimpeded through the porous border, recruiting fighters with a history of marginalization, exclusion and disenfranchisement within this country. In September, the International Crisis Group, in a report titled “Kenya: al Shabaab Closer Home”, explained how historical marginalization has proved to be a recipe for violent extremism, especially among the youth.
“Not only are there plenty of immediate grievances to exploit, but nearly two decades of radicalization and recruitment in Kenya mean that the threat is both imminent and deep,” the report observed. Other analysts say that, with Kenya’s weak and uncoordinated intelligence and judicial system, coupled with the porous border it shares with Somalia, it may have invited trouble to the homeland, opening the door wider than ever before to terrorism. Punitive measures, mass arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, rape, and extrajudicial killings are also said to fan deepening anger and aggression against the state
– See more at: http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/has-kenya-lost-al-shabaab#sthash.lzANavfZ.dpuf
With Kenyans still reeling from the devastating effects of the massacres in Mandera County, in which 64 have perished in nine days, pundits are increasingly divided on whether Kenya should reconsider its military presence in Somalia. This country, for decades the East, Central, Great Lakes and Horn of Africa ‘oasis of peace’ in a troubled region, has found itself stuck in Somalia since the Kenya Defence Forces were deployed in the world’s textbook example of a failed state three years ago.
Somalia has not known peace for two decades, while Kenya has suffered only bouts of internal political violence in the five decades since Independence, from which it quickly recovers, including the post-election violence crisis of 2007-08. But now Kenya seemingly cannot move out of Somalia, despite the all-too-frequent vicious attacks on Kenyan soil by the same people the KDF pursued across the border.
So, how did Kenya get it so wrong? In October 2011, the Grand Coalition regime boldly embarked on ‘Operation Linda Nchi’. This was Kenya’s first military intervention inside a neighouring state and was confidently, even proudly, touted as the last nail in al Shabaab’s coffin. Many described it as timely and cheered KDF on in its mission to “tame” al Shabaab, which had wreaked havoc in the region, with its terror tentacles rapidly spreading as far afield as Uganda.
Since the incursion, at least 782 Kenyans have been killed in terror-related attacks, mainly waged and claimed by al Shabaab, allegedly on account of “Kenya’s occupation of our lands”. On September 21 last year, unidentified shooters attacked the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, a raid that lasted for three days, resulting in the death of least 67 shoppers and mall staffers as well as police and military personnel.
Killing in the name of ‘all Muslims’
In July this year, more than 60 people were killed in an hours-long night raid in Mpeketoni, Lamu County. Surprisingly, President Uhuru Kenyatta blamed “local political networks”, even after al Shabaab claimed responsibility. The first of the two latest targeted killings occurred on November 24, when gunmen attacked a Nairobi-bound bus and shot 28 non-Somalis at close range, execution style.
This was after they separated them from fellow passengers, mostly Somalis. Security analyst Andrew Franklin said the group’s intention is to a wage a religious war among Kenyans by pointedly killing non-Muslims. “The intention of every terror group is to win the hearts of as many followers as possible. That is why they claim to be killing in the name of all Muslims in Kenya,” he said. On Monday this week, gunmen attacked a quarry in Komorey in the same county, targeting hapless stone masons who were fast asleep in their tented camp. They were killed in the same style, all shot at close range. The assailants disappeared on foot, according to survivors and other witnesses.
The attackers said they were avenging “Muslim suffering in Mombasa”, after four mosques were closed in police raids. The mosques had actually already been reopened. These attacks appear to constitute a turning point, with Kenyans raising doubts on Kenya’s ability to protect its citizens against both internal and external aggression. Ethiopia sent its troops into and out of Somalia before Operation Linda Nchi and, in fact, dismantled the then Islamic Courts Union, but it soon morphed into al Shabaab.
The ancient eastern African nation, which also shares a long border with Somalia, has recorded no al Shabaab terror attacks on its soil. The Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service is reputed to have an excellent system to detect and defuse terror attacks. “Every information is important. Yours is decisive. Do you have information? Let us protect our country Ethiopia together,” is the slogan of the ENISS. The then al Shabaab leader, the late Ahmed Godane, vowed that Kenya will be “witness a bloodbath”. “We tell the Kenyan public: You have entered a war that is not yours and is serving against your national interests,” he declared.
