Debunking three dangerous myths about the conflict in Libya

For the first time in years, there is a new hope that the fragmentation of Libya can be averted, thanks to new rounds of UN mediation efforts.

There is a danger, however, that the media coverage accompanying these talks will actually fuel the conflict by perpetuating three fictions about the ongoing strife.

Reports of the situation in Libya usually describe a war between two groups. On one side is the anti-Islamist “internationally recognised government”, based in the eastern city of Tobruk and, on the other, “radical Islamists” who control a Tripoli-based government in the west. This simplistic account empowers hardliners on all sides of the conflict, making a negotiated settlement less likely. The truth is far more complicated.

Fiction one: this is a two-sided conflict

International coverage of the situation in Libya assumes that decisions are made from the top down, as they so often are in the west. But in fact, Libya’s political groups are organised less as hierarchies and more as networks. Their leaders are only one voice among many and decisions are based on consensus.

Near the end of the 2011 revolution, there were 236 fighting groups operating in Misrata, the country’s third-largest city. Each had its own command structure and identity, and ranged in size from nine to 1,727 fighters. On the western front of Misrata, 146 groups co-ordinated attacks and defence, but there was no leader. Instead, a group of 14-20 prominent commanders met every night to discuss strategy and decide on next steps.

Members would voice different opinions, and a consensus would emerge through hours of discussion. Some voices carried more sway, but there was no leader making choices on behalf of the group.

The political parties in Libya function in a similar way. They rely on consensus-based decision making among relative equals. The Tripoli-based coalition (sometimes called the Libya Dawn) is in fact a temporary alliance between dozens of political factions and hundreds of military units, each with its own identity and interests. It only decided to join the UN mediation efforts after days of group consultations and side discussions.

The Tobruk-based government is no different. There is an alliance of convenience between its political and military factions but the two have competing interests at times. And even within the military forces there are further divisions. What is often described as the Libyan National Army, is better understood as a coalition of local federalist-leaning militias, tribal-oriented confederations, disaffected military units, Zintani revolutionary battalions and Qaddafi-era military personnel.

Neither “side” in the conflict should be seen as a cohesive bloc, even though it is in the interest of these coalition leaders to portray themselves as unified groups.

Fiction two: the issues are national

Thanks to the densely networked and relationship-based makeup of Libya’s different political groups, the violence there is almost exclusively fuelled by local, not national, concerns. The 2011 revolution may have appeared to be a single uprising but it was actually more like a series of parallel, city-based armed revolts. Each had its own particular historic and political tensions.

Today’s violence is just as balkanised. The unrest in southern Libya, for example, plays out between two ethnic minorities – the Tebu and Tuareg. They clash over lucrative smuggling routes and control of oil installations.

Similarly, the clashes in Benghazi between General Khalifa Haftar’s coalition and an array of armed groups – ranging from Islamist-leaning militias to outright religious extremists – have parochial roots.

The only purely national conflicts are political, not military. These include disputes over who controls the nation’s oil and its central bank. The battle for legitimacy between Libya’s two duelling parliaments is being fought in the national and international media, which makes improving the accuracy of reporting crucial. As things stand, few Libyans see either parliament as legitimate.

Fiction three: Islamists v anti-Islamists

With the help of a partisan national media and a largely uninformed international press, Haftar has successfully demonised all his opponents as Islamist terrorists. Many Misratan military commanders are now equated with Islamic State – something they find comical and baffling.

The international media’s fixation on this simplistic dichotomy between anti-Islamists and religious extremists is problematic. Many Misratan commanders argue it trivialises the very real threat posed by Libya’s various extremist groups.

There are varying degrees of conservatism between the political and military groups on all sides. The commanders in Misrata acknowledge that many of its members are more conservative. But as one Misratan commander explained

Some of the groups are more conservative but they believe in democracy, which is all that matters to me. Besides, I would say most are less religiously conservative than the Republicans in the US Congress.

Most Libyan leaders occupy a middle ground and this tendency to pit two extremes against each other reduces their chances of negotiating a settlement. It empowers hardliners who use the rhetoric to justify their own aspirations for power.

A negotiated settlement is Libya’s only hope at this stage. Without one, violence will escalate. And with the increased media attention paid to UN mediation efforts, it is critical that we take more care in writing and reading about the situation there. This will empower moderates on all sides, increasing their chances of success. An opportunity like this is unlikely to appear again soon.