On the other hand, the Uhuru Kenyatta-led Jubilee government has also vowed to dismantle the terror group and “pursue them within and without our borders”. The way the terror group comes into and out of Kenya involves an intricate web of informers and helpers, including the security agencies such as corrupt police and Immigration officers. The ragtag militia has dealt a devastating blow to Kenya’s peace and tranquility, with tens of gun and grenade attacks experienced since 2011.
Tendai Marima, a Zimbabwean blogger and doctoral scholar in the UK, in a scathing attack in an article headlined “Kenya’s blundering in Somalia”, published on the Aljazeera English website, described Kenya as a “clumsy, overgrown, weak-muscled 17-yearold stumbling onto a rainy, muddy battlefield for the very first time”, when it crossed into Somalia with no experience in war and in the face of a possible severe backlash. She characterized the typical KDF infantryman as, “Weighed down by his Kalashnikov and ego, he fiddles about to get his aim right, but his younger, more agile, bloodthirsty opponent is already waiting with his weapon cocked and ready to fire”.
Billions of shillings spent; more terrorists inside Kenya
President Mwai Kibaki’s Grand Coalition government, under whose tenure KDF moved into Somalia, grossly underestimated the consequences of the foray. Kenya initially claimed successes against the militants when it mounted air and ground strikes, allegedly killing many fighters. The Senator for Mandera, Billow Kerrow, now says: “We have spent billions since October 2011 on our KDF forces in Somalia, but have only succeeded in transferring more terrorists onto our soil”. He says Kenya should first police its own towns before engaging in external wars.
While Amisom and KDF have mounted successful attacks against the extremists, potentially weakening the group’s capacity to mount attacks both inside and outside Somalia, militants still pass unimpeded through the porous border, recruiting fighters with a history of marginalization, exclusion and disenfranchisement within this country. In September, the International Crisis Group, in a report titled “Kenya: al Shabaab Closer Home”, explained how historical marginalization has proved to be a recipe for violent extremism, especially among the youth.
“Not only are there plenty of immediate grievances to exploit, but nearly two decades of radicalization and recruitment in Kenya mean that the threat is both imminent and deep,” the report observed. Other analysts say that, with Kenya’s weak and uncoordinated intelligence and judicial system, coupled with the porous border it shares with Somalia, it may have invited trouble to the homeland, opening the door wider than ever before to terrorism. Punitive measures, mass arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, rape, and extrajudicial killings are also said to fan deepening anger and aggression against the state
– See more at: http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/has-kenya-lost-al-shabaab#sthash.lzANavfZ.dpuf
Somalia has not known peace for two decades, while Kenya has suffered only bouts of internal political violence in the five decades since Independence, from which it quickly recovers, including the post-election violence crisis of 2007-08. But now Kenya seemingly cannot move out of Somalia, despite the all-too-frequent vicious attacks on Kenyan soil by the same people the KDF pursued across the border.
So, how did Kenya get it so wrong? In October 2011, the Grand Coalition regime boldly embarked on ‘Operation Linda Nchi’. This was Kenya’s first military intervention inside a neighouring state and was confidently, even proudly, touted as the last nail in al Shabaab’s coffin. Many described it as timely and cheered KDF on in its mission to “tame” al Shabaab, which had wreaked havoc in the region, with its terror tentacles rapidly spreading as far afield as Uganda.
Since the incursion, at least 782 Kenyans have been killed in terror-related attacks, mainly waged and claimed by al Shabaab, allegedly on account of “Kenya’s occupation of our lands”. On September 21 last year, unidentified shooters attacked the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, a raid that lasted for three days, resulting in the death of least 67 shoppers and mall staffers as well as police and military personnel.
Killing in the name of ‘all Muslims’
In July this year, more than 60 people were killed in an hours-long night raid in Mpeketoni, Lamu County. Surprisingly, President Uhuru Kenyatta blamed “local political networks”, even after al Shabaab claimed responsibility. The first of the two latest targeted killings occurred on November 24, when gunmen attacked a Nairobi-bound bus and shot 28 non-Somalis at close range, execution style.