Source: Theconversation

Among the insecurity hotspots in Africa is the horn which broadly covers the larger east African region. The other is the West African belt covering more or less the Sahel region which extends from Egypt to the West African coast.
Then there is the northern zone covering the Arab countries of Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. In this belt, Morocco is fairly stable, while Algeria is rather ‘undecided’. There is also the corridor along the sea from the horn of Africa to the Mediterranean that is used for human trafficking into Yemen. This belt joins with the horn of Africa coast and the terrorist issues in Somalia and extends to a bit of Madagascar.
The southern part of Africa is fairly stable, but there is a bit of ethnic and political instability and therefore insecurity in areas around Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Central African Republic and a bit in Tanzania and Zambia.
Insecurity in East Africa arises from the perennial non-functional, ineffective governments in the horn of Africa, particularly Somalia and South Sudan, and this creates major problems in the region that are also linked with insecurity issues that arise from central Africa.
In a recent interview, security expert Peter Alingo said the drivers of conflict and hence insecurity in the Sahel region, include mainly the struggle for natural resources especially oil. This encompasses issues that afflict Nigeria and the West Africa coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone and a bit of Ghana.
Alingo noted that in the areas around Mali, Bangui, Togo and Burkina Faso, religious-based factors (extremism) enmeshed with the quest for control of resources and political power, drive insecurity. “In north Africa, the conflict is religious based, but not in the sense of radicalisation that drives such groups as Boko Haram in Nigeria. Here extremism is combined with agitation for more democratic space. Libya on the other hand is a completely collapsed state; an importation of what is happening in the Middle East.
He said that the security situation in Africa worsened last year, with the increase in extremism especially in Kenya and Nigeria. “These two countries have been the worst hit by terrorist attacks, but other countries in West and North Africa especially Egypt and Libya have been rocked by internal turmoil.”
In Nigeria, the Boko Haram Islamist outfit upped its game, captured several towns and caught the world’s attention when it abducted more than 200 school girls who are yet to be rescued. “They have become bolder this year and it appears as if the government’s efforts to repel the group are bearing no fruit. There are those who argue that the government has no capacity but others contend that within and without the government of Nigeria, there are very powerful forces that support this group,” Dr Emmanuel Kisiangani, a senior researcher at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS Africa) explained.
According to Kisiangani, some literature has suggested that this could be the reason why countries that were in a position to help Nigeria in rescuing the abducted girls were reluctant to do so. This scenario also applies to Kenya where it has been alleged that some rich people at the coast have been financing gangs that have caused insecurity in that area.
In Nigeria, the signs that the government could no longer contain Boko Haram have manifested in security forces retreating when confronted by the terrorists. This is a worrying trend and there does not seem to be hope of improvement of security in that country in the near future. “These groups have taken lives of their own and controlling them will be a long process. With Nigerian elections being held in February, there are those who would gladly use the group to weaken the support base of their opponents. The use of criminal gangs for political gain has happened before here in Kenya, but if the government puts more resources into it, it can manage the gangs in Kenya before they take on a life of their own,” argued Kisiangani.
Sebastian Gatimu, a researcher at ISS Africa, said the situation in Kenya was pathetic last year while the crisis in South Sudan was been the worst since that country’s independence.
He claimed that extremists view Kenya as an extension of the west because of its geo-strategic linkages and hence use it as a soft target to make a statement to the west. Additionally because of these external drivers, common crime and internal conflict in Kenya has changed its shape, making it difficult for the government to respond.
This problem is common to countries that border Somalia but Ethiopia has been able to effectively have control of its border. Kenya is now being advised to seriously consider putting resources into fencing its border with Somalia. “It would be expensive but instead of putting billions in street cameras that will only capture faces of people including ordinary muggers, this strategy will work against al Shaabab,” argued Alingo.
Kisiangani explained that Ethiopia is working closely with a group of Somalis inside Somalia which provides Ethiopia with a buffer zone. “Ethiopia is also very strict about its border with majority of its Amison troops stationed near its border while the Kenyan troops are stationed in the interior. Instead of pulling out of Somalia, Kenya is advised to work more with communities inside that country and bargain for its troops in Somalia to be based closer to the Kenyan border.”
Kenya also needs to take care of its internal issues arising from corruption, sheer negligence and the disconnect between the ordinary Kenyan, the state and its security agencies. If this is not done, terrorists, criminals and radicals will continue to create insecurity.
Alingo however does not see insecurity in Somalia decreasing this year, partly because the initiatives that have focused on the country have not clearly spelt the strategy for engagement including discipline of the forces that have been sent there.
“It is also instructive that member states view African Union and UN missions as means of making money and the troops go there for the same, which blurs the gravity of the mission.”
And for the East African region to have peace, the instability in South Sudan, the Congo and Somalia have to be resolved as these create opportunities for international gun peddlers. The regional actors including individual governments, the Great Lakes Conference, Igad and AU should be committed in creating a sense of stability to secure the fragile states in the region. “Once that loophole is sealed, we will have solved about 40 per cent of the insecurity problem, but unfortunately the regional actors do not take this issue seriously enough and this could take a long time to achieve.”
Alingo noted that instability spirals from one country to another with IDPs and refugees moving from one country to the other. “That is part of the problem in Kenya. The human movements across borders come with tools and risks for instability.”
To curb insecurity, he said, Africa needs to put its house in order with the AU making serious efforts to drive stability and development in the continent, as Africa’s biggest problem is inequality and exclusion. “Our politics is what it is and it is not the major issue; it can be better but it works even where we have benevolent dictators. Democracy is not cast in stone. To deal with insecurity, Africa needs to seek solutions to its problems in accordance with its interests. This should be driven by the AU and the regional economic commissions.”
Gatimu on the other hand urged African governments to go out of their way to reach out to terror and criminal gangs instead of using force all the time. “The US is talking to the Taliban in Afghanistan and so while coercion is important, we need to weaken the extremist groups by reaching out to sections within them.”
The experts however concurred that solutions for Africa’s insecurity will take years to achieve and only if governments adequately address the perceptions of fairness, the distribution of resources and inclusiveness.
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