This was after they separated them from fellow passengers, mostly Somalis. Security analyst Andrew Franklin said the group’s intention is to a wage a religious war among Kenyans by pointedly killing non-Muslims. “The intention of every terror group is to win the hearts of as many followers as possible. That is why they claim to be killing in the name of all Muslims in Kenya,” he said. On Monday this week, gunmen attacked a quarry in Komorey in the same county, targeting hapless stone masons who were fast asleep in their tented camp. They were killed in the same style, all shot at close range. The assailants disappeared on foot, according to survivors and other witnesses.
The attackers said they were avenging “Muslim suffering in Mombasa”, after four mosques were closed in police raids. The mosques had actually already been reopened. These attacks appear to constitute a turning point, with Kenyans raising doubts on Kenya’s ability to protect its citizens against both internal and external aggression. Ethiopia sent its troops into and out of Somalia before Operation Linda Nchi and, in fact, dismantled the then Islamic Courts Union, but it soon morphed into al Shabaab.
The ancient eastern African nation, which also shares a long border with Somalia, has recorded no al Shabaab terror attacks on its soil. The Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service is reputed to have an excellent system to detect and defuse terror attacks. “Every information is important. Yours is decisive. Do you have information? Let us protect our country Ethiopia together,” is the slogan of the ENISS. The then al Shabaab leader, the late Ahmed Godane, vowed that Kenya will be “witness a bloodbath”. “We tell the Kenyan public: You have entered a war that is not yours and is serving against your national interests,” he declared.
On the other hand, the Uhuru Kenyatta-led Jubilee government has also vowed to dismantle the terror group and “pursue them within and without our borders”. The way the terror group comes into and out of Kenya involves an intricate web of informers and helpers, including the security agencies such as corrupt police and Immigration officers. The ragtag militia has dealt a devastating blow to Kenya’s peace and tranquility, with tens of gun and grenade attacks experienced since 2011.
Tendai Marima, a Zimbabwean blogger and doctoral scholar in the UK, in a scathing attack in an article headlined “Kenya’s blundering in Somalia”, published on the Aljazeera English website, described Kenya as a “clumsy, overgrown, weak-muscled 17-yearold stumbling onto a rainy, muddy battlefield for the very first time”, when it crossed into Somalia with no experience in war and in the face of a possible severe backlash. She characterized the typical KDF infantryman as, “Weighed down by his Kalashnikov and ego, he fiddles about to get his aim right, but his younger, more agile, bloodthirsty opponent is already waiting with his weapon cocked and ready to fire”.
Billions of shillings spent; more terrorists inside Kenya
President Mwai Kibaki’s Grand Coalition government, under whose tenure KDF moved into Somalia, grossly underestimated the consequences of the foray. Kenya initially claimed successes against the militants when it mounted air and ground strikes, allegedly killing many fighters. The Senator for Mandera, Billow Kerrow, now says: “We have spent billions since October 2011 on our KDF forces in Somalia, but have only succeeded in transferring more terrorists onto our soil”. He says Kenya should first police its own towns before engaging in external wars.
While Amisom and KDF have mounted successful attacks against the extremists, potentially weakening the group’s capacity to mount attacks both inside and outside Somalia, militants still pass unimpeded through the porous border, recruiting fighters with a history of marginalization, exclusion and disenfranchisement within this country. In September, the International Crisis Group, in a report titled “Kenya: al Shabaab Closer Home”, explained how historical marginalization has proved to be a recipe for violent extremism, especially among the youth.
“Not only are there plenty of immediate grievances to exploit, but nearly two decades of radicalization and recruitment in Kenya mean that the threat is both imminent and deep,” the report observed. Other analysts say that, with Kenya’s weak and uncoordinated intelligence and judicial system, coupled with the porous border it shares with Somalia, it may have invited trouble to the homeland, opening the door wider than ever before to terrorism. Punitive measures, mass arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, rape, and extrajudicial killings are also said to fan deepening anger and aggression against the state
– See more at: http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/has-kenya-lost-al-shabaab#sthash.lzANavfZ.dpuf
